113 Ga. 527 | Ga. | 1901
Tbe Bank of Monticello brought its petition against Singleton, to foreclose a mortgage which he had given to secure a note of $300. Singleton filed a plea in which he alleged, among other things, that the consideration of the note and mortgage was “illegal, void, and contrary to public policy, being for money loaned to defendant in aid of, to promote, and to further a gaming transaction.” The plea describes in detail the events leading up to the loan by the bank to Singleton, and from this narrative it appears that on the day the loan was made the defendant went to the bank and made an unsuccessful attempt to borrow $300, intending to use $200 of the amount in depositing “ margins ” with his broker for the purchase of cotton futures. Later, accompanied by his broker, Benton, who was a director of the bank, he again visited the bank, and the two together had a conversation with the cashier, at which time it was made clear to that official that the purpose of the desired loan was to obtain money with which to buy cotton futures through the agency of Benton, the broker; and after this conversation, and as a result of Benton’s persuasion, the cashier consented to loan the money requested to the defendant, taking his note secured by a mortgage on realty. When the defendant sought to withdraw from the bank the remainder of his discounted note over and above the $200 which he intended to deposit with Benton as margins, amounting to $65, the cashier ref used to allow him to do so, informing him that the entire amount of the discounted note had been turned over to Benton to be placed on the cotton-future transaction. This, it is alleged, was without the defendant’s consent or authority, and on account of this unauthorized conduct he was unwillingly forced to go deeper into the speculation than he had intended. The bank only consented to make the loan to the defendant at the earnest
Applying what has been said to the present case, it is clear that if the Bank of Monticello loaned its money to Singleton absolutely, without concerning itself as to the disposition which he might make of it, the knowledge of its cashier, who was its authorized agent, that Singleton was borrowing the money for the sole purpose of engaging in a gaming transaction would not, without more, vitiate its claim against him. A plea which set forth no more than this would have been properly stricken on demurrer. The plea in the present case, however, does not stop at this. It goes further and alleges that the bank was active in furthering the alleged illegal speculation. It avers that after accepting his security for the borrowed money, only a part of which he desired to invest in cotton futures, the cashier refused to allow him to draw the remainder of the money over and above that portion, but informed him that the entire amount of the discounted note had been sent to his broker, Benton. This, he asserts, was entirely without his authority. Benton likewise refused to let him have the surplus over the amount which he desired to place for speculation. These allegations, we think, are clearly sufficient to make out, if sustained, a case of pernicious activity on the part of the bank in furthering the gaming transaction
Judgment reversed.