Six4Three, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.Six4Three, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.
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Factual and Procedural History
This is the second time this case has come before this court on appeal.2 In September 2019, we resolved cross-appeals from a July 2018 order that
Early in the litigation the trial court approved a stipulated protective order. The order authorizes a party to label documents produced in discovery Highly Confidential or Confidential. If a document is labeled Highly Confidential, counsel cannot disclose it to third parties or to “directors, officers or employees of a party, or . . . witnesses.” If a document is labeled Confidential, counsel may show it to their client‘s principals and to witnesses, but not to third parties. If a party labels material Confidential or Highly Confidential, an opposing party may “at any time” object to the designation. The designating party then has 20 days “to apply to the Court for an order designating the material as confidential.” Although in its briefs to this court Six4Three repeatedly states that Facebook improperly designated many documents as Confidential or Highly Confidential, the record does not indicate that Six4Three pursued a challenge to the designation of documents relevant to this appeal under the procedure provided in the protective order.3
In May 2018, in support of its opposition to the individual defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, Six4Three submitted a massive declaration by attorney David Godkin with over 200 exhibits, many of which were copies of documents that Facebook had labeled Highly Confidential or Confidential.
Prior to the October 2018 hearing on the motions to seal, the court issued a tentative ruling stating that it would, on its own motion, strike numerous exhibits to the Godkin Declaration that were irrelevant to the anti-SLAPP motion. After hearing oral argument, the court issued an order striking 182 exhibits, in whole or in part, based on irrelevance or on the improper submission of entire documents of which only a page or two was relevant, and sealing 22 full exhibits and certain pages of four exhibits that were deposition transcripts.
Six4Three timely filed a notice of appeal stating that it “appeals the trial court‘s order directing the sealing of numerous Facebook documents . . . under the collateral-order doctrine.” The notice cites Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 471 (Overstock) for the
After briefing was complete, this court requested supplemental letter briefs addressing whether Six4Three is “aggrieved” by the sealing order, so as to have standing to appeal it. Our request cited a Texas opinion holding that an order sealing documents did not aggrieve a party who had and was able to use copies of the sealed documents. (Nephrology Leaders & Assocs. v. American Renal Assocs. LLC (Tex.Ct.App. 2019) 573 S.W.3d 912, 914.)
Discussion
1. The Striking Order Is Not Appealable.
Six4Three‘s opening brief focuses primarily on the sealing order. When it turns to the striking order, Six4Three addresses only why it considers the stricken documents relevant and why it submitted full copies instead of excerpts, but its opening brief does not address why the striking order is appealable. Facebook‘s brief contends that, while the collateral-order doctrine applies to orders sealing exhibits (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 77), it does not apply to orders striking exhibits. In reply, Six4Three does not contend that the collateral order doctrine applies, but asserts that the striking order is appealable because it is “contained within a sealing order” and “based on the sealing rules.” Neither rationale establishes that the striking order is appealable.
A single order or judgment can be in part appealable and in part nonappealable. (See, e.g., Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1060; P R Burke Corp. v. Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1053–1054.) The fact that an aggrieved party may appeal the sealing portion of the court‘s order does not establish that another portion of the order not independently appealable may be reviewed simply because contained in the same document. Neither the “sealing rules” nor any
The court in Overstock addressed the type of “abusive litigation practices” with which the trial court here felt it was confronted. (Overstock, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 498.) If parties “inundate” a court with confidential documents and engage in such “brute litigation overkill” as submitting entire documents when but a page or two is relevant, offering many documents to support a claim when one will suffice, and submitting exhibits they never cite, the beleaguered court may “welcome” a motion to strike that will “winnow down the material to that which is relevant.” (Id. at pp. 498–500.) Alternatively, the court may strike irrelevant material on its own motion. (Id. at p. 499.) But Overstock did not involve an order striking documents,5 and the court said nothing about the appealability of such an order.
2. Six4Three Lacks Standing to Appeal the Sealing Order.
Assuming that an order sealing documents pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 2.550–2.551 is an appealable collateral order, the order may be appealed only by a party aggrieved by the order (
Six4Three undisputedly possesses copies of every document that the court ordered sealed, and submitted copies of the documents (by lodging them conditionally under seal) to support its opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion. Thus, as in the Texas case to which we directed the parties’ attention, the sealing order did not impair Six4Three‘s ability to use the documents in this litigation. (See Nephrology Leaders & Assocs. v. American Renal Assocs. LLC, supra, 573 S.W.3d at p. 914 & fn. 2 [party that had copies of documents and used them in action lacked standing to appeal sealing order].) While the sealing order undoubtedly affects the ability of the public to view the sealed documents, neither any of the media that appeared in the trial court nor any other party purporting to represent the interests of the public has joined in this appeal. We do not minimize the importance of the public‘s interest in access to such documents (see NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1197–1212), nor presume that there is no merit to the contention that the sealing order here is overly broad, but that determination is subject to appeal only by a party aggrieved by the order.
In its letter brief, Six4Three asserts that the sealing order immediately and substantially injures two of its legally cognizable interests: the sealing order assertedly bars Six4Three and its attorneys from showing documents
The protective order bars Six4Three‘s counsel from disclosing to its principals all documents labeled Highly Confidential, and it bars Six4Three or its counsel from disclosing documents labeled Confidential to other developers who may have been harmed by Facebook‘s alleged misconduct, and who might thus become witnesses or offer useful evidence. The disclosure limitations that Six4Three asserts have impaired its ability to prosecute this action are contained in that order—not the sealing order, which limits only public access to many of those documents. Yet, so far as appears, Six4Three never challenged Facebook‘s confidentiality designations as the protective order enables it to do. (See p. 2, ante.) Nor apparently did Six4Three‘s counsel allude to any impaired ability to develop evidence in briefing or arguing the anti-SLAPP motion. Moreover, there is no indication that Six4Three raised this issue while opposing the motion to seal. Forfeiture of the contention aside, the failure to raise the issue when opposing the sealing motion confirms that the harm Six4Three now alleges does not arise from denying public access to the documents. The supposed harm arises from the terms of the protective order to which Six4Three stipulated and from which it has not
Six4Three also contends that the sealing order places it in jeopardy of violating demands made by committees of the United States Congress and the British Parliament or of incurring sanctions from the trial court if it complies with those demands. With its letter brief, Six4Three has submitted copies of two letters to its principal, Theodore Kramer. One is from the Chair of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee of the House of Commons, and is dated 18 days after the sealing order. The letter quotes an order of the Committee purportedly ordering Kramer to submit “[u]nredacted copies of Six4Three‘s opposition to the anti-SLAPP . . . motion,” along with related documents.8 The second letter, sent in September 2019, is from the House of
The request from the House of Representatives committee is not “compulsory process,” as Six4Three characterizes it. It is not a subpoena or any type of order with which Six4Three or Mr. Kramer is legally bound to comply. By its explicit language it is no more than a request. Neither Six4Three nor its principal faces legal consequences if they comply with the court‘s protective order and refuse the request. And in all events it is not the sealing order that restrains them from complying with the request.
As to the demand from the British parliamentary committee, it also is not the sealing order that could give rise to any liability Six4Three might incur, for the sealing order does not restrict the conduct of Six4Three or Mr. Kramer. Moreover, Six4Three advises that Mr. Kramer has already complied with this demand “after multiple written notices were provided to Facebook under . . . mechanisms provided in the Protective Order and Facebook did nothing.” Thus, it is not necessary to consider whether Kramer was subject to the jurisdiction of the parliamentary committee, or whether he would in fact have been subject to sanctions had he refused to comply with the committee‘s demand. While Six4Three asserts that it “now faces [requests for] terminating and monetary sanctions and continuing threats of contempt in the trial court by Facebook,” vacating the sealing order would not affect any liability Six4Three potentially may have incurred for violation of the
Thus, Six4Three has failed to show that it is aggrieved by the sealing order, and it lacks standing to appeal that portion of the trial court‘s order.9
Disposition
Six4Three‘s appeal is dismissed. Facebook shall recover its costs on appeal.
POLLAK, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
TUCHER, J.
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on April 24, 2020, be modified as follows:
On page 7, at the end of the first full paragraph, after the words “aggrieved by the order,” add as footnote 7 the following footnote, which will require renumbering all subsequent footnotes:
7 Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1063–1064 held that a sealing order is an appealable collateral order, with which we do not disagree. Although the court there considered the appeal of an adverse party who had access to the sealed documents, the court apparently overlooked and did not consider whether that party had standing to raise the issue. That decision provides no authority for an issue it did not address.”
There is no change in the judgment.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
Dated: ___________________________ P. J.