Kenneth SIMMONS, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2014-000387
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Filed June 8, 2016
Opinion No. 27641. Heard March 2, 2016.
If necessary, to resolve issues related to the appointment of counsel, a hearing shall be conducted within thirty (30) days of this order.
Within sixty (60) days of the date of this order, Judge Brown shall issue a scheduling order setting forth the schedule that shall be followed in this matter, including the date of the hearing on the merits. The scheduling order may be amended as necessary.
s/Costa M. Pleicones
Costa M. Pleicones
Chief Justice
Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Melody J. Brown, all of Columbia, for Respondent.
Joseph M. McCulloch, Jr., of Columbia, Lori R. Mason, of Cooley LLP, of Palo Alto, California, Adam S. Gerhenson, of Cooley LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts and Jennifer Pavane Kenter, of Cooley LLP, of New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae The Innocence Network. Daniel J. Westbook, of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, of Columbia, Vilia B. Hayes, Charles W. Cohen and Casey S. Duffy, all of Hughes Hubbard & Reed, LLP, of New York, New York, for Amici Curiae ARC of South Carolina, Able SC, SCAAIDD, Protection and Advocacy for People With Disabilities, Inc. and Family Connection of South Carolina.
JUSTICE KITTREDGE:
Petitioner Kenneth Simmons was convicted and sentenced for the 1996 murder and criminal sexual assault of an 89-year-old Summerville woman. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief (PCR), which was granted in part. Because Petitioner is intellectually disabled, the PCR court vacated Petitioner‘s death sentence and imposed a sentence of life without parole, a matter which is not before us. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded individuals (citation omitted)). Petitioner additionally sought a new trial on newly discovered evidence and due process grounds, which the PCR court denied without discus-
I.
This was a brutal and horrific murder, a fact that does not escape us. From the beginning, the State relied heavily on the supposed match between Simmons‘s DNA and DNA found in semen at the crime scene. As the Solicitor told the jury during opening statements, the State‘s evidence against Simmons consisted solely of statements Simmons made to police and DNA analysis. Regarding the DNA evidence, the Solicitor told the jury the State would present the testimony of forensic analysts “that nine out of nine of the locations on DNA molecules that they compared with the semen in that vaginal swab [taken from the victim] matched the DNA from Kenneth Simmons‘[s] blood.”
As the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) lacked the ability at the time to perform the necessary forensic analysis, the State sent the DNA samples to Lifecodes Corporation (Lifecodes), a private laboratory in Stamford, Connecticut. There, forensic analysis was performed by Lauren Crane and Dr. Michael Baird.2 To aid their testimony, the
When directly asked if Simmons‘s DNA matched the perpetrator‘s DNA at all nine loci tested, Crane responded, “What we found was a mixture of DNA which we could not eliminate Kenneth Simmons‘[s] blood as being a contributor to.”4 While a correct statement, this failed to inform the jury that she was basing that opinion on only six of the loci tested. At her PCR deposition, Crane admitted the CTT test results, which looked at the other three loci, were inconclusive and had no evidentia-
Then, during its closing argument, the State essentially told the jury it was impossible for the DNA to have come from anyone other than Simmons: the State emphasized the supposed nine-for-nine match between Simmons‘s DNA and the samples recovered from the victim and noted the frequency of occurrence of Simmons‘s genetic profile in the black community was 1 in 8,029,316.
The jury found Simmons guilty on all charges. This Court affirmed Simmons‘s murder conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. State v. Simmons, 360 S.C. 33, 36-37, 46, 599 S.E.2d 448, 449, 454 (2004).
II.
Simmons filed an application for PCR on multiple grounds, including an ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to his trial counsel‘s failure to adequately challenge the State‘s DNA evidence and a claim he was ineligible for the death penalty because he is “mentally retarded.”5 Simmons later amended his application for PCR, expanding on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and adding a newly discovered evidence claim,6 as well as a claim that the State violated his due process rights by presenting false evidence to the jury and failing to disclose exculpatory evidence.
The PCR court vacated Simmons‘s death sentence pursuant to Atkins and summarily denied the remaining claims, including Simmons‘s challenge to the DNA evidence, “as without merit.”11 Yet Simmons failed to file a Rule 59, SCRCP motion, as our issue-preservation rules require.
III.
The State first argues that Simmons‘s claims are procedurally barred because they were not raised to the PCR court in a motion to reconsider. We note that although the State is technically correct, we also believe dismissing the writ of certiorari would be fundamentally contrary to the interests of justice. As discussed below, our jurisprudence permits a remand under such extraordinary circumstances.
A.
The State, to its credit, does not deny the obvious—that is, the strength of the State‘s DNA evidence against Simmons was misrepresented to the jury. We hasten to add that our careful review of the voluminous record reveals no evidence of conscious wrongdoing in the prosecution of this case. We are persuaded that the misleading chart, and the demonstrative use of it by the State, was the result of faulty information provided by Lifecodes concerning a complex matter.
“[I]t is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not
B.
In ruling on an application for PCR, “[t]he [PCR] court shall make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented.”
As noted, we believe the State is technically correct regarding issue preservation. However, as the State acknowledges, this Court has previously remanded cases such as this to the PCR court for findings of fact. See, e.g., McCullough v. State, 320 S.C. 270, 272, 464 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1995) (“Although the error was not raised to and ruled on by the PCR judge, we find it necessary to vacate the order and remand this matter to the circuit court to issue an order addressing its decision to
Petitioner requests that we proceed and grant relief today in the form of a new trial, an invitation we decline. We sit today in an appellate capacity and making findings of fact de novo would be contrary to this appellate setting. See, e.g., In re Treatment & Care of Luckabaugh, 351 S.C. 122, 131-34, 568 S.E.2d 338, 342-44 (2002) (vacating and remanding a trial court‘s ruling because that court‘s order did not contain factual findings “sufficient to allow this Court, sitting in its appellate capacity, to ensure the law is faithfully executed below,” and refusing to engage in the speculation that would be required to uphold the trial court‘s decision (citations omitted)). Moreover, a preemptive ruling on the merits would be unfair to the State, which would be deprived of the opportunity to have this matter fully resolved by a proper order from the PCR court. In this regard, the State correctly asserts it should not be foreclosed from the panoply of arguments available to it, especially related to the prejudice prong in the PCR analysis and the strength of Petitioner‘s confession to the crimes. In striking this difficult balance, we believe a remand is in the best interests of justice. And finally, because of the growing knowledge of science as it relates to DNA, we grant the PCR court discretion to permit additional evidence.13
IV.
We therefore remand this matter to the PCR court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
Tavario BRUNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.
Florence County; Docket No.: 2011-GS-21-01197
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
June 9, 2016
ORDER
Petitioner filed a motion on May 26, 2016 for resentencing pursuant to Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 2014). Now, therefore, pursuant to
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Roger E. Henderson be vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the Petitioner‘s Motion for Resentencing in the above-captioned matter.
Judge Henderson shall at all times be vested with concurrent jurisdiction in all circuits of the state to dispose of matters relating to this case, and shall decide all matters pertaining to the Petitioner‘s Motion, and shall retain jurisdiction over this matter regardless of where he may be assigned to hold court, and may schedule such hearings as may be necessary at any time without regard as to whether there is a term of court scheduled.
If necessary, to resolve issues related to the appointment of counsel, a hearing shall be conducted within thirty (30) days of this order.
