48 F.R.D. 385 | S.D.N.Y. | 1969
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is grounded on this court’s denial of an application for postponement of the trial and our dismissal of the claims based on the Securities Act.
The facts material to the application for postponement are fully and accurately set forth in the affidavit of Richard Conway Casey, sworn to December 1, 1969, submitted in opposition to the motion, and we adopt that statement of facts as though fully set forth in this memorandum. Suffice it to say that although this case was on the ready calendar from October 7, 1969 and ap
The application made no showing of any circumstance intervening after the assignment for trial but was grounded on the claimed business inconvenience of Mr. Sepe’s coming to New York for trial. This is patently an insufficient reason for an adjournment once a case has been assigned out for trial. It must be borne in mind that, at that stage, the wheels were set in motion not only for trial of the instant case but for a group of cases lined up to follow. If the wheels are stopped, all movement of the calendar stops, and the judge and jury are left idle until the next case is ready for trial. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, because of the unexpected gap in the calendar, to get the next case ready for trial without undue harassment of counsel, parties and witnesses. As a result, postponement of trial, once a case is in the trial pool, causes unreasonable gaps in the calendar with unjustified expense to the public and unnecessary inconvenience and delay to other litigants awaiting trial.
This case was four years old and had been tried before, but the jury disagreed. The prior testimony of Mr. Sepe was available and could be used at the second trial.
We think, for the foregoing and other reasons which we have stated many times,
As to plaintiff’s second ground, the claims under the Securities Act were properly dismissed. There was not the slightest evidence that any of the commodity futures transactions in issue were executed on any exchange in the United States. Rather, the transactions were between foreigners, were made in France or in Italy and were executed on the London exchange. The Securities Act was therefore inapplicable.
Finally, it would have added nothing of substance and much to confusion if the claims under the Securities Act were submitted to the jury. If anything, plaintiff fared far better under
Accordingly, the motion to set aside the verdict of the jury, vacate the judgment for defendant entered on November 12, 1969, and grant a new trial is in all respects denied.
So ordered.
. See United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 941 (2d Cir. 1963).
. See Davis v. United Fruit Co., 402 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1968).
. See Maiorani v. Kawasaki Kisen K. K.: Kobe, 65 Civ. 3169 (S.D.N.Y., June 4, 1969); Sacharow v. Vogel, 66 Civ. 1468 (S.D.N.Y., May 22, 1969); Vitarelle v. Long Island R. R., 45 F.R.D. 474 (S.D. N.Y.1968), aff’d, 415 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1969); Schneider v. American Export Lines, Inc., 293 F.Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Peterson v. Terminal Taxi, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 349 (S.D.N.Y.1968); Quagliano v. United States, 293 F.Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y.1968).
. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd(b); Kook v. Crang, 182 F.Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y.1960).