372 F.3d 193 | 3rd Cir. | 2004
CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges
UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS (Opinion filed: June 16, 2004)
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
John M. Stull, Esquire (Argued) 1300 North Market Street
Nos. 02-3620 & 02-4283 P.O. Box 1947 Wilmington, DE 19899 ORRIN T. SKRETVEDT, Attorney for Appellant Appellant Raymond M. Ripple, Esquire (Argued) Donna L. Goodman, Esquire v. Suite D-7012 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS, a Legal Department Delaware corporation; PENSION AND 1007 Market Street RETIREMENT PLAN; HOSPITAL Wilmington, DE 19898
AND MEDICAL-SURGICAL PLAN;
DENTAL ASSISTANCE PLAN; Attorneys for Appellee NONCONTRIBUTORY GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PLAN; CONTRIBUTORY GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PLAN; TOTAL AND OPINION OF THE COURT
PERMANENT
DISABILITY INCOME PLAN; SAVINGS INVESTMENT PLAN; AM BRO, Circuit Judge
TAX REFORM
ACT STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN; Orrin T. Skretvedt seeks, inter alia , SHORT TERM DISABILITY PLAN interest on the delayed payment of benefits
due him under two plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
On Appeal from the of 1974 (“ERISA”). Skretvedt received United States District Court benefits from one of those plans pursuant for the District of Delaware to a court judgment, while his employer
D.C. Civil Action No. 98-cv-00061 voluntarily paid him benefits under the (Honorable Mary P. Thynge) other plan after that judgment was entered. The Magistrate Judge denied Skretvedt’s request for interest with respect to the
Argued September 16, 2003 delayed payment of benefits under both plans in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Great-West Life & Annuity a l l o w a c la im a n t , u n d er s o m e Insurance Co. v. Knudson , 534 U.S. 204 circumstances, to seek interest on the (2002). delayed payment of ERISA benefits as
“appropriate equitable relief” under § Based on Anthuis v. Colt Industries 502(a)(3)(B). However, the Magistrate Operating Corp. , 971 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. Judge concluded that such a claim for 1992), we determine that an award of “interest” would be one seeking “money prejudgment interest on a judgment damages,” which Great-West has termed awarding benefits pursuant to ERISA “the classic form of legal relief,” Great- § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), West , 534 U.S. at 210 (emphasis in follows the Supreme Court’s decisions in original; internal quotation marks and Board of Commissioners of Jackson citations omitted), that is not available as County, Kansas v. United States , 308 U.S. “appropriate equitable relief” under 343, 352 (1939), and Rodgers v. United § 502(a)(3)(B). States , 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947), providing that where “[t]he issue is While we agree that the Supreme uncontrolled by any formal expression of Court has bridled the scope of relief the will of Congress,” Board of available under § 502(a)(3)(B), we are Commissioners , 308 U.S. at 349, “interest convinced that, looking more specifically is not recovered according to a rigid theory at the Court’s requirement that the relief of compensation for money withheld, but requested under § 502(a)(3)(B) have been is given in response to considerations of “typically available in equity,” Skretvedt’s fairness. It is denied when its exaction pursuit of interest on the wrongful or would be inequitable.” Id. at 352. delayed withholding of his benefits is not Accordingly, we conclude that Great- a request for money damages, but rather a West , construing the scope of “appropriate request for restitution that typically would equitable relief” available to a litigant have been available in equity. We under ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. conclude that a constructive trust is the § 1132(a)(3)(B), does not apply to a appropriate device for such a request, and request for prejudgment interest on a that Skretvedt may seek interest on the j u d g m e n t a w a r d e d p u r s u a n t t o delayed payment of his ERISA benefits in § 502(a)(1)(B). accordance with the principles discussed in
Fotta v. Trustees of United Mine Workers With respect to Skretvedt’s request of America , 319 F.3d 612, 617-18 (3d Cir. for interest on the delayed payment of a 2003) (“ Fotta II ”). second type of benefits that his employer voluntarily paid after much delay, the Magistrate Judge acknowledged that our prior holding in Fotta v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America , 165 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 1998) (“ Fotta I ”), would sue letter. On September 29, 1995, acting
I. Background on advice of counsel, Skretvedt signed a Facts [1] A. “Settlement Agreement and Release of All Skretvedt was employed by E.I. du Claims” with DuPont. We previously Pont de Nemours and Company [2] from June noted that this agreement “released all of 28, 1974, until February 7, 1995. In early [Skretvedt’s] employment-related claims 1994, Skretvedt was working as a Senior against DuPont except for his application Research Environmental Engineer when for disability benefits, which DuPont he began receiving treatments for work- agreed to review in a ‘neutral’ manner.” related anxiety from his family physician. Skretvedt I , 268 F.3d at 171 . Skretvedt took a leave of absence from his
F o l l o w i n g t h e s e t t l e m e n t job on November 11, 1994, and did not agreement, DuPont’s three-member Board return to work at DuPont thereafter. of Benefits and Pensions (“Benefits DuPont began investigating during this Board”) reviewed Skretvedt’s application period whether Skretvedt would qualify for disability benefits, and determined that for disability benefits. For reasons that the he was ineligible because, the Board parties dispute, DuPont terminated claimed, he had failed to show that he was Skretvedt on February 7, 1995. “permanently incapable of performing the Skretvedt filed a claim with the duties of [his] job with the degree of E q u a l E m p l o y m e n t O p p o r t u n it y efficiency required by the Company, at the Commission alleging that DuPont violated time of [his] termination.” Skretvedt I , 268 the Americans with Disabilities Act by F.3d at 172. Skretvedt was also advised discriminating against him because of his that, in order to succeed in appealing the anxiety disorder. The EEOC found no Board’s determination, he would have to violation based upon the information that submit “additional objective evidence that Skretvedt submitted, and issued a right-to- will indicate a total impairment of
function,” such as “MRI, X-ray reports and complete medical evaluations.” Id. Skretvedt contended, and DuPont denied, [1] As this appeal raises only issues of that he and one of his doctors sent three law, we state undisputed facts that provide letters to the Board’s designated person for background for our legal determinations. appeals, requesting clarification with A detailed statement of the facts respect to the types of “objective medical underlying the parties’ dispute can be evidence” he would need to perfect his found in Skretvedt v. E.I. du Pont de application on appeal in light of the fact Nemours & Co. , 268 F.3d 167, 170-73 (3d that his claimed disability is psychological. Cir. 2001) (“ Skretvedt I ”) . After receiving no response, he claims, he [2] We collectively refer to the defendant submitted a formal appeal to the Board on ERISA plans and Skretvedt’s former May 16, 1997. Nonetheless, no further employer as “DuPont.” response was received. Income Plan” (“T&P benefits”). Count VI alleged that Skretvedt was B. Procedural Background
eligible to participate in a DuPont tax- Skretvedt filed an eight count deferred savings program known as SIP, complaint in the United States District and sought damages with respect to his Court for the District of Delaware on contributions in SIP having been paid out February 4, 1998. prematurely (in light of his having been, he Count I sought benefits from the alleged, wrongfully denied the right to “Incapability Retirement” pension program participate in the program after his (“incapability benefits”), and alleged that termination). DuPont’s Benefits Board failed to inform
Count VII claimed that Skretvedt Skretvedt under ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. had been wrongfully denied further § 1133, of the reasons for denying him participation in a DuPont stock ownership benefits. plan known as TRASOP, and sought Count II claimed medical benefits reinstatement of TRASOP benefits and through a DuPont benefits program known certain damages resulting from the as MEDCAP and reimbursement for premature termination of his participation expenses incurred as a result of MEDCAP in the plan. benefits not having been provided as of the
Count VIII contended that date of his termination. Skretvedt was improperly denied benefits Count III asserted a right to dental under DuPont’s short term disability benefits through a DuPont benefits (“STD”) plan. p r o g r a m k n o w n a s D A P a n d
Among other things, Skretvedt also reimbursement for expenses incurred as a sought prejudgment interest, postjudgment result of DAP benefits having been denied. interest, and reasonable attorney’s fees Count IV alleged that Skretvedt was with respect to each claim. due a $3,000 payment under a DuPont Skretvedt moved for summary long-term life insurance plan known as the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, “Noncontributory Plan” as a result of his arguing, inter alia , that there was no becoming disabled. Skretvedt also sought genuine material dispute of fact as to the declaratory relief that would deem him Benefits Board having acted in an arbitrary eligible for participation in DuPont’s and capricious manner, or having abused “Contributory Plan” life insurance its discretion, and that he was entitled to program, and sought life insurance the award of benefits he requested. benefits under its Noncontributory Plan. DuPont also moved for summary Count V requested benefits from judgment, arguing, inter alia , that there the “Total and Permanent Disability was no evidence to support a finding that the Board acted in an arbitrary and “vacate[d] the District Court’s order capricious manner, thereby entitling them granting summary judgment on the count to summary judgment. On September 6, challenging the Board’s denial of 2000, the Magistrate Judge granted Skretvedt’s application for T& P benefits summary judgment in favor of DuPont on and remand[ed] it to the District Court,” all claims, and denied Skretvedt’s motion assuming “that the District Court will for summary judgment. She concluded, direct that DuPont’s [Benefits] Board inter alia , that “there is no genuine issue of consider this claim in the first instance, material fact upon which plaintiff could be since even though Skretvedt is incapable successful [in showing that the Board had of performing the duties of his previous acted in an arbitrary and capricious position at DuPont, he may nevertheless be ineligible for T&P benefits.” Id. at 185. [3] manner]” and that “a genuine issue does not exist as to the propriety of the Board’s
In light of our opinion, on remand action. . . .” Skretvedt v. E.I. du Pont de the Magistrate Judge entered a judgment Nemours & Co. , 119 F. Supp. 2d 444, 453- on December 13, 2001, in favor of 55 (D. Del. 2000). Skretvedt “on his claim for incapability Skretvedt appealed the grant of benefits.” DuPont granted incapability summary judgment in favor of DuPont and benefits on March 6, 2002, in response to the denial of summary judgment in his that judgment. On the same day, without favor with respect to his claims for Skretvedt’s having to resort to further incapability and T&P benefits only. We judicial proceedings, DuPont granted T&P held that “[b]ecause the medical evidence benefits upon reevaluating Skretvedt’s claim in light of our opinion. [4] that Skretvedt presented makes it clear that he meets the eligibility standards for incapability benefits, and the Board can point to no conflicting medical evidence, [3] We also remanded Skretvedt’s request . . . the Board’s decision was arbitrary and that he be awarded attorney’s fees, noting capricious because it was ‘without reason’ that such a request is one for the and it was ‘unsupported by substantial Magistrate Judge to consider using her evidence.’” Skretvedt I , 268 F.3d at 184. discretion, guided by the five-factor Accordingly, we reversed the Magistrate analysis set out in McPherson v. Judge’s summary judgment order “in favor Employees’ Pension Plan of American Re- of DuPont and denying summary judgment Insurance Co. , 33 F.3d 253, 254 (3d Cir. in favor of Skretvedt on the claim for 1994). See Skretvedt I , 268 F.3d at 185 incapability benefits[,] . . . and . . . n.10. remanded to the District Court with [4] Skretvedt’s incapability and T&P directions to grant summary judgment in favor of Skretvedt on the claim for benefits were subsequently adjusted by DuPont in his favor on April 15, 2002, and incapability benefits.” Id. We further
again on April 16, 2002. On April 1, 2002, Skretvedt Judge, referring to Skretvedt’s Other submitted to the Magistrate Judge an Claims Brief as a “Motion for Additional “Opening Brief in Support of Claims for Compensation,” addressed the merits of Short Term Disability Benefits, Interest on each of the requests contained in the brief. Delayed Payment of Benefits and Related The Court concluded that Skretvedt was Tax Reimbursement Claims (corrected)” not entitled as a matter of law to the (the “Other Claims Brief”). Although he interest, tax-rela ted compensation, had pursued only his claims in Counts I TRASOP adjustments, and adjustments to and V for incapability and T&P benefits in his incapability and T&P benefits that he his appeal to our Court in Skretvedt I , and sought. Furthermore, STD benefits, the although we remanded only with respect to Court held, were not available because: (1) those claims, Skretvedt sought to raise the relevant statute of limitations had again claims for which the Magistrate lapsed prior to Skretvedt’s request for Judge had previously granted summary those benefits; (2) the settlement judgment to DuPont, as discussed above. agreement Skretvedt signed with DuPont The brie f req ues ted, inter alia , waived any claim to STD benefits; and (3) compensation with respect to DuPont’s employees with work-related injuries, such denial of medical benefits under Count II, as Skretvedt, were not eligible for STD compensation for his having been under the terms of the plan. prematurely removed from the TRASOP
Skretvedt filed a motion for plan under Count VII, and an award of reconsideration on September 4, 2002, and STD benefits under Count VIII. The brief then filed a notice of appeal of the August also sought interest on the delayed 21, 2002, order on September 20, 2002, payment of all of his benefits and which was docketed at No. 02-3620. The c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r a d v e r s e t a x Magistrate Judge denied the motion for consequences Skretvedt faced for having reconsideration on November 12, 2002. received back payments of benefits in the Skretvedt filed an amended notice of same tax year. The brief did not specify appeal on November 14, 2002, seeking to what action it was requesting the appeal the August 21, 2002, and Magistrate Judge to take, and did not November 12, 2002, orders, [5] which was contain a formal motion, but instead in its docketed at No. 02-428 3. W e “ C o n c l u s i o n ” s e c t i o n s t a t e d : “WHEREFORE, Skretvedt presents his view of STD, interest on delayed payments [5] Skretvedt incorrectly reported the date and raises germane issues needing to be of the November 12, 2002, order in his resolved in his favor.” Other Claims Brief amended notice of appeal as November 13, at 12. DuPont submitted a memorandum 2002. As this order reaffirms the August opposing Skretvedt’s claims. 21, 2002, judgment, we refer hereafter (unless the context requires otherwise) to On August 21, 2002, the Magistrate that judgment only. consolidated both timely appeals. [6] contest the issue of appellate jurisdiction, we have the duty to raise the issue sua II. Jurisdiction sponte .” Commonwealth. of Pa. v. The Magistrate Judge had subject Flaherty , 983 F.2d 1267, 1275 (3d Cir. matter jurisdiction over this matter 1993). We must, accordingly, determine pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f) and 28 whether the orders were final under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Both parties assert that we U.S.C. § 1291. have final order jurisdiction under 28
In order to examine our current U.S.C. § 1291 to review the Magistrate jurisdiction, we first address our Court’s J u d g e ’ s o r d e r ( a n d o r d e r o n decision and remand order in Skretvedt I . reconsideration) disposing of the relief Prior to that decision, the Magistrate Judge requested in Skretvedt’s Other Claims granted summary judgment on all of Brief. [7] “Although the parties do not Skretvedt’s claims in favor of DuPont in September 2000. As noted above, we issued a limited remand with respect to the [6] While these appeals were pending, claims for incapability and T&P benefits, Skretvedt moved before the M agistrate and directed the Magistrate Judge to Judge for attorney’s fees and costs consider the attorney’s fees issue in her pursuant to ERISA § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. discretion. The Magistrate Judge entered § 1132(g). His motion was granted, but he a judgment, pursuant to our opinion and was awarded less than he requested. order, that completely disposed of the Skretvedt appealed that award, which was incapability benefits claim. [8] DuPont docketed at No. 03-2805 and has since been decided by another panel of this Court.
is final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See, e.g. , [7] Where, as here, the parties have Abrams v. Lightolier Inc. , 50 F.3d 1204, consented under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) to 1209 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995). allowing a magistrate judge to “conduct [8] The judgment entered by the any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of Magistrate Judge with respect to judgment in the case,” id. , 28 U.S.C. incapability benefits reads in its entirety: § 636(c)(3) provides for an “appeal “Pursuant to the Order of the Third Circuit directly to the appropriate United States Court of Appeals dated October 5, 2001, court of appeals from the judgment of the Judgment is entered on behalf of the magistrate judge in the same manner as an plaintiff on his claim for incapability appeal from any other judgment of a benefits.” Ordinarily, “[w]here the order district court.” Id. ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. appealed from finds liability and imposes 73(c). Accordingly, final order a monetary remedy, but does not reduce jurisdiction to review such an order arises that award to a specific figure, this court from 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) to the extent it will usually find the order interlocutory.”
subsequently granted T&P benefits without Skretvedt’s having to seek a judgment. Neither party, however, sought
Century Glove, Inc. v. First Am. Bank of formally to dispose of the claim for T&P New York , 860 F.2d 94, 98-99 (3d Cir. benefits ( e.g. , by dismissing Count V 1988); see Prod. and Maint. Employees’ voluntarily to the extent that it sought T&P Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp. , 954 F.2d benefits or moving for summary judgment 1397, 1401 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A decision on mootness grounds because the benefits awarding but not quantifying damages had been paid voluntarily). normally is not final because it leaves a question that is not collateral to the merits In disposing of Skretvedt’s Other to be resolved in the district court.”). Claims Brief, the Magistrate Judge, as However, “even when a judgment fails to noted already, addressed on the merits fix the amount of damages, if the Skretvedt’s arguments with respect to determination of damages w ill be various other benefits sought in other mechanical and uncontroversial, so that counts of his complaint ( e.g. , Count VII the issues the defendant wants to appeal for TRASOP benefits, Count VIII for STD before that determination is made are very benefits). This had no effect on the unlikely to be mooted or altered by it—in finality of the August 21, 2002, order, but legal jargon, if only a ‘ministerial’ task with respect to the claim for T&P benefits remains for the district court to perform— that remained pending, the August 21, then immediate appeal is allowed.” Id. at 2002, opinion and order did not explicitly 1401. dispose of that claim. While the order did
While the Magistrate Judge did not address Skretvedt’s additional request in quantify the accrued incapability benefits his complaint for interest on the delayed due to Skretvedt, DuPont applied a payment of those benefits, the claim for “mechanic al” formu la under t he T&P benefits itself was not directly incapability plan and awarded Skretvedt back incapability benefits. Skretvedt’s only issue with the application of that Skretvedt in calculating his award was formula was whether he should have been “mechanical” and Skretvedt only disputes credited for six additional months of one aspect of that application (which was company service because, in his view, he fully disposed of by the Magistrate Judge), was entitled to six months of STD we conclude that the Magistrate Judge’s benefits, and his length of service with order (and order on reconsideration) DuPont should have been extended by six “end[ed] the litigation on the merits” with months. The Magistrate Judge addressed respect to that claim and “le[ft] nothing for this argument, and Skretvedt now raises it the court to do but execute the judgment.” on appeal. Gerardi v. Pelullo , 16 F.3d 1363, 1369 (3d
Accordingly, because applying the Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and terms of the incapability benefits plan to citations omitted). addressed. With respect to Skretvedt’s claim
for the underlying award of T&P benefits, Ordinarily, in the absence of a Fed. he represented to the Magistrate Judge that R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification, “there is no DuPont had paid those benefits. See Other final order if claims remain unresolved and Claims Brief at 1 (“T&P Plan benefits their resolution is to occur in the district recently were granted by DuPont’s claims court.” Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer agent, Aetna.”). Skretvedt did not argue East, Inc. , 124 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. that DuPont in any way failed to award 1997). We recognized in Beazer East , T&P benefits or miscalculated the award however, that of T&P benefits, except as noted infra note to determine the effect of a 14. The Magistrate Judge also recognized district court’s decision–and in her August 21, 2002, opinion that T&P therefore to determ ine benefits had been awarded. See Magis. whether there is a final Judge Op. at 2 (“[Subsequent to Skretvedt ord er–it is so m e ti m es I ,] the DuPont Board of Benefits and necessary to look beyond Pensions granted plaintiff [T&P] benefits, the pleadings. A final order and [i]ncapability benefits approving a is not absent just because start date of February 8, 1995.”). the district court failed to Accordingly, we determine that the claim adjudicate all of the claims for T&P benefits was sufficiently resolved that were at one time in the August 21, 2002, opinion and order p l e a d e d . I n s t e a d , a n where the Magistrate Judge recognized a p p e l l a t e c o ur t m u s t that payment of T&P benefits was moot.
That order was therefore a final order [10] determine whether, at the time it is examining its jurisdiction, there remain
judgment on a claim that has been unresolved issues to be abandoned’ by a party. Lusardi v. Xerox adjudicated in the district Corp. , 975 F.2d 964, 970 n. 9 (3d court. Cir.1992) (quoting Jones v. Celotex Corp. , 867 F.2d 1503, 1503-04 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)).”) (additional citation
Id. at 560. [9] omitted). [10] The August 21, 2002, order also met
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. [11] relevant portions of the Magistrate Judge’s August 21, 2002, decision on appeal address purely legal issues in the context
III. Standard of Review of what is essentially a summary judgment “[W]e must look to the course of determination. “Inasmuch as we are the proceedings in the district court and the deciding this appeal by resolving questions basis for its decision to determine the of law, we are exercising de novo [ i.e. , standard of review.” Blasband v. Rales , plenary] review.” Bowers v. Nat’l 971 F.2d 1034, 1039 (3d Cir. 1992). The Collegiate Athletic Ass’n , 346 F.3d 402,
410 (3d Cir. 2003). The motion for reconsideration in 58’s separate document requirement where this case dealt with the Magistrate Judge’s it (1) is self-contained and separate from legal determinations. “The decision to the opinion, (2) sets forth the relief deny a Motion for Reconsideration is granted, and (3) omits the District Court’s within the discretion of the District Court, reasons for disposing of the parties’ but ‘if the court’s denial was based upon motions as it did). the interpretation and application of a legal [11] The outstanding claim for statutory precept, review is plenary.’” Le v. Univ. of attorney’s fees and costs under ERISA had Pa. , 321 F.3d 403, 405-06 (3d Cir. 2003) no effect on the finality of the Magistrate (quoting Koshatka v. Pa. Newspapers, Judge’s August 21, 2002, order on the Inc. , 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir.1985)); see merits. See Gleason v. Norwest Mortgage, McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co. , 958 F.2d 550, Inc. , 243 F.3d 130, 137 (3d Cir. 2001) 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992) (same). (“When an outstanding claim for
IV. Claims Litigated Other Than attorneys’ fees is by a statutory prevailing Those Remanded by Skretvedt I party, the unresolved issue of those fees does not prevent judgment on the merits As noted, on remand from Skretvedt from being final.”) (citing Budinich v. I , Skretvedt raised various claims Becton Dickinson & Co. , 486 U.S. 196, regarding TRASOP benefits, medical 202 (1988)); Napier v. Thirty or More premiums, STD benefits, and other claims asserted in various counts in his complaint Unidentified Fed. Agents , 855 F.2d 1080, 1090 (3d Cir. 1988) (“In [ Budinich ], the (the “ancillary claims”). Skretvedt now Supreme Court held that a determination appeals from the Magistrate Judge’s denial of liability and damages is final despite a of relief on remand with respect to those pending determination of costs and claims. As discussed above, however, attorney’s fees. The rationale of Budinich Skretvedt did not pursue any of these is that the determination of costs and fees following entry of judgment involves considerations distinct from the underlying merits of the action itself.”). claims in his prior appeal to our Court. [12] challenge the Magistrate Judge’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of DuPont We have held on numerous with respect to these ancillary claims in his occasions that “[a]n issue is waived unless first appeal to our Court and thus clearly a party raises it in its opening brief, and for waived any arguments in favor of reversal those purposes a passing reference to an with respect to those claims, having issue will not suffice to bring that issue achieved success on the issues he did before this court.” Laborers’ Int’l Union appeal in Skretvedt I , Skretvedt now seeks v. Foster Wheeler Corp. , 26 F.3d 375, 398 to litigate those abandoned ancillary (3d Cir.1994); see, e.g. , Kopec v. Tate , 361 claims. F.3d 772, 775 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004); Tse v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. , 297 F.3d 210, 225 We have consistently rejected such n.6 (3d Cir. 2002). Although he did not attempts to litigate on remand issues that
were not raised in a party’s prior appeal and that were not explicitly or implicitly [12] Skretvedt’s opening brief from remanded for further proceedings. “An Skretvedt I at one point averred generally issue that is not addressed in an appellant’s that he sought “to secure employee brief is deemed waived on appeal. benefits under related plans of the DuPont Appellants’ alternative theor[ies] of company” after referencing incapability recovery [were] not before this court in the benefits. Appellant’s Skretvedt I Opening earlier appeal; a fortiori , [they] could not Brief at 3. Skretvedt additionally indicated be remanded to the district court. that he sought the “status of [a] retiree Consequently, we cannot consider [them] under the “[incapability benefits] pension here [on appeal from the District Court’s plan and related plans.” Id. Of course, proceedings on remand].” Wisniewski v. “where important and complex issues of Johns-Manville Corp. , 812 F.2d 81, 88 (3d law are presented, a . . . detailed exposition Cir. 1987) (citations omitted); see also of argument [in a party’s appellate brief] is Frank v. Colt Indus., Inc. , 910 F.2d 90, required to preserve an issue.” Frank v. 100 (3d Cir. 1990) (party “waived . . . Colt Indus., Inc. , 910 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. argument by its failure to present it in the 1990). Skretvedt’s brief did not address proceedings prior to this appeal,” the merits of his claims with respect to including proceedings “when the case was these “related plans” and was clear in its before us on the previous appeal”). conclusion section as to the only relief he
As we explained in Cowgill v. sought on appeal. There Skretvedt Raymark Industries, Inc. , 832 F.2d 798 (3d “request[ed] the Court [to] reverse the Cir. 1987), Order . . . granting Defendants summary judgment and enter summary judgment for [a]dherence to the rule that a the Appellant with an order to the District party waives a “contention Court to grant him his Incap and T&P that could have been but benefits .” Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
was not raised on a prior appeal,” Munoz v. County of Imperial , 667 F.2d 811, 817
288 (3d Cir. 1968). Nonetheless, “[a] (9th Cir.), cert. denied , 459 district court may consider, as a matter of U.S. 825, 103 S.Ct. 58, 74 first impression, those issues not expressly L.Ed.2d 62 (1982), is, of or implicitly disposed of by the appellate course, necessary to the decision.” In re Chambers Dev. Co., Inc. , orderly conduct of litigation. 148 F.3d 214, 225 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal Failure to follow this rule quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g. , would lead to the bizarre Casey v. Planned Parenthood of result, as stated admirably Southeastern Pa. , 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d by Judge Friendly, “that a Cir. 1994). party who has chosen not to As we explained in Cowgill : argue a point on a first When a court of appeals appeal should stand better as reverses a judgment and regards the law of the case r e m a n d s f o r f u r th e r than one who had argued consideration of a particular and lost.” Fogel v. i s s u e , l e a v i n g o t h e r Chestnutt , 668 F.2d 100, determinations of the trial 109 (2d Cir.1981), cert. court intact, the unreversed denied , 459 U.S. 828, 103 determinations of the trial S.Ct. 65, 74 L.Ed.2d 66 court normally continue to (1982). . . . work an estoppel. 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore’s Federal
Id. at 802 n.2 (quoting Laffey v. Northwest Practice ¶ 30.416[2], p. 517 Airlines, Inc. , 740 F.2d 1071, 1089-90 (3d ed. 1984). When the (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (alterations omitted). [13] estoppel is operative in proceedings in the same case on remand, courts [13] Our decision in Cowgill rested frequently speak in terms of primarily on collateral estoppel, which we the law of the mandate or described as, at least in this context, the law of the case rather incorporating the same underlying than collateral estoppel but principle as the so-called “mandate rule.” the underlying principle is Under the mandate rule, a species of the the same. Todd & Co., Inc. law of the case doctrine, “a trial court must v. S.E.C. , 637 F.2d 154 (3d comply strictly with the mandate directed C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) ( w h e n a n to it by the reviewing court.” Ratay v. appellate court affirms in Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. , 405 F.2d 286,
circumstances, address claims that Skretvedt previously abandoned. 1 4
Accordingly, we shall not now Accordingly, we dismiss the portion of consider arguments with respect to the Skretvedt’s current appeal addressing ancillary claims Skretvedt waived in his claims asserted in his complaint other than prior appeal. “The judicial system’s Counts I and V for incapability and T&P interest in finality and in efficient benefits, respectively, and address herein administration dictates that, absent only relief requested with respect to those extraordinary circumstances, litigants counts. [15] should not be permitted to relitigate issues that they have already had a fair opportunity to contest.” Cowgill , 832 F.2d [14] With respect to STD benefits, we will at 802 (quoting Todd & Co., Inc. v. S.E.C. , not now consider, for example, whether 637 F.2d 154, 156 (3d Cir.1980)) (internal Skretvedt is entitled to those benefits and quotation marks omitted). Our limited the effect of any award of them on the remand in Skretvedt I granted nearly all of calculation of his incapability and T&P the relief requested. We will not now, in benefits. this second appeal, given the absence of a [15] Skretvedt has requested additionally s h o w i n g o f a n y e x t r a o rd i n a r y
that damages (“tax compensation”) be awarded with respect to the increased tax part and reverses in part, all liability he incurred because his accrued issues necessarily disposed ERISA benefits were paid in a single tax of in the affirmance become year. Had DuPont properly approved his law of the case even though benefits claim when it was submitted, he the case is remanded for suggests, his tax liability would have been pro ce e d i n g s o n o t h er lower because benefit payments would issues). have been made monthly and he would not
Cowgill , 832 F.2d at 802. have received one large payment of In light of Skretvedt’s clear waiver accrued benefits in a single tax year. of the ancillary claims, we need not rely on Skretvedt argues that the Magistrate Judge the mandate rule or law of the case in failed to apply Gelof v. Papineau , 829 F.2d reaching our determination. Skretvedt had 452, 455 n.2 (3d Cir. 1987), a case under a full and fair opportunity to litigate the the Age Discrimination in Employment ancillary claims in his prior appeal, and did Act. Putting aside that Gelof is not an not do so. Thus we see no basis under the ERISA case, it also did “not address . . . facts of this case for applying any of the whether such an award should be made in exceptions to the law of the case doctrine. all back pay cases” because of the See In re City of Phila. Litig. , 158 F.3d defendant’s “concession that the judgment 711, 718 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing should properly include the negative tax exceptions to the law of the case doctrine). impact of a lump sum payment as an
V. Interest on the Delayed Payment of Benefits element of damages. . . .” Id. Skretvedt’s Other Claims Brief sought, inter alia , interest on the delayed Skretvedt additionally suggests that payment of incapability and T&P benefits he would be entitled to tax compensation under Counts I and V, respectively. [16] The as a matter of “contract,” but he has not Magistrate Judge analyzed Skretvedt’s identified any term in any of his ERISA request for interest with respect to both plans that would provide for such a forms of benefits under our decision in remedy. He does argue, however, that tax Fotta I , which held that a claimant whose compensation is due him as a matter of ERISA benefits were delayed but restitution, presumably under ERISA ultimately paid voluntarily (without a court § 502(a)(3)(B). As the Court of Appeals judgment having been entered) could, for the First Circuit has suggested under under some circumstances, assert a cause analogous facts, “[t]his argument is highly dubious; the tax payments at issue would seem to be completely distinct from any ill-gotten profits which might properly be made subject to a viable restitution claim.” Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp. , 30
§ 502(a)(3)”); Armstrong , 30 F.3d at 13 F.3d 11, 13 n.5 (1st Cir. 1994). ( Mertens “compels the conclusion that Skretvedt’s claim for ta x plaintiffs are precluded from recovering compensation would seem to be no more damages for the federal and state tax than an ordinary claim for money damages liabilities they incurred on . . . lump sum as compensation for losses suffered. payments”); see also Harsch v. Eisenberg , Mertens v. Hewitt Associates , 508 U.S. 956 F.2d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 1992). 248, 255 (1993), makes clear that such [16] We do not read our mandate in claims for money damages are not permissible under § 502(a)(3)(B) because Skretvedt I as having precluded Skretvedt they are “the classic form of legal relief” from seeking interest with respect to the and are therefore not within the scope of claims for incapability and T&P benefits “appropriate equitable relief” allowed that were on limited remand. The under § 502(a)(3)(B). Accordingly, we see Magistrate Judge clearly had authority to no basis for such a claim to be brought conduct further proceedings with respect under § 502(a)(3)(B). See Farr v. U.S. to interest on those remanded claims, as West Communications, Inc. , 151 F.3d 908, that “issue[] [was] not expressly or 916 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Mertens and implicitly disposed of by the appellate holding that “binding precedent compels decision.” In re Chambers Dev. Co., Inc. , us to conclude that Plaintiffs may not 148 F.3d at 225 (internal quotation marks recover their tax benefit losses under omitted). of action under ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B) [17] to interest earned on withheld benefits. for interest on that delayed payment as a
A. Prejudgment Interest on a form of “appropriate equitable relief.” Judgment Procured Pursuant to Fotta I , 165 F.3d at 214. The Magistrate § 502(a)(1)(B) Judge concluded that “[a]lthough Fotta [ I ] may support [a claim for interest], this Skretvedt was awarded incapability court cannot apply Fotta [ I ] in light of . . . benefits pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) by way of a court judgment. This [ Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson , 534 U.S. 204 (2002)].” provision states: Magistrate Judge Op. at 9. Simply put, the
A civil action may be Magistrate Judge concluded that Fotta I brought . . . by a participant had been implicitly overruled by Great- or beneficiary . . . to recover West . We enter this thicket as a matter of benefits due to him under first impression for our Court. the terms of his plan, to We conclude first that Great-West enforce his rights under the does not apply to Skretvedt’s claim for terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future prejudgment interest with respect to incapability benefits awarded pursuant to benefits under the terms of a court judgm ent unde r ERIS A the plan. . . . § 502(a)(1)(B). We then address separately Skretvedt’s claims for interest Id. Skretvedt’s request for interest with with respect to T&P benefits, which his respect to ERISA benefits he was awarded employer voluntarily paid after several years of litigation, and conclude that p u r s u a n t t o a j u dg m e n t u n d e r § 502(a)(1)(B) is no more than an ordinary Great-West does not preclude a claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B) for restitution request for prejudgment interest on a by way of a constructive trust with respect judgment obtained pursuant to a federal
statute. Our Court in Anthuis v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. , 971 F.2d 999 [17] Section 502(a)(3)(B) provides: (3d Cir. 1992), applied to the ERISA context the long-standing rule that, in the A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant, absence of an explicit statutory command beneficiary, or fiduciary . . . otherwise, district courts have broad discretion to award prejudgment interest to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress on a judgment obtained pursuant to a such violations or (ii) to federal statute. enforce any provisions of
While it is true that this subchapter or the terms Congress did not mandate of the plan. . . . p r e j u d g m e n t i n t e r e s t Id. payments for other than standards in granting prejudgment delinquent contributions, we interest”). have held generally that
Anthuis relied in part on the “[i]n the absence of an Supreme Court’s determination in Board e x p l i c i t c o n g r e s s io n a l of Commissioners of Jackson County, directive, the awarding of Kansas v. United States , 308 U.S. 343, 352 prejudgment interest under (1939), that, where “[t]he issue is federal law is committed to uncontrolled by any formal expression of the trial court’s broad the will of Congress,” id. at 349, “interest discretion.” Ambromovage is not recovered according to a rigid theory v. United Mine Workers , of compensation for money withheld, but 726 F.2d 972, 981-82 (3d is given in response to considerations of Cir. 1984). Ambromovage fairness. It is denied when its exaction c i t e d B o a r d o f would be inequitable.” Id. at 352. The Commissioners of Jackson Supreme Court later explained in Rodgers County, Kansas v. United v. United States , 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947), States , 308 U.S. 343, 352, that 60 S.Ct. 285, 289, 84 L.Ed. 313 (1939), in which the the failure to mention general federal rule was interest in statutes which announced that prejudgment create obligations has not interest is to be “given in been interpreted by this response to considerations Court as manifesting an of fairness [and] denied unequivocal congressional when its exaction would be purpose that the obligation inequitable.” shall not bear interest.
Billings v. United States ,
232 U.S. 261, 284-288, 34
Id. at 1009 (alterations in original); see S.Ct. 421, 425-427, 58 also Schake v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. L.Ed. 596 [(1914)]. For in Severance Plan for Salaried, Nonunion t h e a b s e n c e o f a n Employees , 960 F.2d 1187, 1190, 1192 n.4 unequivocal prohibition of (3d Cir. 1992) (where a judgment has been interest on such obligations, entered in favor of a prevailing ERISA this Court has fashioned plaintiff, “[i]t is undisputed that rules which granted or prejudgment interest typically is granted to denied interest on particular make a plaintiff whole because the statutory obligations by an defendant may wrongly benefit from use a p p r a i s a l o f t h e of plaintiff’s money,” subject to the congressional purpose in District Court’s applying “the appropriate imposing them and in the
light of general principles A n t h u i s , w e a p p l i e d B o a r d o f deemed relevant by the Commissioners in determining that a Court. See, e.g. , Royal successful ERISA plaintiff could obtain Indemnity Co. v. United prejudgment interest as part of his or her award of delayed ERISA benefits. [19] States , [313 U.S. 289, 295-97, 61 S.Ct. 995, 997, 998, 85 L.Ed. 1361 (1941)];
Rodgers in determining that a “back pay Board of Com’rs of Jackson award under the Fair Labor Standards Act County in State of Kansas v. should be presumed to carry . . . United States , 308 U.S. 343, pre-judgment interest unless the equities in 60 S.Ct. 285, 84 L.Ed. 313 a particular case require otherwise”); [(1939)]. Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers of Id. Aa. , 726 F.2d 972, 982 n.27 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying Board of Commissioners and
Applying Board of Commissioners Rodgers and determining that “[t]he or Rodgers , we have in the past purposes of the provisions of the determined that prejudgment interest is Taft-Hartley Act under which this lawsuit available with respect to judgments proceeded is the protection of pension obtained pursuant to several statutes that beneficiaries and union members. It would are silent as to its exaction. [18] Moreover, in not be inconsistent with these purposes to award aggrieved members of those protected classes interest on lost [18] See, e.g. , Gov’t of V. I. v. Davis , 43 income.”). F.3d 41, 47 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Rodgers [19] Anthuis and Schake are by no means and holding that prejudgment interest “is an aspect of the victim’s actual loss which alone in concluding that a successful must be accounted for in the calculation of ERISA plaintiff may be entitled to restitution in order to effect full prejudgment interest as part of his or her compensation” under the Victim and benefits award. See, e.g. , Cottrill v. Witness Protection Act); Poleto v. Consol. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., et al. , Rail Corp. , 826 F.2d 1270, 1274-79 (3d 100 F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 1996) (“district Cir. 1987) (applying Rodgers and, where court may grant prejudgment interest in its Congress was silent, “look[ing] to the discretion to prevailing fiduciaries, purposes behind [the] statute as a general beneficiaries, or plan participants” in indication of Congressional purpose,” in ERISA cases); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. d e t e r m in i n g t h e a v a i l a b i l ity o f of N. Am. , 987 F.2d 1017, 1030 (4th Cir. prejudgment interest under the Federal 1993) (“ERISA does not specifically Employers’ Liability Act); Brock v. provide for pre-judgment interest, and Richardson , 812 F.2d 121, 126-27 (3d Cir. absent a statutory mandate the award of 1987) (citing Board of Commissioners and pre-judgment interest is discretionary with
Although we wrote in the context of Anthuis the statutory provision of ERISA benefits having been awarded pursuant to under which a plaintiff could obtain § 502(a)(1)(B), we did not make explicit in prejudgment interest as part of her or his
benefits award. But we did not suggest that it would be necessary for a prevailing plaintiff to pursue such a claim as “other
the trial court.”) ( en banc ); Hansen v. appropriate equitable relief” under Cont’l Ins. Co. , 940 F.2d 971, 984 n.11 § 502(a)(3)(B). [20] We now make explicit (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]o determine whether an award of prejudgment interest is appropriate, the court must determine that, in accordance with Board of granted would otherwise fall Commissioners and Rodgers , an ERISA short of making the claimant plaintiff who prevails under § 502(a)(1)(B) whole because he or she has in seeking an award of benefits may been denied the use of the request prejudgment interest under that money which was legally section as part of his or her benefits award. due. Awarding prejudgment
interest is intended to serve Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s at least two purposes: to decision in Great-West , interpreting the c o m p e n sate prev ailin g extent of “appropriate equitable relief” parties for the true costs of available under ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B), money damages incurred, does not apply to the availability of and, where liability and the prejudgment interest on a benefits award amount of damages are obtained under § 502(a)(1)(B). We fairly certain, to promote therefore reverse the M agistrate Judge’s s e t tl e m e n t a n d d e t e r denial of prejudgment interest with respect attempts to benefit from the to the delayed payment of Skretvedt’s inherent delays of litigation. incapability benefits so that the Court may Thus prejudgment interest exercise its discretion in the first instance should ordinarily be granted in determining whether prejudgment unl e s s e xcep tional o r interest is appropriate. Under Anthuis , unusual circumstances exist [a]s a general rule , making the award of interest prejudgment interest is to be inequitable. awarded when the amount of the underlying liability is reaso nably capable of Anthuis , 971 F.2d at 1010 (quoting Stroh ascertainment and the relief Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc. , 783
F.2d 745, 752 (8th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted)).
award for an ERISA plaintiff who is We recognize that we have “not . . . successful under § 502(a)(1)(B). To the offer[ed] extensive guidance for deciding extent that Fotta II discusses a successful what rate of interest is appropriate in a ERISA plaintiff needing to use given case.” Holmes v. Pension Plan of § 502(a)(3)(B) to “sue for interest,” in the Bethlehem Steel Corp. , 213 F.3d 124, 131- context of deciding whether a plaintiff 32 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead, we reiterate who had not received an underlying award that “the awarding of prejudgment interest of benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) could still under federal law is committed to the trial sue for interest on the delayed payment of court’s broad discretion.” Ambromovage , benefits under § 502(a)(3)(B), such 726 F.2d at 981-82; see also Sun Ship, Inc. statements are dicta . v. Matson Navigation Co. , 785 F.2d 59, 63 benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B). Our Court (3d Cir. 1986) (“In federal question cases, disagreed. the rate of prejudgment interest is
We believe the distinction is committed to the discretion of the district unpersuasive. The principles court.”). justifying p r e j u d g me nt B. Interest on the Delayed Payment interest also justify an award of Benefits Under § 502(a)(3)(B) of interest where benefits are delayed but paid without In Fotta I , we faced a novel the beneficiary's having question: can “a beneficiary who has been obtained a judgment. The able to receive his or her benefits due concerns animating our under an ER ISA plan only after decisions in Schake and considerable delay, but without resorting Anthuis — viz ., making the to litigation to recover that payment[, c l a i m a n t w h o l e a n d assert] a cause of action under ERISA.” p r e v e n t i n g u n j u s t Fotta I , 165 F.3d at 211. While Anthuis e n r i c h m e n t — a r e n o t and Schake allowed for prejudgment diminished merely because interest as part of an underlying judgment the plan has paid the awarding benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B), overdue benefits without the Fotta I required us to determine whether claimant having resorted to ERISA would support a separate cause of litigation to secure payment. action allowing for an award of interest [21] A late payment of benefits on the delayed payment of benefits. effectively deprives the Appellants in Fotta I conceded that beneficiary of the time value prejudgment interest is available where of his or her money whether there is an underlying § 502(a)(1)(B) or not the beneficiary claim, but argued that ERISA does not secured the overdue benefits allow for an independent cause of action to through a judgment as the be brought seeking interest alone where result of ERISA litigation. there has been no underlying award of U n j u s t e n r i c h m e n t principles also apply with equal force in this setting. [21] We refer to “interest” and not To hold that the absence of “prejudgment interest” with respect to the a judgment deprives the cause of action discussed in Fotta I , as a injured beneficiary of the plaintiff seeking to recover interest on the time value of his or her delayed payment of benefits where there is money would create a no underlying court judgment does not financial incentive for plans seek “prejudgment” interest, but merely to delay payment and thus “interest.” retain interest that rightfully While not ruling out that belongs to the beneficiary. § 502(a)(1)(B) might “provide[] a possible
statutory basis” for a claimant to bring a Fotta I , 165 F.3d at 212. At base, Fotta I suit seeking interest on the delayed concluded, there is no persuasive payment of benefits, id. at 213-14 n.1, distinction between justifying prejudgment Fotta I concluded that “that section interest where a judgment for unpaid 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA— allowing a benefits has been obtained and justifying beneficiary to sue for ‘other appropriate an award of interest where benefits are equitable relief . . . to enforce any delayed but paid without the claimant provisions of this subchapter or the terms having received a judgment. of the plan’—is the appropriate vehicle for The facts of this case demonstrate such a cause of action.” Id . at 213. An the wisdom of that conclusion. Skretvedt award of interest on the delayed payment first applied for benefits in 1995. He was of benefits under § 502(a)(3)(B) “ensures awarded incapability benefits by way of a full compensation [and] serves to prevent court judgment entered on remand from unjust enrichment.” Id. We held that such our decision in Skretvedt I , thereby a claim under § 502(a)(3)(B) was one cast allowing him to request that the Court in “[r]estitution–the traditional remedy for exercise its discretion to award him unjust enrichment,” which “is widely, if prejudgment interest. While no judgment not universally, regarded as a tool of was entered with respect to Skretvedt’s equity.” Id. Therefore, a claimant could T&P benefits, as our Court requested that seek interest on the delayed voluntary DuPont reconsider the denial of those payment of benefits as a form of restitution benefits in light of our opinion in Skretvedt authorized by § 502(a)(3)(B), allowing for “other appropriate equitable relief.” [23] I , DuPont voluntarily awarded Skretvedt those benefits shortly after Skretvedt I . Fotta I wisely noted that making the
voluntarily by DuPont in the late stages of claimant whole and unjust enrichment are this litigation. concerns equally present with respect to both of these scenarios ( i.e. , where [23] Other circuit courts have since benefits have been awarded pursuant to a similarly held that a cause of action may judgment and where benefits have been be maintained for interest on the delayed withheld but are ultimately awarded payment of benefits as “appropriate without resort to a judgment). [22] equitable relief” under § 502(a)(3)(B). See Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 277 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Where interest is [22] Indeed, this case presents an even sought to make the plaintiff whole by more compelling example than Fotta I , as eliminating the effect of a defendant's Skretvedt did have to resort to litigation breach of a fiduciary duty, we see no and was only paid T&P benefits reason why such interest should not be
Hewitt Associates , 508 U.S. 248 (1993), that “the term ‘equitable relief’ in §
1. Great-West and Equitable 502(a)(3) must refer to ‘those categories of Versus Legal Restitution relief that were typically available in In Great-West the Supreme Court equity.’” Great-West , 534 U.S. at 210 reiterated its earlier holding in Mertens v. (quoting Mertens , 508 U.S. at 256). The Court then clarified that restitution, a remedy Fotta I generally regarded as equitable and therefore within the scope of
deemed ‘appropriate equitable relief’ relief available under § 502(a)(3)(B), in within the scope of § 502(a)(3)(B).”); see fact exists in two forms: legal restitution also Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co. , and equitable restitution. Only the latter 184 F.3d 938, 946 (8th Cir. 1999) form of restitution, the Supreme Court (§ 502(a)(3) supports a claim for interest held, is available under § 502(a)(3)(B). Id. on the delayed payment of benefits to at 212-13 (“[N]ot all relief falling under prevent unjust enrichment where “the the rubric of restitution is available in wrongdoer . . . use[d] the withheld benefits equity. . . . [R]estitution is a legal remedy or retain[ed] interest earned on the funds when ordered in a case at law and an during the time of the dispute”). The equitable remedy . . . when ordered in an Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit equity case, and whether it is legal or has specifically suggested that such equitable depends on the basis for the restitutionary relief is available through a plaintiff’s claim and the nature of the constructive trust. See Clair v. Harris underlying remedies sought.”) (internal Trust and Savings Bank , 190 F.3d 495, quotation marks and alterations omitted). 498-99 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[P]laintiffs are asking . . . that the court impress a This distinction between legal constructive trust on the interest that the restitution and equitable restitution turns defendants earned on benefits withheld in on the following: violation of the terms of the plan. A
In cases in which the constructive trust . . . is an equitable plaintiff “could not assert remedy commonly sought and granted in title or right to possession of cases of unjust enrichment. . . . If A particular property, but in wrongfully appropriates money or other which nevertheless he might property belonging to B, the court can be able to show just grounds order A to hold the property in trust for B. for recovering money to pay That is the nature of the relief sought by for some benefit the the plaintiffs in this case [and] Health Cost defendant had received from Controls [ v. Washington , 187 F.3d 703, him,” the plaintiff had a 710 (7th Cir. 1999)] holds that such relief right to restitution at law is squarely within the scope of section through an action derived 502(a)(3)(B).”). from the common-law writ case of the equitable lien) to of assumpsit. 1 [Dan B. a plaintiff who was, in the Dobbs, Law of Remedies: eyes of equity, the true Damages–Equity–Restituti owner. But where “the on ] § 4.2(1), at 571 [(2d ed. property [sought to be 1993)]. . . . In such cases, recovered] or its proceeds the plaintiff’s claim was have been so dissipated so considered legal because he that no product remains, [the s o u g h t “ t o o b t ai n a plaintiff’s] claim is only that judgment imposing a merely of a general creditor,” and personal liability upon the the plaintiff “cannot enforce defendant to pay a sum of a constructive trust of or an money.” Restatement of equitable lien upon other Restitution § 160, Comment property of the [defendant].” a , pp. 641-642 (1936). Restatement of Restitution,
supra , § 215, Comment a , at * * * 867. Thus, for restitution to In contrast, a plaintiff could lie in equity, the action seek restitution in equity , generally must seek not to ordinarily in the form of a impose personal liability on constructive trust or an the defendant, but to restore equitable lien, where money to the plaintiff particular or property identified as funds or property in the b e l o n g i n g i n g o o d defendant’s possession. conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property Great-West , 534 U.S. at 213-14 (emphasis i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s and last three alterations in original). Put possession. See 1 Dobbs § simply, “equitable relief” under § 4 . 3 ( 1 ) , a t 5 8 7 - 5 8 8 ; 502(a)(3)(B) is to be construed by Restatement of Restitution, reference to the types of relief typically supra , § 160, Comment a , at available in equity, and courts are to 641-642; 1 G. Palmer, Law analyze the underlying nature of the claim of Restitution § 1.4, p. 17; and relief requested by a plaintiff in order § 3.7, p. 262 (1978). A to determine whether that relief had been court of equity could then typically available in equity. order a defendant to transfer
Res titution in equity was title (in the case of the “ordinarily in the form of a constructive constructive trust) or to give trust or an equitable lien, where money or a security interest (in the property identified as belonging in good Skretvedt seeks legal relief.” Magis. conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be Judge Op. at 9. The Magistrate Judge traced to particular funds or property in the perceived in Great-West a per se defendant’s possession.” Great-West , 534 pronouncement that where a plaintiff seeks U.S. at 213 (citing 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of an award that ultimately involves money Remedies: Damages–Equity–Restitution § (regardless whether that award consists of 4.3(1), at 587-88 (2d ed. 1993) (“Dobbs”); a constructive trust over funds that “belong Restatement of Restitution § 160 cmt. a, at in good conscience to the plaintiff” and 641-42 (1936); George E. Palmer, Law of can “clearly be traced to particular funds in Restitution § 1.4, at 17 (1978) (“Palmer”); the defendant’s possession”), such an id. § 3.7, at 262). [24] award is a claim for legal relief and is not
available under § 502(a)(3)(B). [25] Without examining the specific forms of equitable restitution addressed in Our reading, however, is that Great-West , the Magistrate Judge in this Great-West did not adopt such a rule. case concluded that “the [Supreme] Court Instead, the Supreme Court indicated that, clearly indicated [in Great-West ] that to determine whether a specific form of claims for monetary damages, for the most underlying relief requested is available part, will be claims for legal relief. Here, under § 502(a)(3)(B), we must consider Skretvedt seeks money to compensate for whether that relief was typically available the lost interest caused by DuPont’s at law or in equity and, in the case of delayed payment. Thus, the Great-West restitutionary relief, whether the relief decision compels this court to find that requested was in fact a form of equitable
restitution. 2. R e e x a m i n i n g a [24] The Court also noted that an Restitutionary Award of additional form of equitable restitution, an I n t e r e s t U n d e r accounting for profits, is outside the § 502(a)(3)(B) general rule that an action sounding in Analyzing the propriety of an equitable restitution must not seek to impose personal liability on the defendant. “If, for example, a plaintiff is entitled to a interest award under § 502(a)(3)(B) again determination, Great-West indicated that in light of Great-West , we start with courts should “consult[], as we have done, whether a claim for interest on the late standard current works such as Dobbs, payment of funds would generally be one Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements, at law or one in equity. It is clear that a which make the answers clear.” Great- claim for interest alone ( i.e. , where the West , 534 U.S. at 217. Accordingly, we underlying obligation had already been inquire whether Skretvedt may seek paid) on a late payment ( e.g. , an overdue interest on the delayed payment of his loan) was traditionally not permitted at T & P be ne fits thro u g h e q u i t ab le law. See Stuart v. Barnes , 153 U.S. 456, restitution–by way of a constructive trust, 462 (1894) (in an action for assumpsit, equita ble lien, or accounting for “[w]hen he who has [the] right [to compel profits–the three forms of restitution that payment] commences an action for its the Court determined are equitable. enforcement, he at the same time acquires
Because a constructive trust may be a subordinate right, incident to the relief placed over “interest” actually earned by a which he may obtain, to demand and plan that has wrongfully delayed paying receive interest. If, however, the principal benefits, we examine only the constructive sum has been paid, so that, as to it, an trust remedy. [26] action brought cannot be maintained, the opportunity to acquire a right to damages is lost.”). However, an independent claim [26] In a well-reasoned opinion, the for interest on wrongfully withheld funds District Court in Dobson v. Hartford (where the underlying funds themselves Financial Services, et al. , 196 F. Supp. 2d are no longer in dispute), as Fotta I 152, 169-73 (D. Conn. 2002), determined explains, would be cognizable under a that both a constructive trust and/or restitutionary theory. See Restatement of accounting for profits would allow for the Restitution § 190, at 780 (“Where a person disgorging of a fiduciary’s ill-gotten gain in a fiduciary relation to another acquires obtained by wrongfully withholding property, and the acquisition or retention disability benefits in violation of ERISA. of the property is in violation of his duty as The Court of Appeals for the Eighth fiduciary, he holds it upon a constructive Circuit very recently has determined that trust for the other.”). an award of interest is still permissible after Great-West using the accounting for Given the Supreme Court’s determination in Great-West that only profits remedy. See Parke v. First equitable restitution is available under § Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. , ___ F.3d ___, 2004 W L 1144787, at *3-*7 (8th Cir. 502(a)(3)(B), we now determine whether a claim for interest on wrongfully withheld 2004) (“an award of interest on wrongfully ERISA funds is equitable, as opposed to delayed benefits remains permissible under [§ 502](a)(3)(B) after [ Great-West through legal, restitution. In making this
an accounting for profits] as a remedy for According to Dobbs, a constructive a breach of a fiduciary duty to a trust can be imposed “upon any beneficiary”); see also Dunnigan v. Metro. identifiable kind of property or entitlement Life Ins. Co. , 214 F.R.D. 125, 134-35 in the defendant’s hands if, in equity and (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“ Great-West has no conscience, it belongs to the plaintiff.” bearing on [an action for interest on the Dobbs § 4.3(2), at 589-90. A constructive delayed payment of benefits under trust is “only used when the defendant has § 502(a)(3)] because the relief [plaintiff] a legally recognized right in a particular seeks–an accounting of [the fiduciary’s] asset [, which] may even be a fund of profits made on withheld disability money like a bank account.” Id. at 591. benefits–is a form of relief ‘typically The constructive trust has what Dobbs available in equity’. . . .”). calls the “important characteristic” of
With respect to the accounting for allowing a plaintiff to “obtain, not merely profits remedy, however, the Supreme what he lost, but gains received by the Court in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood , 369 defendant from the property’s increase in U.S. 469 (1962), cautioned that value, from its transfer, from its use in a
[t]he necessary prerequisite business operation.” Id. at 592. to the right to maintain a
Dobbs is consistent with the suit for an equitable Restatement of Restitution, which suggests accounting, like all other that a constructive trust arises “[w]here a equitable remedies, is . . . person holding title to property is subject the absence of an adequate r e m e d y a t l a w . Consequently, in order to maintain such a suit on a where the legal issues are cause of action cognizable too complicated for the jury at law, as this one is, the adequately to handle alone, plaintiff must be able to the burden of such a show that the ‘accounts showing is considerably between the parties’ are of increased and it will indeed such a ‘complicated nature’ be a rare case in which it that only a court of equity can be met. can satisfactorily unravel Id. at 478 (footnotes omitted). Dairy them. In view of the powers Queen appears to cast some doubt on the given to District Courts by purely equitable nature of the accounting Federal Rule of Civil for profits remedy. We proceed with the Procedure 53(b) to appoint constructive trust remedy because it is masters to assist the jury in clear that this remedy would have been those exceptional cases typically available in equity.
to an equitable duty to convey it to another plaintiff. . . . on the ground that he would be unjustly
Id. at 643-44. Dobbs, Palmer, and the enriched if he were permitted to retain it. . Restatement all make clear that the . .” Restatement of Restitution § 160, at constructive trust remedy typically would 640-41; see also Palmer § 1.3, at 12 (“In allow Skretvedt, in equity, to force DuPont the cases as a whole, constructive trust is to disgorge the gain it received on his accepted as a technique to be used in withheld benefits under a restitutionary working out solutions to problems of theory. unjust enrichment. . . .”). Generally, a constructive trust is imposed “to restore to 3. Specific Funds Traceable the plaintiff property of which he has been to an ERISA Plan unjustly deprived and to take from the
We must still determine, however, defendant property the retention of which whether the restitution Skretvedt seeks is by him would result in a corresponding with respect to “money or property unjust enrichment of the defendant. . . .” identified as belonging in good conscience Restatement of Restitution § 160, cmt. d, to the plaintiff [that can] clearly be traced at 643. Even where the to particular funds or property in the plaintiff . . . has not suffered defendant’s possession.” Great-West , 534 a loss or . . . has not suffered U.S. at 204; see also Palmer § 3.7, at 262 (in “most of the restitution cases the a loss as great as the benefit received by the defendant[,] equitable relief sought by the plaintiff is with respect to specific property, usually to . . . the defendant is compelled to surrender the obtain either specific restitution or a lien benefit on the ground that he on the property”). would be unjustly enriched
DuPont, seizing on this aspect of if he were permitted to Great-West , argues that Skretvedt seeks to retain it, even though that make it and the defendant ERISA plans enrichment is not at the “personally liable” for “interest” on the expense or wholly at the delayed payment of his ERISA benefits in expense of the plaintiff. violation of Great-West . We disagree. Thus, if the defendant has Skretvedt’s cause of action under made a profit through the § 502(a)(3)(B) is against the relevant violation of a duty to the ERISA plans whereby he seeks restitution plaintiff to whom he is in a by way of a constructive trust over the fiduciary relation, he can be actual funds wrongfully earned by those compelled to surrender the profit to the plaintiff, although the profit was not made at the expense of the
plans. [27] In our case, we need not even look to a third-party transferee to find the funds In explaining the degree to which a Skretvedt alleges belong to him. Instead, plaintiff must identify money or property we need look no further than the ERISA that is “clearly . . . trace[able] to particular plans that withheld Skretvedt’s benefits for funds or property in the defendant’s several years and profited with respect to possession,” Great-West , 534 U.S. at 213, the withholding of those benefits. As did the Supreme Court looked to Harris Trust the fiduciaries in Harris Trust , Skretvedt and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith has sufficiently identified specific funds Barney, Inc. , 530 U.S. 238 (2000). There, traceable to the defendant ERISA plans an ERISA pension plan fiduciary that belong in good conscience to him. [28] purchased interests in several motel properties for $21 million from a non- 4. Proceedings on Remand fiduciary party in interest (the “transferee”
In this context, we reverse the of the plan’s assets). The transaction, the Magistrate Judge’s determination that as a Court assumed, was prohibited by statute. matter of law Skretvedt cannot seek The Court allowed an action under § interest on the delayed payment of his 502(a)(3)(B) against the transferee “for T&P benefits under § 502(a)(3)(B). We restitution of the property (if not already remand to the Magistrate Judge disposed of) or disgorgement of proceeds Skretvedt’s claim for interest with respect (if already disposed of), and disgorgement to the delayed payment of T&P benefits of the third person’s profits derived for that Court to determine in the first therefrom,” id. at 250, where the transferee instance whether, under Fotta II , “those “had actual or constructive knowledge of the circumstances that rendered the transaction unlawful.” Id. at 251. [28] Indeed, as several circuit courts have noted, the Senate Finance Committee, in its report on ERISA , specifically
benefits were wrongfully withheld or wrongfully delayed, that is, . . . withheld or delayed in violation of ERISA or an
in an award for the delayed payment of ERISA plan.” 319 F.3d at 617. [29] If benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B) since benefits were wrongfully withheld, our prior holding in Holmes v. Pension “interest is presumptively appropriate . . . Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp. , 213 F.3d u n l e s s e x c e p t i o n a l o r u n u s u a l 124, 131-34 (3d Cir. 2000). In Holmes , circumstances exist making the award of we held that a District Court did not abuse interest inequitable [, such as] bad faith or its discretion in awarding interest on the dilatoriness by the claimant.” Id. at 618 delayed payment of pension benefits under (internal quotation marks and citations the Treasury Bill yield rate as calculated in omitted). [30] 28 U.S.C. § 1961 because, according to the District Court in that case, requiring the ERISA plan to disgorge its profits “would [29] Our determination in Fotta II that a be essentially punitive in nature, and . . . district court must consider whether punitive measures were inappropriate benefits were wrongfully withheld or where the delayed payment of benefits was wrongfully delayed was based on the fact inadvertent rather than intentional.” Id. at that § 502(a)(3)(B) “does not . . . authorize 132 (internal quotation marks and citations appropriate equitable relief at large , but omitted). only ‘appropriate equitable relief’ for the To the extent that Skretvedt seeks purpose of ‘redress[ing any] violations or on remand a constructive trust to disgorge enforc[ing] any provisions of ERISA or an the gain of his ERISA plans, it would ERISA plan.” Fotta II , 319 F.3d at 616 seem, in light of Great-West , that the (quoting Fotta I , 165 F.3d at 213 (citing actual gain (if any) made on withheld Mertens , 508 U.S. at 253)) (internal benefits would be an appropriate subject of quotation marks omitted; emphasis in a constructive trust. See Dobbs § 4.3(2), at original). 592 (“The constructive trust has [an] Of course, to the extent that especially important characteristic[:] . . . Skretvedt seeks prejudgment interest on under the rules for following property or his incapability benefits, which were money into its product, the plaintiff may awarded by court judgment pursuant to obtain . . . gains received by the defendant § 502(a)(1)(B), wrongful withholding or from the property’s increase in value. . . wrongful delay is not per se relevant, as .”). prejudgment interest in that context However, the Eighth Circuit in derives from § 502(a)(1)(B) and the Parke , applying the accounting for profits District Court’s exercise of discretion in remedy, has noted that awarding interest. See supra Section V-A. [a] defendant . . . [30] Great-West may have changed the “gains” from the wrongful nature of how “interest” is to be calculated C. Postjudgment Interest
w i t h h o l d in g o f t h e 28 U.S.C. § 1961 provides that plaintiff’s benefits even if “[i]nterest shall be allowed on any money the plaintiff does not prove judgment in a civil case recovered in a specific financial profit. In district court.” Id. Skretvedt seeks particular, the defendant postjudgment interest, presumably on any receives a benefit from award of interest and prejudgment interest having control over the he receives on remand from this opinion money. See [Dobbs] and to the extent DuPont delayed in paying § 3.6(2), at 344 n.22 incapability benefits after the Magistrate (“[U]ntil the plaintiff is Judge’s December 13, 2001, judgment. [31] paid, the defendant has the use of funds that ought to go With respect to Skretvedt’s to the discharge of his obligation of the plaintiff. That is a benefit. The
the use of money . . . to which the plaintiff defendant may [choose] not was entitled” but “did not actually reap [to] use the funds or collect interest or profits.” Dobbs § 3.6(2), at i n t e r e s t o n t h e m . 344. This treatise indicates that the Nevertheless, he has a “clearest case for [such interest] liability benefit found in his power for unrealized gains occu rs with to do so.”). fiduciaries who are under a duty to invest Parke , ___ F.3d at ___, 2004 WL funds for the benefit of the plaintiff but 1144787, at *7 (third alteration in fail[] to do so.” Id. at 345. original). Thus, while Parke suggested We need not, and cannot, address that it may be possible to disgorge a today whether interest or actual gain is to defendant’s actual gain if “specific be awarded to Skretvedt under § financial profit” can be shown, the Court 502(a)(3)(B), however, as the Magistrate concluded that “[i]n the particular context Judge could determine that Skretvedt is of withheld benefits under ERISA, . . . not entitled to such an award under Fotta [i]nterest is, in many respects, the only II and a record has not been developed as way to account for this gain and therefore to the actual gain, if any, made by the is an appropriate measure of the extent to relevant ERISA plans. which [a defendant] was unjustly [31] As noted supra , no judgment exists enriched.” Id. In reaching that conclusion, Parke relied on a section of with r e s p ec t to T & P bene fits . Dobbs suggesting that interest, as opposed Accordingly, there is no basis for an award to a defendant’s actual gain, is available as of postjudgment interest under § 1961 with restitution where the defendant “has had respect to these benefits. underlying incapability benefits award, determined that postjudgment interest there was a delay between the Magistrate under § 1961 “properly runs from the date Judge’s December 13, 2001, judgment of the entry of judgment.” Kaiser awarding incapability benefits and DuPont Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno , having paid those benefits on March 6, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990). The fact that 2002, with further adjustments made on the December 13, 2001, judgment was not April 15 and 16, 2002. Several circuit a final order for purposes of appeal would courts have held that an award of not otherwise prevent postjudgment postjudgment interest on benefits awarded interest from running under § 1961 pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) is pursuant to a timely request from mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 if Skretvedt. We stated in In re Lower Lake requested. [32] The Supreme Court has Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation , 998
F.2d 1144, 1177-78 (3d Cir. 1993), that § 1961 “does not, by its terms, mandate that the judgment from which interest is [32] See, e.g. , Cottrill v. Sparrow, calculated must be a final judgment. Our Johnson & Ursillo, Inc. , 100 F.3d 220, 224 view is consistent with the statute’s (1st Cir. 1996) (“ERISA provides for philosophy of providing compensation postjudgment interest to be calculated at from a point at which the loss-causing the federal rate, 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) defendant’s liability is entered on record.” (1994)”); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am. , 987 F.2d 1017, 1031 (4th Cir. 1993) ( en banc ) (“In contrast to the district court’s discretion in the awarding of pre-judgment interest, federa l law mandates the awarding of post-judgment postjudgment interest statute allows interest. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988). While interest on “all money judgments,” ERISA does not specifically address including those in ERISA cases.”) post-judgment interest, it does provide that (internal citations and quotation marks the statute is not to be construed to ‘alter, omitted); Mansker v. TMG Life Ins. Co. , amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or 54 F.3d 1322, 1331 (8th Cir. 1995) (“28 supersede any law of the United States.’ U.S.C. § 1961 provides the proper measure 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988). Therefore, for determining rates of both prejudgment the federal post-judgment interest statute, and postjudgment interest” in ERISA 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988), is applicable in cases); Carriers Container Council, Inc. v. ERISA cases.”); Caffey v. UNUM Life Ins. Mobile S.S. Ass’n, Inc. et al. , 948 F.2d Co. , 302 F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir. 2002) 1219, 1226 (11th Cir. 1991) (upholding (“The statute mandates the imposition of application of § 1961 to an ERISA award); post-judgment interest, thus removing the I.A.M. Nat. Pension Fund, Plan A, A award of such interest from the discretion Benefits v. Slyman Indus., Inc. , 901 F.2d of the District Court. The federal 127, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same). Id. [33] to pursue postjudgment interest with
respect to DuPont’s four month delay in However, while postjudgment paying incapability benefits. interest can begin to accrue on a non-final judgment under Iron Ore , the phrase “any With respect to postjudgment money judgment” in § 1961(a) “requires interest on the Magistrate Judge’s award of that the judgment at issue award a fixed any prejudgment interest for incapability amount of fees to the prevailing party in benefits, postjudgment interest should be order to trigger the post-judgment interest calculated based upon the underlying period.” Eaves v. County of Cape May , judgment and award of prejudgment 239 F.3d 527, 534 (3d Cir. 2001). As we interest. See Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson have noted, however, the judgment entered Navigation Co. , 785 F.2d 59, 63 (3d Cir. with respect to incapability benefits on 1986); see generally Caffey v. UNUM Life December 13, 2001, did not quantify a Ins. Co. , 302 F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir. 2002) mon etary amo u nt. Ac cord ingly, (“postjudgment interest should be awarded postjudgment interest under § 1961 did not on the entire amount of the judgment, begin to accrue on that date because no including any prejudgment interest”) “ money judgment” had been entered. (noting agreement among the Fourth, Absent the existence of a “ money Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit judgment,” Skretvedt is, therefore, unable Courts). Accordingly, Skretvedt could
receive postjudgment interest on any award of prejudgment interest under [33] A circuit split has developed on this ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) with respect to issue, however. The Ninth Circuit, incapability benefits, should the Magistrate looking to “practical considerations,” has Judge award prejudgment interest in determined that postjudgment interest exercising her discretion, as discussed under § 1961 begins to run only where a above in Section V-A. final, appealable judgment has been
There is some question, however, as entered. See Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. to whether § 1961 applies to a judgment Co. of Am. , 269 F.3d 974, 990-91 (9th Cir. obtained pursuant to an equitable 2001) (“‘judgment’ within the meaning of remedy, [34] which would affect the 28 U.S.C. § 1961 means ‘final, appealable order’”). The Sixth Circuit, implicitly agreeing with Iron Ore , has determined availability of post-judgment interest on an delayed payment of T&P benefits; and (3) award of interest for the delayed payment postjudgment interest on both of those o f T&P b en efits u n der ER I S A awards. We remand for the M agistrate § 502(a)(3)(B). We need not address this Judge to reconsider in the first instance issue today, as the Magistrate Judge might whether Skretvedt is entitled in light of determine that Skretvedt is not entitled to this opinion to prejudgment interest on the a constructive trust for interest under Fotta award of incapability benefits and/or II because there was not a wrongful interest on the delayed payment of T&P withholding of or delay in paying T&P benefits, without prejudice to Skretvedt’s benefits. ability to file a timely motion for
postjudgment interest on any resulting Conclusion award of prejudgment interest (with We reverse the Magistrate Judge’s respect to incapability benefits) or interest August 21, 2002, and November 12, 2002, (with respect to T&P benefits). The orders only with respect to their denial of: appeal is dismissed otherwise to the extent (1) prejudgment interest on the award of it seeks to address claims raised in the incapability benefits; (2) interest on the complaint other than Counts I and V for
i n c a p a b i l i t y a n d T & P b e n e f i t s , respectively.
Supreme Court held that the pre decessor statute to section 1961[] did not apply to equitable decrees, relying on the use of the word “ j u d g m e n t ” , a s distinguished from “decree”, the equitable counterpart. C h i e f J u s t i c e T a n e y explained that, “[the statute] is confined, in plain terms, to judgments at law.” Id.
Id. at 125-26 (noting a “hesitancy” to interpret § 19 61 as man dati ng postjudgment interest on back-pay awards under the Fair Labor Standards Act when those awards are procured under a section of that Act arguably providing for relief that is equitable in nature, but nonetheless allowing for postjudgment interest on other grounds) (footnote omitted).
NOTES
[9] See also Hindes v. F.D.I.C. , 137 F.3d the procedural requirements of Fed. R. 148, 156 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We have Civ. P. 58 for an order that begins the case law indicating that ‘[a]n order that running of the time for appeal. See Local effectively ends the litigation on the merits Union No. 1992 of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec. is an appealable final judgment even if the Workers v. The Okonite Co. , 358 F.3d 278, district court does not formally include 285-86 (3d Cir. 2004) (order satisfies Rule
[20] We recognize that the panel in Fotta whether such an award is precluded by the federal statute that gives rise to the cause II , in a case where there had been no of action, and if such an award is not underlying judgment representing an precluded, whether it would further the award of benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B), congressional policies embodied in the act. construed Anthuis as allowing for an ERISA does not preclude an award of award of prejudgment interest under prejudgment interest. Furthermore, . . . we § 502(a)(3)(B). have no doubt[] that an award of Fotta I . . . determined who prejudgment interest under ERISA furthers has a cause of action under the purposes of that statute by encouraging § 502(a)(3)(B). Before Fotta plan providers to settle disputes quickly I , o n l y a n E R I S A and fairly, thereby avoiding the expense beneficiary who had brought and difficulty of federal litigation.”) a legal action to recover (internal citation omitted); Bricklayers’ w r o n g f u l l y w i t h h e l d Pension Trust Fund v. Taiariol , 671 F.2d benefits could sue for 988, 989 (6th Cir. 1982) (“The general rule i n t e r e s t u n d e r is that in the absence of a statutory [§ 502(a)(3)(B)]. See, e.g. , provision the award of prejudgment Anthuis , 971 F.2d at 1010. interest is in the discretion of the court.”); Fotta II , 319 F.3d at 617. But as noted, Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. , Anthuis itself made no mention of a 269 F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) successful ERISA plaintiff who received (allowing for prejudgment interest on an benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) having to ERISA award); Florence Nightingale “sue for interest” under § 503(a)(3)(B). Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Blue Cross/Blue Instead, it indicated that “in the district Shield of Ala. , 41 F.3d 1476, 1484 (11th court’s discretion, prejudgment interest Cir. 1995) (“The award of an amount of may be awarded for a denial of pension prejudgment interest in an ERISA case is benefits.” Anthuis , 971 F.2d at 1010 a matter committed to the sound discretion (emphasis added). Accordingly, a district of the trial court.”) (internal quotation court under Anthuis could allow for marks omitted). prejudgment interest as part of the benefits
[25] Without deciding the issue, the Court constructive trust on particular property held by the defendant, he may also recover of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has profits produced by the defendant’s use of also suggested that Great-West “raises the that property, even if he cannot identify a question whether § 502(a)(3) ever allows particular res containing the profits sought an award of interest for delayed benefits or to be recovered. See 1 Dobbs § 4.3(1), at whether such a claim is an impermissible 588; id. , § 4.3(5), at 608.” Great-West , attempt to dress an essentially legal claim 534 U.S. at 214 n.2. We address this form in the language of equity.” Flint v. ABB, of restitution infra note 26. Inc. , 337 F.3d 1326, 1331 (11th Cir. 2003).
[27] As a record has not been developed contemplated that “appropriate equitable as to whether Skretvedt’s ERISA plans relief” under § 502(a)(3)(B) would have, in fact, profited with respect to the include, “[f]or example, . . . a constructive withholding of Skretvedt’s benefits during trust [to] be imposed on the plan assets. . . the relevant time period, or whether those .” S. Rep. No. 93-383, reprinted in 1974 plans have retained funds from that period U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4989; see Harsch v. (as opposed to having, at least Eisenberg , 956 F.2d 651, 656 (7th Cir. hypothetically speaking, transferred their 1992) (quoting the above language); funds to a third party), we express no Novak v. Andersen Corp. , 962 F.2d 757, opinion as to the entit(ies) that would 760 (8th Cir. 1992) (same); Sokol v. properly be the subject of a judgment Bernstein , 803 F.2d 532, 538 (9th Cir. entered pursuant to § 502(a)(3)(B). 1986) (same).
[34] We expressed this concern in Brock that “the better rule is for plaintiffs to be entitled to post-judgment interest from the v. Richardson , 812 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. date of entry of the initial, partial judgment 1987): . . . , even though that judgment was not In Perkins v. Fourniquet , 55 yet appealable.” Skalka v. Fernald Envtl. U.S. (14 How.) 328, 330, 14 Restoration Mgmt. Corp. , 178 F.3d 414, L.Ed. 441 (1853), the 429 (6th Cir. 1999).
