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Sisson by and Through Allen v. Elkins
801 P.2d 722
Okla.
1990
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*1 HARGRAVE, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., and

HODGES, LAVENDER, SIMMS,

DOOLIN, ALMA WILSON and

SUMMERS, JJ., concur.

KAUGER, J., recused. SISSON, By Through her

Carmen

mother, guardian, natural and next-of- ALLEN,

friend, formerly Brenda Bren Allen, Sisson;

da and Brenda Individu

ally, Appellants, ELKINS, M.D., Individually;

Ronald C. M.D., Inc., Elkins,

Ronald C.

corporation, Appellees.

No. 72578.

Supreme of Oklahoma. Court

Nov. 1990. Nov. 1990.

As Corrected

Concurring Dissenting Opinion Kauger,

of Justice Nov.

As Corrected Dec.

clude correctly lower court refused on the instruct doctrine of lo- quitur, adequately instructed on the imposed upon physician of care pos- sessing a medical specialty. We affirm. Sisson, plaintiff, Carmen was born congenital with a heart defect which re- quired surgery corrective to sustain her life. age At seven weeks of Carmen under- went procedure, a Raschkind the first of operations. three corrective At four she underwent her next life-sustaining surgery, procedure. operation Rastelli This latter implanting involves an artificial Dacron graft or “conduit” major which acts as a blood vessel. Because the conduit is of a size, it fixed becomes less efficient as the grows. child It is not uncommon for the progressively conduit to become obstruct- ed, replacement. requiring years procedure, Ten after her Rastelli circulatory system Carmen’s had regressed point suffering to the that she was dizzi- fainting spells. ness and It became neces- sary undergo that she a Rastelli “redo” to replace existing All conduit. Rastelli sternum, procedures require that breastbone, open expose be cut the un- derlying Opening conduit. the sternum in procedure more “redo” involves risk be- cause the structures tend to beneath ad- back they here to the of the sternum as operation. heal the earlier Because a surgeon preoperatively cannot know precise position, conduit’s he must assume sternum, it is adherent Baum, Shores, Shores, Mark Ralstin & proceed great therefore caution as he appellants. City, Oklahoma for through Tearing cuts the sternum. or cut- ting the conduit is a risk in a Rastel- known Short, Barnes, Wiggins, Wiggins, John defendant, Elkins, li “redo”. Dr. Adler, appel- Margo City, & Oklahoma operating surgeon. lees. Frates, Farris,

Kent F. Frates & Okla- In opening Carmen’s sternum the doctor City, homa amicus curiae State Oklahoma conduit, causing significant cut into the Medical Ass’n. hemorrhage stopped by which could application pressure. Dr. Elkins

SUMMERS, Justice: completed opening placed sternal partial, bypass. case Sisson then total Dur- this complication, brought back a verdict for the defendant this Sisson underwent a challenging thirty appealed, period approximately doctor. minutes of Plaintiff pressure resulting in re- sufficiency the correctness and reduced blood con- jury. oxygen court’s instructions to the duced to her brain. The reduced We oxygen patient flow caused her to perma- sustain of the was unsuccessful. Id. at 166-67; damage. Keller, nent brain see also Hembree v. Von (1941). 189 Okl. An trial, At mother Carmen’s claimed three given instruction on res *3 errors Elkins’ course of action (1) only at common in the law absence of negligence: (1) which constituted the use of plaintiff’s the having offered direct evi- a reciprocating, oscillating, rather than saw (2) negligence, dence of the injury where sternum, (2) opening place in the failure to by something was caused within the exclu- prior bypass surgery, Carmen on (3) defendant, sive control of the and where (3) failure to induce cardiac the arrest after event causing injury was of a kind hemorrhage. jury The returned a unani- ordinarily which does not occur the ab- mous in favor of Dr. verdict Elkins. On sence of negligence part on the of the appeal, plaintiff trial maintains that the person in the situation of the defendant. refusing give to requested court erred a John’s, supra; Independant St. Eastern instruction, charg- ipsa loquitur res and in Torpedo Gage, supra. v.Co. with a of a non-specialist physician in a case where John’s, the defendant Since the doctrine of Si. res clearly specialist. was a ipsa loquitur Oklahoma codified for has been medical permit- State Medical Association malpractice by has been 76 cases O.S.1981 21: as ted to file its brief curiae. amicus any arising In negligence action care, rendering medical a pre- of sumption negligence shall arise if the LOQUITUR RES IPSA 1 following foundation facts are first es- urges Plaintiff that court the trial tablished: refusing give to a ipsa loqui- erred in res injury; 1. The plaintiff sustained (“The phrase tur instruction. The Latin proximately 2. Said caused itself”) thing speaks for refers to a rule of by an instrumentality solely within the whereby negli in certain cases defendants; control of the defendant or gence may of the defendant inferred be hap mere fact that the from the accident Such does not occur pened. Bottling Lawton Coca Cola v.Co. under circumstances absent negli- 610, 202 Okl. Shaughnessy, 216 P.2d 579 gence defendant, part on the of the (1950); Independent Torpedo Eastern Co. fact, If such discretion of 108, 1119, v. 240 1123 Gage, 206 Okl. P.2d court, degree requires a of knowl- (1952); v. Bottling Okla. Coca-Cola Co. edge possessed by skill not aver- Newton, 360, (1951). 205 Okl. P.2d 627 age person, such then that event fact Hosp. Nursing In & School v. St. John’s by expert testimony. must be established (Okla.1967), 434 P.2d Chapman, (Laws 1976.) April c. 44 eff. recognized com this Court first that the may loquitur law doctrine of res Instead of mon inference did, gence medical cases. as common rule applicable to presumption the effect and result of the statute At common law establishes thereof. It further doctrine of res was to aid differs from common law prima plaintiff making ipsa loquitur, facie case of doctrine of discussed John’s, direct in that the does negligence circumstances where St. statute not power incorporate plaintiff proof beyond plain of the the element that must tiff, power particular in a show the position but within the the defendant. not be to malprac injury. mindful that in caused the This circumstances which Court See, Crouch, case, pre P.2d negligence e.g., should never be Flick v. tice (Okla.1976); Little, at 1228. the mere fact that treatment 665 P.2d In sumed from (Okla.1978); ipsa loquitur v. Arbuckle instruction for set out in Little Memorial specifies plaintiff Control, Hospital OUJI-Civ. No. 9.13 Board proof to establish the founda- has the burden (Okla.App.1983). Turney Anspaugh, v. facts. See tion determining applies whether the doctrine in circumstances absent malpractice case, part surgeon. fact, we have held counsel for plaintiff the three numbered question foundational chose to ask the requirements produced set “yes” forth in the statute would have need either Imler, a “no” subject. be met. answer on that Tenny Middlebrook v. record & M.D.'s, Kugler, (Okla.1985). subject thus silent on the third Thus, ease, fact, turning supplied foundation and it today’s we cannot be must John’s, supra. inference. determine St. Refusal whether the three foundation supported by any instruct on issues plain facts have been established evidence is not error. Skogsberg First tiffs evidence so as to allow statute to *4 Nat. Kingmon, Bank P.2d 957 be applicable. of (Okla.1968); Cardwell, Lewallen v. R., plaintiff’s expert, Dr. testi P.2d (Okla.1958). Because evidence fied to the facts that Carmen sustained necessary of such third fact is for the injury instrumentality and that the that statutory presumption ap of to injury caused was in the sole control of ply, the refusing trial court was correct in Therefore, Dr. Elkins. evidence of the give ipsa to res instruction. clearly first foundation in two facts is 21(3); Middlebrook, 76 O.S.1981 713 P.2d problem record. The there whether was at 578. any requirement of evidence the third —the Defendant, below, although successful that the is of type that does not joins urging with in Amicus this Court to ordinarily negli occur in the of absence Middlebrook, or, overrule in the alterna- gence. tive, 21(3) invalidate 76 O.S.1981 for con- surgeon Dr. every R. admitted that who Middlebrook, stitutional reasons. Prior to performs Rastelli a “redo” runs risk of question whether existed a res lo- cutting the conduit. He that ma- testified quitur given instruction could be in a case jor bleeds can and do occur without' specific where there also of was gence. also he He testified that would However, negligence. acts of in Middle- oscillating opening have used an saw brook,-we found that there no error in was cutting to avoid breastbone conduit. ipsa loquitur res instruction (Dr. saw.) reciprocating Elkins used a He a medical case where evidence opinion, patient stated that his presented was of negligent acts. placed bypass been heart should have on Reading 21(3) literally, Id. at 578. Section prior surgery, Dr. and that Elkins we held that the. doctrine would be negligent doing surgery. was Plain- limited to instances where the common law tiff argues that third foundational fact applied, of ipsa loquitur would have testimony. can In be this inferred applica- but instead held that the statute is however, ipsa loquitur, the law of res ble in action where the three numbered plain- doctrine cannot invoked until foundation are met. We do not facts Id. supplied tiff has evidence of the foundation Middlebrook, depart reasoning from our John’s, “An facts. we said inference St. it. we eval- decline to overrule Nor do negligence under the doctrine [of statute, constitutionality uate the of a only arises from an loquitor estab- ] 21(3), applicable which was fact. lished foundation can- inference properly which upon case and the Court not supply the provide foundation fact from refused to instruct. We will not ours) (emphasis which it arises.” St. opinion. such an advisory Application See Andrews, quoting v. Emigh John’s at Development Fun Country Authority, (1948) 191 P.2d 164 Kan. (Okla.1977). Fire Co. v. National Union Insurance Elliot, (Okla.1956). ON THE DUTY OF INSTRUCTION A SPECIALIST point testimony did Dr.

At no in his R. testify proposition an as second as such Carmen’s Plaintiff’s serts that error committed does not occur under these reversible was giving covering prejudicial instructions we find no error in the order of duty special- non-specialist given, of both a and a the instructions the better physician. giving She ist asserts “general” to follow one would be imme- contradictory both instructions one, diately “specialist” latter confusing, physician spe- that a is either a specialist, effect such being to the that a as non-specialist, cialist or and that because here, higher the defendant is held to the in- specialist, Elkins is a cardiac using learning and skill ordi- given that should struction have been special- narily possessed by similar pertaining specialist. As authori- ists. solely ty, Reif, relies v. Boyanton she Initially, Boyanton we note that as cited 68,417, slip op. (Okla.Ct.App. July No. value; unpub precedential it lacks 1989) (unpublished opinion). opinion Appeals. lished the Court instruction, objected numbered Further, 30.5. it was vacat 20 O.S.1981 “10”, as follows: the court reads opinion ed this Court own recent our otherwise, agrees he states Unless (Okla. Boyanton Reif, physician employed person im- to treat a 1990). *5 possesses that pliedly warrants that he pronouncement is Boyanton Our dis- skill, learning, experience degree of and positive. that medical case ordinarily possessed by pro- of his others defendant, against surgeon instruc- field, practicing the same and fession specialist for and non- tions both medical ordinary use care in the that he will specialist physicians given, substan- were application his skill exercise of and the tially given identical to here. those We knowledge and to accom- experience his error found no there. See also Karriman plilsh purpose for which he is em- Clinic, Orthopedic judg- the he ployed, and will use his best (Okla.1973); Traverse, 362 Eckels v. P.2d diag- in the of his skill ment exercise Furthermore, (Okla.1961). we not- nosing treating the condition and ed that error could arise should both in- He does a cure and patient. not warrant spe- not be given, structions because success responsible not for the lack of is of, is not cialist instruction a refinement an failure that lack from his unless results to, non-specialist alternative instruc- ordinary or from his lack to exercise care non-specialist tion. While instruction skill, ordinary learning, experi- and required, knowledge addresses the and skill ordinary learning, possesses If he ence. adequately degree not it does address skill, experience ordi- and and exercises Boyanton, care. P.2d at 605. Con- same, he is not nary applying care whole, sidering the instructions as a see judgment. for responsible mistakes of Middlebrook, at we conclude substantially as Uni- the same Okla. It is presenta- that the trial court’s concurrent 13.8, Civil, Instruction, Jury No. form two to the jury tion of these instructions that trial court here cor- exception confusing not did not constitute and out “same or similar rectly excised error. reversible appearing in the O.U.J.I. locality” clause O.S.Supp.1983 20.1 formbook. Jury argues Plaintiff also that In (statute establishing medical stan- national No. 10 is inconsistent with struction dards). O.S.Supp.1983 which holds Okla 20.1 physicians homa to a national standard of given duty instruction here on to, objected She asserts that 20.1 re specialist, not care. Section and 13.4, objec national quires No. and standard to be patterned O.U.J.I. standard, Although given and instruc- given as instruction No. 8.2 tive good specialists Jury and used Instruction No. 8 stated: sessed standing in the field under similar same physician out to be a who himself A holds degree higher particular owes This of learn- specialist in a field of medicine circumstances. is using patient possessing and general practitioner. to his skill than that aof degree learning pos- and skill subjective tion stated a HARGRAVE, C.J., standard insofar as HODGES, physician LAVENDER, is rely JJ., DOOLIN, allowed on his best SIMMS and concur. judgment. Jury Instruction giv- No. part:

en states in OPALA, V.C.J., judgment. concurs in physician “.... employed to treat a WILSON, J., ALMA part, concurs in person impliedly warrants that he part. dissents in will use best judgment his in the exercise KAUGER, J., concurring part, of his skill in diagnosing the condition dissenting part, joining OPALA, in treating patient.... If he V.C.J., in his treatment of Art. 5 § possesses ordinary learning, skill and ex- Const, Okla. and 76 O.S.1981 21. perience and ordinary exercises care in applying same, responsible ishe SIMMS, Justice, concurring: in judgment.” mistakes I in affirming concur judgment of the court, however, trial I cannot embrace the We Jury find that Instruction No. 10 is Imler, rule of Middlebrook v. Tenny, and O.S.Supp.1983 inconsistent with 76 Okl., M.D.’s, Kugler, (1985), 20.1, which reads: which permits giving required The standard of care of those instruction when direct of specific engaging healing presented acts of jury. arts within the State of Oklahoma shall See, dissenting opinion, Middlebrook, su- be measured national standards. pra, at 587. *6 Initially we note that Section 20.1 makes no OPALA, Justice, Vice Chief requirement “objective” of an standard. KAUGER, Justice, whom joins solely for Further, the generally ap standard of care exposition 46, Okl.Const., the of Art. 5 § plied to physicians requires physi and concurring of 76 O.S.1981 § skill, care, cian the exercise learning judgment. ordinarily by physicians exercised un Today the court affirms the trial court’s der similar circumstances. Karriman v. judgment in a malpractice medical on case Clinic, 540; Orthopedic 516 P.2d at Stan jury defendants, the verdict the for hold- Coronary Disease, dards Care Heart of ing, alia, the inter trial court correct- 2807; Prosser, OBJ W. 54 The Law of ly to jury refused instruct the on our codi- Torts, (4th Ed.1971). at 162 This standard fied of version the common law’s res plainly Jury is stated in Instruction No. 10. loquitur doctrine, which is found in 76 O.S. physician To allow the to exercise his best Although 1981 21.1 I fully support the §

judgment is within these boundaries not judgment’s affirmance, I not pause would contrary to 20.1. Section consider, today does, to as the court wheth- on judgment The entered the verdict er plaintiffs the were entitled to the re- physician in favor of the defendant is af- quested ipsa loquitur res instruction.2 Rather, they firmed. I would assume were and pertinent opinion promulgated § The terms In of O.S.1981 are: an not but carried to mandate, court, majority per- a of this whose arising negligence “In action from changed pronounce- not sonnel have since that care, rendering presumption medical a ment, evidentiary predicate held the had following negligence arise the founda- shall if (or statutorily required facts”) “the foundation tion facts are first established: invoking doctrine, ipsa loquitur for the any injury; plaintiff "1. The sustained 21, may which are § embodied in established by proximately "2. Said caused Presbyterian Hospi- Pearson v. instrumentality solely an within the control of inference. tal, Inc., (No. 65,982 defendants; 59 O.B.J. 3460-3461 the defendant 6, 1988). opinion ordinarily December va- occur later “3. Such does publication negligence cated and withdrawn from absent on on Feb- under the circumstances ruary upon part parties’ joint the the the defendant. motion to 1989— " ” * * * added.) (Emphasis dismiss that followed the claim’s settlement. (non-medical) no other ipsa loquitur.5 In proceed the then to address defendants’ constitutionality upon negligence compel frontal attack case would law variant of common-law presumed. lack of due care to be Under § provision ipsa loquitur This doctrine. rule, is generally the trier common-law application solely for to claims enacted negligence only if permitted infer direct to my view, In against providers. health negligence plain- is beyond evidence of statutory Art. 5 doctrine violates § ability secure but lies within the tiff’s to 46, Okl.Const.,3 governs only it because § Moreover, reach of defendant.6 evi- subclass litigants. of tort acts of want of due care dence of proce- inapplicable.7 Today’s Article 5 46 mandates statewide § renders the doctrine expressly prohibits uniformity. dural It “In- opinion distinguishes further: § enacting legislature “any from local or negli- stead of an inference [rjegulating law ... did, gence the common rule the rules evidence in changing presumption there- establishes statute judicial (Emphasis proceedings_” sum, these (Emphasis original.) In of.” pre- mine.) create a terms a dichotomous res distinctions create only against sumption generally governs doctrine —one that providers. care presumption health gence and the other that is limited cases plaintiff arises when the shows that litigation. proximately caused in- injury was v. Porter8 held Reynolds this court strumentality sole within the defendant’s Const., in- Okl. is that when Art. harm “does control challenge validity, voked a statute’s neg- under circumstances absent occur only resolved is whether issue to be part of the defendant.”4 ligence addressing subject enumer- sharp departure The statute manifests enactment — treat- “targets ated parameters law’s of res common 46— different Const., plaintiff defendant pertinent if shows that the of Art. 5 Okl. 3. The terms over it. no inani- had control When provide: exclusive implicated, object mate shall, not, Legislature except "The as otherwise Constitution, pass any provided local in this *7 peculiar "it situation ... is the involved authorizing: special law or effect, and, says negligence ‘speaks’ in part have been of the defendant must of, jurisdiction "Regulating or or causing damage be- or involved in judicial pro- changing the rules cause, experience, as a matter common courts_” ceedings inquiry before ordinary course of such a situation and things, added.) (Emphasis damage plaintiff injury or to the if defendant had would not have occurred 21, supra note 1. 4. See 76 O.S.1981 exercising ordinary required in been care Chapman, supra at 162 such a situation.” Imler, Tenny Kugler v. & 5. See Middlebrook (the 2). syllabus ¶ court’s kl., (1986), where M.D.'s 713 P.2d 572 O Indeed, purpose the doctrine’s statutory recognized approach to court plaintiff "is to in such a situation to aid the loquitur application ipsa in medical prima make facie case of generally ob malpractice from cases differs trier of the to infer facts taining tort norms of common legit- gence part of the as a on the defendant presumption-of-negli While the § cases. fundamental imate deduction of fact "any gence applicable in action” standard is facts direct evidence....” established including negligence, those which (the syllabus Chapman, supra at 162 court's negligence, acts is evidence of there ¶1)- of the common-law same be said cannot Bottling Co. v. See Lawton Coca-Cola also (See ipsa loquitur. Middlebrook doctrine 610, (1950) Shaughnessy, 202 Okl. 216 P.2d 579 M.D.’s, Imler, Kugler supra Tenny at 587 & v. (Simms, 1). (the syllabus court’s ¶ C.J., Middlebrook, dissenting).) validity implicat 21 was not §of constitutional Okl., Crouch, Flick 555 P.2d 7. v. directly challenged. it is ed. In the instant case (1976). Hospital also St. John’s & School (the Nursing supra Chapman, at 162 note v. Nursing Hospital School v. John’s & 6. St. 4). syllabus court’s ¶ (1967). Okl., 166-167 Chapman, instrumentality, involves an Where Okl., (1988). loquitur invocable the doctrine of res merit less than entire class similar- ly persons situated or things.” Clearly, statutory version of res

singles out medical defendants

for a treatment. No different other negligence litigants subject are evidentiary

same presumption found in today I would follow this court’s

teachings Reynolds and invalidate that

part of the statute which alters the ele-

ments of the common-law doctrine exclu-

sively malpractice litigation. for medical

All negligence governed by actions must be parameters

identical of the common-law

doctrine.

For all these reasons I would affirm the judgment.

trial court’s Justice,

KAUGER, (concurring part,

dissenting part, OPALA, joining Justice,

Vice in part). Chief

I dissent for the stated in reasons dissenting opinion in Boyanton v. Reif (Okla.1990). I also dissent

because under the Okla. Const. art. 46,1 statute, 76 O.S.1981 is unc

onstitutional.2 WOOLDRIDGE,

Gregg Appellant, Alan *8 Oklahoma, Appellee.

STATE

No. F-89-223. Appeals

Court of of Oklahoma. Criminal

Nov. 1990. Porter, 2201(A) Reynolds supra provides: 2. at note 8. Title 12 O.S.1981 “A. notice Judicial shall be taken Const, provides pertinent art. Okla. law, court of the common constitutions and part: state, public every territory statutes force in not, except Legislature shall as otherwise "The jurisdiction of the United States.” Constitution, pass provided any this local Title 76 21 could be cured strik- O.S.1981 authorizing: arising “In action changing judi- the rules of evidence in rendering courts, of medical care." proceedings inquiry cial before

Case Details

Case Name: Sisson by and Through Allen v. Elkins
Court Name: Supreme Court of Oklahoma
Date Published: Dec 4, 1990
Citation: 801 P.2d 722
Docket Number: 72578
Court Abbreviation: Okla.
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