In the first count, the plaintiff claims that the termination was a breach of her implied contract of employment. In the second count the plaintiff alleges that the termination was in violation of public policy, in that the plaintiff's actions were for the advancement of a recognized charity. The third count alleges that the plaintiff's termination was a violation of public policy and was thus a malicious discharge.
The defendant moves to strike all three counts. The plaintiff has conceded the defendant's arguments concerning the motion to strike the first and third counts and they are stricken.
The motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a CT Page 1633-B complaint. Westport Bank Trust Co. v. Corcoran, Mallin Aresco,
It should be noted the plaintiff does not allege she was an employee for an indefinite term, whose employment could be terminated at will. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,
This public policy exception to the employment at will rule carved out in Sheets attempts to balance the competing interests of employer and employee. Under the exception, the employee has the burden of pleading and proving that his dismissal occurred for a reason violating public policy. The employer is allowed, in ordinary circumstances, to make personnel decisions without fear of incurring civil liability. Employee job security, however, is protected against employer actions that contravene public policy.
Id.
Given the inherent vagueness of the concept of public policy, it is often difficult to define precisely the contours of the exception. . . . [T]he plaintiff [must] allege that his discharge violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision [or CT Page 1633-D that] . . . his dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy.
Id., 680.
Assuming Morris applies, the plaintiff argues that the dismissal was in violation of the public policy in favor of promoting charity, which policy is illustrated in Section 501 (C)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that a termination based on the employer's belief that the employee was misusing the donated property when the charity gave her the property constitutes a violation of the public policy in favor of advancing charities. The plaintiff argues that such mistaken terminations would have a chilling effect on the advancement of charitable giving.
Assuming arguendo that there is a judicially recognized public policy in favor of promoting charitable donations, the question remains whether it is alleged that the termination here constitutes a public policy violation sufficient to weigh against the employer's right to terminate employment contracts CT Page 1633-E at will. The facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint may not have the effect of dissuading employees from soliciting charitable donations on behalf of their employers, and may not mitigate against the public policy in favor of promoting voluntary donations to charities. Here the plaintiff simply alleges she was terminated for misuse of the furniture after she received it from the seminary. Without more, it is not apparent that any purpose discouraging charitable gifts was intended or achieved by her firing. In this situation the plaintiff has not alleged a "demonstrably improper reason for dismissal . . . derived from some important violation of public policy"; Sheetsv. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., supra,
Here, not only has the plaintiff filed to allege how an CT Page 1633-F important public policy may be violated by the firing of an employee who has apparently misappropriated donated property, she has failed to allege that she was an employee at will. The right to recover in tort for wrongful discharge extends only to employees at will. D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Notre Dame HighSchool,
Accordingly, the motion to strike count one, two and three of the complaint is granted.
McDONALD, J.
