27 S.W. 62 | Tex. | 1894
This was an action of trespass to try title, brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendants in error. The judgment of the trial court was in favor of the defendants, and it was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. *147
It was agreed between the parties, that both claimed under one L.G. Davis, and that he was the common source of title. Upon the trial the plaintiff introduced in evidence a writ of attachment in its favor against L.G. Davis, together with a levy on the land in controversy as his property; a judgment in the attachment suit against the defendant therein, foreclosing the lien of the attachment on the land, and ordering it to be sold for the satisfaction of the judgment; the order of sale in pursuance of that decree, with the sheriff's return, showing that he had sold the land under the order of sale, and that the plaintiff had become the purchaser; and a sheriff's deed conveying the land in accordance with the sale. The plaintiff then rested, and the defendants offered no evidence. The court then directed a verdict for the defendant, which was accordingly returned.
We are of opinion, that when the plaintiff showed a valid title emanating from the common source, it made a prima facie case. If the plaintiff in an action of trespass to try title, in order to maintain his action, prove that both he and defendant claim from a common grantor, and if in doing this he should exhibit the defendant's title, and it should appear upon its face to be superior to his own, he can not succeed, unless he go further, and show that notwithstanding its apparent soundness, it is for some reason invalid.
This is what was meant when it is said, in Keys v. Mason,
The theory of the doctrine of the common source is, that proof of a claim of title by one under another is prima facie evidence as against the claimant that the title was at one time in that other; so that when the plaintiff shows that he has a valid chain of title from a certain grantor, and that the defendant claims under the same grantor, without proving what the defendant's title is, he shows prima facie that he is owner of the land, and it then devolves upon the defendant to show the superiority of his own title.
In Sebastian v. Martin-Brown Company,
We are asked to reverse and render the judgment; but there are expressions in the opinion in Sebastian v. Martin-Brown Company, supra, which are calculated to mislead and which have probably misled counsel and the courts. We therefore deem it just to reverse the judgments and remand the cause, and it is so ordered.
Reversed and remanded.
Delivered June 14, 1894.