Skoog v. Harbert Private Equity Fund, II, LLC
12 CVS 406
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, COUNTY OF CATAWBA, IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE, SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
March 25, 2013
2013 NCBC 17
Gale, Judge
GREG SKOOG, ROSEMARY SKOOG and ALAN DIETZ, Plaintiffs, v. HARBERT PRIVATE EQUITY FUND, II, LLC, and HARBERT PRIVATE EQUITY FUND II MM, LLC, Defendants.
{1} THIS MATTER is before the court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (“Motion“) pursuant to
Sigmon, Clark, Mackie, Hanvey & Ferrell, P.A. by Forrest A Ferrell and Stephen L. Palmer for Plaintiffs.
McGuire Woods LLP by Douglas W. Ey, Jr., R. Matthew Pearson, and T. Richmond McPherson, III for Defendants.
Gale, Judge.
I. PARTIES
{2} Plaintiffs Greg Skoog, Rosemary Skoog, and Alan Dietz are citizens and residents of Catawba County, North Carolina and were shareholders of Lance Transport, Inc. (“Lance Transport“). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–3, 6.) Lance Transport was a freight transportation business in Hildebran, North Carolina. (Am. Compl. ¶ 7.)
{3} Defendant Harbert Private Equity Fund II MM, LLC (“Harbert MM“) is an Alabama limited liability company doing business in Catawba County, North
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{4} Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit in Catawba County on March 5, 2012. The case was designated a Business Court case by Chief Justice Sarah Parker by Order dated April 9, 2012 and assigned to the undersigned on April 11, 2012. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the original Complaint on May 7, 2012 and a hearing was held on July 12, 2012.
{5} Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on August 15, 2012, mooting the original Motion to Dismiss. The Amended Complaint brings a claim alleging violations of the North Carolina Securities Act (“NCSA“),
{6} Defendants filed the present Motion on September 14, 2012. The Motion has been fully briefed, a hearing was held on December 4, 2012, and the matter is ripe for disposition.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
{7} The court does not make findings of fact in connection with a motion to dismiss, as a motion to dismiss “does not present the merits, but only [determines]
A. Negotiations
{8} In 2008, Harbert, as the majority shareholder of CF Holding Company, Inc. (“CF Holding“)2, approached Plaintiffs to negotiate a potential acquisition of Lance Transport by CF Holding. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) Winston Gillum was the primary negotiator on behalf of Harbert and CF Holding, and Greg Skoog primarily negotiated on behalf of Lance Transport. (Am. Compl. ¶ 9.)
{9} On October 9, 2008, Harbert and CF Holding issued a Letter of Intent offering to purchase Lance Transport’s business for 11,300 shares of common stock of CF Holding (valued at $154.87 per share), cash, and a payoff of Lance Transport’s debt obligations, which were guaranteed by Plaintiffs. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) At the time of the negotiations for the sale of Lance Transport, CF Holding was experiencing financial difficulties and was in default on a loan with Bank of America. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 27.) To allow CF Holding to meet its operating expenses, Harbert loaned CF Holding a total of $1.5 million in “working capital” during this time period; $500,000.00 each on September 30, 2008, December 26, 2008, and February 2, 2009. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 17, 41, 64.)
{10} During Plaintiffs’ due diligence period, Harbert provided financial information for CF Holding which covered the period ending in November 2008
{11} As a result of their due diligence review Plaintiffs “became aware that CF Holding would require substantial infusions of working capital for it to remain a viable operating entity.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) When Greg Skoog expressed this concern to Winston Gillum, Gillum responded that Harbert would provide CF Holding with approximately $3 million in cash when the acquisition occurred, and that Harbert “had $35 million in committed but uncalled capital to provide additional equity investments into CF Holding if needed.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20–21.) Don Beard of Harbert also expressed Harbert’s intention to “support CF Holding over the long haul” at a dinner Plaintiffs attended before the closing of the sale of Lance Transport to CF Holding. (Am. Compl. ¶ 36.)
B. Closing
{12} On February 12, 2009 the acquisition of Lance Transport closed and CF Holding and Lance Transport signed a Stock Purchase Agreement setting forth the final terms of the deal. (Am. Compl. ¶ 38; Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A.) The final terms included that Plaintiffs would receive $797,838.00 cash, 16,000 shares of stock in CF Holding (valued at $2 million, or $125 per share), promissory notes in the amount of $2.1 million, and the assumption by CF Holding of approximately $3,445,186.00 in Lance Transport debt, for a total compensation of over $8 million. (Am. Compl. ¶ 39.) Alan Dietz and Greg Skoog were also offered post-closing employment with CF Holding. (Am. Compl. ¶ 39.)
{13} Documents referenced in the Amended Complaint demonstrate other parts of the transaction that are not stated in the specific allegations of the Amended Complaint itself. These include that as part of the closing, Harbert
C. Post Closing
{14} Soon after the closing in February, 2009, CF Holding was required to make vehicle tag payments totaling approximately $500,000.00, of which Plaintiffs allege they were unaware at closing and which significantly reduced CF Holding’s operating capital. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 42.) Harbert made a fourth $500,000.00 infusion of working capital into CF Holding sometime after the closing. (Am. Compl. ¶ 52.) CF Holding made only three interest payments on the $2.1 million of notes issued to Plaintiffs pursuant to the terms of the Stock Purchase Agreement before filing for bankruptcy protection in 2011. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 53.)
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{15} The appropriate inquiry on a motion to dismiss pursuant to
V. ANALYSIS
{16} Plaintiffs claim that they would not have entered into the transaction with CF Holding had they known its true financial condition. (Am. Compl. ¶ 40.) They allege that Harbert “intended to provide selective information to the Plaintiffs in an effort to mislead them into a false belief as to the value of the consideration they would receive in exchange for selling the business of Lance Transport to CF Holding[ ],” knowing that the consideration Plaintiffs were to receive pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agreement was overvalued. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 45.)
{17} Plaintiffs complain these alleged actions by Defendants were in violation of the NCSA, making them either primarily liable under
A. Allegations Against Defendant Harbert MM
{18} In their original Complaint, Plaintiffs stated without further specificity that Defendant Harbert MM was “acting in concert with Harbert,” and so is jointly and severally liable with Harbert. (Compl. ¶ 72.) At the hearing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the original Complaint, Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that they were not attempting to allege a claim in the nature of a conspiracy against Harbert MM, but instead that Harbert MM was liable under the terms of the NCSA, and asked to be able to amend their Complaint to reflect the discussion that occurred at the hearing. (Hearing Tr. 86:4–87:21, July 12, 2012.) In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs again state only the conclusion that Harbert MM “was acting in concert with” Harbert, and as such is jointly and severally liable; Plaintiffs do not allege that Harbert MM is a “controlling person” of Harbert or of CF Holding so as to state
B. Harbert’s Primary Liability Under Section 56(a)
{19} So far is as relevant here, subsection (a) of § 56 of the NCSA creates primary civil liability for:
(a) Any person who:
(1) Offers or sells a security in violation of
G.S. 78A-8(1) [or]78A-8(3) . . . , or(2) Offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of the untruth or omission), and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or omission . . . .
{20} Section 56(a) provides liability only against one who offers or sells a security. The NCSA defines a “security” as:
any note; stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness; certificate of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement; . . . investment contract . . .; or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security[.]
i. Harbert as a Seller or Offeror of a Security
{21} The question then arises whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Harbert offered or sold the shares of CF Holding to Plaintiffs such that their
{22} The NCSA defines “sell” as including “every contract of sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for value,” and defines “offer” or “offer to sell” as including “every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security for value.
{23} In Williams the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered who may be deemed a seller or offeror under the NCSA. 98 N.C. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 746. The Court of Appeals cited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Pinter v. Dahl, which “placed great emphasis on the solicitation of the buyer as the ‘most critical stage of the selling transaction’” when determining that the defendant attorney was not an offeror or seller because he did not solicit the investment at issue in any way. Id. at 279, 390 S.E.2d at 749. This is consistent with the NCSA’s definition of “offer,” which includes “solicitation of an offer to buy” a security.
{24} Plaintiffs have alleged that it was Harbert that approached the Plaintiffs offering to negotiate CF Holding’s acquisition of Lance Transport, and that “Harbert was the majority and controlling shareholder of CF Holding and conducted all material negotiations concerning CF Holding’s acquisition of Lance Transport’s business operations.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 11.) Plaintiffs have also alleged that Harbert made promises of continued support for CF Holding to induce Plaintiffs to sell Lance Transport to CF Holding. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21–22, 37.)
ii. Harbert’s Liability Under Section 56(a)(2)
{26} Section 56(a)(2) provides a cause of action against a person who:
offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of the untruth or omission) . . . .
{27} To state a claim pursuant to § 56(a)(2) then, a plaintiff must at a minimum allege (1) a false or misleading statement, or a statement which, because of the circumstances under which it was made, was made false or misleading because of the omission of other facts; (2) that the statement was material; and (3) that the statement was made by one who offered or sold a security. NNN Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Highwoods Realty Ltd. P’ship, 2013 NCBC LEXIS 11, at *68 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2013).
{28} An omission must be tied to an affirmative statement, because there is no general duty of disclosure imposed by either federal or North Carolina securities
{29} A statement is material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable purchaser would consider it important in deciding whether or not to purchase,” Williams, 98 N.C. App. at 280, 390 S.E.2d at 749 (alterations in original omitted) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)), or if a reasonable purchaser “would have viewed the total mix of information made available to be significantly altered by disclosure of the fact.” Dunn v. Borta, 369 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2004). The issue of materiality usually involves a mixed question of law and fact, typically to be decided by a jury. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976). However, materiality may be resolved on a motion to dismiss if no “reasonable jury could find it substantially likely that a reasonable investor would find the fact at issue material in the ‘total mix’ of information.” Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650, 657 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450).
{30} The court then examines whether Plaintiffs’ allegations adequately tie omissions to affirmative statements in order to state a claim under § 56(a)(2). Plaintiffs complain that Harbert failed to disclose the following information before closing:
the dates of the $1.5 million in loans from Harbert; - that CF Holding was in default on its loan with Bank of America;
- CF Holding’s $500,000.00 vehicle tag expense due soon after closing and CF Holding’s inability to pay that expense if the Lance Transport sale was not completed; and
- the inability of one of CF Holding’s subsidiaries to make its lease payments.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 27, 34, 64.) Plaintiffs allege that the above omissions made the following statements by Harbert misleading:
- that the financial condition of CF Holding was as indicated by the November 2008 financial documents;
- that Harbert had $35 million in committed but uncalled capital to provide equity investments in CF Holding if needed and would support CF Holding over the long haul; and
- that the value of the shares of CF Holding stock was $125 per share, the value attributed to the stock in the Stock Purchase Agreement.
(Pls.’ Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. [hereinafter Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss] 6.)
{31} Plaintiffs allege that these omissions were material because the information was necessary for them to have an accurate view of the current financial state of CF Holding, and consequently, of the value of the consideration Plaintiffs were to receive pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agreement. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 64–65.) In addition to these omissions, Plaintiffs further seek to premise liability on Harbert’s affirmation of future financial support for CF Holding. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 40.)
{32} Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not satisfied the requirements of § 56(a)(2) because they have failed to tie the alleged omissions to any statements which were made misleading by the alleged omissions, that, in any event, some of the alleged omissions were actually disclosed to Plaintiffs, and that the information
1. The Stock Valuation at Closing Was Not a “Statement” on which § 56(a)(2) Liability Can Rest
{33} Plaintiffs seek to tie the various omissions of which they complain either to the November 2008 financial documents they were provided, or the valuation placed on CF Holding stock in the Stock Purchase Agreement. However, the value of the stock stated in the Stock Purchase Agreement cannot be fairly considered to be a “statement” by Harbert. Rather, it reflects the agreement reached between the parties to the transaction as to the value to be attributed to the shares of CF Holding stock, as well as the value of other components to comprise the overall sales consideration. This value was a matter of negotiation, as evidenced by the fact that the value given the stock changed over the course of the negotiations. Compare (Am. Compl. ¶ 15) with (Am. Compl. ¶ 26). Plaintiffs have pointed to no financial statement or warranty provided by Harbert regarding the result or method of any valuation.
2. The Timing of the $1.5 Million in Loans
{34} In their initial Complaint, Plaintiffs first alleged that they were not told of the $1.5 million in loans Harbert made to CF Holding, or that the $1.5 million would be repaid out of the $2.75 million Harbert agreed to put in to CF Holding at closing. (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 26, 37–40.) However, these allegations cannot be squared with the fact that the documents incorporated into the Stock Purchase
{35} Even if the court accepts that the November financial documents provided to Plaintiffs constitute a “statement” by Harbert of the general financial state of CF Holding as of November, 2008, that statement could not be made misleading by its failure to disclose events in December 2008 and February 2009 which had not yet occurred. See, e.g., Carlucci v. Han, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110786, at *47 (E.D. Va. 2012) (“the allegation concerning Envion’s financial state in April 2012 does not render earlier statements about Carlucci’s potential investment return false at the time those statements were made.“) Plaintiffs do not point to any portion of the November financial documents which was made misleading by the failure of Harbert to disclose the timing of Harbert’s loans, rather making the contention at oral argument that the failure to amend the November financial documents to reflect those loans was misleading. Stated simply, Plaintiffs cannot tie omissions regarding the timing of the loans to the November 2008
{36} In sum, the court concludes that alleged failures to disclose the timing of the three loans cannot anchor a claim under § 56(a)(2).
3. The Default on the Loan with Bank of America
{37} Plaintiffs also maintain that they were not informed that CF Holding was in default on its loan with Bank of America immediately before closing. (Am. Compl. ¶ 27.) The statements made by Harbert made no specific affirmative representations as to the state of CF Holding’s loan with Bank of America. Plaintiffs must then demonstrate somehow that other statements were rendered misleading by the failure to disclose this fact. See Krim v. Coastal Physician Grp., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 621, 630 (M.D.N.C. 1998).
{38} It is not clear to what affirmative statement by Harbert Plaintiffs attempt to tie the omission, and considering Plaintiffs’ clear awareness of the financial difficulties CF Holding was experiencing, the court has serious doubt whether Plaintiffs could in any event successfully contend that covenant defaults under the lending agreement were material. But, the greater problem Plaintiffs face is that the default was disclosed in the closing documents upon which the
4. The Upcoming Vehicle Tag Payment
{39} Harbert contends that, even assuming that Plaintiffs were not specifically aware of the upcoming vehicle tag payments due and any inability CF Holding may have faced before closing in their ability to make them, the information as a matter of law was not material in light of the total mix of
{40} The court concludes that Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that any statement by Harbert was made misleading by its failure to disclose the upcoming vehicle tag payments. There is no allegation that Harbert provided any other information about upcoming obligations or general costs of doing business of CF Holding, and Plaintiffs do not allege that any statement in the November financial documents was made misleading by the omission. See Schoenhaut v. Am. Sensors, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 785, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Finding that the defendant’s failure to disclose the details of decreasing sales to one of the defendant’s largest customers was, as a matter of law, not a material omission because the Prospectus did not give the current level of sales, predict future sales levels, or suggest that the customer would remain a customer.) Plaintiffs did not request, and Defendants did not provide, any financial statement for the period between November 2008 and closing. Information regarding upcoming tag license payments would not have materially altered the “total mix” of information Plaintiffs received regarding the financial state of CF Holding. Plaintiffs were well aware that CF Holding was experiencing financial difficulty and that it “would require substantial infusions of working capital for it to remain a viable operating entity.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) Thus, Plaintiffs were already aware that CF Holding would have difficulty paying its bills coming due in the near future, and that the acquisition of Lance Transport was intended to help mitigate CF Holding’s financial difficulties. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.)
5. The Subsidiary’s Inability to Make its Lease Payment
{41} The final omission alleged by Plaintiffs is the failure of Harbert to inform Plaintiffs of CF Holding’s subsidiary’s inability to make payments on a lease of the building out of which the subsidiary operated. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33–34.) Plaintiffs again, however, fail to point to any statement by Harbert which was made misleading by this omission; Plaintiffs do not allege that they were provided any information about CF Holding’s subsidiaries or that Harbert took steps to conceal such information from Plaintiffs. See United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining the difference between simple nondisclosure and concealment, and noting that usually only concealment will give rise to an action under common law fraud); Krim, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 632 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (holding that Plaintiff failed to establish the scienter element of a Rule 10b-5 action because it did “not allege that Defendants concealed or misstated” anything).
6. Harbert’s Promises of Future Financial Support
{42} In claims of actual fraud under North Carolina law, “[a]n unfulfilled promise is not actionable fraud . . . unless the promisor had no intention of carrying it out at the time of the promise.” McKinnon v. CV Indus., Inc., 713 S.E.2d 495, 503 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). This same concept has been applied to claims of securities fraud in federal cases. See Ferland v. Orange Groves of Fla., Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690, 705–06 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (For claims brought pursuant to either § 12(a)(2) or Rule 10b-5, “[a] promissory representation . . . should only be considered a misrepresentation of fact where the evidence shows that the promise was made without the intent to perform“).
{44} In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any material misstatements of fact by Harbert adequate to state a claim under § 56(a)(2). As to that claim, Harbert’s Motion is GRANTED.
{45} Plaintiffs further allege that Harbert’s overall actions violated
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly:
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, . . . [or]
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
{46} Section 8 does not by its terms provide for civil liability for violations of its provisions. Instead, Subsections (1) and (3) of § 8 are made actionable by
{47} Plaintiffs allege that Harbert sought to induce Plaintiffs to sell Lance Transport to CF Holding because they knew of the truly dire financial condition of CF Holding and wished to mitigate their loss of investment in CF Holding. (Am.
{48} When promoting a § 56(a)(1) claim, in addition to Harbert’s scienter, Plaintiffs must allege actual and reasonable reliance on actions or inactions taken by Harbert. Plaintiffs have pled that Harbert “intended to provide selective information to the Plaintiffs in an effort to mislead them into a false belief as to the value of the consideration they would receive,” and “intended to deceive and/or mislead Plaintiffs as to the true financial state of CF Holding” (Am. Comp. ¶¶ 29, 48), and that “[b]ut for the incomplete financial information provided to Plaintiffs concerning the financial status of CF Holding, and Harbert’s repeated assurances that it would support CF Holding over the long haul,” Plaintiffs would not have entered into the transaction. (Am. Compl. ¶ 37.)
{49} The court believes there are significant questions which Plaintiffs may not ultimately be able to overcome, specifically whether they reasonably relied on Harbert when they failed to request further financial information once they admittedly became aware of the financial hurdles with which CF Holding was faced. Discovery may well further present problems in Plaintiffs being able to claim ignorance of facts that were expressly disclosed or reasonably inferable from documents they signed at closing. And there are questions whether, in light of the overall mix of information, Plaintiffs reasonably relied on Harbert’s promise of future financial support without requesting more in the nature of specific
{50} But, the court concludes that these inquiries are in the nature of a more factually-intense analysis than is appropriate in the context of a
C. Harbert’s Secondary Liability Under Section 56(c)
{51} Alternatively, Plaintiffs allege that if Harbert is not primarily liable as the seller or offeror of the stock, then Harbert should be held liable as a “control person” of CF Holding pursuant to
IT IS SO ORDERED, this the 25th day of March, 2013.