101 Neb. 211 | Neb. | 1917
Action under employers’ liability act, sections 3642-3696, Rev. St. 1913. H. J. Cathroe Company was the employer and the London Guaranty & Accident Company are insurers of its liability.
On January 15, 1915, plaintiff was a bricklayer engaged in laying brick in the lower portion of a stormwater sewer. A workman whose duty it was to lower brick in an iron basket managed the same so negligently that a brick or the corner of the basket struck the plaintiff on the head, causing a wound from which he bledquite freely, and was obliged to stop working. The wound healed in a week or two, but plaintiff was not able to return to the job, although he afterwards worked for about a week for other parties. A few months afterwards he began to act peculiarly, complained of severe pains in his head, was unable to sleep, assaulted a married son with whom he he had previously been upon good terms, threatened to kill himself and his children, and in other manners manifested a deranged intellect. He consulted a physician and surgeon in April or May of the year following the accident, who told him that he might have a clot of blood upon the brain. He was afterwards, on the complaint of his
Plaintiff complains of the refusal to allow reasonable medical and hospital expenses, and of the findings that the occupation of plaintiff was seasonal, and that the disability of plaintiff would continue only for six months following the trial. As to the first point: The allowance was evidently refused because no medical expenses were incurred
As to the cross-appeal: In addition to denials, the answers plead that the parties had not agreed upon compensation within one year after the accident, and that the plaintiff did not file his petition to recover compensation within said time; that his claim for compensation was not made within six months after the occurrence of the injury, and he was not suffering from any physical or mental incapacity during such time which would excuse his failure; that no medical and' hospital services were needed during the first 21 days of his alleged disability, and no claim was made for the same upon the Cathroe Company. Section 3679, Rev. St. 1913, provides: “That all claims for compensation shall bé forever barred unless, within one year after the accident, the parties shall have agreed upon the
We are of opinion that section 3674 and section 3679 should be construed together, and that as to the limit in section 3679 of one year the period must be construed as in section 3674, so that the time begins to run after the removal of such physical or mental incapacity.
The accident occurred on January 15, 1915. The petition was filed November 1, 1916. The first claim for compensation was made September 26, 1916, which was a few days after the plaintiff was discharged from the insane hospital, but it was shown that both defendants had notice and knowledge of the accident a few days after it occurred. If plaintiff was physically and mentally incapacitated until discharged, as found by the district court, the claim was filed in ample time.
The cross-appellant contends that this finding is not supported by the evidence. It” is shown that in 1913 plaintiff had been confined in the hospital as a dipsomaniac, but that he had not' indulged in liquor again until after the accident and there is no proof of excessive use of intoxicants since that time. The attending physician at the
The judgment of the district court is modified so that plaintiff shall recover the sum of $1,000 for total disability to time of trial and $5 per week for partial disability for six months thereafter, and as so modified the judgment is
Affirmed.