62 Conn. App. 690 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2001
Opinion
The plaintiff, Edgar Simard, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the decision of the defendant commissioner of motor vehicles (commissioner) suspending his motor vehicle operator’s license pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 14-227b. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his appeal because the record lacked substantial evidence sufficient to permit the hearing officer to suspend his
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. On November 30, 1998, the plaintiff, while operating a motor vehicle, was stopped by a Plainville police officer after the vehicle was observed traveling erratically. The officer detected the odor of alcohol emanating from within the vehicle and about the plaintiffs person. The plaintiff was slow to react to the officer’s questions, had glassy eyes and could not remember the alphabet. Furthermore, the plaintiff admitted to having consumed “three to four drinks” that evening. Thereafter, the officer requested the plaintiff to perform three standard field sobriety tests.
A written report of the arrest and test failure was forwarded to the department of motor vehicles pursuant to § 14-227b (c).
“[J]udicial review of the commissioner’s action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act . . . and the scope of that review is very restricted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391, 399, 710 A.2d 807, cert, denied, 245 Conn. 917, 717 A.2d 234 (1998). “The substantial evidence rule governs judicial review of administrative [fact-finding] under General Statutes [§ 4-183 (j)].
“[W]e must decide, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 401, quoting Stamford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 241 Conn. 310, 314, 696 A.2d 321 (1997); Burinskas v. Dept. of Social Services, 240 Conn. 141, 147, 691 A. 2d 586 (1997).
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his appeal because there was not substantial evidence to suspend his motor vehicle operator’s license. The plaintiff specifically argues that absent evidence to rebut his proffered expert opinion evidence, the hearing officer was required to accept his experts’ opinions that the plaintiffs BAC was less than 0.10 percent at the time of operation. The plaintiff further claims that once the presumption found in § 14-227b (f), now (g),
I
The plaintiffs first claim is that the hearing officer improperly rejected uncontradicted evidence from two experts, O’Brien and Pape, that the plaintiffs BAC was less than 0.10 percent at the time of the operation of the vehicle. We disagree.
It is clear that “[t]he hearing officer is not required to believe unrebutted expert testimony, but may believe all, part or none of such unrebutted expert evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dumont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 48 Conn. App. 641; Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 48 Conn. App. 405. “In determining whether an administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court
In the present case, the record before the hearing officer included evidence of the plaintiffs intoxication at the time of operation. The plaintiff failed three field sobriety tests, was slow to react to the arresting officer’s questions and admitted to having consumed three to four alcoholic beverages before operating his motor vehicle that evening. Therefore, because the hearing officer was not required to accept the unrebutted expert evidence and because there was sufficient evidence independent of the expert testimony to establish the plaintiffs intoxication during the time he operated the vehicle, we cannot conclude that the hearing officer acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of his discretion in suspending the plaintiffs motor vehicle operator’s license.
The plaintiff also claims that he successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of intoxication when he presented expert evidence. We disagree.
It is clear that § 14-227b (f), now (g), “creates a rebut-table, as opposed to a conclusive, presumption.” Dumont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 48 Conn. App. 644. We stated in Bancroft, and again in Dumont, that “the statutory presumption is sufficient to withstand expert evidence to the contrary and support a conviction without further evidence, if the [trier of fact] disbelieves the contrary evidence. . . . [T]his principle applie[s] equally to an administrative hearing under § 14-227b, [where a] hearing officer may rely on the presumption created by the statute if he or she disbelieves expert evidence to the contrary. Additional expert evidence to rebut the plaintiffs evidence is not required in such a case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 641; Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 48 Conn. App. 407. Therefore, considering the limited scope of our review, we cannot conclude that the hearing officer improperly relied on the statutory presumption in suspending the plaintiffs motor vehicle operator’s license.
We conclude that the administrative record contains substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s suspension of the plaintiffs motor vehicle operator’s license. Accordingly, the court properly dismissed the plaintiffs appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The three field sobriety tests were the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk and turn, and the one leg stand.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 14-227a (a) provides in relevant part: “No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . . A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ... if he operates a motor vehicle ... (2) while the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person is ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight.”
General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 14-227b (c) provides in relevant part: “If the person arrested . . . submits to such test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test or analysis indicate that the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person is ten-
General Statutes § 4-183 Q) provides: “The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess
General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 14-227b (f), now (g), provides in relevant part: “In the hearing, the results of the test or analysis shall be sufficient to indicate the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person at the time of operation, except that if the results of the additional test indicate that the