Sinkfield v. StateSinkfield v. State
Lead Opinion
Appellant Damon Bernard Sinkfield appeals from his convictions for malice murder, possession of a firearm on school property, and carrying a concealed weapon. We find no error in the court’s charge and recharge to the jury, or in its sentencing of Sinkfield. Nor do we find any error in the scope of closing arguments permitted by the trial court. Therefore, we affirm.
The evidence introduced at trial showed a history of violent confrontations between Sinkfield and the murder victim. Eyewitnesses testified that on the day of the murder, the victim was sitting in a car parked on school property in front of North Clayton High School, and that Sinkfield approached the car, and began to kick it and taunt the victim. After this went on for some time, the victim stepped out of the car and approached Sinkfield. Several words were exchanged, and then Sinkfield drew a gun from his pocket and shot the victim in his chest, killing him. Sinkfield then fled onto the school campus, carrying the murder weapon with him. The victim also was armed with a handgun, which he attempted to fire after Sinkfield shot him, although it did not discharge.
1. Viewed most favorably to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Sinkfield was guilty of malice murder, carrying a weapon on school property, and carrying a concealed weapon.
2. Sinkfield claims that the trial court erred in charging the jury with regard
3. Sinkfield claims that the trial court erred in recharging the jury only on malice murder when it had asked for a clarification of that charge and whether it required certain specified findings. Sinkfield urges that the jury’s recharge request indicates that it was confused with regard to the initial charges on malice murder, justification and mutual combat, and that the trial court should also have recharged on mutual combat.
The record shows that the jury requested the trial court to “clarify the definition of malice murder, especially does it mean intent to kill, or both are aggressors, or . . . both must apply and not [only one]. . . . [Also] clarify the time needed to be considered malice, such as one second, thirty seconds, etc.” In response, the trial court repeated its complete charge on malice murder, including its charge on the justification defense.
A trial court is duty-bound to recharge on any part of the charge when the jury so requests, but a trial court does not err by limiting a recharge to the specific points raised by the jury’s inquiry.
4. Sinkfield claims the trial court erred in sentencing him for both possessing a weapon on school property and carrying a concealed weapon, because the latter offense merges with the former. The two offenses do not merge. The offense of carrying a concealed weapon does not require that it be done on school property;
5. Finally, Sinkfield argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to comment in its closing argument that he had failed to produce corroborating witnesses. Appellant asks us to reconsider our holding in Wilson v. Zant,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crimes were committed on February 4, 1993. Sinkfield was indicted on November 11, 1993, the trial commenced on October 17, 1994, and a mistrial was declared on October 18, 1994. Thereafter, a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was filed. A hearing was held on the motion on November 17, 1994, at which the motion was denied. A second jury trial began on September 18, 1995, and the jury returned its guilty verdicts on September 22, 1995. On that same day, Sinkfield was sentenced to life imprisonment for malice murder, five consecutive years for carrying a weapon on school property, and twelve concurrent months for carrying a concealed weapon. The Sentence Order was filed on October 4, 1995. No request for a new trial was filed. A timely notice of appeal was filed on October 20, 1995. The transcript was certified by the court reporter on December 4,1995. The appeal was docketed in this Court on December 14, 1995, and submitted for decision without oral argument on February 5, 1996.
Jackson v. Virginia,
See Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia, Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, pp. 74-75 (2nd ed. 1991); see also Anderson v. State,
Simmons v. State,
Anderson, supra.
Williams v. State,
See Welch v. State,
See State v. Burgess,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I fully concur in the majority opinion and I thoroughly agree with the majority’s refusal to “reconsider our holding in Wilson v. Zant, [
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher joins in this opinion.