This is аn action by plaintiff, John W. Sinnett, against defendants, Ronald M. Albert and Hie Food Products, Inc., for damages for libel. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the district court sustained defendants’ motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the plaintiff’s petition. The critical issue on appeal involves the nature *177 and extent of “privilege” where the alleged defamation of the plaintiff occurred in connection with proceedings tо disbar or discipline an attorney who is not the plaintiff.
It should be noted that in Nebraska, proceedings before a committee on inquiry must be had prior to instituting the judicial procedure for discipline of attorneys. Unless requested by the attorney charged, neither the hearing, records, or proceedings of the committee on inquiry shall be made public nor any publicity be given thereto prior to the filing of a complaint against thе attorney in this court. See, Rules Creating, Controlling and Regulating the Nebraska State Bar Association, Article XI, paragraphs 10 and 11; and Revised Rules оf the Supreme Court of Nebraska, Disciplinary Proceedings, paragraphs 10 and 11, p. 32 (November 15, 1971).
The defamatory statement here was a part of a complaint lodged by the individual defendant with a committee on inquiry of the Nebraska State Bar Association against an attorney. Thе complaint involved the attorney’s conduct in connection with a previous lawsuit between the parties involved here. Although the allegеdly defamatory statement was never admitted into evidence, it may be inferred that it was an incidental or explanatory part of the complaint against the attorney. The members of the committe on inquiry properly refused to testify as to any of the records or proceedings before the committee.
Although the plaintiff asserts various errors in connection with the exclusion of evidence, we do not reach those matters in view of our determination on the basic issue of privilege.
“The absolute privilege to publish defamatory matter under the circumstаnces to which the privilege applies is based upon the ground that ‘there are certain relations of life in which it is so important that the рersons engaged in them should be able to speak freely that the law takes the risk of their abusing the occasion and speaking maliciously аs well as untruly, and in order
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that their duties may be carried on freely and without fear of any action being brought against them, it says: “We will treat as absolutely рrivileged any statement made in the performance of these duties.” ’ ” Ramstead v. Morgan,
The absolute privilege attaches to defamatory statements made incident to, and in the course of, a judicial proceeding if the defamatory matter has some relation to the proceedings. Restatement, Torts, §§ 586, 587, and 588, pp. 229 to 234; Annotation, 77 A. L. R. 2d 493.
The rule of absolute privilege is applicable not only to judicial proceedings but to quasi-judicial proceedings as well. Shumway v. Warrick,
Proceedings for the discipline or disbarment of attorneys have been regarded as judicial in character. On the issue of privilege in connection with complaints or institution of proceedings to disciplinе or disbar attorneys, the case of Ramstead v. Morgan,
We think it deserves comment that all of the proceedings befоre the committee on inquiry were completely protected from public disclosure while any judicial proceeding which might have followed would no longer be private. It is unquestioned that there is an absolute privilege to publish false and defamatory matter in judicial proceedings, where the matter has some relation to the proceeding. We therefore hold that the same rule of absolute privilege attaches to defamatory statements contained in a complaint made to the committee on inquiry of the Nebraska State Bar Association regarding the alleged misconduct of an attorney. The rule applies whether or not the complaint resulted in later formal hearings.
People have a right to complain about professional misconduct of an attorney to the properly constituted authorities. The exercise of that right should not be discouraged by fear on the part of the complainant that he may have to defend a lawsuit for defаmation by anyone who deems himself defamed by relevant statements made in the complaint. Reasonable demands of sound public policy require the imposition of absolute privilege. Where the defamatory matter has some relation to the proceeding, that shield of immunity dеfends the complainant not only from the attorney complained *180 against but against any other person who might have been defamed.
One other issue must be covered. The plaintiffs original attorney in this action was required to withdraw as counsel immediately following the voir dire when the court became aware that the counsel was expecting to be a witness. Plaintiff complains that this was improper because it may havе worked a substantial hardship. It is against sound principles of professional ethics for one who knows that he is to be called as a material witness in a case to appear as attorney therein. Muse v. Stewart,
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Affirmed.