24 Ala. 260 | Ala. | 1854
There was no error in allowing the transcript from the records of the Court of Ordinary in Jasper County, Georgia, to be read in evidence to the jury. No objection was made to the authentication of the transcript, as not being in conformity to the requirements of the act of Congress upon that subject, but it was objected, 1st, that the record does not disclose the fact that William Traylor, whose will was proved, was dead ; 2d, that it did not appear, from anything on the face of the proceedings, that said Court of Ordinary had jurisdiction to admit said will to record ; and, 8dly, that it did not appear there was present, when said will was probated, the number of justices required by law. In support of these objections, the counsel for the plaintiff in error cite the case of the Commissioners’ Court uf Talladega v. Thompson, 18 Ala. 694, to the effect that the proceedings of a court of special, limited jurisdiction must show affirmatively, on their face, their jurisdiction over the subject matter, or their proceedings are void; and other decisions of this court to the same effect. That this is the correct view to take of the proceedings of courts of special, limited jurisdiction of this State, there can be no doubt. But, we apprehend, the question under consideration does not properly fall under the authority of this class of cases. The question here is, not directly as to the effect of the transcript offered in evidence as a decree, but whether it is competent to go to the jury as the record of a court of a sister State. In such cases, whether the record is of a court of general jurisdiction, or one of special and limited jurisdiction, courts of this State are bound to presume in their favor, to the extent that they have jurisdiction over the subject matter upon which they profess to adjudicate, until the contrary appears. This much our courts owe to the judicial proceedings of the sister States. The true rule, we apprehend, was laid down in the case of Dozier v. Joyce, 8 Porter 393, which was a case involving the admissibility of a record of the Court of Ordinary of South Carolina. The court in this case uses the following language: “ The certificate and seal which gives verity to the record, establishes as well the
The court, in our opinion, erred in refusing to exclude the testimony of Jeremiah Stallings, as we think it apparent from his testimony that he had a direct interest in producing a verdict for the party who called upon him to testify. He stated, that he held an order from his son for the proceeds of the sale of the negro to the defendant, after deducting what was due the defendant by the said Champion T., Stallings, the son. It is true, he states, that the son had made a present of this order, or the proceeds thereof, to his mother; but she is the wife of the witness, and there is nothing in the facts disclosed that would negative the idea that the witness would have a right at least to the use of the money realized from the order, by virtue of his marital rights as husband. This is a clear and distinct interest in the event of the suit, as he states that the funds are to be paid over as soon as this suit is terminated. As every sale of personal chattels implies a warranty of title, the conclusion is inevitable, that, if the present suit goes against the defendant, neither the witness nor the mother of Champion T. Stallings gets any money on the order which he holds.
The same remarks apply to the deed of gift under which the plaintiff claims title. It was not void, but voidable merely. If it was disavowed by the grantor after he became of age, then it was void i but not otherwise. This fact should also have been left to the jury in the charge of the court.
There was no error in refusing either of the two charges requested by the plaintiff. These charges seem to assume, that there was something in the fact that the grantor appeared in open court and acknowledged the deed preparatory to its registry, which takes it out of the general rule which appertains generally to deeds executed by minors. In the first charge asked, it is assumed that the infant, so appearing in open court and acknowledging it, renders the act irrevocable ; and, in the second, that if a revocation is possible, it must be done only by appearing in open court after notice to the parties. Such are not our views of the law, in either aspect of the case. It will be recollected, that there -was no delivery of possession when this deed of gift was made; but, on the the contrary, the evidence tends to show that the possession remained with the grantor down to the time when he executed the bill of sale to the defendant. Any act, under such circumstances, on the part of the grantor, by which he shows to the world, after he becomes , of age, that he does not intend to be bound by his deed, is all that ■ the law requires to effect the revocation. The rule would be different, in some cases, if possession had passed with the deed. Then, if the object of the grant were land, an entry must be made, before ejectment would lie; and if a slave, by parity of reasoning, a demand, before trover
For the errors above noted, let the judgment of the court below be reversed, and cause remanded.