142 Ga. 194 | Ga. | 1914
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
From the uncontradicted evidence in the record it appears that the plaintiff had been discharged from his office. Under the provisions of section 3588 of the Civil Code, where one is employed under a contract for a year, and the employer wrongfully discharges the agent before the end of the year, the latter may either sue immediately for any special injury from the breach of the contract, or, treating the contract as rescinded, may sue for the value of the services rendered, or he may wait till the expiration of the year and sue for and recover his entire wages. The court below during the entire case, as shown by his charge to the jury upon the conclusion of the evidence, was of the opinion that the plaintiff based his right of recovery upon a quantum meruit; and we are of the opinion that the court took the proper view of the case. There is no allegation in the petition and nothing in the evidence to show that the term of service for which the plaintiff was engaged as general manager had expired and that he was suing to recover his entire wages, or that he was suing for any special injury for a breach of the contract. And that being true, the court did not err in submitting the case to the jury in his charge upon the single theory that the plaintiff relied upon a quantum meruit. And his charge upon this subject to the jury being substantially correct, the judgment refusing a new trial will not be disturbed because of certain verbal inaccuracies in some of the excerpts. It may be remarked, moreover, that the submission of the case upon the theory that plaintiff relied upon a quantum meruit was not hurtful to him. Had he relied solely upon a contract for a stipulated sum as a salary, then the defendant might well have urged that no valid contract for a stipulated sum was shown. It appears from the evidence that the board of directors had not authorized a contract to pay the plaintiff a salary of $200 per month as general manager; and it nowhere appears that the president or vice-president had any right at a “consultation” to bind the company by any action upon this subject. It can not be inferred from anything in this record that the president or vice-president had any authority of this nature whatever. The reverse of this proposition is inferable, rather. The general manager, under the by-laws of the corporation, had the power to employ and discharge labor. In
Judgment affirmed on the main hill of exceptions. Gross-hill dismissed.