45 S.W.2d 579 | Tex. Crim. App. | 1932
Burglary is the offense; penalty assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for two years.
Complaint is made of the reception in evidence of the testimony of Officer McDonald, the substance of which is as follows: On the 25th
Abot, who was with McDonald and took part in making the arrest,, gave testimony, the substance of which is as follows: They observed a car in a by-road off the old Marlin road. They drove their car near the-back of the appellant’s car. The turtle-back was open so they could see two sacks. They got out of their car and walked to where the appellant and his companion were, and observed near the sacks a pasteboard with silverware or imitation silverware on it. After waiting until Sims and Spicer had repaired their car, the officers arrested them.
Officer Gunterman testified that he made no search or examination-of the car until after it was taken to the city of Waco.
The foregoing evidence comes from the bill of "exception found in the-record.
J. W. Kerley, a merchant, testified that his store was burglarized on the night of the 25th of March; that a quantity of canned goods and' meat was taken therefrom; also some silverware, that is, knives, forks, spoons and things of that kind. The silverware taken from the appellant’s car was identified by the witness as a part of the stolen goods. The-witness also identified some of the groceries taken from the car in which-. Sims and Spicer were riding.
Claude Spicer, a witness in his own behalf, testified in substance as. follows: On the 25th of March, he and Carl Sims had hauled gravel. They had been in the habit of meeting some persons every night, and on> that night they went to Orchard Lane for that purpose. About eight o’clock in the evening Sims came to Spicer’s home, where they remained,, listening to the radio and otherwise amusing themselves until 11:30,. when they went to Orchard Lane to see whether Gibson (whom they-wanted to see) was there. After waiting for the appearance of Gibson,, they drove back on Orchard Lane to the Marlin road. They stopped at-a filling station to get some air in the tires. At the filling station was as.
Mrs. Claude Spicer testified that her husband and Sims remained at their home until about 11:00 or 11:30 of the night on which the burglary is charged to have taken place; that she did not see her husband any more after that for several days.
The indictment against Sims is separate and distinct from that against Spicer. The indictment against Sims is No. 2471-A, and that against Spicer is No. 2477-A. It appears that Sims and Spicer were tried at the same time. Experience and observation demonstrate that the joint trial of two individuals upon separate indictments leads to confusion and difficulty in preparing a record for appeal. This is illustrated in the present instance by the appearance in the statement of facts of the testimony of Spicer. He does not appear to have been called as a witness for Sims. The contrary appears, as it is specifically stated that Spicer was a witness in his own behalf and testified as such. He was not available as a witness for Sims for the reason that the statute declares that persons indicted for the same offense cannot be called as witnesses for each other. See article 711, C. C. P., 1925. To the same effect is article 82, P. C. The only other testimony showing the presence of the alleged stolen prop
There was available to Sims no means of preventing Spicer from giving testimony in his own behalf. Spicer was on trial and his right to testify in his own behalf was absolute. An effort by exception to the court’s charge was made by Sims to limit the testimony against him to that given by the officers making the search and arrest. Since Sims was in no way responsible for the introduction of the testimony of Spicer, there should, in response to the exception made, have been an instruction to the jury protecting the appellant against the use of Spicer’s testimany. The responsibility for the appearance in the record of Spicer’s testimony not resting upon the appellant, it cannot operate against him as a waiver of his objection to the testimony of the officers on the principle stated in McLaughlin v. State, 109 Texas Crim. Rep., 307, 4 S. W. (2d) 54, and other cases there cited. The officers’ testimony having been obtained in an illegal search is made unavailable to the state by the terms of
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.