35 Ind. 181 | Ind. | 1871
This action is founded on. two written instruments; one, a deed of conveyance of the real estate in controversy -r and ' two, a will subsequently made by the grantor'in the deed. The material facts- charged in the complaint are these: That Clement G. Rickets, being the absolute owner in fee of the premises described in the complaint, on the 12th day of January, 1856, by a general warranty deed, conveyed the said premises, in fee, directly to. Mary Rickets, who-was then- his wife; that the said Rickets on the 8th day of May, 1856, made his last will and testament, and that on the 17th of the same month, he added a codicil thereto; that by the said will he bequeathed to- his wife certain personal property therein described, and an annuity of three hundred and sixty-five dollars, payable semi-annually, and directed that the sum of six thousand and eighty-three dollars and thirty-three cents should beinvestedby his executor for the purpose of raising such legacy; that in the event the said annuity should prove insufficient for the comfortable maintenance of his wife during sickness or ill health, his executor was directed and authorized to invest such other sums as, in his discretion, should be necessary for that purpose, and to pay her the interest of said sum. whenever, ia his. dis,
It is quite obvious that if the deed is valid and conveyed an estate in fee simple, absolute and unconditional, to the grantee therein named, the grantor could have no power to make a subsequent bequest of the same premises, he having already parted with his title thereto by deed; and
The validity of the deed is, therefore, the real question in the case. The appellants claim that the deed was absolutely void, for the reason that it was made by a husband directly to his wife, without the intervention of a trustee. The appellee admits that the deed is void at law, but maintains that it will be upheld and sustained in equity.
The adjudicated cases in this court do not very clearly define when and in what cases equity will sustain a conveyance direct from husband to wife. This court, in Bunch v. Bunch, 26 Ind. 400, say, “ The deed to the land in question, executed by the defendant to the plaintiff, during their coverture, was void in law. This is not questioned by the plaintiff’s counsel; indeed, the complaint praying that^ the title may be vested and quieted in her is based on the assumption that the deed is void at law, and appeals to the equity powers of the court for its confirmation. Such conveyances, though void at law, are sometimes upheld and confirmed by courts of equity. The confirmation of such contracts is not a right to be enforced in all cases. Such claims are addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and are only confirmed after a most cautious/ examination, in clear cases, where such confirmation is demanded by th¿ clearest dictates of right and justice.”
We have made a very careful examination of the elementary works and decisions bearing upon this question. The decisions are not uniform and consistent with each other. It is important that some fixed and definite rules should be established, by which we are to be governed in the decision of such cases, as it is not safe to leave such questions to the mere ’ discretion of the court, for in such case, the peculiar views or prejudices of the judge would - determine the rights of parties. According to the strict rules' of the old common law, the wife was not permitted to take and enjoy eithéf
Story says, it was formerly supposed that the interposition
In Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 229, where the validity of a postnuptial voluntary settlement made by a husband upon his wife was in question, Marshall, C. J., says :
“ It would seem to be a consequence of that absolute power which a man possesés over his own property that he may malee any disposition of it which does not interfere with the existing rights of others, and such disposition of it, if it be fair and real, will be valid.” Speaking of the case before him, he says: “ The appellant contends that the house and lot contained in this deed constituted the bulk of Joseph Wheaton's estate, and that the conveyance ought on that account to be deemed fraudulent. * * * If a man entirely unincumbered has a right to make a voluntary settlement of a part of his estate, it is difficult to say how much of it he may settle.”
The doctrine is thus stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Wallingsford v. Allen, 10 Pet. 583:
"Agreements between husband and wife, during coverture,
In Putnam v. Bicknell, 18 Wis. 333, it is said: “Though Void at law, an absolute conveyance of real or personal propr erty from the husband directly to his wife is good in equity, and sufficient, so far as the form is concerned, to divest the husband of such property, and to vest the same in the wife, as against all persons save the creditors of the husband, especially when the transfer is fairly made, upon a meritorious or valuable consideration.”
In Huber v. Huber, 10 Ohio, 371, it was held “that a husband may, during his life, settle a separate estate upon his wife, that is, he may (there being no claims of creditors to forbid it) transfer property to his wife in which she never had any beneficial interest, and which will enure to her as her.
In Simmons v. McElwain, 26 Barb. 419, it is said: “ It is true that the deed from the defendant to his wife was void in law, for a husband cannot, during coverture, make a grant or conveyance to his wife. But such a grant will be upheld in equity, when it is necessary to prevent injustice.”
In Wilder v. Brooks, 10 Minn. 50, it is said: “And had the conveyance been made to any person other than his wife, and even for a merely nominal consideration, we see no reason why it would not have been completely unassailable. If these premises are sound, it follows that if the instrument was effectual between Andrew M. Torbet and his wife to pass the property, it was good as to the world, and vice versa.
Again it is said: “ Contracts of all kinds, between husband and wife, are objected to, not only because they are inconsistent with the common law doctrine that the parties are ■one person in law, but because they introduce-the disturbing influences of bargain and sale into the marriage relation, and induce a separation rather than a unity of interests. But certainly neither in reason nor on principle can it be contended that so far as this objection is concerned, there is any difference between the cases of a conveyance by a husband to trustees for the use of a wife or to a third person who conveys to the wife, or to the wife directly. Each of these would have precisely the same effect, in conferring upon the wife property and interest independent of and separate from her husband. And the tendency of modern legislation, as well of judicial interpretation, is to improve and liberalize the marital relation by recognizing and upholding the reasonable rights of both parties to the matrimonial contract.”
The law is thus stated by the Supreme Court of Mass., in the case of Whitten v. Whitten, 3 Cush. 191: “The like presumption exists in the case of purchase in the name of his wife, and of securities taken in her name. Indeed, Mr. Justice Story says, that the presumption is stronger in the
Mason, J., in the case of Stockett v. Holliday, 9 Md. 480, says: “The case of Bowie v. Stonestreet, 6 Md. Rep. 418, conclusively settles that a contract, which can be enforced in a court of equity, may be entered into between a husband and wife for the transfer of property from the former to the latter, for a bona fide and valuable consideration.”
The Supreme Court of Vermont, in the case of Barron v, Barron, 24 Vt. 375, states the law thus: “And as a general rule, whenever a contract would be good at law, when made with trustees for the wife, that contract will be sustained in equity, when made with each other without the intervention of trustees. It is upon this principle that in many cases the husband will be held as trustee of the wife, and the wife entitled to the privileges belonging to a creditor of the husband.”
Though a stranger’s conveyance of property, or covenant to pay money to a married woman, or to a trustee for her, in order to give her a separate use, must contain words indicating such intention, it seems to be well settled that such words are unnecessary in the husband’s conveyance or covenant. The law upon this subject is well stated by the Supreme Court of Conn., in Deming v. Williams, 26 Conn. 226, where it is said: “Now had such transfers been made by a parent into the name of a child, the child would acquire the interest as an advancement, such intent being inferred by law from the relationship of the parties. The same is true in case of a wife, where the husband purchases land and has the deed made directly to her, there being in the case no creditors or fraud upon any other party. The law attaches to absolute deeds and transfers a full alienation of the entire interest or property, so far as the alienation is permitted by the principles of law or equity. Such are all gifts or deeds
We have had urged upon our attention and consideration the cases of White v. Wager, 25 N. Y. 328, and Winans v. Peebles, 32 N. Y. 423. We.have given these cases a careful consideration,and are of the opinion that they are not in conflict with the views we have expressed. In both of those cases the question involved was the validity of conveyances from wives to their husbands. We-have already seen that a married woman in this State is under a disability so far as the alienation of her ljmd is concerned. Her conveyance is absolutely void unless her husband joins with her. Such is the law in New York. None of the disabilities imposed upon married women have attached to the condition of a married man, who was as free to receive the title to property and to dispose of it after marriage as before, with the exceptions that he could not receive a deed directly from his wife, because she could not convey without his joining, and he could not join in a conveyance to himself, and that he had no power to dispose of or in any manner affect the inchoate right of his wife in and to his real estate. As to the world in general, the estate of marriage does not affect his ability to acquire title to or dispose of his property just as he might have done if he had not been married. These cases correctly held that a deed direct from a wife to her husband was void at law, and would not be sustained in equity, for the.reason that this disability was imposed upon married women to protect them from the influence of their husbands.
The adjudicated cases in England are in entire accord with the decisions in this county. We refer to the following English and American cases on this subject, besides those here
From the foregoing authorities the following propositions are fairly deducible:
First. None of the disabilities imposed upon married women have attached to the condition of a married man, who is as free to receive the title to property and dispose of it after marriage as before, except that he cannot by his conveyance affect the inchoate right of his wife to his real estate.
Second. That a conveyance from a husband directly to his wife, without the intervention of a trustee, is void ht law.
Third. That a direct conveyance from a husband to his wife will be sustained and upheld in equity in either of the following cases, namely: 1. Where the consideration of the transfer is a separate interest of the wife, yielded up by her for the husband’s benefit or that of their family, or which has been appropriated by him to his uses. 2. Where the husband is in a situation to make a gift to his wife, and distintly separates the property given from the mass of his property, and sets it apart to the separate, sole, and exclusive use of his wife.
Fourth. Where a wife advances money to her husband, or the husband is indebted to the wife upon any valid con
Fifth. Whenever a contract would be good at law when, made with trustees for the wife, that contract will be sustained in equity, when made with each other, without the intervention of trustees.
Sixth. That prior to the recent legislation in this Stace' authorizing married women to hold real estate to their separate use when a conveyance was made by a stranger to a married woman, or to a trustee for her, in order to give her a separate use in the property, it was necessary that such conveyance should contain words clearly indicating such intention^ but such words were unnecessary in a conveyance from a-husband to his wife, for the law presumed that it was intended for her separate and exclusive use.
Seventh. That section five of an act entitled “an act touching the marriage relation and liabilities incident thereto” (approved May 31st, 1852) made all property held by a-married woman at the time of her marriage, or acquired by her subsequently, hers absolutely, and has enabled her to-use, enjoy, and control the same independently of her husband and as her separate property; and that since the passage ■ of that act a conveyance to a married woman need not contain words indicating that she is to hold the property to her separate use.
Eighth. That when conveyances from a husband to his-wife have not been sustained in equity, it has been on account of some feature in them impeaching their fairness and certainty, as that they were not in the nature of a provision for the wife, or when.they interfered with the rights of creditors, or when the property given or granted had not been distinctly separated from the mass of the husband’s property.
Ninth. That in consequence of the absolute power which a man possesses over his own property,.lie may make any
Tenth. When a husband is free from debt and has no children, and conveys property to his wife for a nominal consideration, the law will presume that it was intended as a provision for his wife.
Eleventh. That a conveyance from a husband to his wife which is good in equity vests the title to the property conweyed in the wife, as fully, completely, and absolutely as ¡though the deed had been made by a stranger upon a valuable-consideration moving from the wife.
It appears by the record in this case that the grantor was possessed of a large property; that in his will he disposed of about eight thousand dollars in specific legacies; that the value of the property disposed of in the residuary clause is not shown; that he had no children, and if he had died intestate his wife would have inherited his entire estate; that the rights of creditors were not interfered with by the conveyance in question; that the great and commendable anxiety displayed in his will for the welfare, comfort, and happiness of his wife tends to show that the conveyance which he had made a short time before was intended as a provision for his wife; and that in making his will he had such conveyance in his mind, and did not intend to devise to his brothers and sisters the property which he had previously conveyed to his wife.
We are clearly of the opinion that the conveyance in question was good in equity and should be sustained. The court •committed no error in sustaining the demurrer to the comiplaint.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.