42 Ala. 255 | Ala. | 1868
Lead Opinion
These cases constitute an appeal and a cross appeal, and both are to be tried on the same record.
The principle settled in Purcell’s Adm’r v. Mather, 35 Ala. 570, is decisive of the main question involved in the litigation between the present parties. That' principle is, that a mere possibility or expectancy, not coupled with any interest in, or growing out of property, cannot be made the subject of a valid sale. In the language of Chancellor Kent, “the thing sold must have an actual or political existence, and be specific or identified, and capable of delivery; otherwise it is not strictly a contract of sale, but a special or executory agreement.” 2 Kent’s Com. 468.
It results that neither of the transfers by Doctor Gillespie to the plaintiff below, of accounts “to be made by the practice of medicine,” in the years named in the tranfers respectively conveyed to the plaintiff such title or interest in the accounts, when created, as would enable him to maintain an action thereon in his own name. But it is hardly necessary to say that this principle does not affect the validity of the transfers of such accounts, if any, which had been created at the date of the contracts respectively.
We are unable to perceive the distinction in principle insisted upon, between the case of Purcell’s Adm’r v. Mather, supra, and the present case. In the former, there was an attempt to convey specifically named accounts, which it was expected would be created ; here, there was a sale, not only of accounts in existence, but of all accounts generally, that might be thereafter created, in the practice of medicine by Doctor Gillespie, during the years named. We think it sufficiently appears from the whole of the con
We do not consider the question as to what are the respective rights and liabilities as between Doctor Gillespie and the plaintiff below, under their several contracts, it not being necessary to a decision of this case.
As to the cross-appeal: Under § 2240 of the Code, mutual debts, subsisting between the parties at the time of suit brought, may be set off, one against the other, by the defendant, “whether the legal title be in the defendant or not.” Conceding that a judgment is not so assignable as to enable the assigned to sue on it in his own name, (Burwell v. Magee, 9 Ala. 433); and that actions on judgments “in the names of the parties really interested,” are not provided for by § 2129 of the Code, still, under § 2240, a transferred judgment may be the subject of a set-off in the hands of the owner, whether he have the legal title or not, for such a judgment is a “debt” against the defendant therein. The phraseology of this section forbids, in our opinion,. the attainment of any other conclusion; and its effect is, to overturn the previously settled doctrine of this court, that the defendant cannot set off to the plaintiff’s action, a demand which he is not entitled to sue on in his own name.
Under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence of Ryan, it was a question for the jury as to whether the ownership of the judgment offered as a set-off, was in the defendant or not; and. the court instructed the jury, “that if they believed said judgment was the property of the de
There was no error in the ruling of the court in reference to the statute of limitations, as applicable to the account for the year 1857. — Todd v. Todd, 15 Ala. 743.
It results from what we have said, that in the case of the appeal by Skipper against Stokes, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.
But the judgment, as to the questions raised on the cross-appeal, Stokes v. Skipper, is affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent to so much of the opinion of the court as holds that a transferred judgment can be plead as a set- off by the assignee. It has been settled by this court that an assigned judgment cannot be plead as a set-off by the transferee, (Burwell v. Magee, 9 Ala. 433, and the cases therein cited,) and that a party cannot avail himself of a claim or debt as a set-off which he cannot sue in his own name ; and that an assigned judgment cannot be sued on in the name of the assignee. Such has been the uniform doctrine of this court.
In the case of Drake v. Mitchell et al., 3 East, 257, Lord Ellenborough, C. J., in delivering his opinion said, “a judgment recovered in any form of action is still but a security for the original cause of action, until it be made productive in satisfaction to the party; and therefore till then, it cannot operate to change any other collateral concurrent remedy which the party may have.” The other justices concurred, and Grose, J., said, “though judgment has been recovered on the bill, yet not having produced satisfaction in fact, the plaintiff may still resort to his original remedy on the contract.”
This case has been approved by this court in the cases of White v. Martin, 1 Por. 217; Keith v. Estill, 9 Por. 669 ; Spivey v. Morris, 18 Ala. 154.
In the case of Keith v. Estill, supra, this court quotes approvingly from the opinion in the case of Wyman v.
Upon these authorities, I hold that judgments are not embraced within the terms used in § 2129 of the Code, and that if a suit is brought on a judgment, it must be in the name of the plaintiff in the same.
I further hold that the terms “mutual debts, liquidated or unliquidated demands, not sounding in damages merely,” do not include assigned- judgments. But even if a party can set off a judgment in his favor when sued by the defendant therein, under the provisions of § 2240 of the Code, still it does not authorize the assignee of a judgment to do so, when he is sued by the defendant to the judgment. Such assigned judgment is not embraced within the terms used in § 2240.
§ 2241 provides that when a set-off is plead and an excess is found by the jury in favor of the defendant, that “judgment must be rendered in favor of the defendant for such excess.”
It would be a singular result to allow a defendant to have a judgment rendered in his favor on a set-off, when he could not have one if he had sued upon it.
In the case of Crawford v. Ex’r of Simonton, 7 Por. 110, this court held that a plea of set-off should disclose such a state of facts as would entitle the party pleading it to his action, if he were plaintiff in the suit;” and in the case of Bell v. Horton, 1 Ala. 413, held that a defendant cannot set-off to the plaintiff’s action a demand which he is not entitled to sue on in his own name.
In the case of Smith v. Taylor, 9 Ala. 633, it is held that a set-off cannot be made unless the party could maintain an action upon it in his own name, against the opposite party. Also, see Bowen v. Snell, use &c., 11 Ala. 379.
I do not conceive that this doctrine is overturned by the provisions of the Code, but that the principle is still applicable, and in all cases where a suit may be brought in the name of the plaintiff under those provisions, in all such
