hOn appeal, plaintiff seeks review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in
Facts and Procedural History
On July 13, 2011, Kim Simon was involved in an automobile accident, when an underinsured driver rear-ended her while she was driving her personal vehicle in the course of her employment with LHC Group, Inc. (hereinafter “LHC”). At the time of the accident, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg (hereinfter “National”) had issued a business auto liability policy to LHC, with a selection of uninsured/underinsured (“UM”) coverage for “owned ‘autos’ only.” In a supplemental petition for damages, Ms. Simon added National as a defendant, alleging that LHC carried and National provided UM coverage for the benefit of Ms. Simon.
On January 29, 2015, National moved for summary judgment on the grounds that LHC’s policy did not afford UM. coverage for Ms. Simon because her personal vehicle was not a “covered auto” as defined by the policy. To its motion, National attached a copy of the accident report, LHC’s insurance policy with the UM coverage form, business auto declarations, and definitions. In response, plaintiff filed an opposition to National’s motion for summary judgment on the UM coverage issue, urging that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding coverage under the policy because the policy failed to describe specific vehicles as required by the final sentence of La. R.S. 22:1295(l)(e).
|aOn August 26, 2015, the trial court rendered and signed a judgment granting National’s motion and dismissing National from the lawsuit with prejudice. Ms. Simon now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it found that LHC’s policy failed to provide UM coverage for Ms. Simon while she was driving her personal vehicle.
Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, show that there' is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. Art. 966(B)(2).
Discussion
Interpretation of an insurance policy usually involves a legal question which can be resolved properly in the framework of a motion for summary judgment. Bonin v. Westport Ins. Corp., 05-0886 La. 5/17/06,
An insurance policy should not be interpreted in an unreasonable or a strained manner so as to enlarge or to restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve an absurd conclusion. Carrier v. Reliance Ins. Co., 99-2573 (La. 4/11/00),
If, after applying the other general rules of construction an ambiguity remains, the ambiguous contractual provision is to be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. Cadwallader,
Although Louisiana’s public policy strongly favors UM coverage and a liberal construction of the UM statute, limitations on UM coverage are valid where they are authorized by statute. Galliano v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
The starting point for'interpreting an insurance policy is an examination of the relevant policy provisions. The declaration page of the policy at issue lists the named insured as “LHC GROUP, INC.” Ms. Simon is not listed as a named insured. According to the policy, LHC purchased liability coverage for “all autos” but limited its selection of uninsured motorist coverage to its “owned ‘autos’ only.” It is undisputed that LHC does not own Ms. Simon’s personal vehicle. Thus, Ms. Simon was not occupying an insured auto at the time of the accident; therefore, the UM coverage was not selected for Ms. Simon’s vehicle in this case. Insurers have the right to limit coverage in any manner desired, so long as the limitations are clearly and unambiguously set forth in the contract and are not in conflict with statutory provisions or public poliey. Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,
Ms. Simon further submits that UM coverage is statutorily mandated because the policy did not describe the specific motor vehicles that were covered for uninsured motorists as required .by La. R.S.
The uninsured motorist coverage does not apply to bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including the resulting death of an insured, while occupying a motor vehicle owned by the insured if such motor vehicle is not described in the policy under which a claim is made, or is not a newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. This provision shall not apply to uninsured motorist coverage provided in a policy that does not describe specific motor vehicles.
Our review of the record reveals that National in its motion for summary judgment introduced the description of owned vehicles that were covered for | ¡¡damage caused by uninsured motorists, and Ms. Simon’s personal vehicle was not listed -or specifically described in the policy. UM coverage is clearly precluded for an employee occupying his own vehicle when that personal vehicle was not specifically listed/described in the employer’s policy. See Halphen v. Borja,
Conclusion
For the stated reasons, the trial court judgment granting National’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing it from the suit is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff/appellant, Kim Simon.
AFFIRMED
Notes
. On the date of the summary judgment hearing, this version of La. C.C.P. art. 966(B) was in effect as amended by Acts 2014, No. 187, § 1, effective August 1, 2014. The article was subsequently amended by Acts 2015, No. 422, § 1, effective January 1, 2016.
. Acts 2010, No. 703, § 1, effective January 1, 2011, amended and reenacted La. R.S. 22:1295(l)(e).