*1 v. RUBY SISSON et al. April 1990—Decided June Argued
No. 88-2041. *2 MARSHALL,J., opinion Court, delivered the Rehnquist, in which J., BREnnan, Blackmun, C. Stevens, and O’ConnoR, Kennedy, and JJ., joined. Scalia, J., opinion filed an concurring in judgment, in White, J., joined, which post, p. 368.
'Warren J. Marwedel the cause argued for petitioner. him With on the briefs was Dennis Minichello. Robert J. Kopka the cause argued for respondents. With *
him on the brief was Her S. den. Jeffrey the opinion delivered of the Court. Justice Marshall We must decide whether 28 U. S. C. §1333(1), which grants federal district courts jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case or maritime jurisdiction,” confers federal juris- diction over petitioner’s limitation of suit liability brought connection with a fire on his vessel. We hold that it does.1 *Briefs of amici urging curiae reversal Auto, were filed for American Inc., by Cox; Terence S. and for the Maritime Law Association of the Brown, Jr., United States Richard H. and Richard W. Palmer. Flynn John A. filed a brief for the Harteras Yachts Division of Genmar Industries, Inc., as urging amicus curiae affirmance. Starr, Solicitor Deputy General Solicitor General Shapiro, Stephen and L. Nightingale filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae. argued Sisson has also throughout litigation this that the Limited Lia Act, bility (1982 §4281 seq., Rev. Stat. § et App. S. C. seq. 181 et ed., V), Supp. provides independent an basis jurisdiction. for federal Re spondents contend that jurisdiction, the Act does not create but instead may invoked cases otherwise within the maritime 1333(1). § correct, We need party not decide which is for even were we to agree that the Liability Limited Act does not independently provide a basis 1333(1) action, § for this jurisdiction. sufficient to confer Petitioner also argues Act, Admiralty Extension 62 Stat. App. 46 U. S. C. Ultorian, a 56-foot Everett Sisson the owner September yacht. pleasure 24, 1985, while the On Ultorian Michigan, marina water- docked at a on Lake was way, washer/dryer erupted of the vessel’s a fire the area destroyed damaged fire the Ultorian several unit. neighboring wake fire, vessels marina. of the and the against respondents for over for $275,000 filed claims Sisson damages Invoking marina vessels. to the and the other Liability liability provision that limits of the Limited Act any damage done “without the an owner of vessel for knowledge privity value of or of such owner” to the the vessel 183(a)(1982 V), § freight, App. Supp. ed., its U. S. C. declaratory injunctive petition filed a for relief Sisson *3 liability his to $800, Federal District Court to limit the sal- vage argued the Ultorian after the fire. Sisson value of jurisdiction had over his the federal court limitation 1333(1). § liability pursuant of action to The District Court disagreed, dismissing subject-matter petition for lack of the jurisdiction. Complaint Supp. Sisson, In re 663 F. 858 of 1987). (ND sought ground Ill. Sisson reconsideration on the independently Liability juris- the Limited Act conferred the diction over action. The District Court denied Sisson’s the motion, both on merits and on the basis of Sisson’sfailure argument raise of the In the before the dismissal action. (ND 1987). Complaint Supp. Sisson,
re 668 F. 1196 Ill. of Appeals The Court of the affirmed, for Seventh Circuit hold- 1333(1) § ing Liability that neither the nor Limited Act con- jurisdiction. Complaint Sisson, ferred re 867F. 2d 341 of (1989). granted (1990), certiorari, 493 1055 We U. S. now reverse. 1333(1) § recently, jurisdiction tort
Until over actions by largely application “locality” a determined of test. Plymouth, 20, As this stated the Court test Wall. (1982 ed., V), Supp. provides independent jurisdiction. §740 an basis for was not argument We decline to consider because it raised below. (1866): occurring, species “Every tort, of however upon high if seas or not, or on board vessel whether admiralty cognizance.” also Ex- See waters, City Cleveland, Aviation, U. S. Inc. v. ecutive Jet test). (1972) locality (describing Executive Jet 253-254 departure from the strict lo- clear marked this Court’s first jet gulls cality a flock sea aircraft struck There, test. power, taking into the crashed off, lost while lay just past end the run- which Erie, of Lake waters city way. Cleveland, aircraft sued The owner of the arguing airport, court, federal of the owner 1333(1) § Not- over the action. federal conferred locality ing id., we test,” with the “serious difficulties whether the tort occurred into a debate over refused enter (the destroyed naviga- plane and been had crashed where Erie) gulls sea it had struck the Lake or where ble waters of (over jurisdic- land), we held that id., Rather, 266-267. signifi- [did not] lacking wrong “the bear because tion was activity.” Id., at to traditional cant 268.
Although holding limited its Jet was our Executive “thorough involving torts, that case’s aviation terms to cases practical problems inherent of the theoretical and discussion locality prompted broadly applying . . rule . the traditional Executive construe Jet and commentators to several courts *4 admiralty jurisdic- applying federal to determinations of as Ins. torts.” Foremost the context of aviation tion outside (1982). Foremost, 668, Richardson, 457 S. v. U. Co. interpretation approved Executive Jet. this broader we collision, we on what S., Foremost involved 457 U. at 673. navigable id., 2,n. an waters, 670, at between to be assumed fishing pleasure boat, recreational boat and 16-foot 18-foot Supp. Co., 470 F. Foremost Ins. see Richardson v. (MD 1979). engaged in ever been Neither vessel had La. activity. any S., 670-671. 457 U. at commercial began application rejecting “peti- Executive our Jet We relationship argument that a substantial with com- tioners’ activity necessary” finding is to a of mari- mercial added). jurisdiction. (emphasis S., 457 U. at 674 time recognized protecting shipping Although we commercial admiralty jurisdiction, the heart of we also noted that is at interest admiralty jurisdiction adequately served if “cannot be is actually engaged in restricted to those individuals com- activity. fully This interest can mercial maritime operators navigable if all vindicated of vessels on subject waters are to uniform rules of conduct. The fail- recognize the breadth this federal ure ignores interest potential effect of noncommercial maritime activity potential on maritime commerce. . . . The dis- ruptive impact navigable of a collisionbetween boats on coupled with waters, when the traditional concern that navigation, compels for law holds the conclu- pleasure sion this collision between two boats on significant relationship waters has a with mar- (footnote omitted). Id., itime commerce.” 674-675 passage, “[n]ot In a footnote to the above we noted that every might disrupt accident waters that mari- support admiralty jurisdiction,” time will commerce federal Jet), (citing “po- id., at 675, n. 5 Executive when activity tential hazard to maritime commerce arises out of that bears a substantial to traditional maritime activity, navigation case, does of boats this admi- ralty jurisdiction appropriate.” n. 5. began
This case a fire that involves on a noncommercialves- navigable waterway. Certainly, sel at a marina located on a potentially disruptive impact such a fire has a on maritime spread nearby commerce, as it can commercial vessels or Indeed, make the marina inaccessible to such vessels. fire is significant facing one of the most hazards commercialvessels. *5 g., Southport Fisheries, Inc. v. Govt. Saskatchewan See, e. (EDNC 1958). Supp. 81, 83-84 161 F. Ins. Office, contrary only argument Respondents’ is that the to the was mini- potential commerce this case maritime effect on happened be docked vessels no commercial mal because argument mis- fire occurred. This when the at the marina inquiry. We determine the of our the nature understands by examining type impact given its potential incident of a jurisdictional inquiry general does not turn character. The fire on commerce of the actual effects on on the particular facts of on the it turn vessel; nor does Sisson’s or the as the source of the fire case, in this such the incident may yacht have specific marina, at the of the location likely to dis- more or less the fire on the Ultorian rendered activity. the rupt Rather, a court must assess commercial type general involved to determine of incident features of the disrupt likely ac- commercial an incident whether such general tivity. on a vessel docked features —a fire Here, require- satisfy plainly at a marina on waters— activity. potential disruption to commercial ment of way comports approach in which we with the here Our types disruption potential inci- of the characterized first as- Foremost. This in Executive involved Jet dents jurisdictional pect Executive Jet test was satisfied sinking haz- could create a in the water “an aircraft because vicinity.” navigation in the vessels of commercial for the ard Likewise, in Foremost Foremost, 675, n. 5. U. impact disruptive col- potentially] “[t]he of a noted the Court Id., In- at 675. waters.” boats on lision between potential disruption finding there supported our deed, we likely description a collision at effects of with a heavily Seaway, ibid., an area Lawrence mouth of the St. though place where vessels, even traveled commercial apparently if actually “seldom, had occurred the collision id., 670, n. 2. Our traffic,” ever, used for commercial *6 thus lead us to eschew the in- fact-specific jurisdictional cases on us urged by respondents.2 quiry test, now turn to the second half of the Foremost We under the to invoke maritime must party seeking jurisdiction which a substantial between the show relationship activity giving to the maritime rise incident and traditional As a activity. first we must define the relevant in this step, activity case. Our cases have made clear that the relevant “activity” is de- by incident, fined not the circumstances of the particular from which the In by general conduct incident arose. Jet, Executive for the relevant example, activity not a Erie, Lake but air travel plane sinking generally. Foremost, S.,U. at 269-270. also See at 675-677 supra, (relevant of vessels activity navigation generally). This argues requirement that we should abandon the Justice Scalia potential disrupting incident have the for maritime commerce. He ar that, gues practical matter, every occurring “as tort naviga on a vessel in give jurisdiction, ble waters” should post, (emphasis rise to maritime at 373 added), no matter how the incident purposes give divorced from the jurisdiction. rise to such approach is correct that his Justice Scalia- simpler apply by would be than the one embraced Executive Jet and that, equal, simpler jurisdictional Foremost things being all formulae preferred. fact, are to preference, Such a informs our refusal to con particulars sider of the fire in determining on Ultorian whether jurisdiction supra, tidy lies. See 363. But the demand for . far, go entirely jurisdic rules can too and when that demand divorces the inquiry tional purposes support jurisdiction, from the the exercise of it Foremost, gone has too far. unanimously the Court agreed that the purpose underlying of federal existence is the protection commerce, federal interest in the of maritime that a case implicate give jurisdiction. Compare must rise to interest such Foremost, 674-675, id., J., (Powell, with at 679-680 dissent ing). only point of debate in Foremost was whether the Court was straying purpose by requiring too from that no more than that the far wrong potentially have a disruptive impact on maritime commerce and activity arise from an with a to traditional mari substantial activity. enough go time Justice Scalia’s view that Foremost did not far plainly is thus view inconsistent with the unanimous of the Court Foremost.
focus on the character of general the activity is, indeed, suggested the nature jurisdictional inquiry. Were courts to focus more required particularly the causes of the harm, would have to they decide to some extent the mer- its of the causation issue to answer the legally and analyti- cally antecedent jurisdictional Thus, in question. case, this we need not ascertain precise cause of the fire to deter- *7 mine what Sisson was “activity” in; rather, the engaged rele- vant was the activity storage maintenance of a vessel at a marina on waters.3 then,
Our final is inquiry, whether the storage mainte- nance of a boat at a marina on waters has a sub- stantial to a “traditional maritime activity” within the of Executive meaning Jet and Foremost.4 Re-
3
case,
In this
all of the instrumentalities
in
involved
the incident were
engaged
activity.
in a similar
The Ultorian and the other craft damaged
by
marina,
the fire were docked at a
provided
and the marina itself
docking
and related
The
services.
facts of Executive Jet and Foremost also reveal
that all
engaged
the relevant entities were
in a common
activity.
form of
Aviation,
Cleveland,
(1972)
City
See Executive
Inc. v.
Jet
gest that to is the is sufficient jurisdictional jurisdiction, we could have stated confer economicallyby clearly stating mari- test much more to torts in torts is limited which time over “navigation.” on Moreover, are in narrow focus vessels policies navigation underlie not serve the federal would giving jurisdictional rise test. fundamental interest our protection jurisdiction is of maritime com- maritime “the to id., can- 674, and we have said that interest merce,” fully operators on unless “all of vessels not be vindicated subject navigable rules conduct,” are to uniform waters id., for uniform rules of maritime conduct at 675. The need liability navigation, but at least not limited to extends by any traditionally vessels, undertaken other activities to or noncommercial. commercial
Clearly, storage of a vessel at a ma- and maintenance substantially “tradi- waters is related to rina on activity” given perspective de- the broad tional maritime aspect Docking test. a vessel the second of the manded waterway in- common, is a if not a marina on activity. dispensable, a marina, At such vessels maritime period, or extended docked obtain fuel are stored for an supplies, navigation. Indeed, into and moved and out docking voyages begin with the of the and end most just navi- that, We conclude craft at a marina. therefore gation, storing maintaining at a a vessel marina substantially navigable waterway is related to traditional activity. foregoing reasons, conclude that the District For the we pursuant jurisdiction over limitation claim has Sisson’s Court §1333(1). nor Court of Neither the District Court Appeals claim, and we has the merits of Sisson’s addressed *9 judgment of therefore intimate no view on that matter. The Appeals case remanded reversed, of is and the is the Court opinion. proceedings this with for further consistent ordered.
So 368 joins, with White con- Scalia, whom Justice
Justice curring judgment. in the jurisdiction agree this over that the District Court has
I 1333(1),1 § agree with the I do not under 28 S. C. but U. case applies this is so. Prior to to conclude that Court test (1982), 668 our Richardson, v. 457 U. S. Ins. Co. Foremost admiralty jurisdiction to in all torts case law extended clear volving navigable as on Foremost recited vessels waters. “significant applicable torts the test of to such activity,” 10 which had been devised traditional years involving vessels, Executive torts not see earlier for City Aviation, Cleveland, Inc. v. 268 S. Jet of (1972). any my new view that test does not add substan requirement merely explains torts, for vessel-related but tive (which why ipso all torts have such vessel-related facto relationship”), “significant some non-vessel-related 1333(1). § description how torts, within Court’s of come goes determining tort about whether a vessel-related one relationship” “significant test threatens to sow con meets except margins, a been, had area fusion what settled the law. of (1866), Plymouth,
In The 3 Wall. we stated “[ejvery occurring, species tort, however whether on upon high not, if or wa- board vessel or seas admiralty passage, cognizance.” Despite ters, City Aviation, v. however, we held Executive Jet Inc. involving supra, Cleveland, action crash of a a tort jet or aircraft in Lake Erie was not a “civilcase 1333(1), § jurisdiction” meaning maritime assuming within the even regarded having “oc- the accident could be acknowledged We the tradi- curred” waters. Court, sought pur I to be Like because conclude the claims nature, against petitioner question are I not reach the sued do whether, jurisdiction basis, in if did exist on that there exist an not would provisions dependent of the Limited Liabil basis for under V). (1982 Act, ed., § ity App. seq. Supp. et U. S. C. *10 thought sig- Plymouth, it in The set forth
tional rule as locality” “was established and test nificant that this “strict grew up a to conceive of tor- in when it difficult an era in other than connection waters tious occurrence on Whereas 409 U. at 254. vessel.” with a waterborne cap- properly to the test tended were involved where vessels only traditional business of that had been the ture those cases produced “per- admiralty it had courts, other contexts “the invo- situations” which borderline verse and casuistic admiralty jurisdiction seem[ed] absurd.” almost cation of Id., 255. injured by public another beach is
“If a swimmer at by submerged object bottom, if a on the or swimmer or being damage machinery piece from water sustains dropped crane, a literal harbor a land-based into a juris- locality application not test invokes panoply of the courts, but the full the federal diction of In cases such law as well. substantive appli- adhered to a mechanical courts have these, some locality have sustained strict rule and cation of the admiralty jurisdiction despite any connection
the lack of wrong traditional forms of between navigation.” Id., at 255-256. commerce pointed general cases, criticism of these We noted the efforts particular from that had arisen difficulties out the involving airplane “locality-alone” apply cases test to 1333(1) § require, interpreted Accordingly, we crashes. Plym- involving only that the aircraft, not of torts the case wrong “locality” requirement that “the met, but also outh significant activ- to traditional bear a ity,” S., at 268. We concluded Jet, Executive “flights by wrongs be- aircraft with land-based connection points States,” id., at within the continental United tween 274, did meet this test. not as rest- could be understood in Executive Jet
Our decision simple ground involve a ing quite did not that the tort on the traditionally thought required by vessel, which had been leading (notwithstanding contrary scholars in the field *11 Plymouth). in dictum The See E. Benedict, American Ad- miralty: (1850); Its Jurisdiction and Practice 173 G. Robinson, Admiralty Handbook of Law the United States 42, 56, 88 (1939); (2d Admiralty Black, G. Gilmore & C. Law of 23-24 1975). very opinion conveyed ed. At the least, the strong implication involving occurring that a case a tort “in connection with a vessel,” waterborne S., at admiralty jurisdiction would be deemed within the without inquiry. further supra,
In Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, however, a involving pleasure case the collisionof two boats on what we presumed navigable to be waters, we read Executive Jet for proposition “significant broader that a to tra- activity” required ditional maritime even for torts involv- ing 'wrong’ vessels. “Because the here,” we said, “involves negligent operation of a vessel on waters, we believe that it has a sufficient nexus to traditional maritime activity admiralty jurisdiction to sustain in the District proceeded Court.” 457 U. at 674. We then to consider reject petitioner’s argument strictly that outside the commercial context govern “the need for uniform rules to liability disappears, conduct and and ‘federalism’ concerns torts, litigated dictate that these be in the state courts.” contrary, Ibid. To the admiralty we concluded, traditional navigation concerns arise whenever impli- the rules of are particular pleasure cated in a suit; a boat’s failure to follow govern “uniform rules navigation of conduct” that “potential disruptive impact” waters could have a just surely on maritime commerce as could a similar trans- gression by a commercial vessel. Id., at 675. many
This discussion Foremost has caused lower courts opinion requiring “significant read the as not rela- tionship activity” to traditional maritime in all cases, e., i. even requiring specifi- when a vessel is involved, but as more cally particularized showing activity engaged tort, if the time of the in to alleged generally engaged some extent, indeterminate would have an actual effect on mari- ante, cases). time 365-366, commerce. See n. (collecting my reading view the the latter imputes requirement inis error. to “the We referred potential disruptive impact of a collision” to rebut the merely petitioner’s argument jurisdiction in that case particular would not further the gen- eral purposes admiralty jurisdiction, navigation since pleasure craft could not affect maritime commerce. It was in that case to answer that it could. enough But that re- that sponse reasonably cannot converted holding into every case such an answer must be available —that no single instance of tort can exist where there is no potentially disruptive impact upon commerce. *12 No rule jurisdictional susceptible of and ready general appli- (and rule) cation therefore no practical can jurisdictional so as to such an precise pass “overbreadth” test. One can afford, avoid, and cannot such perhaps case-by-case analysis for the few at cases the for a lying margins when, example, — plane falls into a lake —but it is the folly general- to it to apply ity cases vessels.2 involving Today’s opinion, by engag- (the in an extended discussion of which ing the to fire degree which instrumentality by in this case damage particular ante, caused) commercial maritime might disrupt activity, of Foremost. 362-364, at reinforces this erroneous reading What achieves for today’s opinion admiralty torts is remi- niscent of the state of the law with to respect admiralty con- test, course, tracts. The must be whether general Ante, point tidy 2The Court this describes “demand for rules.” at 364, n. 2. I represented think it is rather an aversion to chaos —of the sort by conflicting painstakingly lower court decisions that the Court de ante, scribes, 365-366, 4,n. but makes no alleviate. effort to The Executive Jet initially suggested by Court’s statement that “the formula Foremost and in this case fully provides appropriate more refined ante, 4, guidance,” and sufficient n. descrip is neither an accurate past plausible prediction tion of the nor a for the future. rights appertaining “touch[es] to
contract
and duties
com-
navigation,”
Story,
on the
merce and
J.
Commentaries
Con-
(1833). But
of the United States 528
instead of
stitution
adopting,
(until today)
torts,
for contracts as we had
for
directly
general
that matters
related to vessels
rule
were
sought
finely,
by
covered, we
to draw
line more
case
body
object
long
That
of law has
case.
been
criticism.
impossibility drawing principled
respect
line with
to
to the
contract
what,
addition
fact that the
relates to a
(which
maritime)
by
nature
is needed in
vessel
order to
brought
itself “maritime,”
make the contract
has
ridicule
enterprise.
upon
“[t]he
As
noted in
one scholar
building
repairing
rules as to
ing
vessels”—the former hav-
People’s Ferry
nonmaritime,
been deemed
see
Co. Bos-
(1858),
Beers,
ton
20 How.
maritime,
v.
and the latter
see
—(1922)
Dry
Purdy,
New
Dock Co. v.
96S.
Bedford
therefrom,
“and the results obtained
are so humorous that
they
Hough,
deserve insertion in the laws of Gerolstein.”
Admiralty
Years,
Jurisdiction —Of Late
37 Harv. L. Rev.
(1924).3
perhaps
justification
529, 534
There is
more
for this
approach
respect
with
contracts, since
that field the
by
“locality”
test
“vessel”
would not be further limited
suggesting
test, as it is for torts. And I am
an
not
abandon-
approach
ment of our
field,
that other
which
now has
developed
they may
rules,
some
however irrational
be.4
expanding
approach
But there is no reason for
to the tort
agree
apply
today’s opinion,
with,
field.
I
the com-
*13
immediately recognize
Those music lovers are better than I who
Gérol-
European principality
setting
stein as the fictitious
that
is
of Offen
once-popular operetta,
bach’s
La Grande-Duchesse de Gérolstein.
it,
put
As Professor Black has
in the field of maritime
“[t]he
contracts
attempt
project
‘principle’
to
some
is best left alone. There is about as
‘principle’
much
there is in a
irregular
Fortunately,
as
list of
verbs.
not-too-great
stereotypes,
contracts involved tend to fall into a
number of
learned,
verbs,
proper placing
of which can
irregular
like
and errors
Black,
grammar
Admiralty
thus avoided.”
Critique
Jurisdiction:
(1950) (footnote omitted).
Suggestions, 50 Colum. L. Rev.
mentary
judicial
on an earlier
effort to do so: “The decision
increasing complication
. .
seems . . .
.
unfortunate
uncertainty
any
apparently, securing
without,
in the law
practical gain
compensate
disadvantages.”
for these
Admiralty
Note,
Torts,
Over
16 Harv. L. Rev.
Jurisdiction
(1903),
Campbell
discussing
Co.,
210, 211
v. H.
&
Hackfield
(D.
1903).
(CA9
1902), aff’d,
Ltd.
Haw.,
Oct
This leave approach might for “a libel published unusual actions such as defamation few Hough, supra, exclusively shipboard,” on and circulated there little difference be- 531,5 principle but seems me and bring- such an issue to the federal courts bringing tween event, any appear case. exotic actions ing slip-and-fall musings “thorough- more in the theoretical of frequently admiralty men,” ibid., federal reports. than bred many freakish cases will be saved expended time such rare approach thought bring not be will within It should that this any designed occurring torts waters aboard craft carry what people cargo or and to For a constitutes float. discussion “vessel,” Robinson, Admiralty generally Law the see G. Handbook (1939). §8, necessarily not pp. States 42-50 The definition is United modern and America rules out of the admi England “The law static. simply ralty jurisdiction they all are the propelled vessels oars because admiralty; long dignity class and beneath the court smallest period, years, tri the historic and for at least seven hundred within largest quadriremes of the and Roman navies were the remes Greek Parsons, powerful most The Robert W. S. vessels afloat.” U. (1903). 32-33 *15 jurisdictional rule makes it unnec- clear times over particular essary cases, of other what decide, to hundreds “traditionally are maritime” na- a vessel activities aboard particular will have on maritime tort ture, and what effect a vague produce sort tests of The latter commerce. subject-matter boundary in the of that is to be avoided area possible. wherever nullity judicial power boundary and between “The very bright possible, so line, if lit- , should ... be keep required judges thought to to inside it. tle is enable boundary vague contrary, obscure, If, on shadowy penumbra, raising ‘questions marches,’ consequences will to on ensue similar those two bad judges artery. will be misled into traffic Sometimes trying lengthy laboriously reaching decisions cases anybody. judges times, will which At other do not bind exceeding their the uncertain limits of be so fearful cautiously disputes powers they will out throw jus- they really capacity settle, have and thus which badly completely done be de- tice which needs be will expensive an Furthermore, nied. enormous amount jurisdictional legal ability up when will used issues spent upon elucidating much the merits it couldbe better judge ought to tell short, to be able of cases. easily trial belongs has fast in his and what no what court Cooley Chafee, Z. The Thomas M. business there.” (1950) Equity (quoting Lectures, Some Problems Milling v. Hanover Star Co. S. Metcalf, (1916)(Holmes, concurring)). J., judgment. reasons, For I concur in the these