192 Iowa 1224 | Iowa | 1921
The objections made by appellant before the board of review, which were incorporated in tbe petition in tbe district court on appeal, were: First, that the property of tbe bridge company had been valued at an excessive amount; and second, that the valuation placed upon the property was and is inequitable, and not in proportion to tbe values placed upon real estate and other property in the taxing district. There appears also to be some controversy as to what part of the bridge is assessable in Iowa and what part in Nebraska. Appellant contends that the part taxable in Iowa is 26 per cent, and that in Nebraska, 74 per cent, the bridge being across the Missouri River. There is evidence as to soundings made shortly before January 1, 1919, for the purpose of determining the channel. But on this question appellee does not seriously dispute appellant’s claim, and we shall not go into any detail on that subject. It is conceded by appellant that the courts are reluctant to disturb values fixed by taxing authorities, and that there is a presumption that the values so fixed are equitable, and that a complaining owner has the burden of overcoming such presumption, and to establish the injustice or inequity of the assessment. We have so held. Benson v. Town of LeClaire, 185 Iowa 506, 508; Frost v. Board of Review, 114 Iowa 103; First Nat. Bank v. City Council, 136 Iowa 203, 208; King v. Parker, 73 Iowa 757. Appellants also state the rule in such cases, quoting from People v. St. Louis Elec. B. Co., 290 Ill. 307 (125 N. W. 280, as appellant cites it, but we assume that 125 N. E. 280 is meant), that:
“The board was required to exercise its judgment in the matter, and a mere difference in judgment will not authorize a court to set aside an assessment. Here there was not only an entire absence of proof to sustain the assessment, but the evidence shows an over-valuation so excessive as to require the conclusion that it did not arise from an error in the exercise of honest judgment, but was arbitrarily and intentionally made; and from such an assessment the courts will give relief.”
And further, that courts will not give relief against an assessment on account of mere difference of opinion, but where it is manifest that the assessment is grossly excessive, and is a result of the exercise of the will, but not of the judgment, relief
Appellant also cites Iowa Cent. R. Co. v. Board of Review, 176 Iowa 131. In that case, the court said that it was shown in the record that neither the assessor nor the board of review knew anything of the value of such property, and that it was necessary to take into consideration the facts and data in tables submitted by the railway.
It is contended by appellant that, in the instant case, the valuation was a mere guess by the assessor and-by the district court, and that the record presents such a glaring error of judgment and shows such an inequality that a reduction to the amount contended for by appellant is demanded. //We shall see in a moment from the evidence that, unlike the Iowa Cent. R. Co. case, the authorities did know about such matters; and, as said in the Benson case, supra, no great inequality has been shown, and there is nothing to indicate that the taxing authorities did not proceed according to their best judgment, in fixing the value, /fin short, there is a conflict in the evidence, and the 'finding of the district court has substantial support in the evidence. The argument of appellant is based on the assumption that the original cost of the bridge is conclusive as a basis for the assessment, and that there is no evidence in the record to the contrary. But we shall see from the evidence that the court could have found the value substantially as fixed by it. It is difficult sometimes to fix the value with exactness. There are comparatively few bridges of this character, and their values are not the subject of as frequent discussion or consideration as lands, horses, and the like.
1. Appellant summarizes some of the facts which it claims are not in controversy, substantially as follows: The bridge company is incorporated, with outstanding, stock amounting to $943,763, and the property owned by it is the bridge in controversy. The bridge is of stone and steel, and was built in 1888, at a cost, including approaches and one mile of track on the
Going back a moment to the cost of the bridge, it is conceded that there is a variance. The bookkeeper for the Northwestern Railway system and for the bridge company says that the variance between his books and the engineer’s records is because the cost and improvement of some part of the approaches were charged as operating expenses, while the engineer’s department charged it as original cost.
Appellant says in argument that the questions in dispute, and over which there is some controversy in the record, are in regard to the value of the bridge property, and whether the assessment appealed from was equitable, and in proportion to the values placed upon other property in the district. Appellant thus concedes, it seems to us, that there is a conflict in the evidence. Without going into too much detail, we shall set out some . of the evidence, or enough to show a conflict.
Mr. Gray, the assessor, testifying for appellant, says that he considered $360,000 to be the full value of the bridge prop
This witness, called' on behalf of appellee, after appellant had introduced its other witnesses, says that he did not include in the assessment in question the track assessed by the executive council. Lived in Sioux City 30 years, during which time he has been engaged in the real estate and loan business, and has had occasion to examine, investigate, and study the values
Plaintiff’s engineer, Mr. Darrow, describes the bridge, and says it would be more valuable if it was capable of taking care of modern equipment and heavier traffic; that, if constructed according to present-day ideas, it would be more valuable than the present bridge ever was; that cost of steel and materials has increased since this bridge was built, but that modern processes would probably make the increased cost of the construction of a bridge of this kind now about 25 per cent over what it cost when first erected.
Mr. Gregg, the general bookkeeper for the Northwestern Railway and the appellant, says that the revenue from the bridge property was a great deal more, prior to the making of the leases; that the Northwestern Railway owns one half the stock of the bridge company, and the Omaha railroad the other half. Does not know whether the book records as to original costs are correct, — has no reason to believe otherwise. The only income received from the bridge is the rental under the leases. There is nothing to prevent it from receiving more, if other companies should use the bridge. The revenue from tolls was $230,000 one year, which was high mark, and the lowest was $108,000 per annum.
Mr. Polleys lives in Chicago, and is tax commissioner for the Northwestern Railway and the Omaha company. Witness has also had charge of the tax matters for the Sioux City Bridge Company, as one of the subsidiaries of the Northwestern, since
"Now assuming that the true value of the bridge property in question, properly assessed in the taxing district of Sioux City, is 26 per cent of $1,022,000 (the original cost of the Sioux City bridge) or $265,700, deduct from this the one mile of track assessed by the executive council, $60,000, leaves $205,700, as the true value of the bridge property in Iowa. Applying the ratio of 53 per cent to this amount would leave the taxable value of the bridge property in Iowa at approximately $109,000, instead of $360,000, the amount fixed by the assessor.”
One fourth of this would make the assessment, as contended for by appellant, $27,250, instead of the amount fixed by the trial court, $82,500.
Mr. Barlow, living in St. Paul, chief engineer of the Omaha Railway Company, says he is familiar with this bridge and knows that the cost of it, including approaches and one mile of track, was $1,022,355.28; that, in 1918, the value of that portion of the bridge and approach in Nebraska was fixed for
One of appellant’s witnesses states that, because the bridge is old, the present steel part of the bridge is practically scrapping value only. But it produces an income of $81,000 perj year or more. The assessment finally fixed by the trial courtjJ $82,500, just about equals the income.
It may be that we have gone too much into detail. There may be other circumstances not mentioned. "Without attempting to point out the conflict between the different witnesses, it is enough to say that a reading of the testimony shows that there is a conflict. We say this because of appellant’s contention that there is no dispute in the evidence. The case is triable de novo, and is so considered. Without further discussion, we are of opinion that appellant has not met and overcome the burden, and has not sustained the two propositions relied upon by it, as to the value .of the property or that the assessment was inequitable. — Affirmed.