SINAI HOLDINGS, LLC, аnd JACOB GITMAN, Plaintiffs, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant.
CASE NO. 23-62159-CIV-DIMITROULEAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
October 29, 2025
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Jacob Gitman and Sinai (“Plaintiffs“)’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [DE 184/192 (sealed)] and Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Defendant” or “Chase“)‘s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 186/190 (sealed)].
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts [DE 185/192 (sealed)] (“PSOF“), Defendant‘s Amended Response [DE 220/230 (sealed)], and Plaintiffs’ Reply [DE 221] as well as Defendant‘s Statement of Material Facts in support it its Motion (“DSOF“) [DE 187/191 (sealed)], Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition [DE 207/216 (sealed)], Plaintiffs’ Response Statement of Facts (“PRSOF“) [DE 208/217 (sealed)], Defendant‘s Reply in Support of its Motion [DE 224], and Defendant‘s Reply Statement of Facts [DE 225/229 (sealed)], and the record as a whole. The Court is fully advised in the premises.
Upon careful review of the briefing and the record, the Court grants Defendant‘s motion and denies Plaintiffs’ motion.
Chase is a national bank. DSOF ¶ 1; PSOF ¶ 1.1 Plaintiff Sinai Holdings LLC (“Sinai“) is a holding company that has no independеnt business operations and derives its cash flow from investment companies in the healthcare industry. DSOF ¶ 2; PRSOF ¶ 2. Plaintiff Jacob Gitman (“Gitman“) is a member, manager, and owner of Sinai. DSOF ¶ 4; PRSOF ¶ 4.
In mid-July of 2020, Chase‘s Global Payments Anti-Money Laundering Operating Committee (“AMLOC“) placed Sinai and Gitman on the Anti-Money Laundering Interdiction List entities and individuals for which Chase will not process wire transactions. See generally AC [DE 44]; DSOF ¶¶ 9, 33; PRSOF ¶¶ 9, 33. PSOF ¶ 70; DRSOF ¶ 70. As a result of Plaintiffs’ placement on the Interdiction List, Chase cancelled at least 34 of Plaintiffs’ transactions. DRSOF ¶ 73. Upon cancellation, Chase sent a cancellation message to the financial institution on the other side of the transaction and/or to the counterparties. PSOF ¶ 19; DRSOF ¶ 19. The messages varied slightly, but almost all contained the language, “We are unable to execute your transaction due to sanctions and/or internal JPMC policy” (the “Cancellation Message“). DSOF ¶ 40; PRSOF ¶ 40. Chase sometimes added a statement that “no OFAC2 reporting will take place,” or that “no further action will be taken.” DSOF ¶ 41; PRSOF ¶ 41. Some messages also directed the recipient to obtain “details of any direct or indirect affiliation/subsidiary/parent company relationship with Sinai Holdings, LLC.” Also, some included the subject line “SSU3 OFAC Investigation - Request for
As related to Plaintiffs, Chase sent this message thirty-six times in connection with thirty-four transactions. DSOF ¶¶ 46, 47; PRSOF ¶¶ 46, 47. Twenty-nine of those transactions were initiated by the Plaintiffs, so Chase sent the Cancellation Message to the Plaintiffs’ bank. DSOF ¶ 48; PRSOF ¶ 48. The remaining five were initiated by third parties that tried to wire funds to the Plaintiffs. DSOF ¶ 49; PRSOF ¶ 49. For four out of the five remaining transactions, Chase sent the Cancellation Message to the third party‘s bank. DSOF ¶ 50; PRSOF ¶ 50. Because the last transaction involved a Chase customer trying to wire funds to the Plaintiffs, Chase sent the Cancellation Message to that customer directly. DSOF ¶ 51; PRSOF ¶ 51.
In their Amended Complaint (“AC“) [DE 44] Plaintiffs allege that Chase made false statements about Plaintiffs to third parties, including that it could not complete transactions to Plaintiffs “due to Sanctions” relating to a “OFAC investigation,” despite knowing that Plaintiffs were not on the OFAC sanctions list. AC ¶¶ 51, 72. Plaintiffs allege Chase‘s statements significantly harmed Plaintiffs’ business relationships. AC ¶ 52. Plaintiffs bring six claims against Chase: Count I - Defamation (Libel); Count II - Defamation (Slander); Count III - Defamation by Implication (Libel); Count IV - Defamation by Implication (Slander); Count V - Tortious Interference with Business Relationships; Count VI - Declaratory Judgment. See AC.
Through the instant motions, Chase moves for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims. See [DE 186/190 (sealed)], and Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on their defamation Counts I-IV. They ask this Court to enter injunctive relief on Counts V and VI and reserve the issue of damages for trial.
The Court is very familiar with this action. Though filed in 2023, this action really originates in 20215 with the filing of a prior, related case. The Court will briefly detour into this history and offer the reader some perspective on the long shadow of litigation that precedes the instant motions.
On October 29, 2021, Monarch Air Group, LLC (“Monarch“) and David Gitman filed an action against Chase. See Monarch Air Group, LLC d/b/a Mercury Jets, et al. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. 21-cv-62429-WPD (“Monarch I“).6 In Monarch I, Monarch and David Gitman asserted claims against Chase for defamation and tortious interference arising from alleged defamatory statements made to Monarch‘s customers and David Gitman‘s transferees in connection with cancelled wire transactions to Monarch from or through Chase accounts. See Monarch I, [DEs 1, 21, 78].
On Mаy 12, 2023, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Chase and entered a final judgment. See Monarch I, [DE‘s 205, 206]. As to the defamation claims, this Court held that Chase‘s statements to its account holders regarding why Chase was unable to execute the transactions were qualifiedly privileged, and the plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence Chase acted with express malice, as required to overcome the privilege. See Monarch I, [DE 205] at pp. 5-11. This Court also found that the plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim was barred by Florida‘s “single action rule” because it was based on the same underlying facts and communications as the failed defamation claims. See Monarch I, [DE 205] at pp. 11-13. Extensive post-judgment motion
On April 26, 2023, Monarch and David Gitman filed a second lawsuit against Chase (“Monarch II“).7 See Monarch Air Group, LLC d/b/a Mercury Jets, et al. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. 23-cv-60770-WPD (“Monarch II“). [DE 1]. On October 6, 2023, the Court dismissed that lawsuit. See Monarch II, [DE 17]. In the October 6, 2023 Order, the Court found that the claims in Monarch II were “barred by res judicata insofar as [those claims] arise[] from the same cancelled wire transactions forming the basis of Monarch I,” but found that “whether res judicata applies with respect to Plaintiffs claims that Chase has continued to cancel, reject, and/or dishonor wire and ACH transactions” was a closer issue. See Monarch II, [DE 17] at pp. 6-7. Nevertheless, because the Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing for their claims, the Court found dismissal appropriate. See Monarch II, [DE 17] at p. 7.
On November 13, 2023, Plaintiffs Sinai and Jacob Gitman (David‘s father) filed a third action, the instant lawsuit, against Chase, apparently based on the same allegedly defamatory statement that was at issue in Monarch I: “We are unable to execute your transactiоn due to sanctions and/or internal JPMC Policy.” See [DE 1] at ¶¶ 4, 33. Chase filed its first Motion to Dismiss [DE 19] a month later, based in part on claim preclusion grounds. The Court declined to dismiss the action on issue or claim preclusion grounds, finding the issue of privity between the instant Plaintiffs and the plaintiffs in Monarch I—a necessary element to show preclusive effect—was a question of fact that was better determined on a more complete record. See [DE 32] p. 8.
Turning to the instant cross motions. Under
“A fact is material for the purposes of summary judgment only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Kerr v. McDonald‘s Corp., 427 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, “[a]n issue [of material fact] is not ‘genuine’ if it is unsupported by the evidence or is created by evidence that is ‘merely colorable’ or ‘not significantly probative.‘” Flamingo S. Beach I Condo. Ass‘n, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Southeast, 492 F. App‘x 16, 26 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). “A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party‘s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment; there must be evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party.” Id. at 26-27 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Accordingly, if the moving party shows “that, on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party” then “it is entitled to summary judgment unless the nonmoving party, in response, comes forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.” Rich v. Sec‘y, Fla. Dept. of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 530 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
In deciding a summary-judgment motion, the Court must view thе facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). The
IV. DISCUSSION
The Court will first address whether this action is barred by res judicata, given the grant of summary judgment in Chase‘s favor in Monarch I. See Monarch I [DEs 205, 206]. Then, the Court will address the merits of the Parties’ arguments. Ultimately the Court finds res judicata applies to those statements that were made before the entry of judgment in Monarch I, and that in the alternative, Chase is entitled to judgment on the merits as a matter of law.
A. Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata precludes re-litigation of issues in a later action that were or could have been raised in a previous action in which a final judgment on the merits has been issued. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, n.6 (1982); Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Baptiste v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 29 F.3d 1533, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994). “The general principle behind the doctrine of res judicata is that a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is absolute and puts to rest every justiciable, as well as every actually litigated, issue.” Albrecht v. State, 444 So. 2d 8, 11-12 (Fla. 1984). Res judicata is intended to release parties from the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, prevent inconsistent decisions concerning the same claims, and encourage reliance on previously adjudicated claims. Allen, 449 U.S. at 93; Parkland Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
“For judgments in diversity cases, federal law incorporates the rules of preclusion applied by the State in which the rendering court sits.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008) (citation
Under Florida law, claim preclusion, or res judicata—which Chase asserts—applies where there is: “(1) identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.” Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004). All elements are met here.
i. Identity of the Thing Sued For
First, Plaintiffs sue for the “same recovery” that was sought in Monarch I. In that case, Monarch and David Gitman sought “damages and injunctive relief” in connection with Chase‘s use of the Cancellation Message. See Monarch I, [DE 78] ¶¶ 26-48. Plaintiffs seek the same relief in this case. See AC [DE 44] ¶¶ 71-101. And although this case includes a claim for declaratory relief that was absent from Monarch I, that addition does not alter the identity of the thing sued for. “Time and again, the courts have expressly rejected the proposition, advanced by [Plaintiffs] here, that a claimant may avoid the res judicata prohibition by changing either the relief requestеd or the theory under which the claim is made.” Pelphrey-Weigand v. Weigand, 283 So. 3d 822, 827 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); see also Diaz v. Moore, 861 F. Supp. 1041, 1047 n.18 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (finding the first two elements of res judicata are satisfied “a party‘s request for additional relief in the second action does not take the first judgment out of the scope of res judicata.“) (citation omitted). The first prong is met.
The test for the “identity of the causes of action” prong is whether “the facts or evidence necessary to maintain the suit are the same in both actions.” Wurtzebach v. Flooring Depot FTL, Inc., 384 So. 3d 251, 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (quoting Tyson v. Viacom, Inc., 890 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)); Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. 1956) “In determining whether the causes of action are the same, a court must compare the substance of the actions, not their form.” Jaffree v. Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461, 1469 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat‘l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir. 1986)). Res judicata “extends not only to the precise legal theory presented in the previous litigation, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same ‘operative nucleus of fact.‘” Olmstead v. Amoco Oil Co., 725 F.2d 627, 632 (11th Cir. 1984).
This prong is partially met here. The facts essential to maintain both actions are mostly the same. Both actions turn on Chase‘s Cancellation Message: “We are unable to execute your transaction due to sanctions and/or internal JPMC Policy.” Sinai, AC [DE 44] ¶ 37; Monarch I, SAC [DE 78] ¶ 15-16, [DE 205]. And both actions are based upon the same legal theory: that the Cancellation Message was defamatory and falsely stated Plaintiffs were subject to “OFAC sanctions.” See generally, id. Likewise, Chase mounts the same defense—that the statements were true, and even if they were not true, they were qualifiedly privileged, and Plaintiffs have not shown express malice. Chase relies on similar materials in support of these defenses. The “substantial overlap” in the “witnesses and proofs” of both actions compel the conclusion that the identity of the action is the same. Desisto v. City of Delray Beach, 2014 WL 11444095, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2014).
Florida courts “have not strictly adhered to the identity of parties requirement in all cases when invoking the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.” West v. Kawasaki Motors Mfg. Corp., U.S.A., 595 So. 2d 92, 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); see also Stockton, 838 F.2d at 1546 (noting that “it is not necessary there be an exact identity of parties“). To be in privity with a party to an earlier lawsuit, “one must have an interest in the action such that she will be bound by the final judgment as if she were a party.” Pearce v. Sandler, 219 So. 3d 961, 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 920 (Fla. 1995); Gonzalez v. Fed. Nat‘l Mortg. Ass‘n, 860 F. App‘x 693, 694 (11th Cir. 2021). “The question whether a party‘s interests are virtually representative of the interests of a nonparty is one of fact for the [district] court.” Jaffree, 837 F.2d at 1467 (quoting Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir. 1987)).
The undisputed facts show that Plaintiffs here—Jacob Gitman and Sinai—are in privity with the plaintiffs in Monarch I—David Gitman and Monarch. Jacob Gitman is the father of David Gitman, see DSOF ¶¶ 4, 5; PRSOF ¶¶ 4, 5, which tends to show privity. See e.g., Jaffree, 837 F.2d at 1467 (noting that “familial status” is “an important factor when assessing the preclusive effects of a prior adjudication.“). Moreover, Jacob was previously a minority shareholder and managing member of Monarch; Jacob ultimately transferred that managerial role to his son David. Id. ¶¶ 68-69, 72. Ownership or control of a corporation also tends to establish privity. See Zikofsky v. Mktg. 10, Inc., 904 So. 2d 520, 525 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“[A] ruling against a corporation in a final judgment is binding in later litigation upon individuals who fully participated in the earlier lawsuit through their control of the corporation“); McGregor v. Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 119 Fla. 718, 162 So. 323 (1935); Cohen v. United States, 924 F. Supp. 1164, 1169 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (the plaintiff “exercised control over the companies’ affairs and was, therefore, in privity with his
Based upon the foregoing and the Court‘s familiarity with the Monarch I and Monarch II actions, Court finds that Jacob Gitman, David Gitman, Monarch, and Sinai are all working in very close connection; their interests in this litigation, and in general, are completely aligned. This connection is also reinforced by Plaintiffs’ assertions throughout the briefing that the alleged defamation of one entity had the effect of defaming the оther, related entities. See e.g. Plaintiffs’ Mtn. [DE 184/192 (sealed)] (“Chase‘s OFAC Sanctions Statements were understood by third parties as targeting Gitman and Sinai personally—even in cases where Sinai‘s subsidiaries were individually named or Gitman was not explicitly mentioned. This perception arose directly from Sinai‘s corporate structure and Gitman‘s central role in funding, overseeing, and managing all subsidiaries.“); PRSOF ¶ 46 (“the message was sent over 80 times in connection with other entities affiliated with Gitman and Sinai. Given that Sinai was a holding company the slanderous implications of the message were attributed to Plaintiffs.“). Moreover, Jacob Gitman and Monarch were co-plaintiffs in a related defamation suits in state court, the statements at issue which, Plaintiffs assert, partially (and improperly) formed the basis of the Chase‘s decision to interdict Plaintiffs here.8 Accordingly “there is no reason to think—and none has been supplied” that Plaintiffs’ interests “would have diverged in any way” from those Plaintiffs in Monarch I.
iv. Identity of the Quality of The Persons for or Against Whom the Claim is Made
The test for the “quality of the persons” is “whether the parties in the [prior] action had the incentive to adequately litigate the claims in the same character or capacity” as the parties here. Stockton, 838 F.2d at 1547. The Monarch I plaintiffs vigorously, extensively, and continuously litigate that action against Chase, the same Defendant here. Indeed, they continue to do so on appeal and in post judgment motion practice four years after filing the action and two years after final judgment was issued. See generally Monarch I. This prong is met.
v. Top Office
Finally, the Court observes that just prior to issuing this Order, this Court accepted transfer of yet another related case, Top Off. Pros Bus. Servs., Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. 25-26414-WPD, filed by attorneys Stok Kon + Braverman in the Southern District of New York on March 27, 2025. Top Office is registered to the same address as Sinai and Monarch, and Jacob Gitman is its president. Top Office, [DE 1] ¶ 6; DSOF ¶¶ 29, 30. Top Office‘s lead claim is that Chase defamed it by stating it could not process the company‘s wires due to “Sanctions And/Or//Internal JPMC Policy.” See Top Office, [DE 1] ¶ 22. Although the merits of that case remain to be seen, the Court notes to the extent this newly filed action supports any “apparent tactical maneuvering,” this action new also supports the application of res judicata here. Jaffree, 837 F.2d at 1467 (citation omitted).
To the extent this action is not barred by res judicata, the claims here fail on the merits. Although this action has produced more discovery in advance of summary judgment than Monarch I, this new round of discovery still produces no genuine dispute of material fact; Chase prevails as a matter of law for the same reasons it did in Monarch I.
Through its motion, Chase argues it is entitled to judgment on Plaintiffs’ defamation claims: Defamation (Libel); Defamation (Slander); Defamation by Implication (Libel); Defamation by Implication (Slander). Chase argues the allegedly defamatory statement contained in the communications made by Chase—“We are unable to execute your transaction due to Sanctions and/or Internal JPMC Policy” DSOF ¶ 40—was (1) true; (2) qualifiedly privileged and made without express malice; and (3) Plaintiffs cannot prove damages. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs slander claims fail as Plaintiffs have not produced any evidence of slander. Beyond disagreeing with Chase‘s position in their response, Plaintiffs make a handful of separate arguments, which the Court also addresses below.
i. Truth
Under Florida law, the elements of a cause of action for defamation are: “(1) publication; (2) falsity; (3) actor must act with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity on a matter concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a matter concerning a private person; (4) actual damages; and (5) statement must be defamatory.” Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008).
Parties dispute whether Chase‘s statements—that the transactions were cancelled “due to sanctions and/or Internal JPMC Policy“—were false because of the use of the conjunction “and/or.” “A false statement of fact is the sine qua non for recovery in a defamation action.”
It is undisputed that Chase was unable to execute the transactions at issue because Chase placed Plaintiffs on an internal interdiction list in accordance with its policy. DSOF ¶ 35; PRSOF ¶ 35. Therefore, Chase argues the statement “[w]e are unable to execute your transaction due to Sanctions and/or Internal JPMC policy” is true when considered in its totality. Chase argues the phrase “and/or” does not render the statement ambiguous. But, in doing sо, Chase admits that a reading of Chase‘s statements yields three possible interpretations: that Chase was unable to execute the transactions due to “Sanctions” or “Internal JPMC Policy” or both. See [DE 186/190 (sealed)] at p. 8. In turn, Plaintiffs argue that two of these three meanings are false as applied to Plaintiffs, because Plaintiffs are not and have never been subject to OFAC sanctions. PSOF ¶¶ 72-80. And either way, Plaintiffs assert that Chase‘s expression of doubt—that Chase is uncertain
Plaintiffs also argue the statements are defamatory when “construed as the common mind would naturally understand it.” See McCormick v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 139 So. 2d 197, 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), and puts forward evidence of third party that interpreted the message to mean that Sinai and Gitman were on the OFAC sanctions list. PSOF ¶ 89. Conversely, Chase puts forward evidence that Chase personnel understood the Cancellation Message to accurately describe the reasons for cancelling the transactions. DSOF ¶ 58. Parties also vigorously dispute whether the statements were “of and concerning” Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs find at least one statement named Sinai directly. See PSOF ¶¶ 76-79, and Chase disputes the meaning of that message.
Nevertheless, the Court need not decide whether the use of “and/or” renders the statements ambiguous and reasonably susceptible to defamatory meaning or whether it concerned Plaintiff. For that matter, the Court also need not decide whether Plaintiffs were defamed by implication, or whether there were “actual damages.” This is because even assuming the statements are false and defamatory and concerned Plaintiffs, Chase‘s communications to Plaintiffs’ сustomers were privileged. See Demby v. Eng., 667 So. 2d 350, 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“The publication may be qualifiedly privileged even if it is untrue.“) (citation omitted).9
ii. Qualified Privilege
Under Florida law, “[a] communication made in good faith on any subject matter by one having an interest therein, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains matter which would otherwise be
Here, as in Monarch I, the undisputed evidence establishes that the statements made by Chase to Plaintiffs’ customers were qualifiedly privileged. The common law recognizes as privileged “communications made for bona fide commercial purposes where the interest to be protected is the recipient‘s” and “business matters where both parties have a corresponding interest in the matter.” John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Zalay, 581 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Chase, as a national bank, has an interest in communicating to its account holders the reason why a transaction cannot be completed, a matter in which its account holders have a corresponding interest. The statements concerned only the transactions Chase was unable to execute, and most messages did not mention either Plaintiff by name. See DSOF ¶¶ 40-41. Chase communicated those statements through private messages only to those account holders who were attempting to
Plaintiffs argue Chase cannot show good faith, a necessary element of the qualified privilege test. They argue Chase put them on the Interdiction List for unverified and unsupported reasons, which reflects bad faith conduct. Plaintiffs question whether the “red flags” proffered by Chase as their reasons to interdict Plaintiffs were supported by facts. But good faith is presumed when the other elements of qualified privilege are established. See Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 810; Thomas, 761 So. 2d at 404 (“Once it is determined that [the statement] is qualifiedly privileged, it becomes cloaked with a legal presumption of good faith.“). And as a prima facie matter, good faith may be inferred from the fact that the stаtements were made pursuant to Chase‘s internal policy. DSOF ¶ 35. Chase‘s statements were qualifiedly privileged.
iii. Express Malice
Because Chase‘s statements were qualifiedly privileged, Plaintiffs must show that Chase acted with express malice. “Express malice . . . traditionally has been defined as ill will, hostility, and an evil intention to defame and injure.” Lewis, 406 So. 2d at 492 (citing Montgomery v. Knox, 3 So. 211, 217 (Fla. 1887)). “A defendant acts with express malice in making defamatory statements when his ‘primary motive in making the statements [is] the intent to injure the reputation of the plaintiff.‘” Lozada v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 702 F. App‘x 904, 911 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1992)). Once the privilege is established, and the burden shifts the Plaintiffs to prove express malice. Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 810.
Here, Plaintiffs fail to provide evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that Chase acted with express malice. In fact, the evidence produced by Chase suggests the opposite: Chase made the statements pursuant to Chase‘s standаrd operating processes, and the statements reflected the reasons why Chase was unable to execute the transactions (even if those reasons were partially false). See DSOF ¶¶ 35. The “primary motive” for sending these cancellation messages was not to harm Plaintiffs but to cancel transactions that Chase believed posed a risk to its banking operations.
The undisputed facts demonstrate as follows.
Plaintiffs argue Chase “abused” its privilege because (1) sanctions language did not “further” the privileged interest and (2) the sanctions language did not further a “social purpose.” Plaintiffs point to the Restatement of Torts to support these tests but admittedly cites no Florida case law characterizing the “abuse” requirement in the way they suggest. There appears to be no daylight between “abuse” and “express malice” under Florida law. See Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 806 (asking “whether [defendant] abused or lost the privilege due to express malice.“); Zalay, 581 So. 2d at 180 (“the question . . . is whether the defendant abused or forfeited that privilege. The jury must determine whether the statements were made with express malice.“). Thus, where there is no express malice, Chase did not “abuse” its privilege, either.15
Plaintiffs go on to argue Chase acted with express malice because Chase did not comply with its own internal procedures when it decided to interdict them. To make this argument, Plaintiffs squint at the policy language in search of some not-complied-with detail. This is no way to assess malice. Given the collection of information Chase possessed about Plaintiffs when it decided to interdict them, see supra, regardless of whether this information was 100% verifiably accurate (and Plaintiffs repeatedly argue it was not)—the evidence indisputably shows that Chase‘s decision was a reasonable business decision, based in a reasonable risk assеssment. It was not based in any express malice. Zalay, 581 So. 2d at 179. This is true regardless of whether this decision was a good or correct decision. Plaintiffs’ characterization of Chase as a “mindless bureaucracy,” and its decision as “perfunctor[y],” reinforces the conclusion that the decision to interdict and the resulting cancellation messages were not motivated by any personal ill will. See [DE 184/192 (sealed)] p. 2.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue for express malice because the language used was “so extreme as to demonstrate express malice” Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 812, because the language lumps Plaintiffs together with “terrorists, human traffickers, drug smugglers, and proliferators of weapons of mass
Based upon the foregoing, Chase‘s statements were qualifiedly privileged. Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show express malice, and the Court enters summary judgment in favor of Chase on Plaintiffs’ defamation claims.
iv. Slander
In their motion, Plaintiffs do not make any independent argument on its slander argument, despite mоving for summary judgment on those counts (II and IV). Nor do Plaintiffs make allegations of slander in its Amended Complaint outside of its defamation allegations. See AC [DE 44]. But when Chase argues in its motion that Plaintiffs have failed to put forward any evidence of slander, Plaintiffs respond with these asserted facts: “Soon after Chase interdicted Plaintiffs, Jacob Gitman visited TD Bank in Sunny Isles, FL to inquire about a transaction that was cancelled by Chase.” And that “while waiting in an open space, Jacob Gitman overheard the Bank tellers talking and heard them say that ‘this guy,’ referring to himself, was on the OFAC sanctions list.” PRSOF ¶¶ 101, 102 (cleaned up). Plaintiffs cite to Jacob Gitman‘s deposition transcript, which states:
I went to TD Bank office in Sunny Isles and I had account with them and -- I sent some wires and money didn‘t reach the destination and I started like inquiring, what is going on. And, you know, it‘s open space, but there is seating thеre. And two Ukrainian girls, they are talking, carrying on between themselves, and I understand it. And one of them says, this guy, he‘s in OFAC list. They shocked me. I thought she‘s joking. So it‘s first time I found out there is something going on there.
Q: Do you know the names of the two people that were speaking Ukrainian?
A. No. They were like bankers sitting there and I don‘t know them. Maybe they still work there.
Q. Did you speak to them at all on that occasion or you just overheard their communication?
A. I just heard them.
Q. You didn‘t get either of their names?
A. No. I didn‘t pay attention. I thought that they mistaken me with somebody. I didn‘t know about that.
J. Gitman Depo Tr. 178:2-13 [DE 192]. Assuming this testimony would be admissible at trial, it is not slanderous. Slander involves “defamatory spoken words, whereas libel pertains to defamatory written statements.” Fortson v. Colangelo, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1378 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 2006). Under Florida law, the elements of a cause of action for slander are the same as defamation generally: “(1) publication; (2) falsity; (3) actor must act with knоwledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity on a matter concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a matter concerning a private person; (4) actual damages; and (5) statement must be defamatory.” Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008).
Taking as true that both women were bankers, the statement fails the very first element: publication. “A defamatory statement does not become actionable . . . until it is published or communicated to a third person; statements made to the person alleging the defamation do not qualify.” Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Geddes, 960 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). Internal corporate communications are generally not considered defamatory in Florida because “the essential element of publication to a third party is lacking.” Advantage Personnel Agency, Inc. v. Hicks & Grayson, Inc., 447 So. 2d 330, 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)); see e.g., Hoch v. Loren, 273 So. 3d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (“Florida courts have found no publication where a corporation is sued for defamation and the defаmatory statement was made by one managerial employee of the corporation to
Moreover, Plaintiffs have not put forward any evidence that these women were acting within the scope of their employment when making the statement—a required step for holding Chase liable. Tillett v. BJ‘s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1095-J-34MCR, 2010 WL 11507322, at *6 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2010) (defamation claimed failed as to employer where there was no allegation that the employee was acting within the scope of their employment when the statement was made); Dieas v. Assocs. Loan Co., 99 So. 2d 279, 281 (Fla. 1957) (articulating Florida‘s vicarious liability standard). For at least these reasons, Plaintiffs have not put forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate their slander claims (Counts II and IV). They fail.
v. The Single Action Rule Precludes Plaintiffs’ Tortious Interference Claim
In Count V, Plaintiffs assert a claim for tortious interference based on thе allegedly defamatory communications to Monarch‘s customers. Chase argues it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim because that claim is barred by the “single action rule,” which prohibits “multiple actions when they arise from the same publication.” Callaway Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Banyon Lakes C. Corp., 831 So. 2d 204, 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)16; see also Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 69-70 (Fla. 1992); Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. Sentinel Star, Co., 316 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Under this rule, “[w]hen claims are based on analogous underlying facts and the causes of action are intended to compensate for the16
As the Amended Complaint makes clear, Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claim is based on the same underlying facts and communications as their failed defamation claims. Not only do the same communications serve as the basis for both types of claims, the thrust of both types of claims is that the communications were injurious to Plaintiffs’ reputation, thereby causing Sinai‘s customers to breach, terminate, and/or discontinue their business relationships with Plaintiffs. See AC ¶ 100. Because Count V revolves around the allegedly defamatory communications, and whether those statements impermissibly interfered with Plaintiffs’ business relationships, the single action rule aрplies.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that their tortious interference claim relies on the same underlying facts and seeks the same damages as their defamation claims, acknowledging that “Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, however, because Florida‘s single-action rule bars Plaintiffs’ recovery for Chase‘s tortious interference” AC ¶ 101. Instead, they add this Count to request injunctive relief. But where the single action rule forecloses this cause of action, no injunctive relief is available, either.
Chase moves for judgment of Plaintiffs’ Declaratory Judgment Count (Count VI). Under this count, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Chase‘s statements are “defamatory,” that Chase lacks “qualified privilege,” and that Chase‘s conduct “tortiously interferes” with their business. AC ¶ 106. Having found Chase‘s statements are qualifiedly privileged, Plaintiffs’ “derivative” declaratory judgment claim thus fails as a matter of law. Eaton v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 2022 WL 972452, at *4, *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2022) (granting summary judgment on a “derivative” declaratory judgment claim).
vii. Plaintiffs are not entitled to Summary Judgment on the Chase‘s Bank Secrecy Act Defense
Finally, Plaintiffs move for summary judgment regarding Chase‘s affirmative defense under the Bank Secrecy Act or the USA PATRIOT Act. Chase pleaded that defense to guard against any attempt to seek discovery or damages regarding conduct that is protected under those statutes. See Am. Answer ¶¶ 135-45, [DE 86]. As the Court recently noted in Monarch I, “Plaintiffs have been unsuccessfully attempting to seek such [privileged] material for over three years.” Monarch I [DE 332] p. 6. No new argument is presented here that would alter the Court‘s and the Magistrate Judges’ many previous conclusions on the issue. See e.g. [DEs 150, 176], Monarch I, [DEs 67, 256, 276]). Not only are Plaintiffs not entitled to summary judgment on this issue, but the Court agreеs with Chase that the Magistrate correctly decided the discovery issues that Plaintiffs now appeal in part based on this argument.
Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
- Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.‘s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 186/190 (sealed)] is GRANTED.
- Plaintiffs Jacob Gitman and Sinai Holding LLC‘s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [DE 184/192 (sealed)] is DENIED.
- Plaintiffs’ Appeal of the Magistrate Judge‘s Discovery Order [DE 180] is DENIED. The Court agrees with the Judge Hunts opinions in [DE 176] and [DE 150] and incorporates the findings of fact and conclusions of law therein into this Order.
- Chase‘s Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Plaintiffs’ Expert Philip Shechter [DE 206] is DENIED AS MOOT.
- Likewise, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal its Response to Chase‘s Motion [DE 233] is DENIED AS MOOT.
- The Joint Motion to Continue Trial [DE 234] is DENIED AS MOOT.
- The Court will enter a separate final judgment pursuant to
Rule 58 .
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 29th day of October, 2025.
WILLIAM P. DIMITROULEAS
United States District Judge
Copies: Counsel of record