40 Wis. 544 | Wis. | 1876
On tbe record in this case, tbe question presents itself, whether tbe final judgment was not defective and erroneous for failing to specifically dissolve tbe partnership. Tbe judgment states, by way of recital, that “judgment dissolving tbe copartnership having been heretofore rendered reserving tbe claim for damages,” etc., it is adjudged that tbe said defendant recover nothing of tbe plaintiff on bis counterclaim. The judgment contains a clause stating that it appeared by tbe stipulation of the parties that tbe assets of tbe copartnership bad been divided between tbe parties, thus fully disposing of all tbe property of the firm, and obviating all necessity for any other or further action of tbe court upon that subject. But correct practice doubtless required that tbe partnership should be dissolved in tbe final judgment, because, under tbe code of procedure, there is properly speaking no such thing as an interlocutory judgment, tbe only judgment authorized being one which finally disposes of and determines tbe rights of tbe parties. Sellers v. Union Lumbering Co., 36 Wis., 398. Tbe counsel on neither side, however, object to the form of tbe judgment, but have treated it as one disposing of all of tbe rights of tbe parties and practically dissolving the partnership.
Though tbe judgment does not in express terms decree a
The law seems to be well settled, that a court of equity will dissolve a copartnership when the disagreements and disputes between the parties have become so violent and lasting as to prevent any beneficial effects from the continuance of the connection. Bishop v. Breckles, 1 Hoff. Ch. R., 534; Collyer on Part., §§ 296 and 297; Story on Part., § 287. The successful management of the business of a copartnership depends so essentially on mutual confidence and harmony of views between the partners, that when these are wanting, cooperation becomes impracticable. In Bishop v. Breckles, the assistant vice-chancellor, while observing that it requires more than the mere will of one party to justify a dissolution, still seemed to think that the continuance of the union should not be enforced when dissension had marred all prospect of the advantages contemplated at its formation. And this view is rational and in accordance with legal principles. For it would seem absurd to continue a partnership when it appeared that the parties refused to act together, or permit each other to act separately, in transacting the business of the concern.
"What is a proper remedy by the injured party for a viola
By the Cov/rt. — The judgment of the county court is affirmed.