183 Iowa 1336 | Iowa | 1918
The point which appears to be most seriously argued and relied upon for a reversal is as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. This question was properly raised by motions to direct a verdict, at the close of proponents’ evidence and at the close of all the evidence; by motion for new trial, etc.
Other assignments of error are that the court erred in permitting witnesses to testify that deceased was of unsound mind on the day the will was executed, for the reason that the witnesses did not see deceased at that time; also in refusing to give an instruction requested by proponent.
1. We have carefully examined the record, and have come to the conclusion that, under our authorities, the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict. We shall not set it out in detail, but will endeavor to set out the evidence as favorably to contestant as the record will justify, and refer to proponents’ evidence in a still more general way. First, though, we may properly set out those facts about which there is little or no dispute.
The will was executed February 3, 1915. It appears that, at the time of her death, on April 21, 1915, testatrix
At the time of the execution of the will, according to the testimony of her nurse, who was also the other subscribing witness to the will, deceased was thin and frail looking, and was not able to walk alone scarcely any of the time; complained of her head and limb; she was sleepless at night; her appetite was pretty good, usually; and deceased said she could not read any more; deceased asked witness to read Scriptures to her; this was the daily practice, twice every day; deceased forgot about her key to the bank box; said that one of the ministers came so often that he annoyed her, and that he was wanting money, and she asked the nurse to phone him and stop his coming, which was done; this was the day before she went to Hot Springs; deceased told her, after the will was made, that she had had her will made two or three times, and it didn’t suit her yet, and she expected to have it changed, and that she could have it made again: deceased told her she had always intended to give the Dakota land to foreign missions, but keep her Olay County land; in talking, she would change the subject; deceased paid witness for her services in cash; she paid the medical expenses of the house through the nurse; gave witness a check to get money at the bank; talked of her property. Witness gives her opinion that deceased was of unsound mind.
Counsel for appellants strenuously insist that the testimony of this witness does not justify the expression of an opinion as to the mental condition of deceased, and they make the same claim as to other witnesses. However this may be, as to the witness Mrs. Little, she ivas one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, • and we think her testimony is at least weakened by that fact. Some of the cases hold that the legal effect of this is to assert the mental, capacity of deceased, and affects the credibility of the witness. Sellars v. Sellars, 2 Heisk. (Teun.) 430, 432. Apj)ellan(s of
Deceased’s own brother, whose testimony we have before quoted, testifying as a witness for contestant, testifies that, up to the time the will was made, deceased was perfectly able to recognize all of her relatives; and that there never was a time, up to then, when she was so feeble, that she did not know all of her friends and neighbors who came to call upon her.
She inherited the quarter section of land in Clay County, Iowa, from her husband. Some years before her death, she sold one 80 of this to her brother Thomas, a Methodist minister in Dakota. She had a piece of land in South Dakota; and, on the advice of a brother, she sold, -and invested in North Dakota, and made $8.00 an acre on this. She reinvested in other Dakota land, which was not profitable, and her brother took it off her hands. The other half of the quarter section in Clay County she conveyed to the Women’s Foreign Missionary Society, a corporation, a.t the agreed value of $11,121, upon the agreement of the corporation that they would pay her an annuity of 5% upon that value, in half-yearly payments, during the remainder of her life. The annuity was paid to her as long as she lived. Her brother testifies that she told him that some church people came to her and solicited means for the missionary cause, and came to her for a donation; that they were persistent. She claimed the Dakota land was missionary money, and that she was going to give that to the missionary cause. It is not quite clear from the record whether this Dakota land was a part of the deed for which an annuity was to be paid. As we understand it, it was so. She received about $3,100 or $3,200 from her father’s estate; so that she had, up to the time of her decease, in addition to the annuity agreement of $556 a year, property, above her liabilities, .of about $7,500,
About December 1, 1914, she began to prepare for the execution of her will. She consulted with her pastor about it, and about making a final disposition of her property; inquired about the different church boards and about the Children’s Home. He made no suggestions as to what disposition she should make of her property. About January 1, 1915, she asked Mr. G-arfield, who had been her attorney for many years, to come to her house, and talked with him
She left surviving five brothers and two sisters. By her will, she gave $2,000 to the Women’s Home Missionary Society of the Des Moines Conference of the M. E. Church,
The financial condition of her brothers and sisters is shown. Some of them are well to do; others, not so well. After the executioú of the will, on one or two occasions, she expressed some dissatisfaction with its provisions, and said that she was going to have it changed.
Three or four of her brothers and sisters testified for contestant, and these include contestant himself, as well as other witnesses. The tendency .of the testimony for contestant, in addition to that already set out, some of which is more or less in the nature of conclusions, is that she was forgetful: She forgot that she had paid her church subscriptions; she forgot that her brother had paid her money; thought he had made a mistake, and in some instances it was found that she was mistaken; for two years before her death, she would break off, in talking, and would not finish the sentence, and as she grew weaker, she grew worse. Some of the witnesses had noticed these peculiarities for ten years or more. There is testimony that her eyesight failed, along with her health; that she said she was going to will property to her brother, the contestant, because he had
“A. Well, without perfectly close observation over a continued period, it is a difficult disease'to diagnose, when compared with other mental conditions and physical conditions in the female, especially at her age; but from this view, I would think that the supposition that that was the trouble could easily be stated around 1910 and 1911, at the time she was taking care of her mother; at that time her own health was reasonably good. She had most of the, — so far as I could see, — of the care of her mother. And except for that feature, there was a forgetting, and failure to comprehend the details of -the plan of treatment.”
He thought she had not the mental capacity to transact any business where it would require acuteness of mind, or determining values, or the consequences of an act. He says that she always recognized him, and had the capacity to recognize her brothers and sisters; that she asked for his bill; that she transacted her business with him intelligently, so far as handling money and things of that kind was concerned, — paid her bills in a perfectly intelligent way: but he did not know anything about whether she had the mental capacity to attend to the minor, current business- affairs of her life. He thought she would not have the mental capacity to fill out a check; and yet the undisputed evidence is that she did so. He did not think it possible for her, unaided, in January, 1915, to write an intelligent letter in regard to her property and what she would will to do with it; and yet the undisputed evidence shows that she did so. He thought it not possible for her to have received her friends and talked with them intelligently upon a subject that might interest hex*, and thought she would not be able, during January and February, 1915, to see her lawyer and tell him in an intelligent way what disposition she wished to make of her property; axxd yet she did these things.
Appellants’ contention is that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, and is against the weight of the evidence; that the case should not have been submitted to the jury. They cite, among other cases, Perkins v. Perkins, 116 Iowa 253; In re Estate of Perkins, 109 Iowa 216; Gates v. Cole, 137 Iowa 613; Sevening v. Smith, 153 Iowa 639; Dos Moines Nat. Bank v. Chisholm, 71 Iowa 675; Fothergill v. Fothergill, 129 Iowa 93; In re Estate of Townsend, 122 Iowa 246; Mitchell v. Mutch, 180 Iowa 1281.
Some of these cases involve the validity of contracts, and mental capacity to make a valid contract, which requires a higher degree of mental capacity than to make a will. It will serve no useful purpose to quote from these cases, or to state the facts. It is sufficient to say that we have examined this record with care; and it seems to us quite clear that the instant case is not as strong in its facts as the cases cited, where it was held that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a verdict setting aside the will. , It is true, of course, that deceased was and had been suffering physical pain; that there was some weakening of.her mental faculties,- — but not sufficient to justify the conclusion that she was not competent to transact the business in hand. The fact that she contracted an unfortunate or foolish marriage, a good many years before, while a circumstance, is not persuasive: there are many such.
We are inclined to the view that the court erred in permitting witnesses who Avere not present at the time of the
There may be other matters of minor importance argued, but what has been said is decisive of the case, and we shall not prolong the opinion to go into further detail.
It is our conclusion that the judgment ought to be, and it is, — Reversed.