CLINSTON SINKFIELD v. GRANTT CULLIVER, et al.
CIVIL ACTION 03-0432-WS-M
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION
September 28, 2005
This is an action under
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $25,000 for severe emotional distress, punitive damages in the amount of $25,001, and to have the two referenced disciplinaries removed from his record. (Doc. 4 at 8).
Defendants Culliver, Burnham, and Salter filed an Answer (Doc. 25) and a Special Report (Doc. 26) on October 13, 2004, denying that they violated Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights and asserting the following defenses: that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim; qualified immunity; sovereign
Subsequently, on December 6, 2004, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’ Special Report, and on January 3, 2005, an affidavit, both reiterating Plaintiff‘s original claims. (Docs. 30 and 31). On January 31, 2005, this Court entered an Order converting Defendants’ Special Report and Answer to a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 32). Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, along with Plaintiff‘s responses thereto, was taken under submission on March 1, 2005.1 (Doc.
After consideration by the Court, it is recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, that this action be dismissed with prejudice, and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendants Grantt Culliver, Gloria Burnham, and Tammie Salter and against Plaintiff Clinston Sinkfield on all claims.
I. FACTS
On June 11, 2003, while incarcerated at Holman Correctional Facility (“Holman“), Plaintiff claims that Defendant Correctional Officer Gloria Burnham was located in cubicle two overlooking the area where Plaintiff was showering. Plaintiff contends that he, along with other inmates, was forced to shower in the nude in Defendant Burnham‘s presence, and according to Plaintiff, “her view was constant and intrusive.” (Doc. 4 at 5). As Plaintiff was almost finished showering, Defendant Burnham accused him of masturbation. (Id.). A disciplinary was filed regarding this allegation, and Plaintiff was found guilty of the charge.
Subsequently, Plaintiff claims that on March 3, 2004, Defendant Correctional Officer Tammie Salter “recklessly and deliberately” observed him showering in the nude and “sexually harassed” Plaintiff by accusing him of masturbation. (Doc. 16 at 1). Defendant Salter filed a disciplinary against Plaintiff charging him with this misconduct, along with indecent exposure, and Plaintiff was again found guilty of the charge. (Id.). Plaintiff contends that having the female Defendant officers observe him showering in the nude is an invasion of his privacy under the
According to Defendants, on June 11, 2003, Officer Burnham, who at that time worked on a rotating post assignment, was observing and monitoring Plaintiff, among other inmates. (Doc. 26, Ex. 2). On this date, Officer
Additionally, on March 3, 2004, Defendant Officer Salter observed Plaintiff standing in dormitory three, left side shower. According to Defendant Salter, Plaintiff was again masturbating, while staring at Defendant Officer Salter, and
As a result of the alleged incidents, Plaintiff contends that he suffered emotional distress. (Doc. 16 at 2). Plaintiff has requested compensatory and punitive damages, as well as to have the two subject disciplinaries removed from his record. (Doc. 4 at 7-8).
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
In analyzing the propriety of a motion for summary judgment, the Court begins with these basic principles. The
However, Rule 56(e) states that:
an adverse party [to a motion for summary judgment] may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party‘s pleading, but the adverse party‘s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
III. DISCUSSION
In this action, Plaintiff seeks redress for alleged constitutional deprivations pursuant to
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . . For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ actions violated his
The
Further, “[t]he ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ standard applies to the conditions of a prisoner‘s confinement.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345-46). The
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the United States Supreme Court reiterated the State‘s constitutional responsibilities with regard to inmates:
[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being. . . . The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual‘s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs -- e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety -- it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the
Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200 (citations omitted).
In order to prevail on an
the
Eighth Amendment requires more than a scientific and statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that such injury to health will actually be caused by exposure to [the challenged condition of confinement]. It also requires a court to assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today‘s society chooses to tolerate.
Second, the inmate must prove that the prison official
Having set forth the general legal principles applicable to Plaintiff‘s claim, the Court now turns to the facts. As the basis for his
Under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff‘s allegations related to his treatment at Holman do not amount to the denial of a basic human need, see DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, nor do they evidence a deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff‘s health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38. Plaintiff‘s only claim of damage is emotional distress, and it has been held that “[a] claim of psychological injury does not reflect the deprivation of the minimal civilized measures of life‘s necessities that is the touchstone of a conditions-of-confinement case.” Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1996)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1139 (1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Billingsley v. Shelby County Dept. of Correction, No. 02 29203, 2004 WL 2757915, *7 n.3 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 24, 2004) (denying an
Plaintiff has simply not alleged prison conditions which “involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.”5 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the question is whether a jury could reasonably conclude that Defendants violated Plaintiff‘s rights under the
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Burnham and Salter violated his
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Initially, this Court notes that the United States Supreme Court has indicated that prisoners retain a very minimal
In the present action, while the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that prisoners “retain a limited constitutional
The Eleventh Circuit has held that when a prison regulation or policy “impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Fortner, 983 F.2d at 1030 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). The following four factors determine whether a regulation or policy is reasonable:
(a) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the regulation and a legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (b) whether there are alternative means of exercising the asserted constitutional right that remain open to the inmates; (c) whether and the extent to which accommodation of the
asserted right will have an impact on prison staff, inmates and the allocation of prison resources generally; and (d) whether the regulation represents an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns.
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1516 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91).
With regard to the fourth factor, the Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that it “is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test, but rather it allows an inmate to ‘point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoners’ rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests’ as evidence that a restriction is not reasonable.” Fortner, 983 F.2d at 1030 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).
Applying these factors to the present action, the Court finds that allowing cross-sex surveillance in the manner in which it has been conducted in this action is not a violation of Plaintiff‘s
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the question is whether a jury could reasonably conclude that Defendants violated Plaintiff‘s bodily privacy rights under the
The Due Process Clause of the
“Determining whether one was deprived of liberty presents a unique challenge with prisoners, who are already deprived of their liberty in the ordinary understanding of the word.” Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999). The United States Supreme Court has identified two circumstances in which an inmate may be deprived of his liberty such that due process is required. The first circumstance is when a change in an inmate‘s conditions of confinement is so severe that it essentially “exceed[s] the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The second circumstance is when the state has consistently bestowed a certain benefit to inmates (for instance, via statute or administrative policy), and the deprivation of that benefit “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Id. “In the first situation, the liberty interest exists apart from the state; in the second situation, the liberty interest is created by the state.” Id.
In this action, Plaintiff claims that he was deprived of due process when he was found guilty on two different occasions of violations of rule # 38, Indecent Exposure/Exhibitionism.6 On the first occasion, Plaintiff received a punishment of 45 days in disciplinary segregation, 45 days loss of all privileges, and was referred to classification for review. (Doc. 26, Ex. 4). Subsequently, on March 14, 2004, when Plaintiff was again found guilty of violating rule # 38, Indecent Exposure/Exhibitionism, he received a punishment of 45 days disciplinary segregation to run consecutively with 45 days loss of store, phone, and visitation privileges. (Doc. 47, Ex. A at 4).
Initially, a court generally looks at whether a plaintiff has a protected liberty interest in the issued sanctions. In the present action, it does not appear that Plaintiff has a protected liberty interest in his sanctions; however, even
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court held that an inmate facing disciplinary action must be given “advance written notice of the claimed violation and a written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken” to meet minimum requirements of procedural due process. The inmate should be given no less than 24 hours to prepare for his hearing. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. The Court also held that the inmate “should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Id. at 566.
Defendants clearly complied with the procedural due process mandate set forth in Wolff. Regarding Plaintiff‘s first disciplinary hearing, on June 14, 2003, Plaintiff was given written notice that a disciplinary hearing would be conducted on June 19, 2003, concerning his behavior on June
Regarding Plaintiff‘s second disciplinary hearing, on March 4, 2004, Plaintiff was given written notice of the disciplinary hearing to be held on March 14, 2004. (Doc. 47, Ex. A). In the notice, Plaintiff was informed that he was being charged with a violation of rule # 38, specifically Indecent Exposure/Exhibitionism from regulation # 403. (Id.). Again, Plaintiff was provided the alleged specific
In both instances, Plaintiff was given notice and allowed to call witnesses at his hearings if he so desired. The fact that the hearing officers did not believe Plaintiff‘s testimony over that of the Defendant Officers does not indicate that Plaintiff was denied due process. Regarding the evidence necessary to find a prisoner guilty of a disciplinary charge, the United States Supreme Court has held that “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Warden Culliver conspired with Defendant Officers Burnham and Salter to punish him by observing him in the shower and writing false disciplinaries alleging indecent exposure. (Doc. 42 at 2). Plaintiff offers no additional facts or evidence other than that the Defendants conspired against him. In order to state a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show the parties reached an understanding to violate his federal rights. Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 932 (1991). “The linchpin for conspiracy is agreement, which presupposes communication.” Rowe v. Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bailey v. Bd. of County Comm‘rs of Alachua County, 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir. 1992)). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to show there was an agreement. Plaintiff‘s conclusory conspiracy claim is therefore due to be dismissed. Accord Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-557 (11th Cir. 1984) (vague and conclusory conspiracy claims are subject to dismissal).
If a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party‘s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,”
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Defendants Grantt Culliver, Gloria Burnham, and Tammie Salter are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on all claims asserted against them by Plaintiff. Accordingly, it is
MAGISTRATE JUDGE‘S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT
1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See
A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) , by filing a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge‘s Recommendation” within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the party‘s arguments that the magistrate judge‘s recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the objection.
A magistrate judge‘s recommendation cannot be appealed to
2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). Pursuant to
DONE this 28th day of September, 2005.
s/BERT W. MILLING, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE