9 Mich. 94 | Mich. | 1860
Were the property which is the subject of this assessment actually occupied by the corporation of St. Ann’s
The tax was therefore assessed upon the “real estate” of these complainants.
But were it assessed against the land, and not against an owner or occupant, I think it would still be exempt under the circumstances of this case, and a true construction of the statute.
In giving a construction to a statute, it is the duty of a court to consider its policy, and to give it such an interpretion as may appear best calculated to advance its
A statute is not to be construed according to technical
The bill in this case is filed by the complainants to prevent the collection of taxes upon real estate occupied by them in Detroit, on the ground that it is exempt from taxation under section 786, vol. 1 Compiled Laws, which exempts “the personal property of all library, benevolent, charitable and scientific institutions, incorporated within this state, and such real estate belonging to such institutions as shall actually be occupied by them for the purposes for which they were incorporated.’’
The bill states, in substance, that the title is in St. Ann’s church, -to which it was granted to the end that they might, from time to time as they should deem necessary, erect thereupon any buildings or improvements suitable for ecclesiastical, literary or benevolent purposes. That in 1834, St. Ann’s church leased the premises in question to Frederick Rese, Bishop of Detroit, and his successors in office for 999 years, without rent, for similar purposes. That Peter Paul Lefevre, who is alleged to be the successor in office of Bishop Rese, leased the premises to complainants for thirty years next ensuing January 1, 1869, for the nominal rent of one dollar, and on condition that the lessees should pay all taxes and assessments legally imposed upon said premises during said lease. The lease is alleged to have been made for the purpose of keeping and maintaining on the premises, durihg the term, an orphan asylum and gratuitous school for poor and destitute children, and the bill alleges the premises to have been occupied for those purposes. The city has levied the ordinary tax upon the premises.
The case has been argued assuming the validity of the lease and other requisites of title and corporate character,
A society incorporated under the laws of this state for the purposes set forth in the hill is, I think, within the meaning of the statute, a benevolent or charitable institution. And I shall only consider therefore whether the property taxed comes within the exemption. By the terms of the law all property not expressly exempted therefrom is subject to taxation. And any exemption claimed must come plainly within the meaning of the statute.
It is certainly not designed by this law to exempt from taxation all real estate owned by the benevolent or other institution referred to, whether the proceeds of the property or the property itself may or may not be used for the benevolent or literary purposes mentioned.
Every corporation misapplying any of its funds, or diverting them to uses not contemplated in its charter, is guilty of a violation of law. It is always to be presumed that all the corporate funds will be applied to proper corporate uses. Had the Legislature designed to exempt all property the proceeds or income of which should be thus applied, or all property to whomsoever belonging actually used for benevolent purposes, such exemption would probably have been competent. But they saw fit to limit the exemption of real estate to such as shall actually belong to, and at the same time be actually occupied by the institution, for the purposes' for which it was incorporated. The occupation here referred to is not constructive, but actual; and must be by the institution, and for its corporate purposes.
The language is so plain that no explanation can make it plainer. The statute was construed in the case of The Detroit Young Men’s Society v. City of Defroit, 3 Mich. 172. Similar statutes have been construed repeatedly in England as well as in this country; — Purviss v. Traill, 3 Exch. 344; Clarendon v. St. James, 10 C. B. 806; Regina v. Missionary Society, 10 Q. B. 884; Cincinnati College v. The State, 19 Ohio 110.
If a leasehold were taxable as real estate under the statute, apart from the fee, then the phrase might fairly apply. But our tax laws do not contemplate or permit any such separation.
Not only does the statute declare that real estate shall, for the purpose of taxation, be construed to include all lands within the state, and all buildings and fixtures thereon, except in cases otherwise expressly provided by law, — Comp, L. § 783, but in assessing it the statute requires it to be described either as a government subdivision, a lot or block on some plat, or by its boundaries (§804). The taxes assessed are a lien upon the real estate (§820). When taxes are returned, payment may be made on any pa/reel of lands returned, or any undivided share thereof (§ 851). The land itself is sold, and if less than the whole parcel is bid off, it is to be a specific portion from the north side (§866). The deed is to be a deed of the land therein described., and is evidence, prima facie, of title 'in the purchaser (§871). No one ever imagined that a tax sale could be made of a mere leasehold, or that it could be taxed as_ real estate. This tax is on the land, and includes the whole estate. It is very clear that this does not belong to the complainants. And the statute can not be made, by any construction, to exempt what does not belong to them, and furnishes no means of reaching any such case. The fact that the lessees pay but a nominal rent beyond taxes can make no difference, for the statute does not exempt property on any such ground, and the case of complainants would be the same if they paid rent.
The policy of embracing such cases is not for the courts
I think the injunction should not have been granted, and that the decree should be reversed, and the bill dismissed,
The court being thus equally divided, the decree of the court below was affirmed.