26 Fla. 121 | Fla. | 1890
The City of Tampa, in Hillsborough county, made a contract with a certain bridge company for the construction of a bridge within the coporate limits of the city across Hillsborough river. The cost of construction was to be $13,800. Upon petition to the County Commissioners of the county by the citizens of Tampa and application in behalf of the city by the president of its Council, said Commissioners ordered an appropriation of $4,600 towards the
The defendants demurred to the bill for want of equity, and the demurrer was in effect sustained, though the ruling and order thereon were irregular—the order being, “ that
It is contended by appellant that the money proposed to be expended by the Commissioners to aid in the building of the bridge is not for a “county purpose,” and that they have no authority to appropriate money raised by taxation for the county to any other purpose. As to their authority this is clearly correct. The Constitution (Section 5, Article IX) provides that the “ Legislature shall authorize the several counties and incorporate cities or towns in the State to assess and impose taxes for county and municipal purposes, and for no other purposes.” What is a county purpose, as distinguished from a municipal purpose, is a question arising here jfrom the fact that the City of Tampa is a part of the County of Hillsborough, and from the further fact that the county is authorized by statute to build bridges in the county without restriction as to locality, and that the city is authorized by its charter to build bridges within its corporate limits—both having authority for the same purpose there, if that given to the city does not exclude its territory from the domain within the jurisdiction of the county for such purpose. Confining ourselves to the allegations of the bill, it appears that the building of the bridge is wholly matter belonging to the City of Tampa. The contract for building was its contract. The highway on opposite sides of the river, to be connected by the bridge, is alleged to be a city street, and not a county highway, and it is further alleged that the county outside of the city is in no wise interested in the building of the bridge, and that the bridge is for the sole benefit and advantage of the city, being wholly within its corporate limits, and entirely a municipal improvement. These facts, taken as true under the
While this conclusion decides the case upon the present record, we find in the argument of appellant’s counsel, and in that of counsel for appellees, a full discussion of the ques
The theory of appellants is that the officials empowered to act in the management of county affairs have no authority to expend money they raise by taxation for county purposes in building bridges within the corporate limits of any municipality in the county. Whether they have or not is the question to be solved. It is admitted for appellants that if the county has the right to build the bridge, it would likewise have right to appropriate for a part of the expense, but insisted that if it could not pay in whole, it could not pay in part. Then, the problem is, can the county officials upder their general authority, and notwithstanding the special authority ol the city, go into the city to build a bridge, or to act in conjunction with the city for that purpose. The rulings on this question are diverse, but they all agree that it depends on constitutional provision or legislative enactment applicable in the particular case, with general principles of law to interpret or construe these. We have mentioned all there is in the Constitution and laws of this State on the subject. Counties cannot expend money except for county purposes ; and where a county and municipality cover the same ground, there is nothing which expressly directs what each may do respectively in the line of its authority. The nearest approach to any decision on the question in this State is in the case of State ex rel. vs. Commissioners of
There may be distinctively municipal purposes in respect to bridges within a corporation, as where a small stream, purely local, and having no connection with county highways, should be bridged for the convenience of citizens of the corporation; and it is conceivable that there may also be county purposes in the same respect therein, as where the bridge connects public highways of the county, and is of use and importance to the citizens of the county, irrespective of residence in the corporation, and especially if the court house of the county is in the corporation. It would seem but just and reasonable in such case that the county should take or share the burden of furnishing to the public the convenience of the bridge. v In this connection it is worthy of observation that all the tax-payers of the county, those in municipalities not excepted, are required to contribute to the revenue of the county for bridge purposes, without reference to residence. If residing in a municipality they must pay-a bridge tax for any and every locality inside or outside thereof, if in the county; while if not residing in a municipality, if appellants’ view is correct, they cannot be taxed for a bridge therein, though for a county
We hence conclude that the special authority given to any municipality to build bridges within its limits, does not necessarily supersede the general authority given to the county. But as there may be a municipal purpose in which the county has no concern, and a county purpose in which all are alike, though perhaps not equally, interested, the circumstances of each case must determine the question of authority. And it seems to us that this would be so even where there is assent of the municipal government. Whether that authority should be exercised in the event of conflict between the two bodies, is not involved in this case, as the city and county are in accord in the building of the bridge. In cases where such conflict would arise, we are inclined to the opinion that the county should give way, in deference to the general policy against one jurisdiction clashing with another.
As we have said, the authorities differ on the main question under discussion. But much of this difference grows out of the difference in statutes that govern. We will not undertake a review of the cases, but content ourselves with
The cases cited for appellants, and maintaining the position that county revenues cannot be expended under a contract to which the county is not a party, do not seem to us
The distinction between that case and the present is obvious. As in that it was held that county revenues could not be used for township roads, so in this we hold that county revenues cannot be used for city bridges as such, but in that the money was being applied to roads not “ State and territorial,” and not embraced within any authority of the County Supervisors, while in this, if the conditions suit, it will be applied to an authorized “ county purpose.” It does not seem reasonable that in all cases there is such necessary connection between the expenditure of money for public uses and the control ordinarily resulting from such expenditure, as to prevent the expenditure when made for a lawful purpose, because in accomplishing that purpose it is done in a way to relieve from the control that entails further liability.
It is no objection to our conclusion, as applicable to the case at bar, if it can be shown that the bridge answers a county purpose, as distinguished from a local city purpose, that the bridge was to be constructed under a contract with the city, and that the city will have control of the same, and must bear the responsibilities connected with it. This will be that much better for the county. So far as it is said to be objectionable on the ground that the appropriation by the county is towards the payment 'of a debt of the city, the
Under our conclusion it will be for the defendants to determine upon existing facts of the situation whether they will further resist the injunction. The decree is reversed, with leave to them to answer, if they should de?m it advisable.