History
  • No items yet
midpage
Skwira Ex Rel. Estate of Skwira v. United States
344 F.3d 64
1st Cir.
2003
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 ing.9

V. stated, AFFIRM reasons we

For the We REMAND convictions.

Defendant’s with this in accordance resentencing

opinion. SKWIRA, as Administratrix A.

Statia Skwira, and Edward

the Estate of S. Yarrows;

Individually; Ed- Marsha Skwira, Skwira, Jr.; Philip E.

ward S.

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v. Defendant, STATES, Appellee.

UNITED

No. 02-1988. Court of Appeals, States

First Circuit.

Heard Feb. 2003. Sept.

Decided 2003. appropriate. We remand recognize sentence would We Defendant’s sentence current range applicable opportunity, give the sentence an at its discre- falls within court during tion, court upon just. remand. But the district Defendant as it deems sentence a lower sentencing expressed its view that *3 Callahan, Stephen M. with whom

John Kuzmeski, David C. and Grow- Kaplan, R. brief, appel- were on for hoski & Callahan lants. Olderman, whom Rob-

Richard A. with McCallum, Jr., Attorney Assistant ert D. Sullivan, General, Michael J. United States were Attorney, Greenspan and Robert S. brief, appellee. on Advocate, Erik Corey, Judge John Riedel, Lund, Berman, George A. Susan S. Posternak, LLP Blankstein & Lund Legion, sup- pretrial for amicus curiae American management,2 govern- and the eventually ment moved port appellants. to dismiss the law- on grounds. suits statute of limitations BOUDIN, Judge, Before Chief granted district court the motion to LIPEZ, Circuit TORRUELLA cases, respect dismiss five of the Judges. including family’s, holding these five of plaintiffs sets- had failed to file LIPEZ, Judge. Circuit compulsory administrative within claims circumstances, tragic unusual and two after their claims had accrued. requires “discovery this case us to apply *4 2401(b). See 28 U.S.C. § The Skwira fam- rule” to the issue of accrual under ily appeals now the dismissal of their com- (“FTCA”), the Federal Tort Claims Act 28 plaint.3 After a careful of the review rec- 1346(b), §§ U.S.C. 2671-2680. law, controlling conclude, ord and case we court, as did the district that the Skwira I. family’s claim is'time-barred. Skwira, February On Edward veteran, a decorated II World War en- II. tered the Veterans Affairs Medical Center (“VAMC”) Northampton, near Massachu- early February In Skwira was ad- setts, for the treatment of chronic alcohol- mitted to an inpatient substance abuse later, days unexpect- ism. Three Skwira Worcester, facility treatment Massachu- died, edly apparently of natural causes. setts, for the treatment of chronic alcohol- later, 14, 2001, Five on March February ism. On he was transferred Gilbert, jury federal convicted Kristin placed hospital’s the VAMC and in the VAMC, former nurse at the murdering C, working. Ward where Gilbert was La- and patients. Skwira three other VAMC day ter that Skwira took a drastic turn for claimed Prosecutors that Gilbert killed her worse, suffering from an apparent cat- by injecting victims them with lethal doses astrophic cardiac event'. He was trans- epinephrine of the stimulant simulate Baystate ferred for further tests to the natural Investigators death. believe that Medical in Springfield, Center Massachu- may responsible Gilbert for several oth- Baystate setts. Doctors at to'ld the Skwira VAMC, er deaths at apart from the family that he was of natural dying four for which she was convicted. including a heart attack and dis- causes— VAMC, As a result of the at the secting aneurysm deaths that no medical or —and children, wife along surgical Skwira’s with the intervention could save him. survivors of five other alleged victims of Skwira was returned to the where VAMC Gilbert, sued the United under February States he died on 18. The immediate seeking compensation FTCA for the loss causes of death his were listed on death of their loved ones.1 “dissecting The district court certificate as aneurysm,” “infe- infarction,” consolidated the six cases for purposes myocardial rior wall and “ar- States, 00-30080; giving 1. There is a time line events rise v. United No. McEwen v. States, 99-30232; litigation opinion. this at the end United No. v. United States, 00-30192; No. Lessard v. United States, Cutting F.Supp.2d 2. See v. United States, 00-30076). No. (D.Mass.2002) (consolidated opinion States, 99-40065; Cutting v. United No. 3.None of the other four dismissed cases have 99-30231; . appealed. Rauch v. No. Siska been suspi- them that we had some autopsy per- We advised No rythmia” [sic]. up by like to clear cions that we would formed. exhuming Edward Skwira.” Welch Department spring, Later that Murphy sought permission and obtained Inspector Affairs Office Veterans Statia, widow, to exhume Skwira’s from General, Attorney’s by the U.S. assisted body perform autopsy. an Police, and the Massachusetts State Office his office was “look- explained that Welch un- investigation a criminal into the began the VA ing at a number deaths number of deaths on Ward C usually high Center,” and that “there had been Medical By during through early late 1995 of deaths and an increase the number ap- articles had started to summer question why as to there was some newspapers describing an on- pear local increase had occurred.” Skwira’s going inquiry suspicious into deaths at they familiar with the responded were sentence, one article opening VAMC. its reports concerning investigation an press ‘a probe higher identified federal into “[a] VAMC, at the but suspicious into deaths than usual number of deaths’ from cardiac article their actual indication quoted arrest on one ward.” The that this was first *5 hospital’s acting refusing gov- director as to that the that Skwira’s death was one An- play malpractice.” rule out “foul or investigating. was ernment in- published other account mentioned an to exhume family gave The consent untimely into the death of a vestigation body 7. The body Skwira’s on November thirty-five-year-old patient in Ward C. immediately autop- was disinterred and that a nurse That same article indicated sied, and other internal with the heart probe. In government’s was a focus of fur- organs safekeeping removed for and early August, Attorney’s the U.S. office testing. day autopsy, ther The after the confirming press issued short release attended Skwira’s reinterment with Welch that, fact, grand jury in there was a inves- and Yarrows. When Statia asked Statia local re- tigation underway. press The autopsy, about the results of the he Welch ported grand jury taking that the had been informed them that “the death certificate month, testimony for and that the about incorrect.” He told them printed was investigation “focusing was on all deaths attack,” die of a heart Skwira “didn’t that occurred at the VAMC between fall although he then added that this “did not 1995 and winter 1996.” mean that he did die of unnatural causes.” Beginning September or October family in- promised keep Welch to 1996, investigators approach started to progress formed about the of the investi- unexpect- families of who had individuals gation. edly permission and died Ward C asked years, govern- Over the next two to exhume the bodies of the deceased and investigation ment continued its and built family perform autopsies. to Skwira’s was against case who had its criminal Gilbert approached. the first to be Assistant Unit- already been arrested in October Attorney ed Welch and States William autopsy, charged before and with Skwira’s Trooper Massachusetts State Kevin Mur- them,” phoning bomb threats to the VAMC.4 Sta- met them. advised phy with “We investiga- “that tia call and other according Murphy, to we were look- would Welch regularly approximately every tors four ing Hospital. into deaths at Veterans — subject public press ongo- name was made in connec- the local as the Gilbert’s arrest, ing investigation into the deaths at the tion with that and she was identified VAMC. injection by a lethal had been killed with the status of check on months —to to six examining samples exhumed months In tissue death. into Skwira’s investigation death.” calls, patient’s tell or after Cut- Welch would to these response at 220. Hence the ting, 204 F.Supp.2d tell her other really “couldn’t that he her signifi- obliged invest her in the already had told [he] than what develop adequate epi- cant resources past.” and research nephrine testing protocols meeting scheduled July 1997 Welch which, trial, if would methodologies used at that the inform them family ultimately have to Daubert scru- withstand inexplicably ketamine had been chemical tiny.5 medical body. Skwira’s found Skwira’s was even- government’s investment keta- contained no indication that records 8, 1998, tually fruitful. On June Welch ever anaesthetic —had powerful mine—a family and in- Murphy met with the asked the for him. Welch been ordered for the first time that Skwira history not re- formed them medical about Toxicologi- natural causes. He ex- had not died of records. hospital’s in the flected determined that conclusively cal tests had investigation was nec- that further plained epinephrine poisoning. had had died of ketamine determine whether essary to their administered, Murphy expressed also or if it had Welch lawfully been Skwira, error, had murdered oversight, belief Gilbert “out of been administered they present would they indicated meeting, At this Statia negligence.” or grand to a evidence of murder autopsy. the November brought up first de- jury seeking an indictment for that the death again once explained Welch *6 told the Finally, murder. Welch gree stated. He was not correct as certificate investigators had ex- added, however, family that simply that because Skwira again legitimate of a ad- possibility did cluded the was not correct the death certificate ketamine and that the unnatu- ministration of had died of not mean that Skwira further confirmation presence was drug’s the investi- He told them that ral causes. the poisoned had been while at that Skwira gation would continue. VAMC. followed, the the months that During indicted 1998 Gilbert was the heart In November to test

government continued murder several counts of charged and with during removed samples and tissue to murder. The with intent that and assault Investigators suspected Gil- autopsy. days so was sealed for seven kill her vic- indictment epinephrine to bert had used be of the victims could that the families tims, technology pro- and but the forensic trial, lengthy jury Following informed. epinephrine necessary tocols to measure three counts of was convicted of yet had to Gilbert toxicity samples in dated tissue Skwira’s), (including murder degree first court noted As the district perfected. murder, and degree natu- one count of second “[e]pinephrine occurs opinion, in its currently adrenaline, charges. is lesser She and inves- other rally body in the possibil- without serving life sentence it difficult to isolate toxico- tigators found ity parole. particular patient that a logical evidence Inc., Pharms., methodology underlying reasoning or er Daubert v. Merrell Dow

5. See 579, 591-93, testimony scientifically valid and U.S. 113 S.Ct. is prior (noting to ad- methodology prop- that reasoning L.Ed.2d or whether testimony, must mitting expert issue”). district court applied the facts in erly can be of wheth- "preliminary assessment undertake (as were Statia Skwira III. administratrix of right), Skwira’s estate and in her own and The Federal Tort Claims Act’s three adult Philip provides, pertinent statute of limitations children— Skwira, Skwira, Jr., Edward and Marsha part, against tort claim “[a] the Unit Yarrows. The complaint negli- sounded in ed States shall be forever barred unless it gence,7 sought damages and wrongful presented writing appropriate death, pain conscious and agency years suffering, per- Federal within two after 2401(b). § such claim consortium, accrues.” 28 injury, U.S.C. sonal loss of negli- To filing facilitate the of administrative gent infliction of emotional distress. against claims government agencies, the filed, Soon after the complaint was Department of Justice has developed a litigation stayed was pending the outcome form, SF-95, standardized which satisfies of Gilbert’s criminal trial. Once Gilbert the statute’s notice of claim requirement. convicted March parties A potential claimant has two after conducted limited on the issue of her claim complete accrues to and submit plaintiffs’ compliance § 2401’s two-page form. See 28 C.F.R. two-year filing requirement. After 14.2(a); § Corte-Real v. United completion of period this limited of discov- (1st Cir.1991). We have ery, the United States moved dismiss previously noted that the pre burden of the complaint on the ground that the plain- paring this form is minimal. See Santia tiffs’ administrative go-Ramirez claim had not Sec’y v. been Dept. Def., 984 (1st Cir.1993) (“This timely filed. government The argued Circuit approaches family’s the Skwira requirement notice lenient accrued at the ly.”). The claimant need time of only alternative, indicate on Skwira’s death. In the “(1) the SF-95 sufficient information for argued that the claim ac- , agency claims, to investigate the crued October investiga- when the (2) the amount damages sought.” Id. tors first approached the family and asked permission to exhume autopsy filed its SF-95 form *7 body part as of an ongoing inves- supporting 21, materials on October tigation into suspicious deaths at the 1999. The Veterans Administration noti- In response, VAMC. family fied the the Skwira family in correspondence dated 18, 2000, 17, May 2000, contended that their claim July did not accrue the family’s 8, 1998, until June they administrative claims when had been de- were told for nied.6 The family Skwira the first subsequently time that Skwira had died as a filed the instant action in the district result illegally court of an administered dose of on October 2000. Listed plaintiffs as epinephrine. 6. The Skwira,” record before us why does not indicate ward protect S. to ”fail[ed] Edward denied, the claims why separate were nor two S. Skwira they from imminent harm knew or denial letters issued. We assume the claims existed,” should have known prop- to "fail[ed] they were denied because were deemed un- erly supervise personnel the medical at the timely. VAMC,” and to "failfed] monitor and control usage the of and access to the medications at complaint alleged

7. The a number of theories VAMC,including epinephrine.” the Second- negligence, almost all of which amounted arily, complaint alleged also medical mal- negligent to a supervision claim of Gilbert. practice: provide "failure adequate to medi- example, For complaint alleged that the care,” cal properly diagnose." and "failure to VAMCand its staff improper “allow[ed] lethal to medication be administered to Ed- court, 11, 2002, timely in a is well settled this circuit that the district

On June filing pursuant of an administrative grant- opinion, thorough and well-reasoned jurisdictional § prerequisite 2401 is a to dismiss. motion government’s ed the See, e.g., filing suit under FTCA. Gon law, background canvassing the After States, 284 F.3d zalez v. United it: the issue before court framed (1st Cir.2002); States, v. Attallah United will be question in each case pivotal The (1st Cir.1991); 966 F.2d Gonzal matter, when, in- sufficient as a factual States, ez-Bernal v. United 907 F.2d to the formation was available (1st Cir.1990). Thus, comply failure to reveal a connection between statute of limitations with the FTCA’s and the deaths. VAMC subject lacks means that the district court at 227-28. The Cutting, F.Supp.2d jurisdiction to entertain the suit matter fami- that for the Skwira court determined it. v. and must dismiss Coska 26, 1996—the ly, that date was November (1st 114 F.3d 323 n. 8 Cir. family day autopsy after the —when 1997). family, party as “the Skwira die of a did not first learned Skwira jurisdiction a federal invoking the attack, the death certificate and heart court[,] its proving carries the burden of Thus, had maintained. the VAMC States, 45 Murphy existence.” v. United reasoned, had two court (1st Cir.1995).8 that date—until November years from In this the district court file an administrative claim with 1998—to family’s complaint dismissed the Skwira on Administration. Since the the Veterans 12(b)(1) Rule motion. government’s to file a claim before that family had faded 12(b)(1) (providing for See Fed.R.Civ.P. deadline, the that it lacked court.concluded jurisdiction of claim “lack of dismissal jurisdiction and dismissed subject matter matter”).9 subject use “dif over the We complaint. appeal This ensued. evaluating ferent standards of review IV. subject district court’s dismissal for lack of § un language jurisdiction As the under Fed.R.Civ.P. matter 12(b)(1) indicates, depending the failure to file an on the circumstances.” equivocally Gonzalez, In a situation with the appropriate administrative claim predicate parties dispute of a where the government agency within two court’s giving rise to the being allegedly in that claim facts claim’s accrual results 2401(b). court will often jurisdiction, § It the district “forever 28 U.S.C. barred.” *8 statute.”); v. U.S. exception to the Gould view FTCA’s statute of 8. Other circuits the defense, 738, Svcs., as an affirmative rather F.2d Dept. limitations Health & Human 905 of jurisdictional prerequisite, Cir.1990) ("The and there- (4th than a burden is on 745-46 place proof on the defen- fore the burden of diligence exer that due was to show States, See, e.g., Hughes v. United 263 dant. information, that critical cised and 272, (3d Cir.2001) ("Failure to com- 278 notwithstanding, investigation was undiscov- ply the statute is 'an defense with affirmative text, erable.”). in the we have As indicated of estab- which the defendant has the burden adopted approach. latter the States, ") lishing.' (quoting v. United Schmidt 639, Cir.1991)). (8th Other 933 F.2d 640 ("Whenever 12(h)(3) it Fed.R.Civ.P. 9. See also juris- as circuits view the statute of limitations by suggestion parties or other- appears of the and, nature, accordingly, place dictional in jurisdiction of the court lacks wise that the See, plaintiff. e.g., proof on the the burden matter, the subject the court shall dismiss States, v. McCall ex rel. Estate Bess United action:"). 984, Cir.2002) ("[T]he (7th 987 310 F.3d establishing has the burden of an [] 72 issue,

need to in engage preliminary some fact- facts are not in the court’s determi- situation, finding. that district engenders review.”); nation de novo id. at “enjoys authority court broad order dis- (noting jurisdictional challenges evidence, covery, consider extrinsic grounded in considerations of sovereign evidentiary hearings hold in order to de- immunity normally “present what amount jurisdiction.” termine its own Valentín v. (or law”). pure nearly pure) questions of Vista, (1st Hosp. Bella 254 F.3d Cir.2001).10 In such a the district y.

court’s findings of fact will be set aside Preliminary A. Considerations only clearly if erroneous. Id. at 365. The court’s ultimate regarding conclusion It is “elementary” that subject existence vel non juris- matter sovereign, United as is immune question diction is a subject law to de from suit unless it has consented to be novo review. Id. Mitchell, sued. United States v. 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 63 L.Ed.2d 607 In this appeal only we are review (1980). concept While the of sovereign ing the district court’s ultimate legal con immunity has origins English its clusion that the family’s action is law, Maysonet-Robles common see v. Ca Indeed, time-barred. brero, (1st Cir.2003) (“The 323 F.3d family maintain, the Skwira both without King can elaboration, wrong.”), do no the Supreme that we should review de novo Court recognized has that sovereign the district immu court’s dismissal. We take this nity is also position grounded important public as a parties concession that the do policy dispute considerations. the district See Larson v. Do court’s factual find ings Foreign mestic & Corp., recited its written Commerce opinion,11and 682, 704, they only disagree U.S. legal sig over the S.Ct. 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949) (“[T]he nificance of findings i.e., those the dis interference of the Courts — that, trict court’s performance determination as a mat ordinary of the law, plaintiffs’ ter of complaint duties of the departments executive Hence, government, time-barred. since parties’ dis productive would be of noth (or pute mischief.”) pure “focuses on nearly pure) ing but (quoting Decatur v. law, questions (14 Pet.) engenders [it] de novo Paulding, 497, 516, 39 U.S. Gonzalez, 287; review.” (1840)); see L.Ed. 559 v. States U.S. Valentìn, (“Because 254 F.3d at 365 Co., the Fid. & Guar. 309 U.S. situations, predicate In certain clear, family disputes facts 10. "finding.” It is inextricably can be so however, linked to the merits of from opinion the context of the controversy that the district court should only district court meant that the Skwira jurisdictional "defer resolution of the issue dissecting was told that a aneurysm Valentìn, until the time of trial.” 254 F.3d at (as was the cause of death indicated on the 364 n. 3. That is not the case here. certificate). death opinion, Later in its Skwira, fact, court makes clear that died of paragraphs In two brief penulti- on the epinephrine poisoning. Id. at 236. Since the page appellants' mate forty-four page *9 appellants challenge only have chosen to this heading Judge’s brief—under the "The deter- opinion, one fact in the district court’s mination unsupportable was based on find- objections other to the district court’s factual ings appellants of fact”—the take issue with findings are forfeited. See Gonzalez-Morales the district court’s recitation of one fact. The Hernandez-Arencibia, 45, v. 48 n. 3 district "experienced court stated that Skwira (1st Cir.2000). event, a severe cardiac dissecting aneu- rysm.” Cutting, F.Supp.2d 204 at 234. The

73 (1940) (“Public in is the date on At issue this case 653, L.Ed. 894 84 S.Ct. plaintiffs’ which the tort claims “accrued.” consent is the suit unless forbids policy If filed their administrative plaintiffs makes clearly public policy as given, years claim more than two after their of the by declaration jurisdiction exclusive accrued, their cause of action is time- claim Hence, any waiver of body.”). legislative rule, general barred. “The within implied but immunity “cannot be sovereign FTCA, that a tort claim meaning of the is expressed.” United unequivocally must be inju accrues at the time 'of the 1, 4, King, 395 U.S. 89 S.Ct. States v. Attallah, 779; Ku ry.” 955 F.2d at see (1969); see Soriano v. Unit- 23 L.Ed.2d 52 brick, 352; U.S. S.Ct. Gon 270, 276, 77 S.Ct. ed 352 U.S. zalez, Therefore, under 284 F.3d at 288. (“[T]his long has Court L.Ed.2d 306 rule, family’s the Skwira traditional and conditions limitations decided have accrued at the time of claim would to be which the Government consents upon “injury” i.e., death —in Feb his — excep- strictly must be observed sued (Second) ruary 1996. See Restatement implied”). tions thereto are not (1979) (“A § cmt. c cause of Torts complete action for death is when death govern waives the expressly The FTCA occurs.”). in immunity, permitting sovereign ment’s Kubrick, however, injury the Su “for dividuals to sue recognized “discovery” that a preme Court injury or property, personal or or loss of mal applies rule the context of medical wrongful or negligent death caused V.B, practice claims. See Part Un infra. any employee act or omission rule, an der this a claim “accrues” when scope within the acting while Government' “knows the existence injured party both or 28 U.S.C. employment.” of his office Kubrick, 444 injury.” and the cause of his 1346(b). however, FTCA, carefully § Quoting exten U.S. at 100 S.Ct. 352. that waiver. One circumscribes (Second) sively from the Restatement placed on it is a statute many constraints Torts, in Kubrick identified the the Court against “A of limitations: tort rationales for a rule medi two un shall be forever barred United States malpractice cal actions: appro to the presented writing less it is is the fact that most instances One within two priate agency Federal statutory period within which the 2401(b). § claim accrues.” Id. after such is short —one action must be initiated sovereign immunity, all As with waivers two, being the common year, or at most has warned that this Supreme Court many since time limit.... but limitation, timely presen requires which of- malpractice of medical consequences against govern of tort claims tation apparent period for a ten do not become ment, strictly construed. See must be statute, the in- that of the longer than States v. U.S. remedy. is left without a jured plaintiff 117-18, 62 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. that the nature of The second reason is (1979) (“[I]n limi construing the statute of character of the the tort itself and the waiver, tations, of that which is condition knowledge frequently prevent will upon it ourselves to we should not take wrong, so that the of what is by the rely that which on what he is told beyond extend the waiver Con forced to intended.”). surgeon.12 or physician gress injury's rationale —an laten- already recog- nized the former Supreme Court had 12. The *10 74

Kubrick, 7, 100 Attallah, 444 at 121 practice U.S. n. S.Ct. 352 realm. See 955 F.2d at (Second) (quoting (theft). Restatement Torts fact, 778-79 Noting this the gov- (1979)); § 899 cmt. e see Ware v. United argues ernment Supreme two recent (5th States, 1278, 626 F.2d 1284 4n. Cir. Cases, Andrews, Court v. TRW Inc. 534 1980) (“Courts created the medical mal 19, 441, U.S. 122 S.Ct. 151 L.Ed.2d 339 practice [discovery protect rule] those (2001), Wood, 549, and Rotella v. 528 U.S. arising who suffered damage of both a out 1075, (2000), 120 S.Ct. 145 L.Ed.2d 1047 area, medicine, specialized unique and a mandate that we retreat from our post- relationship, doctor-patient.”). Kubrick of a application discovery rule The courts of have appeals applied ver outside the malpractice medical and latent discovery sions of Kubrick's in rule set disease contexts. According gov- to the tings other than medical malpractice ernment, time-of-injury a strict rule should See, e.g., latent disease. Lhotka v. United apply in wrongful death case. We States, (8th 751, Cir.1997) 114 F.3d 753 disagree. nuisance); (trespass and Stoleson v. Unit Although the Supreme Court held States, (7th 1265, ed 629 F.2d 1268-69 TRW Inc. that under the Fair Credit Re- Cir.1980) (occupational safety). The ma (“FCRA”), porting § Act 15 U.S.C. 1681 et jority of courts that have considered the seq., a claim accrues at the time of injury, issue since Kubrick have concluded that a not when discovered, discovery rule can apply wrongful death FCRA, Court actions, noted a complex even if premised that action is not scheme, statutory had a on claim of statute of malpractice. classic medical limita- See, tions e.g., Prisons, already v. which Garza U.S. contained a built-in Bureau of (8th 930, Cir.2002); 284 F.3d discovery 934 exception Diaz v. for willful misrepre- States, 1337, (11th Inc., United 165 F.3d 30, 1340 sentation. TRW 534 at 122 U.S. Cir.1999); Dept. Gould v. 441; U.S. Health & Thus, § S.Ct. 15 see U.S.C. 1681p. Svcs., (4th 738, Human 905 F.2d Cir. according Court, to the since the FCRA 1990); In Re Swine Flu Liab. Li Prods. “explicitly delineates the exceptional case 637, (9th tig., Cir.1985); 764 F.2d Dra discovery which triggers the two-year States, (7th 56, zan v. United F.2d limitation,” statute of any further exten- Cir.1985); States, Barrett v. United 689 sion of the discovery FCRA’s rule should (2d Cir.1982). 329-30 But see come from Congress, not the Court. TRW v. Garrett 26 Inc., By U.S. S.Ct. 441. (6th Cir.1981) (declining to discov extend comparison, the FTCA’s statute of limita- action). ery wrongful rule to death tions contains no such built-in exception. 2401(b). have already § We extended reasoning Moreover, See 28 U.S.C. liabili- beyond Kubrick far the medical mal- ty under is premised general the FTCA on cy justification applying five. diagnosed only condition His was —as under rule the Federal Employers’ Liability the weeks after he became too ill to work. ("FELA”), §§ Act 45 U.S.C. 51-60. As the charge Court reluctant Urie explained: Kubrick court with the inherently "unknown and unknow- Thompson, In Urie v. able” and held that [337 U.S. because of his "blame- (1949)], ignorance” S.Ct. 1018 less held that a of the fact injury, Court of his his claim under did [FELA] not accrue until the claim did not accrue under [FELA]until his plaintiff's injury manifested disease itself. In that itself. manifested 337 U.S. at 169- plaintiff Urie contracted silicosis from 69 S.Ct. 1018. work as a his fireman on a steam locomo- 444 U.S. at 121 n. 100 S.Ct. 352. *11 torts, neomycin treatment. In sulted from the law of the common principles physician told Kubrick June 1971 another right. statutorily created not on a had, fact, in caused the neomycin that the Rotella, a actually applied In the Court hearing problem and that its administra- mal- the medical rule outside discovery negligence. was medical tion un- context, that a claim holding practice filed In 1972 Kubrick his administrative when the does not accrue der civil RICO but, Supreme claim. The issue before the rath- conspiracy, learns plaintiff was whether claim er, injury. See Court learns of his when he (in 1968) began he to Rotella, accrued when first 120 S.Ct. 1075. 528 U.S. at loss, hearing suffer from when he learned Indeed, noted that lower the Rotella court 1969) (in probably that the treatment discovery “generally apply a federal courts loss, hearing when he caused his or was on the issue.” rule when a statute is silent (in 1971) “But,” the treatment definitive- told that at 120 S.Ct. Id. and that continued, ly hearing caused his loss pains been at court “we have The negligent. treatment was district injury, not discovery that explain claim, court had held that Kubrick’s ac- discovery of the other elements of only suspect when he had reason to crued the clock.” Id. is what starts him had been breach- legal duty that a Thus, reject posi- the government’s we (filed ed, i.e., in in and that his claim time-of-injury rule should that a strict tion 1972) Appeals The timely. was Court malpractice and apply outside the medical affirmed, though Kubrick ruling that even contexts, and we have no latent disease government’s injury of his and the knew discovery applying about reservations early it as probable responsibility for action. The wrongful rule to this death accrue until he had his claim did not are the nature of questions more difficult have alerted a adduced “facts which would discovery applicability rule and its person possibility to the turn to case. We now the facts of this improper.” the treatment was questions. those (quoting 100 S.Ct. U.S. Kubrick v. United v. Kubrick B. United States (3d Cir.1978)). Supreme importance Given Supreme accepted Court Although the appli- to the reasoning Kubrick Court’s discovery rule for appropriateness rule, must discuss of a we cation cases, it nevertheless malpractice medical Ku- that decision some detail. William reversed, that Kubrick’s claim did holding in a Ad- sought brick treatment Veterans learned that accrue in 1971 when he for an hospital April ministration negligence. injury was the result of his leg. treating physician His infection of his Instead, that his claim “ac- held Court large doses of the antibiotic prescribed learned of his when he first crued” after six weeks neomycin. Approximately cause. Court probable and its treatment, began to suffer Kubrick explained: hearing. He saw tinnitus and loss of from in- Congress condition, thus cannot hold and We the new

other doctors about a claim must “accrual” of tended that it nerve deaf- they diagnosed as bilateral that his plaintiff await awareness January physician, 1969 another ness. A negligently injury was previous medical inflicted. reviewing Kubrick’s upon Kubrick, armed with records, it such as Kubrick that informed him, harm done to facts about the re- hearing that the loss “highly possible” *12 76 protect by

can seeking knowledge himself advice in trigger is needed to accrual legal community. the medical and To discovery bedevils rule analysis.”). promptly doing excuse him from by so postponing the accrual of his claim C. Accrual Standard purpose

would undermine the of lim- the Kubrick, the statute, itations which is require the (deafness) knowledge of injury his and its reasonably diligent presentation of tort (the probable cause administration of neo- against claims the Government. mycin) provided the factual basis for his Kubrick, 123, 100 444 U.S. at S.Ct. 352. Kubrick, claim. See 444 U.S. at 100 Kubrick therefore impor- answered one S.Ct. 352. This knowledge triggered alone question tant that had divided the courts: two-year because, statute of limitations whether the accrual of a depended claim with knowledge of the injury prob and its on a victim’s actual knowledge negli- cause, able plaintiff only “need have gence. See 444 U.S. at 121 n. inquiry made among doctors with average 100 (overruling S.Ct. 352 cases cited there- training experience and in such matters to in). The court answered that question in have discovered that he probably had a However, negative. recog- Court’s good cause of action malprac [for medical nition in Kubrick of a discovery rule raised tice].” Id. at 100 S.Ct. 352. In the (1) questions, new such as: does a discov- context, malpractice medical where the ery apply beyond rule the medical mal- personal identity of the treating physician context, practice what knowledge usually is patient, known to the knowledge short knowledge of actual negligence legal of the status of the physician as a provides a sufficient factual basis to trig- federal employee is not required for claim ger accrual under a discovery rule. As accrual. extraordinary Absent circum above, indicated the former question has stances, statute “[t]he of limitations under been answered in the by affirmative sever- ... FTCA does until plain not wait circuits, al including our own. The latter tiff is aware that alleged an tort-feasor is a however, question, dogged has federal Gould, federal employee.”13 905 F.2d at courts ever since Kubrick. See Kent Sin- 745; Gonzalez, see (reject F.3d at 292 clair & Charles A. Szypszak, Limitations ing argument that “the statute of limita Action Under the A Synthesis FTCA: tions should ground be tolled on the Proposal, Legis. Harv. J. on 17- (1991) (“[T]he plaintiff was unaware of the defen Court left unclear ... dants’ whether status employees”); the statute federal only commences when Gould, (“Nowhere a plaintiff has actual 905 F.2d at knowledge inju- of an in Ku ry and its cause .... brick legal [and] Court did reference to the identity tort-feasor.”). other address situations where applica- Presumably, a rea tion of diligence may sonably rule be diligent plaintiff, once he is aware difficult due unique injury factual consider- of his probable and its medical ations.”); Cutting, cause, see also 204 F.Supp.2d can two-year discover within the (“The precisely issue of how much period statute of employ- limitations 13. It extraordinary deferred, would be an malpractice may circumstance but the agents if the or its have "misled plaintiff very "must at the least show that plaintiff, or deceived a or otherwise hidden information [this] could not have been found legal identity alleged tortfeasors as fed- Gonzalez, timely diligent inquiry.” Garza, employees." eral 284 F.3d at 935. In (original emphasis). F.3d at 291 plaintiff’s accrual of the medical death) (i.e., as ministrator knew physician, treating his status ment murder). Rather, (i.e., legal its basis for cause negligence well as Therefore, malprac- that a claim would accrue in the medical court indicated claim. a direct context, is often has “reason to believe he where there once the tice *13 and doc- patient by by the an act or omission relationship injured between been ha[s] Garza, a tor, governmental know of 284 F.3d at 934 government.” one need not the added). claim to accrue for a (emphasis connection causal the FTCA. under has for Eleventh Circuit context, malpractice medical the Outside in its accrual standard similar mulated individual(s) however, identity of the the terms, wrongful that a death ac holding evi- injury may less for an responsible knows, plaintiff the or tion accrues “when dent, may less reason plaintiff a have and diligence exercising should Not involvement. suspect governmental to know, and its both of the decedent’s death have been appeals of courts surprisingly, government." with the causal connection cases, in de- forgiving more these slightly added). Diaz, at (emphasis 1340 a reason- of claims until ferring the accrual that, outside these courts agree We suspect to has reason ably diligent plaintiff context,14 malpractice the the medical injury. the connection with governmental accrual subject knowledge of for proper Regalado was Garza example, Gloria For (1) of the FTCA is the fact purposes under shortly after he husband by her murdered injury’s causal connec injury half- City of Faith escaped from had preced As the government. tion with the Monroe, ad- in Louisiana. The way house clear, is, Diaz makes there ing quote from filed suit Regalado’s estate of ministrator course, diligence compo a reasonable of Faith, City of against in court state A knowledge requirement. nent to this in the home’s failure negligence alleging in “bury her head plaintiff may Regalado of enforcement and notify law If Id. 1339. she fails under sand.” of the course escape. Over her husband’s reasonably diligent investigation take a that administrator discovery, the learned the law will im injury, of into the cause notifying law person responsible awareness of to her an knowl pute a federal escape of the was enforcement if have uncovered she edge that would she The admin- employee. of Prisons Bureau inquiry. that See Ku had undertaken filed federal subsequently suit istrator brick, at 123-24 & n. 10. 444 U.S. the FTCA. the Bureau under against court knowledge Circuit, Having determined es- Eighth According to the outside the triggers accrual the ad- content not accrue when tate’s claim did 840, (1991); Wright v. 848 respect court N.E.2d all due to the district 14. With Cleveland, App.3d Ohio Hosp. dissenting colleague, case is not Univ. this our of Moreover, (1989). 366-67 malprac 563 N.E.2d "functionally to a identical” medical case, knowledge malpractice a medical a criminal act This case involves tice case. claim, malpractitioner is irrele- pri of federal status employee and the a government Gonzalez, See purposes. negligently vant for accrual employee marily, that this text, explained in the howev- As proof, F.3d at of at the VAMC.As a matter supervised er, arguably relaxed this harsh courts negligent supervision claim have elements of context, malpractice the medical rule outside significantly from the elements differ See, importance in thereby Marpe emphasizing e.g., malpractice claim. medical between med- Dolmetsch, of the distinction FTCAcontext N.Y.S.2d 246 A.D.2d v. malpractice malpractice and non-medical (1998); Zajac v. Mary ical St. Nazareth Ctr., cases. Ill.App.3d 156 Ill.Dec. Hosp. malpractice curiam), medical context (knowledge (per the Fifth Circuit said that a injury by an act or govern- omission of the claim accrues once a has “knowl- ment), we edge must next ask how certain facts that would lead a reasonable knowledge be. The Supreme person must Court [] conclude that there was a indicated causal Kubrick definitive knowl- connection.” Id. at 163. edge injury required cause is not In assessing these varying formu to trigger the accrual of a medical mal- lations, we are mindful of the emphasis practice claim: “It undisputed in this Kubrick which knowledge triggers case that in January 1969 Kubrick was (and accrual hence the running of the stat aware cause,” of his ‘probable its limitations) ute of is the of suffi *14 and that knowledge, according to the cient facts about the and injury its cause to Court, formed the “factual predicate for a prompt a person reasonable inquire to Kubrick, claim.” 444 U.S. at 100 seek advice preliminary deciding to if added); 352 (emphasis S.Ct. see also id. at there is a filing basis for an administrative (“Dr. 100 S.Ct. 352 Sataloff ... in claim against government: plaintiff “A January 1969[] informed Kubrick that it Kubrick, such as armed with the facts was highly possible that the hearing loss about him, the harm done to protect can

was the result neomycin of the treat- himself by seeking in advice the medical ment.”) added). (emphasis and legal community.”15 Kubrick, 444

Following U.S. at we have S.Ct. similarly degree in- 352. The dicated that something knowledge injury less than and cause that definitive would knowledge prompt a required. person is reasonable For to take example, we these protective steps have also stated will vary that a with malpractice medical the circum case, but, claim stances of the event, has in plaintiff “[o]nce accrued knows conclusive injury knowledge is not probable necessary. and its cause.” Hence, Gonzalez, in line with the precedents, best at 289 we (emphasis add- that, ed); hold outside the malpractice see also at medical id. 291 n. (indicating context, a claim accrues under the accrues when FTCA “plaintiff was on knows, once a plaintiff or in the notice of exercise of injury potential and its cause”) (1) diligence know, added). reasonable should (emphasis Outside the her permit sufficient facts to malpractice context, medical courts have person to believe that there is similarly indicated that something less a causal connection govern between the than definitive knowledge required. is ment injury. and her Garza the court stated that a claim ac- crues once “had reason to Our dissenting colleague claims that this believe” that government was respon- holding contravenes Kubrick and its prog- sible Garza, for the injury. 284 F.3d at eny clear, as a unbroken line of —described 935. The court in Diaz said that “in order authority that “firmly has established that for accrue, the claim to a plaintiff must the baseline threshold for accrual under have some indication that may there have discovery rule is knowledge inju- of an been cause of the injury.” ry cause,” and its with cause defined as Diaz, 165 F.3d at 1340. In Ramming v. “the physical immediate inju- for basis (5th Cir.2001) 281 F.3d 158 ry.” Respectfully, there no such unbro- III, 15. As indicated supra, Part to file an possession of "sufficient information for (and administrative claim under the FTCA agency investigate the claims.” Santia- thereby preserve rights), one’s only one go-Ramirez, need 984 F.2d at 19. injury.”) (empha- has inflicted and who supports this authority line of ken however, added)). court, fact, have, sis Gibson appeals Courts formula. such a request rejected plaintiffs’ rule apply struggled rule, Dyniewicz, binding malpractice indicating that medical outside the Kubrick context, supra, imposition Szypszak, forced precedent, see (“However Gibson, useful 781 F.2d at therein rule. See cited harsher cases deciding Kubrick have found fore- may (“[Blinding precedent circuit courts facts, they continue similar an exten- considering such eases from closes us discovery rule to dis- diligence Kubrick”). apply the sion of manner.”), and a ad hoc in an cases similar Moreover, proposed rule Dyniewicz sce- in one forgiving may seem rule with our the dissent is inconsistent The case in another. harsh can be nario In that a couri- in Attallah. holding for its by the dissent upon relied primarily behalf of the currency on transporting er States, 742 formula, v. United Dyniewicz abducted, robbed, and mur- Cir.1984), (9th these illustrates September Rico in Puerto dered in well. difficulties at the local interna- shortly arriving after *15 were parents Dyniewicz plaintiffs’ The Attallah, F.2d at 778. airport. tional highway on a flash flood during a killed the courier was decomposed body of The have claimed should plaintiffs the that soon thereaf- nearby a rain forest found in conditions. hazardous due to closed been ter, plain- the police local the advised against a claim actively pursuing Despite no leads as to who was they had tiffs that of not state, did learn plaintiffs the the criminal acts. Almost for the responsible responsibili governmental federal possible federal later, May years five parents’ after their years two ty until over against jury returned an indictment grand Circuit, the affirming The Ninth deaths. of U.S. Customs agents the two former case, im of the court’s dismissal district responsi- Service, they that were alleging “the that once immedi a strict rule posed the robbery of the murder and ble for injury is discover physical cause ate plaintiffs the January courier. claim ed,” accrues plaintiffs an FTCA for the loss claim filed an administrative gov of the federal if the involvement even at by the courier currency possessed the Dyn unknown. injury is in the ernment of his abduction. the time iewicz, was 486. Since there 742 F.2d at argued that government the appeal, On physical immediate that the dispute no since was time-barred claim plaintiffs’ the drowning, injury was parents’ cause after the six filed almost it was plaintiffs’ the held that Circuit Ninth the gov injury. knew of their plaintiffs Id. at 487. Under time-barred. was claim such as that ernment, advocating for rule however, the today, rule we articulate the plain the argued that Dyniewicz, found in have necessarily claim would plaintiffs’ injury and its their aware of tiffs were Moreover, in a subse time-barred. been September or about cause on case, indicated Ninth Circuit quent courier body of murdered when the sup in the cases is the rule we find that hence, accrued at found; the claim See of Kubrick. language ported we argument, Rejecting point. States, 781 F.2d v. United Gibson circumstances under the concluded Cir.1986) (9th (quoting accrued at plaintiffs’ (“[T]he prospect 122, 100 S.Ct. 352 at U.S. the for against the indictment time possession for not so bleak “did not agents plaintiffs because hurt mer that he has been the critical facts know, nor in the exercise of By time, that point family had diligence could have known of the Customs knowledge of the press reports numerous agents’ criminal acts until time of their describing an ongoing investigation into indictment.” Id. By way at 780.16 con the unusually high number of deaths trast, if, as our dissenting colleague posits, same ward in which Skwira died. Those “knowledge of cause” for purposes accrual reports indicated that the actions of a par- means knowledge of “the physi immediate ticular nurse were the focus of the investi- cal injury,” basis for the then Attallah was gation. government When investigators wrongly plaintiffs decided since the in At- asked the Skwira family for permission to tallah knew that employees their had been exhume body, they informed the days murdered robbed within of their family that they “suspicions” had about the disappearance. Attallah, See at high number of deaths the VAMC dur- otherwise, however, We held since ing a relatively brief window of time that plaintiffs had no indication that gov included period in which Skwira was ernment employees responsible were hospitalized. Finally, autopsy demon- their loss until an indictment had been strated conclusively that the cause of death Here, filed. unlike the in Attal listed on Skwira’s death certificate was lah, the Skwira had indications of incorrect. These accumulated facts pro- well involvement before inves vided a sufficient basis in November 1996 tigators told them definitively that Gilbert for a reasonable person to believe that poisoned had Skwira.

there was a causal connection between the Application D. *16 of the Accrual Standard (Skwira’s death) and the acts or omissions of a government employee.

In some applications of the discov Therefore, two-year the ery accrual, rule to the statute of question of limita- there be tions began will an issue clock ticking about the point. reasonable dili that gence plaintiff in investigating the family’s The subjective beliefs, described fact and cause of injury. her In the in deposition and trial testimony, rein- Skwira family’s their reasonable dili forces the correctness of this conclusion. gence Rather, is not at issue. we can re Skwira’s son Philip testified in deposi- his question accrual, solve the of as did the tion that it was a “surprise” that Skwira court, district on the of basis the informa had died of a cardiac event since he had tion the family from received been admitted only for treatment of his officials and the local press, prior to alcoholism. daughter Skwira’s Marsha independent inquiry by undertaken the Yarrows testified at Gilbert’s criminal family. trial The district court concluded that that she was by “shocked” the family’s unexpected the Skwira of cause action ac crued, latest, news of arrest, at the Skwira’s the cardiac day after and dur- Skwira’s (in autopsy 1996), ing deposition her November expressed when the she also her family first learned that Skwira did not belief that die his care at the VAMC had been of the causes listed on his death certificate. inadequate. courier, disappearance After the information, of the the appellants this had no other Attallah had conducted their own source of regarding information the where- investigation. They the visited Customs Ser- courier,” abouts of their plain- and that the vice office airport at the they where were told privy tiffs were police to the investigation. that the processed courier had been and left Attallah, 955 F.2d at 780. premises. that, We noted from ''[a]side Attallah, facts when, there are no as in during Gilbert’s also testified

Yarrows of rea through the exercise discoverable press reports had read trial that she permit would diligence which sonable into investigation murder regarding her in reasonably that to believe when stated that She on C. deaths Ward with some act jury is connected accounts, light like a “it was read she these Attallah, F.2d at See government. that was I knew off because went bulb above, by explained November 780. As father.” my happened had exactly what press family was aware the Skwira reading that after also testified She suspicious deaths concerning reports accounts, newspaper C; they govern that the knew on Ward me, even and really bothered It —it investigation a criminal begun had ment men- wasn’t my father’s name though death; they and knew that into Skwira’s people who being one tioned Skwira’s printed cause of death on and right I then knew investigated, was infor was incorrect. This death certificate had exactly what that was there that knowledge to sufficient provided mation him, one that he was happened ticking in No clock the limitations start must investi- they that be people those time, the point 1996. From vember death of. gating the indepen to seek out had two realization, despite the Despite to determine and medical advice legal dent provided and the information reports press file an administrative they if should autopsy, after investigators Moreover, explained as we the VA. against claim did family insists their III, to file an administrative supra, in Part “[t]he since in November 1996 not accrue rights under ones preserve claim and existence and regarding facts critical FTCA, only possession need one inherently injury were [Skwira’s] cause of agency information “sufficient gov- of 1998.” until June unknowable Santiago-Ra the claims.” investigate possession ernment ndrez, at 19. time, until samples heart and tissue protocols testing technology *17 that “considerable realize We were, by and detecting epinephrine neces may be investigation enquiry and prosecution. the Gilbert invented for large, respon a can plaintiff] make sary [a before no Hence, there was family argues, of actionability” judgment about sible in November known they have way could Rotella, U.S. at her claim. death, cause of Skwira’s actual family may have 1075. The Skwira S.Ct. should be of limitations statute cir acutely in the difficult need felt that Gonzalez, 284 See they until did. tolled However, as the of this case. cumstances statute (indicating that at 288-89 Rotella, “identify noted Supreme Court factual if “the may be tolled limitations a may also be negligence ing professional ‘inherently [is] cause of action for the basis discov and its complexity, real matter of Attallah, ”) (quoting unknowable’ statute before the not ery required is 780). at Kubrick, 444 (citing Id. running.” starts 352). 122, 124, One does 100 S.Ct. at un- U.S. “inherently family reads The Skwira actionability be certain have to basis broadly. The factual knowable” too claim.17 an administrative to submit order “inherently unknowable” of a claim agency to hold family could have asked the family's if the 17. In the Skwira ongo- claim, outcome of the abeyance pending the they timely a notice had submitted Simply put, family the Skwira failed to eonsents to be sued must be strictly ob- meet the modest filing burden of an ad- served and exceptions thereto are not to ministrative claim two within Soriano, implied.” 352 U.S. at claim’s accrual.18 district court there- 77 S.Ct. 269. We reject must therefore properly fore the action.19 dismissed the liberal construction advocated by amicus. E. Final Considerations matter, leaving Before we must ad- VI. dress two arguments additional ably pre- The district court faced in this case

sented in an amicus brief by submitted with the unenviable task of telling five The American Legion, directly and not that, despite families tragic deaths of addressed in First, the discussion above. their loved ones at the of govern- hands argues amicus that we should “apply a rule employee, ment their compensa- claims for that a cause of action for death by caused tion under the FTCA were time-barred. the criminal conduct a government em- Understandably, the court “reluctantly” ployee accrues when only there is suffi- reached its decision that “as factual mat- cient information to indict.” Such a rule ter, [there was] sufficient information [] significant would be a expansion of the available to the [Skwira and other discovery adopted rule in Kubrick. If any- plaintiffs] to reveal a connection between thing, earlier, as noted supreme Court the VAMC and the deaths” more than two has indicated its expand reluctance to years before they their filed administrative scope of Kubrick’s rule. See claims. Cutting, F.Supp.2d at Inc., TRW 534 U.S. at 441; S.Ct. Rotella, 528 U.S. S.Ct. 1075.

Amicus also argues we should In reviewing the district court’s ruling, “liberally construe the discovery rule to we slightly have revised terms of its protect the rights of veterans and their that, inquiry, holding outside the medical families.” We powerful understand the malpractice context, a claim accrues under considerations that underlie argu- plaintiff knows, FTCA once a or in the However, ment. we are constrained exercise of reasonable diligence should Supreme Court precedent (1) know, which un- of her injury and sufficient equivocally states that permit “limitations facts to person conditions upon which the Government believe that there is a causal connection *18 ing ríes, criminal investigation or, upon denial regardless and they of whether are cor- — claim, faith, good filed a advised.”). lawsuit rectly "on belief," information and and then ask the stay discovery pending court to outcome The district court concluded that one of Indeed, ongoing investigation. below, plaintiffs the other Nancy dis- Cutting, suc- stayed trict court litigation cessfully the instant until filed her administrative claim within the end of Gilbert's criminal trial. two of its Cutting, See accrual. F.Supp.2d ("Nancy at 228 Cutting's conduct 18. The fact that the family Skwira provides decided template to prompt- for place Office, their Attorney’s trust in U.S. ness under rule in these electing not competent cases."). to independent seek government also concedes that later, legal advice Brandt, until much does not alter Caroline the wife of another of Gil- Gonzalez, that conclusion. (and See 284 F.3d at bert’s party litigation victims not a to the ("lT]he period begins below), limitations to claim, run timely filed a administrative regardless of whether inqui- make thereby preserving rights may she have. claim with filed their administrative injury, her and between time-barred, facts, we, holding to the action is applying VA, hence their court, reluctantly must the district like AFFIRMED. family’s the Skwira conclude they years before than two more accrued

APPENDIX facility private healthcare for treatment February Early is admitted 1996 Skwira alcoholism. VAMC; arriving, shortly after Skwira February 15,1996 is transferred Skwira event”; Baystate is transferred to experiences “cardiac Skwira “dissecting diagnosed with for tests Medical Center aneurysm.” Baystate from back VAMC. February 16,1996 is transferred Skwira “dissecting causes of death as expires; certificate lists February 18,1996 death Skwira [sic], infarction,” “arrythmia” myocardial aneurysm,” “inferior wall and “chronic alcoholism.” investigation higher “a than usual number report into July 17,1996 details Press from cardiac arrest.” of deaths as nurse on Skwira’s ward focus 1,1996 report identifies August Press investigation. jury investigation into deaths grand criminal 8,1996 report announces

August Press winter 1996. occurring the fall 1996 and between threats to charged phoning in false bomb with 2,1996 arrested and Gilbert October VAMC. permission to exhume family and ask approach nvestigators October investigation suspicious ongoing into body part of Skwira’s familiarity press VAMC; acknowledges family at the deaths investigation. concerning reports autopsy performed. body 25,1996 is exhumed November on death family of death listed that causes Investigators inform November were “incorrect.” certificate inexplicably ketamine that chemical July Investigators inform body. in Skwira’s found epinephrine family that Skwira died Investigators inform 8,1998 June poisoning. others. murder of Skwira and 19,1998 jury indicts Gilbert Grand November *19 claim. family files administrative 21,1999 Skwira October claim is issued. July 17, denial of administrative Final 2000 trial. criminal 25, Jury begins Gilbert selection 2000 October this lawsuit. 26,2000 commences October 84 14,

March murdering Gilbert convictedof Skwira. BOUDIN, Judge, concurring. Chief duty the to investigate. See Gonzalez v. States, 281, (1st United 284 F.3d 288-91 Act, Under the Federal Tort Claims Cir.2002). substance, plaintiff the is 1346(b), (2000), §§ U.S.C. 2671-2680 the charged with knowing what might he have Skwira family required was as a condition by found out actively pursuing his bare suing government the federal to file an suspicions and then filing a claim when administrative claim within two there are prospects reasonable liability. the accrual of their cause of action. Al- Critically, plaintiff when the knows or though customarily tort claims accrue at should enough claim, know prompt to he injury, the time of the practice is wide- may not yet know enough to win the suit. spread of extra providing time-either Childers Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 960 F.2d delaying tolling accrual or the statute- (4th 1265, Cir.1992). To win a suit where the basis for suit is apparent may require the development of further when the initial injury occurs. Villarini- facts, perhaps even the conduct of discov- Maestro, Hospital Inc., Garcia v. Del ery and study by further experts. But the 81, (1st Cir.1993); 84-87 Restatement discovery rule is a compromise between (Second) (1979). § Torts cmt. e interests; competing and under the Feder- The locus sponge classicus is the left in Act, al Tort Claims the burden on the patient the during surgery. plaintiff peculiarly is slight: all that is Kubrick, In United States v. 444 U.S. needed to comply with the statute is the (1979), 100 S.Ct. 62 L.Ed.2d 259 filing simple of a two-page form with the Supreme adopted Court this so-called responsible agency. federal 28 U.S.C discovery rule for a medical malpractice 2401(b) (2000); § (2002); § 28 C.F.R. 14.2 against government under the (Standard Claim for Damage Injury or Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 95), Form WL 15A Fed. Proc. Forms then, S.Ct. Since most circuit courts § 63:22. question consider the have been willing easy, It is especially in a case where apply the same reasoning to other kinds government was actively investigating, to of claims against government where, in ignore importance of the principle of things, nature of prospects early notice to putative defendant. claim against were so hid longer the delay between original den that a plaintiff would not wrong and the onset of litigation, the more have been alerted to their existence. E.g., likely that evidence on the defense side States, Attallah v. 955 F.2d may Yes, be lost. in this nothing like (1st Cir.1992); Osborn v. United occurred; but statutes of limitation (8th Cir.1990). 731-34 (unlike laches) are framed to work me- indeed, time, Kubrick, chanically:

At the same one of their many like benefits is arguments about whether cases, other there discovery rule makes clear prejudice from delay are that a banished from plaintiff is not entitled to wait until the scene. all of the facts in support of the claim are 122-23,

known. 444 U.S. at The formulas used in the cases for im- Rather, S.Ct. 352. plaintiff once the plementing rule are neither knows enough provoke a reasonable precise nor Ultimately consistent. person further, to inquire question, has highly dependent facts, on the *20 the major peculiarity here is that as to The enough knew the whether have had family probably of the defen- could responsibility Skwira potential the point-he of that claim the years proof two of their before that-within definitive dant apprizing the short form investigation. have filed government completed should its potential of a government highly the case unusu- present makes the This Often, in cases like this close it. against itself, one normally, as Kubrick al: in a suit one, issue-but not jury this is a an ex- suspicions prompt to consult whom § 2402 28 U.S.C. government. the against usually get good can a fix pert lawyer or a Nakshian, (2000); 453 U.S. Lehman v. reasonably peri- brief liability on within a 156, 161, 69 L.Ed.2d 101 S.Ct. od. (no claims jury trial for tort right of rule, discovery But under the definitive government). the federal against wrongful government of conduct and proof carefully district court In this the period to start the liability required is not Those raw facts. analyzed undisputed claim. Kronisch v. United filing mid-1996, fam- by the Skwira that confirm Cir.1998), (2nd States, 123 n. 6 suspicious that other ily had learned 1078, 121 rt. denied 531 U.S. S.Ct. ce hospital deaths had occurred Childers, (2001); 148 L.Ed.2d 673 unexpected sudden wholly addition whether a question is F.2d at So Skwira, govern- that a Edward death of into delay interpolated further should be involving the U.S. at- investigation ment which, for cases in period the limitations police underway, torney and the state was suspicions should have though substantial necessary, was exhumation that Skwira’s excited, not in the nature they could been (based the death autopsy) on the and that fully within things have been satisfied of the cause of had misstated certificate circuit years. At least one the next two course, And, it that of was known death. delay the statute willing has court been govern- run the federal hospital out, matters Stoleson while science sorted ment. 1265, 1268-71 v. United person would point, At this hand, (7th Cir.1980); filing on the other negligence that some kind of have believed statute, form, thereby tolling the claim employees by government misconduct or task. is not a burdensome might well underlie Edward hospital at the plain- That some of the death. might think Alternatively, some is not actually suspicions had such tiffs investi- actively is government where appears to have been necessary but matter, should be private parties gating further then had two fact. The Skwiras the official the outcome of to await allowed Further, on similar investigate. should the statute investigation and one the other family of evidence But this choice in the meantime. be tolled time file a claim within the victims did policy concerns competing involves too allowed. Yet period exception judge-made of a engrafting autopsy years after the over three waited no hint gives statutory language upon claim. filing their report before given the And such reservation. investigations into range primarily in this case problem kinds, of all conduct (and private official and rather abstract applying an one ramifying have exception could such an trigger notice to concept-adequate general) easily a court cannot consequences that pattern fact unique rule-to a assess. possibilities. parade endless among an

86 the will in

Perhaps Supreme proach contrary Court move runs to the doctrine estab- exception the direction of or of an lished in Stoleson those cases because it eliminates for the pending government inquiry, requirement but there that before a statute of claim, are some a lower court limitations runs reasons for to be on an FTCA plaintiff sovereign cautious. Where the has con must be aware both of the exis- agents’ wrongful injury sented to be sued for its tence of his and “the facts of causa- acts, Kubrick, reasonably 122, the Court has construed tion.” 444 U.S. at 100 S.Ct. strictly the limits such on consent. Ku brick, 117-18, 444 U.S. at 100 S.Ct. 352. In appellants the could not Kubrick itself a line of circuit reversed possibly have discovered the medical cause precedent that, adopting the while discov 8, Edward Skwira’s death before June rule, ery applied it rather too freely. See record, 1998. As is by established 8, id. at 121 n. 352 (collecting S.Ct. government itself was unable to discern cases). Recent Supreme Court decisions the cause of Skwira’s death until it invent- have also quite respectful been of limita special ed techniques protocols Andrews, periods. E.g.,

tions TRW Inc. v. detecting excess levels epinephrine 19, 122 441, 151 534 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 339 body. 8, Until June 1998—the date (2001); Wood, Rotella v. 528 U.S. 120 when government appel- first informed 1075, 145 (2000). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1047 lants about “the facts of causation” —the end, Skwira’s were in no prompting per- risks to know position how Thus, sons to file claims Skwira had too soon seem died. the appellants less weighty importance position than the were getting by described the Su- notice to government preme at the Court warranting earliest delayed one is, opportunity. reasonable It accrual—that thing is one where “the causa- facts of cut off a claim tion no suspi- putative [are] where reasonable control of the defendant, cion existed within the limitations unavailable period. plaintiff to the or at very But where the least claimant thinks or difficult should to obtain.” Id. at added). think claim, that he may (emphasis have a S.Ct. 352 well then present under law the should The standard majority adopted years. notified within If the law two is improperly allows claim to “accrue” be- further, to be fine-tuned Congress may a reasonably fore diligent plaintiff could well be better equipped op- to devise the possibly have the medical discovered or tions and the consequences. assess physical cause of injury. his According to majority, a discovery rule claim “ac- TORRUELLA, Judge, Circuit should, crues” once a plaintiff knows or dissenting. the exercise of diligence, know “(1) I am forced to (2) dissent because the ma the fact of injury injury’s jority contravenes Supreme Court doctrine causal connection the government.” established in United States v. Thus, Maj. Op. at 77. once 111, 118, U.S. known, 100 S.Ct. the statute of limitations begins L.Ed.2d 259 longstanding cir running as soon as the discovers precedent cuit interpreting Kubrick. See sufficient determine information to that his States, Gonzalez v. injury is “probabl[y]” “connected with (1st Cir.2002); Attallah v. United government.” some act of the Maj. Op. at (1st Cir.1992). 80. The “causal approach, connection” majority’s words, “causal connection” ap- in other puts a premium on the

87 a Thus while accrual will not wait for a long so identity of the defendant: him, injury injured plaintiff who to discover that his determine plaintiff might inflicted, claim negligently it is clear that a of limitations starts run the statute not, plaintiff accrue before a is or if cannot plaintiff, even he could against a dis- should be aware existence and cause diligence, of reasonable the exercise Kubrick, him, injury. knowledge or he was of his Under injured how cover what injury of an and its cause constitutes “the injured. predicate factual claim.” Id. at [the] imple- no basis for presents This case 118, Thus, 100 as the Fourth S.Ct. accrual standard. The menting a novel stated, clear of import “[t]he Circuit has (1) confusion in the majority alludes to Kubrick is that a claim accrues within the by Kubrick and its standards articulated meaning plaintiff when the [the FTCA] of non- unique and nature progeny, or, dilligence, knows in the exercise of due jus- potential cases as malpractice medical and should have known both existence a new accrual implementing tifications for injury.” the cause of his Gould v. U.S. However, Maj. Op. 75-77. standard. Services, Dep’t Health and Human 905 I think looking progeny, at Kubrick and its (4th Cir.1990). 738, F.2d 742 discovery jurispru- rule it is clear that our clear, dence, is well crystal while less than ultimately if Kubrick open Even left majority’s de- enough that the established accrual, questions regarding claim this depart from Kubrick’s accrual cision repeatedly Court has construed Kubrick as in favor of the “causal connec- standard that a holding knowledge claimant’s Moreover, is unwarranted. tion” standard injury existence and cause of his is the nothing there in the record that distin- is knowledge required trigger baseline dis- guishes past malpractice this case from Gonzalez, covery-rule accrual. re-we wrongful discovery-rule and death cases cently clarified that Kubrick meant under our which have been considered plaintiff knows of the and “[o]nce well-established accrual standard. cause, probable its bears the re- he/she among

sponsibility inquiring the medical whether legal communities about Progeny he/ A. Kubrick and its wronged legal and should take she was open questions While Kubrick left some Kubrick). (citing 289 Our action.” Id. at regarding parameters discovery all of holding in is consistent with Gonzalez rule, holding core of Kubrick is clear See, e.g., rule cases. prior our repeatedly applied by and has been Nicolazzo v. United malprac- circuits in both medical and other (1st Cir.1986) (citing Kubrick’s hold- malpractice tice and non-medical contexts. suits, ing malpractice that in medical “the discovers, plaintiff or The Kubrick Court established that ac- accrues when diligence plaintiff not occur before the the exercise crual does discovered, “knows the existence and the cause of should have the existence both injury”); Rivera Fernandez v. injury.” his 444 U.S. at 100 cause of his (1st Cir.1983) added). Chardon, F.2d The Court (emphasis S.Ct. 352 Kubrick concluded distinguished (finding “a that the Court clearly between (which began to run period will that “the limitations ignorance legal rights” of his accrual) knew of the existence knowledge not halt “about the when (which injury”); of his Lazarini v. required is to and the cause facts of causation” accrual). States, 215 F.3d 2000 WL Id. at 100 S.Ct. 352. United trigger (1st 2000) curiam) States, (10th Cir.1985) Feb.17, (per Cir. (same).21 (citing proposition Kubrick for the discovery-rule claims accrue “when the majority jettison free to *23 plaintiff knows both existence and the requirement stage. “causation” at this Al- injury”); cause of his Fisher v. United though discovery rule ap- standards

States, *4 959 F.2d 1992 WL 63516 at plied past may slightly differ from (1st 1992) curiam) (“The Apr.1, (per Cir. another,22 one these nominal differences do Supreme Court has determined that justify wiping im- slate clean and plaintiff must know the ‘critical facts’ of his posing a rigorous more accrual standard injury and its cause order for his cause sum, plaintiffs satisfy. for In it is firm- of action to accrue under the Federal Tort ly that the established baseline threshold Act.”). Claims for accrual discovery under the rule is knowledge injury of an majority’s interpretation its cause. Un- Kubrick less the “causal connection” standard departs discovery also from the rule satis- stan- threshold, fies this dard it is an by nearly every as articulated other unwarranted See, departure from precedent. circuit court. Circuit e.g., Massey v. United States, (7th Cir.2002) 312 F.3d B. What Constitutes “Facts (finding that the Kubrick Court held that a Causation?” claim under the FTCA accrues when the plaintiff knows both the existence and The majority’s emphasis on who caused injury); cause of the injury, Garza v. United Skwira’s rather than how he was Prisons, States Bureau injured 284 F.3d 930 injured or what him seriously (8th Cir.2002) (same);20 v. misguided. Winter United In light long of the line of States, (9th Cir.2001) 244 F.3d requiring knowledge cases of “the facts of Gould, (same); (4th accrual, 905 F.2d 738 at 742 causation” trigger only way Cir.1990) (same); Barren Barren v. to sustain the majority’s approach would States, (3d Cir.1988) United 839 F.2d 987 be to argue that its “causal connection” (same); By Chamness and Through standard actually satisfies this Court’s States, Chamness v. United However, “causation” requirement. this (11th Cir.1988); Arvayo v. argument United require would us to construe the majority’s 20.The support citation of my knowledge, 21. To no case Garza besides v. Diaz rejecting adopt- the “causation” standard and (11th Cir.1999) 165 F.3d 1337 ing proposed "causal connection” stan- dispensed has require- with the "causation” place dard in its is inconsistent with ment proposed by majority. in the manner Garza, opinion’s holding. actual Eighth Circuit held that a "cause of action instance, Gonzalez, 22. For this Court at injury still accrues when existence of an point one states that accrual occurs when a Garza, and its cause are known.” 284 F.3d at plaintiff injury proba- knows of his "and its 935. While the imply court did Garza cause,” ble 284 F.3d at and at another under some circumstances a claim would ac- requires knowledge injuiy po- of "an and its crue when the "identity knew the cause.”, tential Id. at (emphasis n. alleged employees,” tortfeasors as federal it added). Though I am sure the difference be- to, imposed this standard in addition not in "probable” “potential” tween would of, place require- the traditional "causation” provide grist opportunistic for the mill of an (suggesting might ment. See id. that accrual litigator, negate long-standing it does not our delayed plaintiff legal until the knows the requirement delayed identity only accrual is until a tortfeasor if agents mislead or hide the is aware of the tortfeasor’s identi- existence and cause ty). injury. of his different than that to oth- applied in a manner inconsistent standard term “cause” er malpractice cases. Since no such stan- precedent. legal clearly yet by dard has been articulated Discovery injury of the cause of one’s Circuit, majority allows itself to knowing responsible not mean who is does invent a new one. it, alleged or even generally Even if this distinction were to the “probable tortfeasor’s connection” rather, appropriate, facts this case do not injury; injury’s an “cause” is permit purely us to treat it as a non- physical the immediate basis known when malpractice case. This case involves a Dyniewicz v. for the is discovered. *24 (9th professional administering medical an ex States, 484, 486 Cir. United 742 F.2d 1984). cessive of a toxic to a is, dose substance immedi That “cause” means the patient undergoing gov treatment at a injury point “from a medical ate cause of hospital. drug ernment That view,” legal identity of the and not the kill Gould, administered with intent to does at alleged tortfeasors. 905 F.2d States, distinguish not itself this from similar 2; see also Davis v. United 748 n. (9th Cir.1981). causation, involving injury cases latent or 328, 331 This is 642 itself, arising or other cases from a breach of from Kubrick where the evident doctor-patient relationship. Ware the critical caus Court determined Cf. States, 1278, v. United 626 F.2d 1284 n. of limitations ative fact that set the statute (5th Cir.1980) (“Courts 4 created the running was that Kubrick was aware of malpractice [discovery medical to rule] the fact that the administration of an anti protect damage those suffered aris who injury. biotic was the medical cause his area, Kubrick, ing specialized out of both a medi 118, 444 100 352. U.S. at S.Ct. cine, unique and a doctor- Thus, relationship, majority’s claim that its “causal patient.”). Accordingly, the district court approach grounded connection” noted, case, correctly “the facts of this unfounded; cir logic of Kubrick is as one “[njowhere noted, charging hospital negligence based or cuit has in Kubrick is malfeasance, functionally make it identi legal identity reference to the malpractice Cutting cal case.” v. Gould, 743; to 905 F.2d at see tort-feasor.” States, 216, 224 States, F.Supp.2d 204 781 F.2d also Gibson v. United (D.Mass.2002). (9th Cir.1986) (knowledge 1344 physi of immediate knowledge “cause” is Second, delaying for accru the rationale cause, knowledge of involvement cal not malpractice entirely al in medical cases is culpability agents). of federal and appropriate Supreme here. As the Court noted, discovery rule is cry has “the Applying Kubrick “Outside C. cases, “the malpractice loudest” because Malpractice Medical Context” may causation be in the control facts about defendant, to irony, majority putative unavailable Without a trace of hard to ob implement plaintiff very claims that it is free to its or at least also 555-56, Wood, v. 528 “causal connection” standard be- tain.” Rotella U.S. novel 1075, 145 L.Ed.2d 1047 injury occurred “outside of S.Ct. cause Skwira’s Maj. (quoting U.S. at malpractice the medical context.” 352). is, malpractice cases en That Nurse S.Ct. Medical Op. at 77. because Gilbert discovery-rule status injected joy privileged their intentionally epineph- unintentional; rine, we they not are appellants’ against claims because these cases differ- historically under a have treated United States merit consideration hidden, they inquire “among often involve Skwiras to doctors with ently because average training experience in such unknown factors which an complex, and matters to have ordinarily [they] discovered injured plaintiff would probably good had a cause of action.” Ku- In this where the expected grasp. brick, U.S. S.Ct. This injury were in the facts about Skwira’s significant “[ojrdinarily, fact is because government, control of the unavailable un- expected cannot be to discover the obtain, impossible til the ratio- general medical cause his even discovery applying nale for rule is before the doctors themselves are able to pure identical to a case of medical mal- Chamness, (quot- do so.” 835 F.2d at 1353 practice. complex The latent medical ing Rosales v. United in this case have causation issues should (9th Cir.1987)). majority, led the like the district court below, treat the appellants’ claims under only appel- causative facts in the malprac- traditional rubric medical possession knowledge lants’ were tice rule cases. Skwira’s death certificate was incorrect *25 and that the hospital employees and its Applying Existing D. to Standard subject were the an investigation. Skwira However, the sum of this information does respectfully I submit that when the any knowledge regarding not constitute proper is applied standard to these facts— physical injury. cause of Skwira’s At is, attempt that when we most, ascertain when plaintiffs everything knew that charge appellants could first we they thought they knew about Skwira’s knowledge of the existence and cause of wrong.23 death was injuries Skwira’s case is a much clos- —this opinion single The does not cite a case er one than it appears majority in the support of its harsh conclusion that a claim opinion. may plaintiffs accrue possibly before could plaintiffs, The like the government obtain information about an injury’s medi- agents death, investigating physical could cal or cause. It cites no cases not possibly have discovered that support treating appellants’ any claims died from the drug differently administration of a from other medical malpractice until 1998. And unlike the plaintiffs disregards claims. It the standards artic- Attallah,24 it would have been futile by for the ulated this Court in 955 F.2d majority suspicions 23. The unsupported by interpre makes much of fami- "[t]he medical beliefs,” ly's subjective gleans which it from tations do not establish sufficient 'awareness’ deposition testimony. Maj. Op. and trial at period running to set [the] limitations when Although majority ostensibly 80. cites the complex [the] condition involves medical "subjective only Skwiras’ beliefs” to "rein- causality.” Corp. Bath Iron Works v. United conclusion,” the correctness of force[] [its] Labor, Dep’t States 2003 WL id., appel- its on what reliance it believes the (1st 2003) July (quot 21665024 at *6 Cir. subjectively inappropriate. lants knew is ing Corp. Jasinskas v. Bethlehem Steel is, course, discovery one, Gonzalez, objective rule test an (1st 1984)). subjec Cir. Inclusion 288; Attallah, 284 F.3d at tive discovery inquiry elements into our rule assumptions F.2d at and our about the only will serve to confuse lower courts seek appellants wholly state of mind of the are ing apply today. the standard announced appellants’ irrelevant as to when Attallah, Moreover, princi- 24. we In concluded that "the should have accrued. none family’s ples established rule concerns amount to more than their warrant generalized suspicion delayed appellants ... about events the hos- accrual since the did held, pital. "generalized And as we have not know ... of [the tortfeasor’s] criminal Gonzalez, 284 F.3d at 289. at 780 STATES, Appellee, UNITED only by adopting it is a nebu-

Respectfully, panel .connection” test that the lous “causal v. headway; under Kubrick’s can make Igor BRUNSHTEIN, also known as requirement, own “facts about causation” “Mark,” Defendant-Appellant. extremely it would be difficult on this rec- had appellants ord to show that sufficient Docket No. 02-1345. knowledge of the medical cause of Skwira’s Appeals, United States Court of death. Second Circuit. Knowledge injury’s is a of an cause Argued: March 2003. fact,” “critical without which claim can By reducing the not accrue. “causation” Sept. Decided: con requirement only “probable to mean

nection between the and the defen

dant,” majority puts its thumb on the

scale and transforms our accrual standard inju too

into one strict whose

ry complex involves latent or causes. cases, in enquiry

such “considerable

vestigation may necessary before [a

plaintiff] responsible judgment can make a *26 Ro actionability”

about the of his claim. Wood,

tella v. 528 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. plaintiffs’ delay filing their ad- justified by

ministrative claim was

impossibility discovering the cause injury.

Edward Skwira’s Because the

appellants filed that claim less than two

years discovering after the cause of injury,, I do not believe their

claim to be barred limi- statute of I respectfully

tations.' dissent. ment; (3) police did not have suffi- acts until the time of their indictment.” following F.2d at 780. We then cited the bring charges against cient information to justify delay factors to our decision to accrual: murderers until 5 after the crime. Id. plaintiffs could not have known the present at 780. These factors are all in some claim; (2) factual basis for their yet majority in the form had other than mis- "no other information” give them consideration. does not leading provided by information law enforce-

Case Details

Case Name: Skwira Ex Rel. Estate of Skwira v. United States
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date Published: Sep 19, 2003
Citation: 344 F.3d 64
Docket Number: 02-1988
Court Abbreviation: 1st Cir.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.