44 Ga. App. 295 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1931
The indictment in this case contains two counts,— the first count charging John Slater with breaking and entering the dwelling house of E. H. Jackson with intent to commit a larceny therein; and the second count charging the defendant with brealdng and entering said dwelling house and stealing therefrom “one green dress of the value of $10, the property of Ella Jackson,” and “one handkerchief of the value of 35 cents, the property of E. H. Jackson.” The only question for determination is whether or not the trial judge erred in overruling the general grounds of the motion for a new trial.
E. H. Jackson testified that on the night of May 13, 1931, in Savannah, Chatham county, Georgia, while he and his wife, Ella, were away from home, some one burglarized his dwelling house, and took therefrom “all the wearing apparel, including an overcoat, spring coat, and dress.” This witness further swore: “I have not seen that dress before. It was another one. Here it is. My wife is not up here; she is sick. Here is a handkerchief something like that. I don’t know which stuff here is mine. . . My wife
The gist of the testimony of Mattie Jenkins (a witness for the defense) is that she bought the dress alleged to have been taken by the defendant from Adler’s, and was certain that it was her dress; that another dress exhibited to her belonged to her; that “all that stuff” did’ not belong to her — that “the handkerchiefs did not; and that the defendant, who was her brother-in-law, stole the clothes from her house. Charlie Jenkins testified substantially as did his wife, Mattie Jenkins.
The gist of the defendant’s statement to the jury was that he got “these things” from Mattie Jenkins’s house; that he bought “the
Evidently the defendant’s conviction finally rests upon proof of his recent possession of one, or both, of the articles alleged to have been stolen. We have set out fully the testimony bearing upon this question, and shall repeat very little of it. The only evidence bearing directly upon the identity of the handkerchief comes from the mouth of R. H. Jackson. Jackson had two dozen handkerchiefs similar to the one alleged to have been stolen, but admitted that there were numerous other handkerchiefs like his, and positively refused to swear that the handkerchief exhibited to him was his handkerchief. Indeed, it does not clearly appear that any of Jackson’s handkerchiefs were missing. He had not “ taken stock.” Of course the handkerchief had to be identified beyond a reasonable doubt, and we are satisfied that it was not so identified. It will be observed that there was no attempt to identify any of the other articles found in the defendant’s possession except the green dress, and that the testimony in regard to the dress was pure hearsay. In this connection, see Jordan v. State, 119 Ga. 443 (2), 444 (46 S. E. 679). While in the case cited there was ample evidence to identify the stolen articles, the court used this significant language : “His counsel contends that the merchandise was of a character which could have been obtained at many other stores, and that it had no earmarks by which it could be identified, and that the evidence fails to show that it was the same as lost. And certainly, if the defendant had been found in possession of White Knight cigars alone, without anything further to connect them with those lost, the State’s case would not have been made out.”
It is perfectly apparent from the record that all the testimony tending to prove that the defendant was found in possession of the dress alleged to have been stolen was hearsay. “The rule is, that, while, in the absence of a proper exception to the evidence, a verdict will not be set aside on account of the erroneous admission of hearsay testimony, yet where the verdict is entirely unsupported except by such testimony, which is wholly without probative value, its introduction without objection will give it no weight or force in establishing the facts in issue. Eastlick v. Southern Ry. Co., 116 Ga. 48 (42 S. E. 499); Kemp v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 122
Our conclusion is that' the defendant was not connected, by any competent evidence, with the offense charged, and that the trial judge erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Judgment reversed.