175 A.D.2d 801 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1991
— In an action, inter alia, to impress a constructive trust, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cavanno, J.), entered August 23, 1988, which, inter alia, determined that her cause of action accrued on February 16, 1982, and (2) an order and judgment (one paper) of the same court, entered August 28, 1989, which, after a hearing, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint as time barred on the ground that the summons had not been properly served upon the defendant on February 13, 1988.
Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the order and judgment is reversed, on the law, the complaint is reinstated, and the motion to dismiss is denied; and it is further,
Ordered that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.
The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the order and judgment in the action (see, Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248). The issues raised on appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the order and judgment (CPLR 5501 [a] [I])-
The plaintiff alleges that she and the defendant were living together in her apartment with the intention of marrying. The parties entered into a contract to purchase a home in East Islip as tenants in common, for $60,000 ($20,000 in cash and a $40,000 purchase money mortgage). Prior to the closing, the parties allegedly agreed that only the defendant’s name would appear on the deed and that the defendant would at a later date transfer to the plaintiff a one-half interest in the subject property. In reliance on this promise, the plaintiff allegedly borrowed approximately $20,000 to pay that part of the contract which required cash. The property was conveyed to the defendant on February 16, 1982. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant repeatedly postponed signing a deed of conveyance to her. Finally, in the late summer of 1985, the defendant directed the plaintiff to leave the premises since he was its sole owner.
We find that the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the complaint, since a question of fact exists with respect to