73 U.S. 268 | SCOTUS | 1868
SLATER
v.
MAXWELL.
Supreme Court of United States.
*272 Mr. Frick, for the appellant.
Messrs. G.H. Lee and C. Boggs, contended.
*273 Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
The relief sought by the bill in this case is put upon three grounds:
1st. That the sale was made at a grossly inadequate price;
2d. That the entire tract was sold in one body; and
3d. That competition at the sale was prevented by the fraudulent declaration of the defendant, made to effect that purpose, that the complainant would redeem the land from the purchasers.
The inadequacy of the price given at the sale of land for unpaid taxes thereon, does not constitute a valid objection to the sale. The taxes levied upon property generally bear a very slight proportion to its value, and of necessity the *274 whole property must be sold, if a sum equivalent to the amount of the taxes is not bid for a portion of the premises.
The sale of the entire tract in one body would have vitiated the proceeding, if bids could have been obtained upon an offer of a part of the property. In this case the answer avers, and the proof shows, that the sheriff offered to sell a part of each tract without receiving a bid, and it was only then that the entire tract was put up and struck off to the defendant.
The case must, therefore, turn upon the last ground, the alleged fraudulent declaration of the defendant at the sale, to prevent competition.
The allegation of the bill is, that at the time the land was offered for sale a great many persons were present with a view to purchase small tracts for farming purposes, but the defendant stated to them that the complainant would redeem his land from the purchasers, and in that way put down all competition, and had the entire property struck off to him for the amount of the taxes; and that this conduct was pursued to enable him to buy without competition, for a trifling amount, all the land of the complainant.
The answer of the defendant to the allegation is evasive and unsatisfactory. It is that he has no recollection of making the statement averred, nor does he believe he did, and that he believes the charge to be untrue. The charge is of conduct which would not readily be forgotten. It is hardly conceivable that a person could acquire so large a domain as 19,944 acres for so trifling a sum as thirty dollars without a distinct recollection of the attendant circumstances. If the property was acquired by unfair means the fact was one within the defendant's own knowledge, and in such cases the general rule of equity pleading is, that the defendant must answer positively and not merely to his remembrance or belief. The distinction which is generally made between recent and remote acts or declarations of the defendant would hardly seem applicable to a case like the present. It is not necessary, however, to attempt to draw any nice distinctions in this particular, for the answer was not *275 excepted to, and by the general replication the complainant has waived all objections to its sufficiency.[*] The difference, however, between a positive answer and an answer in the form of the present one, upon belief, is important to be considered with reference to the testimony required to overcome its denials. A clear and positive denial of an allegation of the bill can only be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses to the fact alleged, or by one witness and corroborative circumstances. But if a fact alleged be denied upon belief merely, or be denied equivocally or evasively, it may be sustained by the testimony of a single witness.[]
Turning now to the testimony presented by the record, we find that the allegation of the bill is sufficiently established. One witness states that he was present at the sale of the land, and that the defendant "stepped up and said he knew the owners, and it was not worth while for any person to buy it; that they would pay the taxes." Another witness states, that certain parties were present at the sale, and that the defendant said "he knew the men, and it was no use for them to bid, that it (the land) would be redeemed." Some attempt was made to impeach the credibility of one of these witnesses, but it failed. On the other hand, there are some circumstances which tend to establish the truth of their statements. There were several persons present, some of whom were desirous of bidding at the sale at least they so stated at the time. It is difficult to explain the fact that none of them made a bid on the property, but allowed the immense tract to be sold at a price less than two cents an acre, except upon the idea that they believed that a bid by them would be of no avail, because a redemption from the sale would be made by the owner.
Again, a portion of the property, amounting to 9944 acres, was returned delinquent for the taxes of 1846, 1847, 1848, and 1849, in the name of the complainant. Twenty-five of these acres were sold in September, 1850, for these taxes, *276 and were bid in by the defendant. In August, 1852, the complainant redeemed the property thus sold, and the receipt given by the defendant for the money paid on the redemption describes the land as purchased by him in September, 1850, for taxes, and sold as belonging to the complainant. This transaction is inexplicable except upon the hypothesis that the action of the defendant in bidding in the property in 1845 was taken for the benefit of the complainant, or that the sale then made was so far subject to objection for unfairness that he desired its concealment until, from lapse of time, it should become impossible to impeach it successfully.
Such being the case there is no doubt that relief should be granted the complainant. It is essential to the validity of tax sales, not merely that they should be conducted in conformity with the requirements of the law, but that they should be conducted with entire fairness. Perfect freedom from all influences likely to prevent competition in the sale should be in all such cases strictly exacted. The owner is seldom present, and is generally ignorant of the proceeding until too late to prevent it. The tax usually bears a very slight proportion to the value of the property, and thus a great temptation is presented to parties to exclude competition at the sale, and to prevent the owner from redeeming when the sale is made. The proceeding, therefore, should be closely scrutinized, and whenever it has been characterized by fraud or unfairness should be set aside, or the purchaser be required to hold the title in trust for the owner.
When the objections to a tax deed consist in the want of conformity to the requirements of the statute in the proceedings at the sale or preliminary to it, or in the assessment of the tax, or in any like particulars, they may be urged at law in an action of ejectment, whether the deed be the ground upon which the recovery of the premises is sought by the purchaser, or be relied upon to defeat a recovery by the owner. In some instances equity will interpose in cases of this kind, as where the deed is by statute made evidence of title in the purchaser, or the preliminary proceedings are regular upon their face, and extrinsic evidence is required *277 to show their invalidity. Where, however, the sale is not open to objections of this nature, but is impeached for fraud or unfair practices of officer or purchaser, to the prejudice of the owner, a court of equity is the proper tribunal to afford relief. Thus in Dudley v. Little,[*] equity relieved against a tax sale and deed, where there had been a combination among several persons that one of them should buy in the land to prevent competition.[]
It follows from the views expressed, that the complainant is entitled to a release from the defendant of all the right and interest acquired by him under the tax deeds in the property owned by the complainant at the time of the sale. The decree of the court below will therefore be REVERSED, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree in accordance with this opinion.
DECREE ACCORDINGLY.
NOTES
[*] Story's Equity Pleadings, § 877.
[] Knickerbacker v. Harris, 1 Paige, 211; 3 Greenleaf's Evidence, § 289.
[*] 2 Hammond, 504.
[] See also Yancey v. Hopkins, 1 Mumford, 419; Rowland v. Doty, Harringtor's Chancery, 3; Bacon v. Conn 1 Smedes & Marshall's do. 348.
