This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to bring the petitioner before this court, with a view to his discharge from imprisonment, upon the grounds stated in the petition. We were strongly urged to issue the writ, without inquiry into its cause, and to hear an argument upon the petitioner’s right to a discharge, on the return of the writ. This we declined to do, on grounds of principle, and common and well settled practice. Before a writ of habeas corpus is granted, sufficient probable cause must be shown; but when it appears upon the party’s own showing that there is no sufficient
We think that the same rule and practice have prevailed in this country. In Watkins’s case,
We are then to examine the petition, accompanied as it is, by a copy of the warrant under which the marshal of the district claims to hold the petitioner, and the return thereon. It appears that the petitioner has been arrested and is claimed as a fugitive from labor, upon a warrant, issued by George T. Curtis, Esquire, a commissioner of the circuit court of the United States, in pursuance of a law of the United States, and that the deputy marshal has returned the warrant to the commissioner who issued it, and has the body of the petitioner before the commissioner for the purposes expressed in the warrant. .
An obvious question occurs here, namely, how far it is competent for this court, by a writ of habeas corpus to the marshal, to take a prisoner from the custody of another tribunal, court or magistrate, of which the marshal is the executive officer, and after the prisoner has, by the execution and return of the warrant, been placed under the control and direction of such court or magistrate, to be held, discharged, brought in, or
It is now argued, that the whole proceeding, as it appears upon the warrant and return, is unconstitutional and void; because, although the act of congress of 1850, c. 60, (9 U. S. Stat. at Large, 462,) has provided for, and directed this course of proceeding, yet that the statute itself is void, because congress had no power, by the constitution of the United States, to pass such a law, and confer such an authority. The ground of argument leading to this conclusion is, that it is not competent for congress, under the power of legislation vested in them by the constitution, to confer any authority, in its nature judicial, upon any persons, magistrates or boards, other than organized courts of justice, held by judges, appointed as such, and to hold their offices during good behavior, and paid by fixed salaries; whereas the commissioners, designated by the law in question, do not hold their offices during good behavior, nor are they paid by fixed salaries. This is the argument.
We are called on to consider two questions: First, whether congress has authority to pass any law on the subject; and second, whether the law actually passed did, in any respect, of which the petitioner had a right to complain, violate the provisions of the constitution. These are grave questions, and it is impossible to approach them without a deep sense of the responsibility which must rest on a judicial tribunal, when called upon to deliberate upon the constitutionality ol any legal enactment adopted by the highest legislative body of the union, and passed under all the forms required to give it the sanction of law.
The subject matter of this act is the return and restoration of fugitive slaves, designated in the constitution as persons held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof.
In order to a just understanding and exposition of this provision of the constitution, and the laws made under it, it is necessary to refer briefly to the circumstances under which the constitution was made, and the great social and political objects and purposes, which the people of the United States had in view, in adopting it. The constitution of the United States is not to be expounded as if it were now opened for the first time, and with a sole regard to the words and figures in which it is expressed; its history is too deeply interwoven with our whole social system, to be disregarded, when we are called upon to ascertain its full meaning and effect.
These North American provinces, when they became independent of the government of Great Britain, regarded themselves, and were regarded, as sovereign states; the articles of confederation were considered rather as a compact amongst independent states, than as a government. While pressed by the force of a common external hostility, by which England attempted to subdue them to obedience, a sense of common danger and common interest, and the necessity of acting together in their common defence, compelled them to act together with a good degree of harmony and union ; but this could last only while this external pressure continued. When it terminated, what was the condition of these independent communities ? That of sovereign states, varying greatly in regard to extent of territory, numbers and strength, with the usual powers incident to sovereign states, of declaring war and peace, making treaties, and exercising an exclusive control and jurisdiction over all persons and subjects within their respective territories. These would have been their rights and powers, had no union been formed.
In some of the states, large numbers of slaves were held; in others a few only; but some, it is believed, in all, except
The evils existing immediately before the adoption of the ■constitution, and the greater and more appalling evils in prospect, indicated the absolute necessity of forming a more perfect union, in order to secure the peace and prosperity of all the states. This could only be done by the several states renouncing and relinquishing a portion of their powers of sov
Such being the circumstances, under which this provision of the constitution was adopted ; such the relations of the several states to each other; such the manifest object which the framers of the constitution had in view; we are to look at the clause in question, to ascertain its true meaning and effect. We think it was intended' to guaranty to the owner of a slave, living within the territory of a state in which slavery is
But the right, thus secured by the constitution to the slave owner, is limited by it, and cannot be extended, by implication or construction, a line beyond the precise casus foederis. The fugitive must not only owe service or labor in another state, but he must have escaped from it. This is the extent of the right of the master. It is founded in the compact, and limited by the compact. It has therefore been held, that if a slave is brought into this state by his master, or comes here in the course of his occupation or employment without having escaped, he is not within the case provided for by the constitution. Commonwealth v. Aves,
Upon the same principle it was held, on the return of a writ of habeas corpus before me in vacation, that a person who was a slave in Virginia, belonging to an officer of the navy, and who had been taken out by such officer by the special permission of the secretary of the navy, and where the ship had been ordered to Boston on her return from a cruise, and the crew to be discharged there, could not be taken back to Virginia by force, and against his will; because the master had no power to imprison him within the limits of this state, or remove him by force from them, under his general authority as an owner by the law of Virginia; and that he was not liable
To the extent, however, to which this privilege or benefit goes, that of securing the return of persons, owing service or labor in one state, who have fled and escaped into another, this provision of the constitution must be regarded as complete and sufficient to the proposed right. But the constitution itself did not profess or propose to direct, in detail, how the rights, privileges, benefits and immunities, intended to be declared and secured by it, should be practically carried into effect; this was left to be done by laws to be passed by the legislature, and applied by the judiciary, for the establishment of which full provision was at the same time made. The constitution contemplated a division and distribution of the powers incident to a sovereign state, between the general government of the United States, and the government of each particular state; a distribution, not depending on local limits, but made by selecting certain subjects of common interest, and placing them under the entire and exclusive jurisdiction of the general government; such, for instance, as the foreign relations of the country, the subjects of war and peace, treaties, the regulation of commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. These are a few of the most prominent subjects, by way of illustration. And the theory of the general government is, that these subjects, in their full extent and entire details, being placed under the jurisdiction of the general government, are necessarily withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the state, and the jurisdiction of the general government therefore becomes exclusive. And this is necessary to prevent constant collision and interference ; and it is obvious that it must be so, because two distinct governments cannot exercise the same power, at the same time, on the same subject matter. This is not left to mere implication. It is expressly declared, in art. 1, § 8, that congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution all the powers vested bj the constitution in the government of the United States, oi
It was, as we believe, under this view of the right of regaining specifically the custody of one from whom service or labor is due by the laws of one state, and who has escaped into another, and under this view of the powers of the general government, and the duty of congress, that the law of February 12, 1793, was passed. Act of 1793, c. 7, (1 U. S. Stat. at Large, 302.) It was passed at the second congress, so soon after the adoption of the constitution, that many of the members may be well presumed to have been members of the convention, and all of them to have been intimately conversant with the great principles of the constitution, and with the views, intentions, and purposes of its framers. This species of contemporaneous construction has ever been regarded as of great weight and importance, and is entitled to the highest respect. It bears with a great weight of authority upon two points; first, as to the power and duty of congress to pass laws to secure and carry into effect a right confirmed by the constitution of the United States; and secondly, as to the fitness of the provisions of law thereby adopted, and their adaptation to the proper and practical assertion of the right secured by the constitution.
The manifest intent of this act of congress was, to regulate and give effect to the right given by the constitution. It secured to the claimant the aid and assistance of certain magistrates and officers, to enable him to exercise his right in a more regular and orderly manner, and without being chargeable with a breach of the peace. It obviously contemplated a prompt and summary proceeding, adapted to the exigency of the occasion, in aid of a power, in terms conferred by the constitution on the claimant. It vested the power of inquiry, (whether regarded as judicial or otherwise,) the same power which is now drawn in question, in magistrates of counties, cities or towns corporate. As to the mode of trial contemplated by this act, it is described by Mr. Justice McLean, in his opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
By the act of 1793, the authority of issuing a warrant to arrest a fugitive from labor, of inquiring into the fact both of owing labor and .of having escaped, and of granting a certificate, is conferred on justices of the peace, appointed for a term of years, and without salary, by the state government, or on the magistrates of cities and towns corporate. It is very manifest, therefore, that these powers were not deemed judicial by the congress of 1793, in the sense in which it is now insisted that the commissioner, beforé whom the petitioner has been brought, is in the exercise of judicial powers not warranted by the constitution, because not commissioned as a judge, nor holding his office during good behavior. Indeed, it is difficult, by general terms, to draw a precise line of distinction between judicial powers and those not judicial. It is easy to designate the broad line, but not easy to mark the minute shades of difference between them. Those officers wno hold courts, and have civil and criminal jurisdiction,
Now so far as we understand it, commissioners of the circuit court of the United States are officers exercising functions very similar to those of justices of the peace under the laws of the commonwealth. They are commonly appointed from among counsellors at law, of some standing and well reputed for professional skill and experience. Their duty is to inquire into violations of the laws of the United States, to hear complaints, issue warrants, hold examinations, and bind over or commit persons for trial for offences. These are functions requiring considerable skill and experience in the administration of justice, and it is just to presume that they are duly qualified to perform their duties. Would it not be competent for congress, under the powers vested in the general government, to provide by law for the appointment of justices of the peace, in each district, to be vested with powers under the laws of the United States, analogous to those exercised under state laws by justices of the peace under the state governments, without commissioning them as judges during good behavior, or giving them fixed salaries ?
At the same time it may be proper to say, that if this argument, drawn from the constitution of the United States, were now first applied to the law of 1793, deriving no sanction from contemporaneous construction, judicial precedent, and the acquiescence of the general and state governments,
But we are not entitled to consider this a new question ;• we must consider it settled and determined by authorities, which it would be a dereliction of official duty, and a disregard of judicial responsibility, to overlook.
We have already referred to the great weight to be given, in the exposition of statutes, to what may be regarded as contemporaneous construction; and this construction is of the more importance, when the question turns upon the constitutionality of a legal enactment, made soon after the adoption of the constitution, and for the avowed purpose, not only of conforming strictly to the powers given by the constitution, but of carrying out the very objects and purposes contemplated by it. To this is now to be added an acquiescence both of the state and general governments, of their representatives and people, for nearly sixty years, and a series of judicial decisions, by the highest courts of our own and of the other states, and also of the supreme court of the United States, whose authority upon controverted questions, within their jurisdiction, and declared by their judgments, is binding upon the judges of state courts.
The constitutionality of the act of 1793, came directly before this court, and was argued and decided in 1823. Commonwealth v. Griffith,
I shall next cite the case of Wright v. Deacon, 5 S. & R. 62, in the supreme court of Pennsylvania, and I do it the more readily, because the opinion was delivered by Tilghman, C. J., whose authority was cited in the argument of this case. It arose on a writ de homine replegiando, sued out by a person claimed as a slave, against the prison keeper in whose custody he was detained, under a certificate granted conformably to the act of congress of 1793. He says that it is well known that the constitution could not have been adopted, unless the property in slaves had been secured; and that this constitution had been adopted by the free consent of the citizens of Pennsylvania. He then cites the article in the constitution. But, he says, it required a law to regulate the manner in which this principle should be reduced to practice, and cites the act of congress made for that purpose, and continues: “ It plainly appears from the whole scope and tenor of the constitution and act of congress, that the fugitive was to be delivered up, on a summary proceeding, without the delay
The same principles have been decided by the supreme court of the state of New York. Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 311. This case was also commenced by a writ de homine replegiando, corresponding with our writ of personal replevin, sued out by the fugitive and alleged slave against his mistress. The case is full and decisive. The opinion, as delivered by Mr. Justice Nelson, is very instructive, but too long to be quoted here. It affirms the right of the master, as established by the constitution, the power and duty of the general government to pass laws to secure the right by suitable and practicable means, the exclusive power of congress to pass such laws, and the invalidity of all state laws on the subject.
But the judicial authority most to be relied on, and which, when distinctly ascertained, is binding and conclusive upon all subjects within their special jurisdiction, is that of the su- . preme court of the United States. Before the case hereafter cited, the question had come before Mr. Justice Washington, then of the supreme court of the United States, on the circuit, in Hill v. Low,
A case came before the supreme court of the United States, in 1842, on a special verdict, in which the point in question was fully discussed and deliberately settled. Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
We have thought it important thus to inquire into the validity and constitutionality of the act of 1793, because it appears to be decisive of that in question. In the only particular in which the constitutionality of the act of congress of 1850 is now called in question, that of 1793 was obnoxious to the same objection, viz., that of authorizing a summary proceeding before officers and magistrates not qualified under the constitution to exercise the judicial powers of the genera) government. Congress may have thought it necessary to change the preexisting law, not in principle but in detail, because, as we have seen in the case of Prig'g v. Pennsylvania, some of the judges were of opinion that state magistrates could not act under the authority conferred on them by the act of 1793, when prohibited from doing so by the laws of their own state, and some states had in fact passed such prohibitory laws. The present fugitive slave law may vary in other respects, and provide other and more rigorous means foi
We do not mean to say that this court will in no case issue a writ of habeas corpus to bring in a party, held under color of process from the courts of the United States, or whose services, and the custody of whose person, are claimed under authority derived from the laws of the United States. This is constantly done, in cases of soldiers and sailors, held by military and naval officers, under enlistments complained of as illegal and void. But it is manifest that this ought to be done only in a clear case, and in a case where it is necessary to the security of personal liberty from illegal restraint.
It seems to us to be the less necessary to call into action the powers of the state judiciary, in a case like this, because it is quite competent for the judges of the United States courts to bring the petitioner before them by habeas corpus, and ascertain whether he is detained by an illegal and colorable authority of an officer, claiming to act under the laws of the United States. This consideration is perhaps of no other importance, than as showing that there is no necessary occasion for drawing the authority of the state and the United States judiciary into conflict with each other. Such a conflict can hardly arise, although it may often seem impending; because it must generally appear, upon a cool and deliberate examination of all the facts and circumstances, whether a subject to which a law of congress relates is or is not within the jurisdiction of the general government; if it be so, it is conclusive. All judges of all courts are obliged to act on the same principles, and be governed by the same rules of duty; they are bound alike by oath to support the constitution of the United States, which declares that the constitution itself, and all laws made pursuant to it, shall be the supreme law of the land.
On the whole, we consider that the question raised by the petitioner, and discussed in the argument before us, is settled by a course of legal decisions which we are bound to respect, and which we regard as binding and conclusive upon this court.
The principle of adhering to judicial precedent, especially that of the supreme court of the United States, in a case depending upon the constitution and laws of the United States, and thus placed within their special and final jurisdiction, is absolutely necessary to the peace, union and harmonious action of the state and general governments. The preservation of both, with their full and entire powers, each in its proper sphere, was regarded by the framers of the constitution, and has ever since been regarded, as essential to the peace, order and prosperity of all the United States.
If this were a new question, now for the first time presented, we should desire to pause and take time for consideration. But though this act, the construction of which is now drawn in question, is recent, and this point, in the form in which it is now stated, is new, yet the solution of the question depends upon reasons and judicial decisions, upon legal principles and a long course of practice, which are familiar, and which have often been the subject of discussion and deliberation.
Considering, therefore, the nature of the subject, the urgent necessity for a speedy and prompt decision, we have not thought it expedient to delay the judgment. I have, therefore, to state, in behalf of the court, under the weighty responsibility which rests upon us, and as the unanimous opinion of the court, that the writ of habeas corpus prayed for cannot be granted. Writ refused.
The allusion in the opinion of the court was to the actual condition of the several states of the union, after their independence had been admitted by the treaty of peace, and before the adoption of the constitution. In construing a treaty or compact, made between two or more parties, it is a good rule for expounding the act, and considering the true intent and meaning of the terms in which it is expressed, to examine and ascertain what was the condition of the respective parties; what would have been their relative rights, powers, duties and obligations, had not such compact been entered into; and thus to determine how that condition was affected, and those rights, powers, duties and obligations limited, changed or qualified, by the actual stipulations of the compact.
It is too clear and manifest to require proof, that, independently of the qualified alliance, created by the articles of confederation, which it is conceded contained no stipulation on the subject of fugitive slaves, the several states would have been sovereign and independent, invested with all the rights and powers which are regarded by the received laws of nations as incident to sovereignty. Amongst these, is the absolute right of each state to regulate, by its laws, the conduct, state and condition of all persons and things within its limits; to prohibit the entrance of all persons, and the introduction of all things, according to its own views of its own policy and best good. And each is under a corresponding obligation to respect the territorial rights of others, and so to regulate the conduct of all persons within its own territory,, as to prohibit them
Assuming this to be an outline of the rights and duties of sovereign states towards each other, stated in the briefest and most general terms, it becomes necessary to inquire what would have been their condition in respect to slaves and slavery, supposing that slavery was sanctioned and upheld by the laws of some, and abolished and prohibited by the laws of others. In doing this, it will be necessary to do little more than cite the case of Commonwealth v. Aves,
By the received laws of nations, it seems to be well established, that however odious we may consider slavery and the slave trade, however abhorrent to the dictates of humanity and the plainest principles of justice and natural right, yet each nation has a right, in this respect, to judge for itself, and to allow or prohibit slavery by its own laws, at its own will; and that whenever slavery is thus established by positive law within the limits of such state, all other nations and people are bound to respect it, and cannot rightfully interfere, either by forcibly seizing, or artfully enticing-.away slaves, within the limits of the territory of the nation establishing it, or on the high seas, which are the common highway of nations. In the case cited, the language of this court is this: “ In considering the law of nations, we may assume that the law of this state is analogous to the law of England in this respect; that while slavery is considered as unlawful and inadmissible in both, because contrary to natural right, and the laws designed for the security of personal liberty, yet, in both, the existence of slavery in other countries is recognized, and the claims of foreigners, growing out of that condition, are, to a certain extent, respected.” In Sommersett’s case, before Lord Mansfield, in 1771, 20 Howells’s State Trials, 1, 82, which is the leading
The principle is, that although slavery and the slave trade are contrary to justice and natural right, yet each nation, in this respect, may establish its own law, within its own territory. And even the slave trade is not regarded as piracy, even by those states who regard it in the abstract as unjust, except when it has been declared so by statute, which can only operate within its own limits; or except when it has been so declared by treaty between two or more powers, in which case it may be so regarded as between such powers, their citizens and subjects. This is confirmed by the. English and American authorities, although the governments of both the United States and England have made strong declarations and passed' very severe laws against the slave trade.
I refer to the case of The Diana, 1 Dodson, 95. A Swedish ship, captured on the high seas, with a cargo of slaves on board, by an English vessel, was carried into Sierra. Leone, and there condemned. On appeal to the high court of admiralty, she was ordered to be. restored by Sir William Scott, on the principle that the slave trade was allowed by the laws of Sweden.
Le Louis, 2 Dodson, 236, was the case of a French vessel
Two common law cases are cited in Commonwealth v. Aves,
These authorities were récognized and confirmed, and the same principle declared, on great consideration, by the supreme court of the United States, in the case of The Antelope,
The result of this inquiry is summed up in the case cited,
It seems, therefore, to be conclusively settled, that it belongs to each independent power to decide for itself, whether it will uphold and maintain by its laws the existence of slavery; and although other powers may denounce it, and declare it founded in force and violence, injustice and wrong, yet they cannot disregard the rights flowing from it, when legalized by another power. The relative rights and obligations of independent powers on this subject are clearly stated in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, already cited. 10 Wheat.. 122. Each
If then these states, prior to the adoption of the constitution, would have been sovereign and independent, these views of the established and recognized laws of nations indicate clearly what would have been their relative condition, and their respective rights. Slavery was likely to subsist in some states, and to be abolished in others. Each would have been clothed with certain rights, and bound to the performance of certain duties, which each would have a right to defend and enforce by war, to which there would be a constant temptation ; and this could only have been avoided by treaty, regulating and providing for the enjoyment and security of such rights. It would have been in vain to say, that slavery being founded in wrong and injustice, any treaty tending to assent to, uphold and sanction it, would be itself immoral and wrong, and so could not conscientiously be made. Nations cannot elect the subjects on which they will treat; treaties are often made under great exigencies, as the best alternative which can be resorted to in order to avoid greater evils. In the infancy of our commerce and of our political power, we thought it not wrong to make treaties with the Algerines, and other piratical powers of the coast of Barbary, who had committed depredations on our commerce, and carried our citizens into captivity. We made treaties for ransoming our citizens held in slavery, and paid tribute, to these acknowledged pirates, to induce them to forbear plundering our commerce, although such payments contributed directly to the upholding and encouragement of robbery and piracy. Having made such treaties, nobody would doubt that it was our duty to fulfil
But if no binding treaty could be made on the subject of slavery, what would have been the necessary alternative ? It would have been a state of things in which acknowledged rights were in constant danger of being drawn into conflict between neighboring states, leading to a war likely to be perpetual, or perhaps to a still more disastrous result—-that of some states being subjugated by others of superior physical strength, in a contest in which right and wrong would be disregarded, and violence and brute force would supersede the government of law and the reign of peace. Can this be regarded as an inflamed or exaggerated view of the condition of these states, as independent, but without compact with each other, if the views of the laws of nations above stated are correct ? The states were equal in right, but unequal in power. In view of the laws of nations, there was no difference between Rhode Island and Virginia, or Pennsylvania and Delaware. With equal rights, constantly in danger of being brought into conflict, with radical differences of opinion and views, both of justice and policy, on the subject of slavery, the danger of hostile collision was imminent. What alternative was there, but either a general treaty of alliance, or a league, or a union under one government, to whom should be confided all these subjects of common and mutual interest. The latter expedient was adopted. The several states agreed to renounce their rights of sovereignty to a limited extent; among other subjects, the regulation of their intercourse with foreign powers, with the Indian tribes and with each other; the right of war and peace, and that of making treaties either with
The duties and relations of the states to each other, by the laws of nations, anterior to the making of the constitution, and the qualified but acknowledged right arising from the establishment of slavery in some states, and its exclusion in ^others, having been alluded to briefly in the opinion of the court, it was thought advisable, in this note, to expand the argument somewhat, arising from that consideration, but more especially to state the judicial authorities upon which it rests.
Notes
See, aliso, charge of Nelson. J., to the grand jury, 1 Blatchf. Rep. 636.
See Const, of U. S. Amendments V. & VII.; 3 Story on the Constitution, M 1639, 1640, 1783; 2 Inst. 50 to 54; Lee v. Lee,
See also Buron v. Denman, 2 Welsh. Hurlst. & Gord. 167, 186.
