93 Iowa 38 | Iowa | 1894
Lead Opinion
I. The principal claim of the plaintiffs arises npon the demand that a certain lot in the city of Council Bluffs be subjected to the payment of the Bussell judgments. This lot was originally owned by said David Gray. On the twenty-ninth ,clay of September, 1875, he executed a quitclaim deed of the property to the defendant, U. H. White. At that time there was a two-story brick business building on the lot, the upper story of which was not entirely finished. There was then a mortgage upon the property for two thousand dollars for purchase money. There was also a second mortgage of two thousand dollars, and judgment had been rendered against Gray, which upon the face of the record amounted to over three thousand dollars. In addition to this, there was a considerable amount of delinquent taxes upon the property. At the time of the conveyance by quitclaim to White, Gray was also indebted to said J. H. Bussell; and in the years 1877 and 1878 Bussell recovered judgments against White for the amount due him. Bussell died in the year 1881. The purchase money mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold on special execution, and a sheriff’s sale certificate was issued in pursuance of the sale. The property was not redeemed from the sale, and a sheriff’s deed was made and executed to William Garner, who was the owner of the certificate when the time of redemption expired. This deed was executed on the fifth day of March, 1877. Afterward, and in the year 1878, Gamer executed a special warranty deed for the premises to the defend
III. The claim made that Gray is the owner of an equitable interest in certain other real estate is not' sustained by the evidence, and that part of the controversy demands no further attention. It appears from the petition and an exhibit attached thereto that, before this action was commenced, a suit was pending in which Gray was plaintiff and U. H. White wras defendant, in which a large amount of money was claimed on account. The plaintiffs, in their petition, incorporated a claim in this action for a lien on whatever was recovered by Gray against White in the other action. The- defendant, U. H. White, in his answer, averred that said claim was wholly fictitious, except as to a few.items procured at Gray’s harness shop, and
Dissenting Opinion
(Dissenting.)—I cannot agree with ‘so much of the foregoing opinion as approves the rule announced in the case of Laird v. Kilbourne, — that the law holds that a person affected by a fraudulent deed discovers the fraud at the time the deed is recorded. It may be true that in most cases the recording of the deed,' taken in connection with other relevant facts, will-be .sufficient to charge interested parties with
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the views expressed by Justice Robinson.