Following a bench trial, Robert Lee Simmons was convicted of driving under the influence to the extent it was less safe for him to drive (“DUI less safe”),
“ ‘On appeal from a criminal conviction that follows a bench trial, the defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence, and we view the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s finding of guilt.’ ”
Officer Brian Scurr responded to the scene and spoke to Fair-cloth, who was complaining of back pain and had “significant damage to the rear of [his] vehicle.” Faircloth indicated that the tow truck had the word “Simmons” on the side. Officer Scurr then received notice from dispatch that there had been another accident nearby.
When Officer Scurr arrived at the scene of the second accident approximately 20 minutes later, he observed Simmons’s tow truck and a 24-ounce “can of Crunk juice malt liquor laying just outside of the driver’s cabin of the tow truck on the road in the snow.” Officer Scurr asked Simmons to exit the vehicle, which did not have a license plate, and Simmons stepped out, lost his balance, and almost fell into the road. Simmons had bloodshot, glassy eyes and a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his breath, and he could not walk without assistance. Officer Scurr elected not to conduct field sobriety tests on Simmons because he was concerned that Simmons’s lack of balance and the proximity to a major road posed a safety hazard. Based on his experience, training, and observations of Simmons, Officer Scurr placed Simmons under arrest for DUI less safe.
Following a bench trial, Simmons was found guilty of DUI less safe, failure to report an accident resulting in injury or property damage of $500 or more, aggressive driving, possessing an open container of an alcoholic beverage in the passenger area of a vehicle, and operating a motor vehicle without registration or a valid license plate.
1. Simmons contends that he did not intelligently waive his constitutional right to a jury trial because the trial court did not
A defendant’s right to trial by jury is one of those fundamental constitutional rights that the defendant must personally, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently choose to waive. A trial court should ask the defendant sufficient questions on the record so that the court can ensure the defendant’s waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.8
“The waiver, however, need not follow any particular form. The only real issue is whether the defendant intelligently agreed to a trial without jury.”
When a defendant questions the validity of such a waiver, the State bears the burden of showing the waiver was made both intelligently and knowingly, either (1) by showing on the record that the defendant was cognizant of the right being waived; or (2) by filling a silent or incomplete record through the use of extrinsic evidence which affirmatively shows that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.10
“We will affirm a trial court’s determination that a defendant validly waived the right to a jury trial unless that determination is clearly erroneous.”
Here, immediately before the trial began, the trial court asked Simmons if he understood that he had a right to a jury trial and asked whether Simmons was “voluntarily and knowingly waiving” his right to a trial by jury, and Simmons responded affirmatively to both questions. “Only after receiving [Simmons’s] oral assurance that he wished to waive trial by jury and proceed to trial before the court did the trial court accept [Simmons’s] waiver.”
OCGA § 17-16-7 provides, in relevant part:
No later than ten days prior to trial or at such time as the court permits, . . . the prosecution . . . shall produce for the opposing party any statement of any witness that is in the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution . . . that relates to the subject matter concerning the testimony of the witness that [it] intends to call as a witness at trial. . . .
“The statutory obligation of OCGA § 17-16-7 is not triggered when a witness merely makes an oral statement. There can be no ‘possession, custody, or control’ of a witness’ statement which has neither been recorded nor committed to writing.”
3. Next, Simmons contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI less safe “based exclusively on the insufficient and inadmissible testimony of witness . . . Faircloth.”
Simmons does not indicate why Faircloth’s testimony was inadmissible. Assuming that he is referring to Faircloth’s testimony regarding Simmons’s statement to him, we resolved that issue against him in Division 2. Further, Faircloth’s testimony was not the only evidence of DUI less safe. In addition to Faircloth’s testimony that Simmons hit his truck four times, had slurred speech, smelled of alcohol, and sideswiped Faircloth’s truck as he fled the scene, Officer Scurr testified that Simmons smelled of alcohol, could not maintain his balance, and had bloodshot, glassy eyes. This evidence is sufficient to support Simmons’s conviction for DUI less safe.
4. Simmons also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to his conviction for aggressive driving, pointing out that Faircloth conceded on cross-examination that he “[could not] say” if the rear-end collisions were caused by the icy conditions. This argument is without merit. After reviewing the evidence — that Simmons struck Faircloth’s truck four times in rapid succession and then struck it again as he fled the scene — in the light most favorable to the verdict, “we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found [Simmons] guilty of violating OCGA § 40-6-397 (a) beyond a reasonable doubt.”
5. Finally, Simmons challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to his conviction for possessing an open container, arguing that Officer Scurr’s testimony that he observed the open container of malt liquor sitting in the snow directly outside the driver’s door of Simmons’s vehicle was insufficient because “the malt beverage can in the street could have belonged to anyone.” We disagree.
“A person violates OCGA § 40-6-253 (b) by either consuming an alcoholic beverage or by possessing an open alcoholic-beverage container in the passenger area of a vehicle on a roadway or shoulder of a public highway.”
we do not determine the credibility of witnesses or weigh evidence; this is within the province of the jury. Our sole consideration on appeal is whether a rational trier of fact could have found [Simmons] guilty of violating Georgia’s open-container law beyond a reasonable doubt. And because there is some competent evidence ... to support a finding that [Simmons] committed the charged offense, we will not overturn the [conviction].20
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1).
OCGA § 40-6-273.
OCGA § 40-6-397 (a).
OCGA § 40-6-253 (b) (1).
OCGA § 40-2-8.
(Punctuation omitted.) Hinton v. State,
Simmons was also charged with striking an unattended vehicle and aggressive driving with regard to the second accident (not involving Faircloth), but the State withdrew those charges at trial.
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Watson v. State,
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Edwards v. State,
(Punctuation omitted.) Allison v. State,
Edwards,
Watson,
See id.; Ray v. State,
Simmons objected to the admission of the statement during trial.
(Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Winfrey v. State,
See Winfrey,
See Gregoire v. State,
Frasard v. State,
Davenport v. State,
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Id. at 152 (1) (d).