James Simmons appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence of cocaine found during a vehicle search.
On March 7, 1995, Simmon^ was headed north driving a rental vehicle with Florida tags on 1-75 in Butts County when he was pulled over by two police officers for tailgating and driving 77 mph in a 65 mph zone. The two officers, Scott Whitwell and Robbie Bishop, issued Simmons a traffic warning. Simmons’ documents were returned to him, and he began walking towards his car. One of the officers testified, “[tjhat was the end of the traffic stop.”
Before Simmons could leave, however, Officer Whitwell initiated further conversation with Simmons and told Simmons that there was a problem in the area with transporting illegal narcotics. Both officers, although designated as traffic enforcement, were dressed in fatigue-style uniforms. Additionally, the officers were accompanied by Whitwell’s personal dog, who was trained in narcotics detection. Whitwell stopped Simmons and asked him if he was transporting illegal narcotics, and Simmons replied that he was not. Officer Whit-well then advised Simmons that while he had him stopped he wanted to walk his narcotics detection dog around the exterior of his vehicle. Officer Whitwell contends and Simmons disputes that he consented to such walk-around. The officers then conducted a walk-around of Simmons’ car with Officer Whitwell’s narcotics detection dog. When the dog signaled that narcotics may be present, the officers searched the vehicle and found approximately 600 grams of cocaine.
1. Simmons contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the initial stop was merely pretextual. Simmons never denied, however, that he was speeding. A reasonable police officer would have stopped Simmons for traveling 12 miles
*782
over the speed limit, and thus this contention is without merit. See
Roundtree v. State,
2. Simmons contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officers exceeded the scope of permissible investigation. The evidence is uncontroverted that when the officers conducted the walk-around of Simmons’ vehicle with the narcotics detection dog, the traffic stop for which Simmons had originally been pulled over had cqncluded.
In denying Simmons’ motion to suppress, the trial court held that “probable cause existed to conduct the ‘walk around.’ ” Probable cause, however, is not the applicable legal standard for determining the validity of a brief detention. The appropriate legal standard for determining whether the additional questioning and the walk-around exceeded the scope of permissible investigation, in the absence of consent, is whether the officers had a
reasonable suspicion
that Simmons was transporting illegal drugs. See
State of Ga. v. Montford,
In this case, the State offered three factors to establish reasonable suspicion: (1) Simmons and his passenger both appeared nervous; (2) Simmons told the officers that the vehicle rental agreement was in Simmons’ wife’s name, and his wife was not present in the vehicle; and (3) Simmons told the officers that he was nervous because the passenger was his girl friend. These factors are insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that Simmons was transporting illegal drugs. See
Rogers v. State,
In the absence of reasonable suspicion, the officers must have obtained Simmons’ consent in order to lawfully continue the stop while detaining him. See
Smith v. State,
Judgment reversed and remanded with direction.
Notes
Simmons also contends that, even if the additional questioning and the dog walk-around were valid, no probable cause existed to search his vehicle. This argument is without merit. “[B]ecause the drug dog alerted to the automobile, the officer had probable cause to believe that contraband was contained therein.” Roundtree, supra at 794-795.