29 A.2d 55 | Pa. | 1942
This action in trespass, brought by Elizabeth Simmons, in her own right and as guardian of her minor son (now of full age), Walter Simmons, arises out of a rear-end collision between an automobile driven by the son and a truck of Jesse C. Stewart Company, the appellant. The son, whose injuries were serious, obtained a verdict of $15,000, remitted to $10,000, and a verdict was returned for the mother in the sum of $1,126.63. Motions for judgments n. o. v. and for a new trial filed by appellant were overruled by the court en banc, judgments were entered in favor of the mother and son, and these appeals followed.
On December 14, 1939, at about 7:45 a. m., Simmons, the minor appellee, was operating an automobile belonging to his mother across Twenty-second Street Bridge, in the City of Pittsburgh. At the time the highways throughout the Pittsburgh area, including the roadway of the bridge, were covered with a thin sheet of ice, with the result that motor traffic in downtown Pittsburgh was moving at about half its usual pace. Entering from Forbes Street, Simmons proceeded across Twenty-second Street Bridge in the line of cars going in his direction, traveling at a speed of 10 to 15 miles per hour and about three car-lengths behind the car directly ahead. Looking into his rear-vision mirror, when about a quarter of the way over the bridge, he observed appellant's truck approaching from behind at an estimated speed of 25 miles per hour, 10 to 15 miles per hour faster than that of the line of traffic. When Simmons arrived at a point about midway on the bridge, the line of traffic came to a halt. He gave a hand signal to the driver of the truck and brought his car to a "slow stop" in line, ten feet behind the automobile ahead. Appellant's truck, coming from behind, crashed into the rear of the stopped Simmons car, pushing it the distance of ten feet into the back of the next car in line. Simmons was thrown forward *56 against the steering wheel of his car by the force of the impact, receiving back injuries of a serious nature. Appellant's truck was not equipped with chains, and was fully loaded, weighing between seven and eight tons. According to the evidence given by the witnesses for appellant, its truck driver and helper, there was no ice at any point except on the surface of the bridge; the speed of the truck was not over 15 miles per hour; the driver did not become aware of the icy condition of the roadway until the truck went into a skid as he applied the brakes, about 20 feet to the rear of the halted Simmons car; and the collision was then unavoidable. The driver admitted, however, that the entire surface of the bridge "looked shiny" and that he noticed "traffic was very slow and it was closely packed together."
On the basis of appellant's own evidence the question of its driver's negligence could not have been taken from the jury. InCirquitella v. Callaghan, Inc.,
As to Mrs. Simmons, the mother, it is urged there can be no recovery for the additional reason that prior to the trial of the present case she recovered a judgment against appellant in the sum of $91.50 upon the trial of a separate suit in the County Court of Allegheny County, for damages to the automobile. It is contended that she was bound to recover every item of damage sustained by her in a single action and that the entry of a judgment in her favor in the County Court action, although admittedly covering only the item of property damage, extinguishes her right to a further recovery for loss of the son's earnings and medical expenses in the present. By virtue of the Act of May 12, 1897, P. L. 62, section 1,* Mrs. Simmons was required to join her cause of action growing out of the son's injuries with that accruing to the son, in a single suit brought in both names, and in that action she might properly have asserted also her claim for damages to the automobile, arising out of the same accident. See Hug v. Hall,
In support of the motions for new trial it is urged that the testimony of Simmons as to the speed of appellant's truck should have been excluded, on the ground that his opportunity for observation was not sufficiently favorable; also that the charge of the trial judge was inadequate on burden of proof and the relative value of interested and disinterested testimony. We have considered these several objections in the light of the entire record and all agree that, when so considered, there is substantial merit in none of them.
Judgments affirmed.