PARAMJIT SINGH, ET AL. v. CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION, ET AL.
No. 99066
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
June 13, 2013
[Cite as Singh v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2013-Ohio-2465.]
BEFORE: Keough, J., Stewart, A.J., and Rocco, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV-786358; RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 13, 2013
David M. Lynch
29311 Euclid Avenue
Suite 200
Wickliffe, Ohio 44092
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
John S. Polito
Brian F. Lange
Bonezzi Switzer Murphy Polito & Hupp Co., L.P.A.
1300 East Ninth Street
Suite 1950
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Paramjit Singh and Jatinder Kaur (“appellants“), appeal from the trial court‘s judgment dismissing their complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Background
{¶2} On December 29, 2009, appellants filed a complaint for medical malpractice against defendants Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Hillcrest Hospital, Dr. Erol Beytas, Dr. Natalya Eidlin, Dr. Leonard Kahn, Dr. Vinit Makkar, Dr. Glenn Meden, and Dr. Teresa Ruch. Appellants sought damages for defendants’ alleged negligent medical care of Singh at Hillcrest Hospital in July 2008. On April 19, 2010, appellants voluntarily dismissed their complaint without prejudice pursuant to
{¶3} On July 3, 2012, appellants refiled their complaint. The complaint was again based on defendants’ care of Singh at Hillcrest Hospital in July 2008, but this time the complaint asserted a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and no medical malpractice claim. Specifically, appellants alleged that the defendants told Ms. Kaur, Singh‘s wife, that nothing more could be done to save Singh or return him to a meaningful existence, and that it was appropriate to remove him from life support. Appellants alleged that defendants’ advice was incorrect because, at Ms. Kaur‘s insistence, Singh was moved to another hospital where he was treated and saved. Appellants further alleged that defendants’ erroneous advice caused them mental anguish and constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress.
{¶5} The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that “a plain reading of the complaint shows that [appellants‘] intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is based on an alleged negligent medical diagnosis of Mr. Singh” and that their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was therefore a derivative medical claim that required an affidavit of merit under
{¶6} Appellants timely appealed from the trial court‘s judgment.
II. Analysis
{¶7} Appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint because they make no claim for medical malpractice in their complaint and hence, their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not a derivative medical claim. Accordingly, they contend, the complaint was timely filed and no affidavit of merit was required. Appellants’ argument is not well-founded.
claims of a * * * spouse of an individual who was the subject of any medical diagnosis, care, or treatment * * *, that arise from that diagnosis, care, treatment, or operation, and that seek the recovery of damages for * * * (a) [l]oss of society, consortium, companionship, care * * * or any other intangible loss that was sustained by the * * * spouse.
{¶9} In this case, the plain language of appellants’ complaint satisfies the definition of a derivative medical claim as set forth in
{¶10} It is apparent from the complaint that the defendants’ alleged communication to Ms. Kaur about Singh arose from the defendants’ “diagnosis, care, or treatment” of Singh while he was a patient at Hillcrest Hospital. Thus, appellants’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from this communication is a derivative claim for relief under
{¶11} Despite appellants’ argument that their emotional distress claim is not a derivative claim because the complaint does not allege any medical malpractice, the essential claim of appellants’ complaint is one of medical malpractice, regardless of how the claim is characterized. The complaint alleges that the defendants were incorrect in telling Ms. Kaur that nothing could be done to save her husband. This allegation is an assertion of medical malpractice and, thus, any emotional distress allegedly incurred as a result of that communication is necessarily a derivative claim.
{¶12} The First District reached a similar conclusion in Butler v. Jewish Hosps. Inc., 1st Dist. No. C-940119, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1787 (May 3, 1995). In Butler, a wife brought an emotional distress claim after a nurse inadvertently blurted out in front of her that her husband had died, when in fact he had not. The wife argued that her emotional distress claim was not a “medical claim,” and thus not subject to the one-year statute of limitations for medical claims, because she was not the patient. The court disagreed, holding that the wife‘s emotional distress claim was a medical claim because it arose out of the care and treatment of the patient.
{¶13} Likewise, in Roberts v. Luneau-Gordon, M.D., 2d Dist. No. 15212, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5245 (Nov. 29, 1995), the Second District held that the parents’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the alleged negligent treatment of their minor child was a derivative medical claim. The parents alleged that the defendants failed to administer an MRI every six months, which delayed the discovery of an enlarged
{¶14} In this case, appellants’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arose out of defendants’ medical care and treatment of Singh. Accordingly, it is a derivative claim subject to the requirements of
{¶15} Affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellants costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCURS;
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J., DISSENTS. (SEE ATTACHED DISSENTING OPINION.)
PARAMJIT SINGH, ET AL. v. CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION, ET AL.
No. 99066
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J., DISSENTING:
{¶16} While I recognize the existence of the contrary authority cited by the majority, I nonetheless believe that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is not a derivative medical claim under
{¶17} As the majority notes, a derivative claim is described in
{¶18} There is no question that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arose from the diagnosis and care of Singh; however, the court cannot conclude from the face of the complaint that the claim seeks only the recovery of an “intangible loss” sustained by plaintiffs. An intentional infliction of emotional distress claim can encompass emotional harm that manifests in bodily injury. See 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 46(1); Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 374-375, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983).
{¶19} Because the defendants filed a