33 N.Y.S. 282 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1895
The action is ejectment, brought to recover an undivided two-fifths of a parcel of land in the town of Greece, county of Monroe. In 1803, township No. 2, short range, west of Genesee river, consisting of upwards of 22,000 acres, and owned by Sir William Pulteney and others, was, by survey made by William Shepard, divided into lots, numbered from 1 to 62, inclusive. This division was represented by a map made by Shepard; and by a partition deed made by the owners of the land in 1804, lot No. 54 was set off to Benjamin Crosby, and lot No. 62 to Joseph Annin. It may be assumed that the survey and map were made in contemplation of the partition, which, as appears by the deed, was made according to them. That township then was comprised in that portion of the territory of the county of Genesee which afterwards was included'in the town of Greece, county of Monroe. Through mesne conveyances from Crosby, title came to John Berger, in 1851, of that part of lot 54, lying between Braddoclc’s Bay and Lake Ontario. In 1872, Berger made contract of sale of it to Adelie Skinner, wife of Roswell W. Skinner. She died before performance of the contract, and afterwards, in November, 1875, Berger conveyed the land to those who were the heirs of the vendee, of whom the plaintiff was one. The finding of the referee that the land in question was within that so conveyed necessarily resulted in his conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The contention of the defense is that the land in the possession of the defendant is in lot No. 62. And in view of the fact so found by the referee, and of the exception
A surveyor, who sought to locate on the ground the lines of lot 54 as established by Shepard’s survey, was called as a witness on the part of the plaintiff, and testified to the effect that in proceeding to do so he examined and ran the lines of several lots in the tract in the manner and for the purpose mentioned by him, to which it is deemed unnecessary here to specifically refer. He made a map, by which it appears that in running the shore line of lot 62 from its northwest corner he omitted to describe the last two courses and distances represented by Shepard’s field notes. On his cross-examination his attention was called to it, and he tes
It may be observed that some difficulty in reproducing the line along the lake as it was represented by the survey of 1803 may have been occasioned by the fact that during the period subsequent to that survey the land along the shore to considerable extent, as well as timber, had been taken away by the action of water. And some uncertainty at this late day very likely exists as to the precise locality of some of the lines of the survey then made by Shepard in dividing that large tract of land into lots. It is a matter of common observation and experience that the courses and-distances as represented by the early surveys in forests are not entirely correct, and that monuments of such surveys, when found and well identified, are much more reliable and satisfactory. The present case is an illustration of the opportunities which those surveys furnish for controversy about lines, and the doubt and difficulty which in such cases may attend judicial determination.
The defendant obtained, in 1890, the deed under which he claims. Whether or not his grantors had or he took by their deed title to any land in lot 62 is not the subject of inquiry on this review, only as it incidentally arises in considering the question of the location of the line between that lot and lot 54. Treating the land in question as in the latter lot, it is difficult to see that the grantors of Frisbee, who made the deed to the defendant’s grantors, had title to any land in lot 62. The learned referee gave at some length his reasons for the conclusion that it was in lot 54. The question was one of fact. And the view here taken is that the finding of the referee thak the land in controversy was in lot 54 is fairly supported by the evidence. The declarations of the occupants, made upon the land, in pointing out the line, were in practical effect evidence only of the extent of their possession, and not of title, other than such as might be inferred from the occupancy. This was not error. Jackson v. McCall, 10 Johns. 377; 3 Washb. Real Prop. (4th Ed.) 427. There was no error on the trial to the prejudice of the defendant. The judgment should be affirmed. All concur.