Jamison SIVULICH, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES; WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD; and AAA of California, Nevada, and Utah, Respondents.
No. 20140015-CA
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 23, 2015.
2015 UT App 101
irrevocable bid for the real property” and “[t]he credit bid did not require that money actually change hands“). Similarly, Brunson‘s claim that SNLIC could not seek a deficiency while also retaining possession of the property purchased at the trustee‘s sale is contrary to the governing statute, which allowed SNLIC to recover “the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee‘s and attorney‘s fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale.”
¶ 6 We agree with the district court that Brunson failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact regarding the calculation of the deficiency. First, Brunson‘s calculations incorrectly allocated the total amount of his mortgage payments toward the loan principal, although those payments included a relatively small amount of principal, along with interest, escrow amounts, and mortgage insurance premiums passed on to a third-party insurer. Second, Brunson‘s claim that an online “Zillow” search on a completely different property demonstrated a greater fair market value for his property was properly rejected as both irrelevant and untimely. In a June 17, 2014 ruling and order, the district court determined a fair market value of $190,000.00, based upon the only competent evidence of fair market value in the form of an appraisal submitted to the district court by SNLIC. Brunson failed to provide any timely evidence to support his valuation claims.
¶ 7 Finally, all of Brunson‘s remaining arguments on appeal lack merit. Specifically, the argument that a summary judgment cannot be granted if its effect would be to deny a requested jury trial is without merit. Similarly, there is no demonstration in the record before us that the district court failed to appropriately construe the evidence in the nonmoving parties’ favor, where Brunson‘s purported issues of fact were based upon conjecture, speculation, mathematical error, or unsupported legal claims. Accordingly, we affirm.
Memorandum Decision
TOOMEY, Judge:
¶ 1 Jamison Sivulich challenges the Workforce Appeals Board‘s (the Board) decision affirming the Administrative Law Judge‘s (the ALJ) judgment denying his claim for unemployment benefits. AAA of California, Nevada, and Utah (Employer) terminated Sivulich‘s employment after discovering that he violated its credit card policies by purchasing several high-priced non-business items with company credit cards. The Board found that because Employer discharged Sivulich for just cause, Sivulich was not entitled to unemployment benefits and Employer was relieved from benefit charges associated with Sivulich‘s claim. We decline to disturb the Board‘s decision.
¶ 2 “‘Whether the [Board] correctly or incorrectly denied benefits is a traditional mixed question of law and fact.‘” Jex v. Labor Comm‘n, 2013 UT 40, ¶ 15, 306 P.3d 799 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We review the Board‘s conclusions of law for correctness. Drake v. Industrial Comm‘n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). But we defer to the Board‘s factual findings “if they are supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.” Uintah County v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2014 UT App 44, ¶ 5, 320 P.3d 1103 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] party challenging the Board‘s findings of fact must marshal[ ] all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 42, 326 P.3d 645 (the Utah Supreme Court reiterating “that a party challenging a factual finding or sufficiency of the evidence ... will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal if it fails to marshal“).
¶ 3 Sivulich seems to argue that the Board misinterpreted Employer‘s “Travel & Entertainment” and “American Express Card” policies, erroneously found that Employer terminated Sivulich‘s employment with just cause, and inappropriately refused to allow Sivulich to submit new information and documents for consideration.1 In his petition for judicial review, he simply reargues his position that the Board‘s findings were wrong but does not identify how the evidence does not support the Board‘s findings. Moreover, Sivulich fails to carry his burden of persuasion on appeal because he inadequately briefs his arguments. Thus, we decline to address the merits of Sivulich‘s arguments.2
¶ 4 “If an appellant fails to adequately brief an issue on appeal, the appellate court may decline to consider the argument.” Jacob v. Cross, 2012 UT App 190, ¶ 2, 283 P.3d 539 (per curiam). Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that an appellant‘s brief include a table of authorities,
¶ 5 First, Sivulich failed to identify where in the record the issues presented on appeal were preserved for review. This is especially important because “[i]t is well settled that issues not raised before the [forum below] are waived on appeal.” Whitear v. Labor Comm‘n, 973 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Second, although Sivulich repeatedly referred to Employer‘s “Travel & Entertainment” and “American Express Card” policies, he did not attach the documents in an addendum and largely failed to cite the record as the rule requires. By not citing the record, the task of combing through the record is improperly left to this court. Finally, Sivulich failed to cite any legal authority to support his argument. “As a result, the issues are inadequately briefed because he has completely shifted the burden of researching the record and applicable law to the court.” Jacob, 2012 UT App 190, ¶ 3, 283 P.3d 539; see also Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109-10 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). “An appellate court is not a depository in which [a party] may dump the burden of argument and research.” Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 9, 194 P.3d 903 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 6 We recognize that Sivulich is a self-represented party and is therefore “entitled to ‘every consideration that may reasonably be indulged.‘” Id. ¶ 11 (quoting Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983)). But “reasonable indulgence is not unlimited indulgence” and does not require this court “to redress the ongoing consequences of the party‘s decision to function in a capacity for which he is not trained.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “a party who represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, even considering Sivulich has appeared pro se, he fails to meet his burden of demonstrating error because he provided too little information for the court to analyze the issues raised on appeal.
¶ 7 We decline to disturb the Board‘s decision.