Lead Opinion
In this сase involving claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, we have before us an interlocutory appeal on a discovery issue. In particular, the plaintiffs ask us to review a district court order requiring the redesignation of the plaintiffs’ standard operating procedures (SOPs) from “attorneys’ eyes only” to “confidential.” The underlying protective order allowed each party to designate highly sensitive proprietary or trade-secret information whose disclosure to another party in the case would cause severe competitive damage as “attorneys’ eyes only.” Under this designation, only court personnel, attorneys, and outside experts could review the material. The district court removed the “attorneys’ eyes only” designation for any of plaintiffs’ SOPs alleged to have been misappropriated, converted, or used without authorization by the defendants. With the modification, these materials would remain confidential and not disclosed to the public, but would be disclosed to the defendants themselves.
Plaintiffs urge that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the order. On appeal, we agree that the court abused its discretion. The defendants did not argue below that the plaintiffs improperly designated materials under the order and did not' provide any basis for modifying the order other than conclusory assertions and a statement that they, unlike the plaintiffs, had elected not to hire an expert in order to save money. On this record, these grounds are not enough. We conclude that while the district court may have had other valid grounds for ordering redesig-nation, this is not apparent from the terms of the order, and therefore, we must reverse and remand. In short, removing the “attorneys’ eyes only” designation may be appropriate, but the court’s rationale for doing so is insufficient. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s ruling and remand for further consideration in light of a number of factors discussed in this opinion, including (1) the standards set forth in the stipulated protected order for designation of mаterial as “attorneys’ eyes only”; (2) the need for defendants, in addition to their attorneys and experts, to have access to the materials to. properly defend the plaintiffs’ claims; and (3) the potential harm to the plaintiffs that would result from disclosure of the materials to the defendants.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This litigation involves a battle between the two domestic producers of ehondroitin sulfate, Sioux Pharm, Inc. and Eagle Laboratories, Inc., and other individuals and entities named in the litigation, hereinafter referred to collectively as Sioux Pharm and Eagle Labs, respectively.
Chondroitin sulfate is a component of dietary supplements for joint health. Sioux Pharm, located in Sioux Center, makes the product from bovine trachea and other ingredients. Its manufacturing
Robert Den Hoed and Dana Summers are former employees of Sioux Pharm. Den Hoed left his job with Sioux Pharm in 2001 and launched Eagle Labs in 2003. Den Hoed is the president, CEO, and majority owner of Eagle Labs. Summers left his position with Sioux Pharm in 2003 and became the secretary for Eagle Labs. Eagle Labs began producing chondroitin sulfate in 2005 and is Sioux Pharm’s only domestic competitor.
Eagle Labs is a small business with no more than four employees, including Den Hoed and Summers, operating out of a small building behind Den Hoed’s family home. By contrast, Sioux Pharm occupies a 40,000-square-foot facility and estimates that its operation is ten times larger than Eagle Labs’.
On March 1, 2012, Summers contacted Sioux Pharm and asked to visit the plant, but his request was refused. Two nights later, Sioux Center police received a call reporting a suspicious red truck parked by the Sioux Pharm facilities. Officers investigating the call found the truck outside and an exterior door propped opén with a wrench. The officers caught Summers breaking into Sioux Pharm. Summers had a set of six keys to Sioux Pharm in his pocket, including a master key, and the officers found another master key in the parking lot near Summers’s truck. The officers searched Summers’s truck and found a white binder that turned out to be an SOP manual. After changing his story several times, Summers admitted that he had stolen the manual that night. He was charged with burglary in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.6A (2011). Sioux Pharm alleges that the break-in was an act of deliberate corporate espionage, while Eagle Labs claims that Summers acted on his own, without its knowledge or authorization.
On March 8, Sioux Pharm filed this civil action claiming trade-secrets violations against Eagle Labs, Bio-Kinetics Corporation, Summers, Den Hoed, and John Ymker, a partner in Eagle. Labs. Sioux Phаrm’s petition alleged that Eagle Labs misappropriated trade secrets, intentionally interfered with contracts and prospective business advantage, and engaged in civil conspiracy. In later amendments to the petition, Sioux Pharm added claims of unfair competition.
With respect to its trade-secret claims, Sioux Pharm broadly alleged in Count I that it
utilize[s] trade secrets in the form of secret chemical and biological research, secret systems, secret procedures, secret software programs, secret specialized hardware, and secret specialized tools, machinery and production process*532 es, all of which allow Plaintiffs to produce a variety of unique, highly specialized products ... with efficiency and precision.
Sioux Pharm further alleged that the above trade secrets were the result of significant efforts and expenditures by the plaintiffs, they provide substantial advantages over competitors, and plaintiffs own the trade secrets. Acсording to the petition, Sioux Pharm undertook “very deliberate steps” to ensure that outsiders such as the defendants had no access to Sioux Pharm facilities and SOPs, including limiting access to the facilities and requiring plaintiffs’ employees to sign confidentiality agreements. The petition alleged that the defendants obtained the trade secrets through physical intrusion into the plant and through theft/review of Sioux Pharm’s SOP manual and trade secrets.
Upon the filing of the petition, Sioux Pharm obtained an ex parte order from the district court authorizing Sioux Pharm to seize the computer and telephone equipment of Eagle Labs and to engage in a walk-through of the Eagle Labs facility. Pursuant to the court order, Sioux Pharm seized the equipment, engaged in the “walk through,” and took various photographs on March 13, 2012. In its answer, Eagle Labs specifically denied all of Sioux Pharm’s allegations relating to trade secrets.
The parties also , filed discovery motions. First, Eagle Labs sought a protective order on March 15 to prоtect any trade-secret information acquired during the walk-through. The district court ruled that all such information could only be reviewed by attorneys for the parties working together. Sioux Pharm, in turn, filed a motion on June 4 seeking greater access to the material, but agreeing that a protective order was necessary to protect the trade secrets of each party. The parties subsequently agreed to, and the district court entered, a stipulated protective order on August 6.
The stipulated protective order allows each party to designate materials as “confidential” or “attorneys’ eyes only” (AEO):
The designation of ‘CONFIDENTIAL’ by the Producing Party constitutes the representation that it reasonably and in good faith believes the Discovery Material constitutes or discloses confidential, non-public, and/or protective information under Iowa law. The designation of ‘ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY’ by the Producing Party constitutes the representation that it reasonably and in good faith believes the designated material constitutes or discloses confidential, nonpublic, and/or proprietary information containing highly sensitive proprietary, financial, or trade secret information, which would cause severe competitive damage if disclosed to another party to this action.
Under the terms of the order, confidential information may be disclosed only to attorneys, court personnel, parties, experts, and witnesses — with the latter three groups required to execute a prior agreement to be bound by the terms of the order. AEO material — unlike confidential material— may not be disclosed to the parties themselves. The order also restricts use of confidential and AEO “to the purposes of this litigation and ... not ... any other purpose.”
The stipulated protective order defines AEO information.as follows:
“Attorneys’ Eyes Only” information means confidential, non-public, and/or proprietary information containing highly sensitive proprietary, financial, or trade secret information, which would cause sevеre competitive damage if disclosed to another party to this action,*533 provided in any form whatsoever in this action....
Additionally, the stipulated protective order allows any party to challenge an AEO or confidential designation and seek redesignation. The party must first ask the producing party in writing to redes-ignate. If that request is not granted within five days, the requesting party may seek redesignation from the court. The order states, “In connection with any such motion, the burden shall be [on] the Producing Party to defend the appropriateness of the designation as Confidential or Attorney’s Eyes Only. Any such objections to such designations shall be made in good faith.” The order further provides:
If the Court upon motion finds that the challenged document or deposition testimony is improperly designated and the Producing Party was not acting in good faith in refusing consent to disclosure, voluntary withdrawal of designation or voluntary re-designation, the Court may grant relief as appropriate under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.517.
The stipulated protective order also contains a general provision allowing amend'ments:
This Protective Order may be amended with respect to specific Discovery Materials without leave of Court by the agreement of counsel for the Producing Party and Receiving Party in the form of a Stipulation filed in this case. This Protective Order shall remain in full force and effect indefinitely until modified, superseded or terminated on the record by written agreement of the Parties or by order of this Court. This Court shall retain jurisdiction during the pendency of this action and thereafter to enforce this Protective Order and to grant relief for any violation thereof.
Nothing contained in this Protective Order shall be construed to affect or govern the scope of discovery in this action, or to preclude any Party from moving this Court for further order or relief. •
The district court entered a scheduling order that required Sioux Pharm to designate experts no later than 210 days before trial or by March 15, 2013, and Eagle Labs to designate experts no later than 150 days before trial or by May 17, 2013. Trial was scheduled for October 15, 2013.
Sioux Pharm’s petition initially alleged that Eagle Labs misappropriated trade secrets solely in the break-in of March 3, 2012. Eagle Labs chose not to designate any experts, concluding that Den Hoed and Summers could adequately explain the origin of their SOPs and no experts were necessary to defend the allegations based on the break-in. Both parties produced their -SOPs under the AEO designation, and Sioux Pharm heavily redacted portions of its SOPs.
On May 10, 2013, Eagle Labs moved for leave to file counterclaims against Sioux Pharm. Eagle Labs asserted that Sioux Pharm trespassed on its property when its representatives entered the property of Eagle Labs pursuant to an ex parte temporary restraining order issued in the case. According to Eagle Labs, while the court authorized a “short walk-through,” the Sioux Pharm representatives, including its principal officers, trespassed on the property by engaging in an examination of
On June 7, the district court ordered two separate trials — one for Sioux Pharm’s trade-secrets claim and one for its unfair competition claim. The unfair competition component of the case is not at issue in this appeal.
Although both sides produced SOPs under the AEO designation, Eagle Labs contests the trade-secret status of Sioux Pharm’s SOPs. In particular, Eagle Labs contends at least some of Sioux Pharm’s SOPs lack trade-secret status based on disclosures made and positions taken by plaintiff Sioux Biochemical, Inc. in prior litigation against Cargill, Inc.
On September 3, Eagle Labs filed a motion to have Sioux Pharm’s SOPs redes-ignated from AEO to confidential. In its motion, Eagle Labs said it would be “impossible for Defendants to adequately prepare their case for trial unless the above-referenced information [i.e., the SOPs] is redesignated from AEO to ‘confidential.’ ” Eagle Labs added that redesignation “would permit Defendants’ counsel the opportunity to share this information with their clients so that evidence can be developed to address the allegations being made by Plaintiffs.” In the same motion, Eagle Labs also offered to redesignate its own SOPs (which it had previously designated AEO) from AEO to confidential. Eagle Labs did not submit any affidavit or other evidence in support of its motion.
Sioux Pharm filed a resistance to Eagle Labs’ motion for redesignation. Sioux Pharm’s resistance also was not supported by any affidavit or other evidence specific to the motion. The resistance made the point that Eagle Labs was not contesting the AEO designation under the protective order. According to Sioux Pharm, since the materials had been properly designated, and the defendants had stolen from Sioux Pharm, the protective order should
Following hearings, the district court granted both motions by an order entered September 23. The order required Sioux Pharm to identify which specific SOPs have been misappropriated and produce unredacted copies of those SOPs designated “confidential” rather than AEO. The court’s order stated:
The court has determined the plaintiff must identify which specific' SOPs have been misappropriated, converted or used without authorization. These must be disclosed by October 1, 2013 after a series of discovery disputes. The court finds these identified SOP classifications should be changed to that of “confidential” for purposes of this case only.
The court in conducting its balancing of the various priorities, finds that this action is necessary to do justice and to allow the defendants to appropriately understand and prepare their trial defense strategy.
Sioux Pharm filed an application for interlocutory appeal and request for immediate stay as well as a motion for reconsideration on September 27. On September 30, the district court denied Sioux Pharm’s motions for a stay and for reconsideration, pointing out that Sioux Pharm “made several recent efforts to clarify and (in the court’s opinion) efforts to expand the scope of discovery beyond the pleadings that would add issues and result in trial being continued.” The district court ordered Sioux Pharm to produce unredacted copies of every SOP it claimed Eagle Labs misappropriated, without the AEO designation. This would allow Den Hoad and Summers to review them. The district court explained:
Conceivably, if Plaintiffs are making their disclosure in good faith, there would be few, if any, surprises because Plaintiffs have had the opportunity to see and compare the SOPs of both parties prior to its disclosure. This eliminates a generic allegation of theft or misappropriation and helps the court in defining what is admissible evidence at trial ... not a scattergun approach that may lead to efforts to admit inadmissible or irrelevant evidence that would result in any jury verdict being set aside.
This disclosure then allows the defendants to view and ultimately understand what it is that they have allegedly misappropriated, converted or used without authorization. This method allows them to assist their attorneys in their defense. Absent disclosures, the defendants do not know which SOP the plaintiffs will present evidence on as misappropriated, converted or used without authorization and essentially would result in “trial by ambush.”
On October 31, we granted Sioux Pharm’s application for interlocutory appeal, which placed its disclosure obligations on hold. We retained the appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
As a general proposition, we review a district court’s discovery ruling for abuse of discretion. Mediacom Iowa L.L.C. v. Inc. City of Spencer,
III. Analysis.
A. Production of Unredacted SOPs. We begin by addressing a preliminary matter. The order that Sioux Pharm has appealed requires Sioux Pharm to produce unredacted SOPs. Sioux Pharm has appealed this issue, but just barely. Its total briefing on this issue consists of the following paragraph:
Believing it had no other option, and in a desperate attempt to avoid the full disclosure of its SOPs to Defendants, Sioux Pharm reluctantly offered during oral argument to produce unredacted SOPs (which could not be viewed by Defendants themselves, because they would remain AEO). However, Sioux Pharm only offered to do so if absolutely necessary to avoid producing redesignat-ed “Confidential” SOPs (which Defendants could view). To be clear, Sioux Pharm does not want to be forced to unredact its SOPs, either, even if such redactions might hinder Sioux Pharm’s prosecution of this lawsuit.
To the extent this is an argument against producing unredacted SOPs, we are not persuaded. Sioux Pharm must produce complete, unabridged versions of the SOPs to allow the defendants to defend the case fairly. Because Sioux Pharm contends its case turns at least in part on similarities between each party’s SOPs in content, font, margins, and formatting, counsel for Eagle Labs cаnnot fairly prepare a defense without seeing the SOPs allegedly misappropriated. When claims hinge on a close textual comparison of each side’s SOPs containing detailed technical information and alleged trade secrets, there is simply no alternative to the production of unredacted SOPs. Although both sides apparently made redactions, the stipulated protective order makes no provision for redaction of documents produced with the AEO designation. Redactions under these circumstances violate the basic principle that “our discovery rules are to be liberally construed to effectuate the disclosure of relevant information.” Farnum v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
We now turn to the fighting issue on appeal: whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering the SOPs (which
B. AEO Designations in Protective Orders — Some Relevant Principles. “[T]here is no true privilege against discovery of trade secrets or other confidential information.” Mediacom Iowa,
In an action brought under this chapter, a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means, including but not limited to granting protective orders in connection with discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the action, and ordering a person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without prior court approval.
Iowa Code § 550.7. Nevertheless, “a trade secret must and should be disclosed if the disclosure is relevant and necessary to the proper presentation of a plaintiffs or defendant’s case.” Mediacom Iowa,
Once a district court has found information sought in discovery is a trade secret, it must determine whether good cause exists for a protective order. Id. at 67. The court should employ three criteria:
“‘[T]he harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which intrudes less directly on expression.’ ”
Id. at 68 (quoting Farnum,
Litigation over protective orders arises in various contexts. Sometimes the issue is whether a protective order should be modified so that third parties may gain access to the material. In Comes v. Microsoft Corp., we considered a request by plaintiffs in a Canadian antitrust litigation against Microsoft to gain access to confidential materials from the Iowa litigation.
After considering the various approaches other courts have taken to address requests to modify protective orders, we conclude the soundest approach is to balance the interests at stake, taking into account the reasons for the issuance of the protective order in the first place and whether the legitimate interests of the parties can still be protected with the suggested modification. The court should also consider to what extent the party opposing modification has reasonably relied on the terms of the protective order and whether the party would have relied on the protective order had the suggested modification initially been included in it. In a case such as this one, the court should consider the value of the interests of the party seeking modification, as well as any public interest in judicial economy and public disclosure, if appropriate. The court should consider whethеr the party seeking modification is attempting to circumvent discovery or evidentiary restrictions in some other jurisdiction. Because each situation in which a party or third party seeks modification will be different, we will not try to list all the considerations the district court may take into account when making its decision, but the court should fully and fairly consider all the circumstances supporting the modification, as well as the circumstances mitigating against it, and not employ any presumption for or against modification.
Id. at 309-10. We concluded by expressly disavowing any presumption against the modification of protective orders. Id. at 310.
Although the principles of Comes apply here, this case involves a different issue than the Comes case. Here, the question is whether materials that have been designated AEO under a stipulated protective order that permits this redesignation should be reclassified as confidential. We recognize that in trade-secret litigation, “courts often issue protective orders limiting access to the most sensitive information to counsel and their experts.” Tailored Lighting, Inc. v. Osram Sylvania Prods., Inc.,
“The disclosure of confidential information on an ‘attorneys’ eyes only’ basis is a routine feature of civil litigation involving trade secrets. The purpose of this form of limited disclosure is to prevent a party from viewing the sensitive information while nevertheless allowing the party’s lawyers to litigate on the basis of that information.”
Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison,
The main concern of parties seeking to impose AEO restrictions is fear that dissemination of sensitive information, particularly to decision-makers of its competitors, would threaten serious competitive harm. Even when the decision-makers of the opposing party act in complete good faith, courts assert that they will simply not be able to compartmentalize what they learn. See BASF Corp. v. United States,
On the other hand, the opposing party seeking disclosure, even if a competitor, may claim that disclosure of documents to its decision-makers is necessary to allow it to litigate effectively. For example, in In re Wilson,
There appears to be a prevailing view among courts addressing the issue that competitive decision-makers of direct competitors should be denied access to trade secrets in litigation. See Paycom Payroll,
In Safe Flight, plaintiffs president, Leonard Greene, asked to act as his own expert because of his position as a “preeminent aeronautic engineer, having received more than sixty aeronautic patents.”
The court in Safe Flight, however, did allow defendant to use in-house counsel to review confidential materials because those attorneys were “segregated” from competitive decision-making.
THE America, Inc. likewise involved what the terms would be for an initial protective order, not the implementation or modification of a stipulated protected order that had previously been entered.
In two additional casеs Eagle Labs cites, the parties were not direct competitors. See MGP Ingredients, Inc.,
C. Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion? We now turn to the question of-whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering the re-designation of the SOPs from AEO to confidential. Redesignation should not be required merely because Sioux Pharm alleges the SOPs were purloined by Eagle Labs. Sioux Pharm argues it is unsure which specific SOPs were stolen. Sioux Pharm may allege misappropriation of a collection of trade secrets if it has a good-faith basis for that allegation without 100% certainty as to which specific ones were taken. See Nike, Inc. v. Enter Play Sports, Inc.,
Redesignation also should not be ordered merely because Eagle Labs chose not to retain an expert. See Tailored Lighting, Inc.,
Plaintiffs’ position essentially forces us to go out and hire our own expert because only our own expert who is a nonparty under the terms of the protective order can look at AEO materials produced by the Plaintiffs.
At the September 23 hearing, one of the defendants’ counsel stated, “Our clients specifically chose not to retain an expert to limit costs in this litigation.” Eagle Labs did not argue that experts were unavail
So, the question becomes, what would be a good reason for redesignation. One obvious answer would be when the material does not qualify for AEO treatment under the existing stipulated order because it is not “confidential, non-public, and/or proprietary information containing highly sensitive proprietary, financial, or trade secret information, which would cause severe competitive damage if disclosed to another party to this action.”
The parties’ stipulated protective order expressly authorizes parties to make an objection to confidential or AEO designation and authorizes the court to resolve the objection, with the burden resting on the party claiming protected status “to defend the appropriateness of the designation.”
However, in this case, Eagle Labs did not dispute below that the materials had been properly designated as AEO, and there was evidence in the record (such as the affidavit of Sioux Pharm’s president and co-owner) supporting such a designation. Nor does the district court’s order indicate that the court found the materials had been misclassified.
As we have already discussed here, and at more length in Comes, courts also have the authority to modify stipulated protective orders. In Comes, we explained that in deciding whether to modify an order “the court should fully and fairly consider all the circumstances supporting the modification, as well as the circumstances mitigating against it.”
The problem here is that the party seeking reclassification made only a eonclusory argument for doing so, and the court did not set forth its reasoning for ordering reclassification in any detail. The district court cited its own “balancing of the various priorities” and found reclassification “necessary to do justice and to allow the defendants to appropriately understand and prepare their trial defense strategy.” This language leaves it unclear whether the court ordered reclassification because it found the SOPs did not meet the protective order’s standards for AEO treatment or because it was deciding to modify the protective order. Assuming the latter to be the case, this language also leaves unanswered whether the district court simply agreed with Eagle Labs’ ipse dixit argument about the unfairness of requiring it to hire an outside expert or whether the court had оther, more persuasive grounds for modifying the order.
A district court abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion for reasons that are clearly untenable. See Mediacom Iowa,
In this case, the district court stated that it engaged in a balancing, but did not expressly engage in the analysis of the risk of harm that might be caused by further disclosure or the impact that the failure to allow more disclosure would have on Eagle Labs’ ability to litigate. The lack of a more detailed order makes it difficult for this court to engage in meaningful appellate review. Cf. Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg,
Our ruling shоuld not be construed as criticism of the district court. From our review of the record, we are impressed by the court’s careful, even-handed, hands-on management of the case. At the same time, both in seeking and in opposing the redesignation of Sioux Pharm’s SOPs, the parties made generally conclusory arguments. As often happens, the arguments became more focused when the parties got to our court. Nevertheless, in trade-secret litigation between two direct competitors, the stakes are high, and any order regarding the confidentiality status of alleged trade secrets must be carefully drawn. That order should give due account to the terms of the protective order and the considerations set forth in Comes.
IV. Disposition.
For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s orders of September 23 and 30, 2013. We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Notes
. Evidence regarding the break-in, including a рolice report and the judgment entry in Summers’s criminal case, was submitted in the course of the subsequent litigation between Sioux Pharm and Eagle Labs and relied upon by the district court in various pretrial rulings. As the district court found, Defendant Summers is an officer and employee of the defendant Eagle Laboratories and was ... caught [burglarizing] the plaintiff's place of business and had a notebook of the plaintiffs’ SOPs in his pickup truck.
. Eagle Labs also made redactions to its SOPs.
. In a separate appeal, we affirmed the district court’s ruling that Summit is subject to personal jurisdiction in Iowa. Sioux Pharm v. Summit Int’l,
. Approximately, a decade before, plaintiff Sioux Biochemical, Inc. had sued Cargill for misappropriation of trade secrets. See Sioux Biochem., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.,
. Sioux Pharm used an expert who prepared a report following a comparison of both sides' SOPs. This report is part of the record on appeal.
. Further, the order provides that if the court determines a designation was not made in good faith, it may award sanctions.
. The stipulated order provides:
This Protective Order does not limit the right of a Party to offer Confidential or Attorneys’ Eyes Only information into evidence at hearings or at trial, or to use it for any other lawful hearing or trial purpose including but not limited to impeachment. Any party may move the Court for an Order that the evidence be received in camera or under other conditions to prevent unnecessary disclosure.
As we have said, " ‘There can be no blinking the fact that there is a strong societal interest in public trials.’ ” Iowa Freedom of Info. Council v. Wifvat,
We have limited access to judicial proceedings in appropriate cases. For example, juvenile court proceedings may be closed to the public upon the motion of any party or on the court's own motion. See In re A.M.,
. The court can reopen the deadline for expert disclosure if need be.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially).
I concur with the court’s opinion.
On remand, the district court should give due regard to the two competing considerations in this case which drive in opposite directions: the risk of harm to Sioux Pharm that might be caused by additional disclosures and Eagle Labs’ need for further disclosure to effectively defend its interests in the litigation.
As pointed out by the court, the district court and the parties on remand should avoid generalizations in favor of specific evidentiary showings and articulated reasoning. To some extent, the shortcomings in the district court’s order may have been a result of sequencing. At this stage of the litigation, the trade secrets of the par
The district court in this case, however, ordered Sioux Pharm to identify with particularity its Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that Eagle Labs allegedly misappropriated. If Sioux Pharm complies with this order first, the district court will then be in a better position to examine each identified SOP that is allegedly a trade secret misappropriated by Eagle Labs (and any other documents for which disclosure is sought) and make the necessary particularized findings with respect to the balancing of the parties’ competing interests.
WIGGINS, J., joins this special concurrence.