73 N.J.L. 699 | N.J. | 1907
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The taxing authorities of the township of Morris and those of the borough of Florham Park laid an assessment for taxes, in the year 1904, upon the property of the Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, located within their respective municipalities and comprising altogether about three hundred and sixteen acres. The sisters claim that the whole of the property in question, both the land and the buildings thereon, is exempt from taxation by virtue of paragraph 4 of section 3 of the General Tax act of 1903 (Pamph. L., p. 395), because, as they say, the buildings are used exclusively for charitable purposes and the lands are necessary for the fair enjoyment of the buildings.
The legislative provision appealed to is that “all buildings used exclusively for purposes considered charitable under the common law, with the land whereon the same are erected, and which may be necessary for the fair enjoyment thereof, * * * shall be exempt from taxation under this act.” The Supreme Court held that by force of this provision the whole of the property upon which the assessment was laid was exempt from taxation. They rested their determination, not upon any original investigation, but upon the decision of this court, rendered in 1890, in a suit prosecuted by the same charitable organization against the former township of Chatham for the purpose of testing the validity of a tax then assessed upon their property (Sisters of Charity v. Township of Chatham, 23 Vroom 373), feeling themselves bound by that decision because the property then subject to
In our opinion in the earlier case, after reciting’ the exempting provision of the statute (which remains unchanged except in its phraseology), we proceeded as follows:
“No reason is perceived why this statutory immunity should not appertain to the lands comprehended in this controversy. They and the buildings upon them are devoted solely to charitable uses. They consist of about three hundred acres of laud, only two-thirds of which are productive. Upon this tract- is a building in which the Sisters of Charity live. Part of such building is devoted to the use of a school. * * * All that the farm produces is applied to- the support of the institution. None of the products are ever sold. If anything remains after the necessities of the sisters are supplied, it must be' applied, according to their rules, either to extend their establishments for the public good or appropriated to the use of the poor. 'With respect to the school, some of the scholars are educated gratuitously and the money derived from the tuition of the others is appropriated, as the rules require, to the- support of the sisters, who minister to the sick in hospitals, take care of orphanages and otherwise to the relief of the poor and for the extension of their charitable institutions. In the light of this description it does not seem possible to mistake the character of this institution; its entire aim and end is to- instruct the poor, to- nurse the sick and to support the orphan. It seems plain that if under any conditions buildings and lands can fulfill the statutory requirement of being hrsed exclusively for charitable purposes/ the property now in question must be able to do so. It is not necessaiy, but it is not out of place, to remark that this section of the statute relating to taxation should be construed, not narrowly by its letter, but liberally, and in view' of its object and spirit.”
The determination of the present cases was considered by the Supreme Court to turn upon the question whether the
But even if the property upon which the present tax has been imposed had been acquired at one and the same time, our decision that it was necessary for the fair enjo3nnent of the buildings erected thereon would not have been binding upon the Supreme Court, for that question was not before us for decision, and in determining it we inadvertently over
And this was not the only matter which this court assumed to decide in the earlier case that was not properly before it. The solution of the question whether a given building is entitled to exemption by virtue of the provision of the Tax act under consideration involves — first, a matter of fact, viz., the ascertainment of the particular purpose for which the building is being used; and second, a matter of law, viz., whether the ascertained user is or is not a charitable one. This court undertook an original inquiry into. the purpose for which the principal building upon the property was being used, and found the following facts: That a portion of it was being used as a place of residence for the members of the sisterhood, and that the remaining portion was being used as a school; that some of the scholars attending the school were educated gratuitously; that the money derived from the tuition of the others was appropriated to the support of the sisters. Having ascertained the use to which this building was being put they then considered the question of law, whether or not the ascertained use was a charitable one, and determined that it was. The determination of this court that a use such as that which has been described was a charitable one, being the determination of a matter of law involved in the case, was binding upon the Supreme Court; but the determination that the building was being used for the purposes described, being the finding of a matter of fact, which it.was the province of the Supreme Court to determine, is not binding upon the lower tribunal for the reason already stated. This court having determined as matter of law that a user of the kind which has been described was a charitable one, should have remitted to the Supreme Court, for its determination, the question whether the use to which the building was being put was in fact of the described character.
It was further declared by this court, in the earlier ease, that the other buildings upon the lands in controversy “were
As this case must go back to the Supreme Court, to- be there dealt with along the lines indicated in this opinion, we deem it advisable to point out. an inaccuracy which appears in our earlier decision in the statement, obiter, of a principle of the law of taxation, particularly in view of the fact that the same statement is again made (obiter) in the later opinion of this court, rendered in the case of Children’s Seashore House v. Atlantic City, 39 Vroom 385. The statement referred to appears at the end of the excerpt which has been cited herein, and is that “this section of the statute relating to taxation should be construed, not narrowly by its letter, but liberally, and in view of its object and spirit.” The true rule upon this subject is accurately stated in 12 Am. & Eng. Encycl. L. (2d ed.) 302, as follows: “A grant of exemption from taxation, being in the nature of a renunciation of sovereignty [or, as some jurists have expressed it, being in derogation of the sovereign authority and of common right], must invariably be construed most strictly against the grantee, and can never be permitted to extend, either in scope or duration, beyond what the terms of the concession clearly require.” It has been declared and applied, not only by the United States Supreme Court, but by the courts of almost every state in the union, as will appear by a reference to the foot note in the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, which contains a citation of the decisions. We our
The judgment of the Supreme Court must be reversed and the cause remitted to that tribunal for the purpose of having there determined the purposes for which the various buildings upon the property are being used; whether the ascertained use in each instance is a charitable one, under the construction put by this court in our earlier decision upon the exemption clause in the Tax act, so far as that construction will aid in determining the question; and, when a given building is found by it to be used exclusively for charitable purposes, how much of the tract of land upon which it has been erected is necessary for its fair enjoyment.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). It is very probable that .1 agree with my brethren in their views as to the meaning, abstractly considered, of section 3, subsection 4, of “An act for the assessment and collection of taxes,” approved April 8th, 1903. Pamph. L., pp. 395, 396. It is even probable that I would agree with them as to the force and effect of this legislation, applied concretely in the present cases, if these were cases of first impression. Nevertheless, I find myself unable to agree with my brethren in voting to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court. My inability arises from the fact, conceded by the Supreme Court (43 Vroom 429), and also in the prevailing opinion, that a reversal cannot be had without overruling Sisters of Charity v. Township of Chatham, 23 Id. 373 (1890), and this I do not think it right to do.
Before passing to the reasons for my vote, I think it necessary to remark that the older case should, in my judgment, be freed from the aspersion cast upon it by the learned justice
Examining the cases in hand, we find that the facts respecting the property of tire prosecutor and the use thereof are the same as in the older case. The Supreme Court, admitting the binding force of the earlier decision, said (43 Vroom, at p. 429) : “The only question to be decided is, whether the land that has been assessed against the prosecutor is exclusively devoted to the same charitable purposes to* which the buildings thereon are devoted, as illustrated by such appellate decision. Of this, there is in the testimony before us plenary proof."
We find, also> that the statute, construed and applied, is the same as in the older case. The Supreme Court said (43 Vroom, at p. 427) : “In that case the identical language of the present statute was before the court of last resort." The opinion now prevailing observes: “In our opinion, in the earlier case, after reciting the exempting provision of the statute [which remains unchanged except in its phraseology], we proceeded * *
But, if the maxim “stare decisis” is not of itself sufficient, there are other grounds on which I do not think it right to overrate the older case, and I mention them very briefly.
The case in 23 Vroom 373 et seq. has been cited by the Supreme Court in Firemen’s Relief Association v. Johnson, 33 Id. 625 (1898); Paterson Rescue Mission v. High, Receiver, 35 Id. 121 (1899); Litz v. Johnston, Collector, 36 Id. 169 (1900), and by this court in Children’s Seashore House v. Atlantic City, 39 Id. 391 (1902). How far did the decision now to be overruled enter into those cases as one foundation stone, and how far are they to be shaken by the withdrawal of the one stone? T cannot answer with certainty in advance of a testing, but that litigants and counsel may regard those cases as more open to question than they were before this day, I am not at liberty to doubt.
In State of New Jersey v. Taylor, 39 Vroom 276 (1902), the constitutionality of a section of the Criminal Procedure act was attacked. Asserting that the question had been laid at rest by Brown v. State of New Jersey, 33 Id. 666 (1898), this court said, only four years later (39 Id., at p. 279): “Such a declaration must be accepted as final. This court will not review, much less overturn, a decision made by it upon a matter which was directly presented for its determination, except upon the fullest conviction that it was erroneous. And it will not do so even then' when the decision has been so long acquiesced in and acted upon that a return to the 'proper principle would disastrously affect existing interests.” See, also, the language of this court in Newark v. Schuh, 7 Stew. Eq. 265 (1881). Are we now, by overruling a solemn decision of four times four years ago, to open the door of this court for assaults upon other decisions which someone may deem objectionable? I fear that we are at least setting the gates ajar.
Believing that more harm is likely to be done by overruling Sisters of Charity v. Township of Chatham, 23 Vroom 373, than by adhering to' its principle, I am constrained to vote to affirm the judgment under review.