22 F. Cas. 228 | E.D. La. | 1854
Lead Opinion
In this case, it appears from the evidence that the steamboat Georgia, of which the libelant was owner, came into collision with the steamboat Dresden in the Mississippi river, at a point about four miles below the mouth of the
My attention has been particularly directed to rule 3 of the rules and regulations adopted by the' board of supervising inspectors in compliance with the provisions of the twenty-ninth section of the act of congress, entitled “An act to amend an act entitled an act to provide for the better security of lives of passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam, and for other purposes,” approved the 30th- of August, 1852. These rules and regulations were adopted on the 29th of October, 1852. By rule 3, to which reference has been made, the pilot of the descending boat is required to keep the channel and check his engine, using only sufficient steam to give her steerage, until the following signals are given and answered:
The rule is evidently intended, by the language employed, to apply to the .navigation of “narrow channels or in fogs.” It is, in my judgment, quite absurd to speak of the channel of the Mississippi river at any stage of water as a narrow channel at any point below the mouth of the Ohio; and we are told by the old and experienced pilot, Reuben Miller, who was examined in this case, that on that part of the river where the collision occurred he would run an ascending boat four hundred yards from the Kentucky shore, and that there is that width of what he terms good water. There was no fog on the river at the time of the collision. It had been raininf., but that had ceased and the night was ele ir. The witness Miller also states that “descending boats come down near the Kentucky shore. Boats going up very frequently keep in the bend, but if there is a boat coming down, they keep near the bar.”
The rule adopted by the supervising inspectors refers, doubtless, to the channels of the narrow shoots as they are technically termed by the river-men, which running off from the main channel form islands, and fall again into it. These in a high stage of water are frequently navigated by steamboats, because they greatly abridge the distance. A channel of four hundred yards cannot reasonably be regarded as a narrow channel, and no difficulty could possibly arise in navigating such a channel on a clear night if pilots understand their duty, and are familiar with the customs of the river. But I do not understand that the rule invoked, even if applied to the main channel of the Mississippi, as well as to its tributaries and narrow shoots, was designed to change the rule of navigation already well recognized. In the first place, has the libelant in this case shown beyond a reasonable doubt, that he kept the channel and checked his engine, using only sufficient steam to give her steerage, until the signals were given and answered? In this case she gave the first signal which was not heard by the ascending boat; but it does not appear that when she gave the signal she at once checked her engine, and used only sufficient steam to give her steerage. Her own pilot testifies that he did not ring to stop the engines until the signal of two taps was given by the pilot of the ascending boat, and it is extremely doubtful whether or not the starboard engine of the Georgia was stopped at all. If those of the witnesses on the part of the Dresden, who speak of this alleged fact, are to be believed, it is certain that it was not. So far as it relates to the conduct of the pilot of the Dresden, the rule seems to have been substantially complied with. lie did not answer the first signal of the Georgia, because he did not hear it. He gave his signal of two taps, not indeed as soon as the Georgia was in sight and hearing, but when she was between three and four hundred yards off; and this was amply sufficient to enable the descending boat to avoid the collision if she had taken all necessary precautions. It must be remembered that the ascending boat is always required to do the maneuvering. She is not by the general rule of navigation, to stop her engine. In the case before the court, however, the Dresden seems to have done so to break the force of the collision, when it was apparently unavoidable.
I am of opinion that the libelant has not presented such a case by the evidence on the record, as should entitle him to a decree for the damages he has sustained. I consider those damages to be the result of the negligence and want of skill on the part of the pilot of his own boat; and his libel must therefore be dismissed, with costs.
Rehearing
Subsequently on the part of the libelants, application was made for a rehearing.
delivered the following additional opinion:
I have again examined the evidence in this case, and after mature consideration must adhere to the opinion already given. The declarations of witnesses in reference to distances must be received with many grains of allowance. We know how difficult it must be to determine the precise position of bbats in the night time, and how uncertain must' be conclusions drawn by witnesses who speak of objects discerned at a distance. In giving my opinion, therefore, I do not pretend that the distance of the Dresden from the Kentucky shore was precisely that which the witnesses say it was. It may have been one hundred or one hundred and fifty yards less. But what I designed to convey in the opinion already rendered, is, that she had proceeded sufficiently far to
The new trial is refused.