SILVERMAN v UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BOARD OF REGENTS
Docket No. 97292
Supreme Court of Michigan
May 17, 1994
445 Mich 209 | 517 N.W.2d 1
Robert S. Silverman brought an action in the Washtenaw Circuit Court against the University of Michigan Board of Regents, seeking a declaration that he was a Michigan resident for the purpose of calculating tuition at the university, and a refund of nonresident tuition paid during 1989 through 1991. The university moved for summary disposition on the ground that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Court of Claims. The court, Donald E. Shelton, J., denied the motion, noting that
In an opinion per curiam, signed by Chief Justice CAVANAGH, and Justices BRICKLEY, BOYLE, RILEY, GRIFFIN, and MALLETT, the Supreme Court held:
The case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.
A complaint seeking only money damages against the state is to be filed in the Court of Claims. A complaint seeking only equitable or declaratory relief is to be filed in the circuit court. A complaint seeking money damages against the state as well as equitable or declaratory relief against the state may only be filed in the Court of Claims, because that is the sole forum that is capable of deciding the whole case.
Reversed and remanded.
The real issue in this case is whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter a judgment declaring Silvеrman to be a resident of Michigan and thus entitled to a refund. 1984 PA 212 neither added to nor detracted from the powers of the circuit court, and has nothing to do with correct resolution of the issue.
The Court of Claims Act waives the state‘s sovereign immunity from suit, and speaks of claims ex contractu and ex delicto. The per curiam opinion does not address Silverman‘s claim that, in seeking a refund of money wrongfully exacted by the university, he is not seeking to maintain an action ex contractu or ex delicto, but rather is seeking a declaration of rights and the equitable remedy of restitution of money wrongfully exacted by the university as a precondition to his remaining a student at the university. The accuracy of the majority‘s assumption that the circuit court did not have power, before the enactment of the Court of Claims Act, to order the refund of money wrongfully exacted by a university as a precondition to attendance is to be questioned.
Helen V. Gallagher for the plaintiff.
Cindy M. Wilder, Maria G. Alfaro-Lopez, and Debra A. Kowich for the defendant.
Amici Curiae:
Mary Elizabeth Kurz for Michigan State University.
Richard C. Gould for Ferris State University.
Thomas Butcher for Grand Valley State University.
James Kendall and William C. Collins for Saginaw Valley State University.
Daniel J. Bernard for Wayne State University.
PER CURIAM. The issue in this case concerns the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. After the plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court, the defendant moved for summary disposition on the ground that exclusive jurisdiction lies in the Court of Claims. The circuit court denied the motion аnd the Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the order of the circuit court, and we remand this case to the circuit court for entry of an order granting the defendant‘s motion for summary disposition.
I
In 1988, plaintiff Robert S. Silverman enrolled at the University of Michigan. Arriving from another state, he was charged the nonresident tuition rate.
In 1989, 1990, and 1991, the plaintiff asked thе university to classify him as a Michigan resident for the purpose of calculating his tuition. These requests were denied.
A month after the 1991 denial, the plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court. His complaint recited the many facts upon which he relied in his claim to be a Michigan resident. It then stated his demand for a declaratory judgment “that he is a Michigan Resident and entitled retroactively to a refund of the tuition difference he should have paid as a resident student if he had been correctly classified as a resident by the [university].” In a
The concluding paragraph of the complaint contained the plaintiff‘s request for relief—he sought a declaratory judgment, a tuition refund, and attorney fees and costs.
The university moved for summary disposition on the ground that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. It argued that this case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.
The university‘s motion was denied by the circuit court. The Court of Appeals affirmed.1
The university has applied to this Court for leave to appeal.2
II
The Legislature created the Court of Claims and established its jurisdiction.
(1) Except as provided in [
MCL 600.6419a ;MSA 27A.6419(1) ]
(а) To hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, against the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.
(b) To hear and determine any claims or demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, which may be pleaded by way of counterclaim on the part of the state or аny department, commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of the state against any claimant who may bring an action in the court of claims. Any claim of the state or of any department, commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of the state may be pleaded by way of counterclaim in any action brought against the state, or any other department, commission, board, institution, arm, оr agency of the state.
* * *
(4) This chapter shall not deprive the circuit court of this state of jurisdiction over actions brought by the taxpayer under the [General Sales Tax Act,
MCL 205.51 to205.78 ;MSA 7.521 to7.549 ], or proceedings for declaratory or equitable relief, or any other actions against state agencies based upon the statutes of this state in such case made and provided, which expressly confer jurisdiction thereof upon the circuit court, or proceedings to review findings as provided in the [Michigan Employment Security Act,MCL 421.1 to421.72 ;MSA 17.501 to17.569(22) ], or any other similar proceedings expressly authorized by the statutes of this state in such case made and provided.
This quotation of
To end the uncertainty created by inconsistent decisions on that procedural point, the Legislature enacted 1984 PA 212, which also added
In addition to the powers and jurisdiction conferred upon the court of claims by [
MCL 600.6419 ;MSA 27A.6419 ], the court of claims has concurrent jurisdiction of any demand for equitable relief and any demand for a declaratory judgment when ancillary to a claim filed pursuant to [MCL 600.6419 ;MSA 27A.6419 ]. The jurisdiction conferred by this section is not intended to be exclusive of the jurisdiction of the circuit court over demands for declaratory and equitable relief conferred by [MCL 600.605 ;MSA 27A.605 ].4
In denying the university‘s motion for summary disposition, the cirсuit court noted the 1984 enactment of
III
There are few appellate decisions applying
In Mooahesh, however, the Court of Appeals was asked to apply the statute to resolve a similar controversy. Mr. Mooahesh was a 1987 Michigan lottery winner who brought a class action in circuit court, seeking relief from the Legislature‘s 1988 repeal of the statutory exemption of state lottery winnings from Michigan taxes.6 Mr. Mooahesh and other members of the class had paid 1988 state income taxes under protest, so clearly he was seeking money damages from the State of Michigan.
The circuit court, upon due consideration, concluded that plaintiff was not seeking money damages, but rather a determinatiоn whether it was constitutional to take plaintiff‘s property and a return of property taken improperly. We believe that the circuit court‘s analysis was correct. The relief plaintiff seeks is more in the nature of an equitable remedy than damages. Plaintiff does not seek damages for an unrelated injury, but rather the return of money allegedly properly belonging to him. Thus, the Court оf Claims did not have exclusive jurisdiction; the claims for equitable relief were properly brought in the circuit court. [195 Mich App 559.]
As explained in the next section of that opinion, we do not agree with the manner in which the Mooahesh panel analyzed
IV
The plaintiff in this case seeks money damages from a state board—he wants a partial refund of the tuition paid to the University of Michigan.7 Plainly that claim, if it stood alonе, would belong in the Court of Claims.
Before 1984, it was uncertain whether or how the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims would be affected by the presence in a case like this of other claims against the state for declaratory or equita-
A complaint seeking only money damages against the state must be filed in the Court of Claims. A complaint seeking only equitable or declaratory relief must be filed in circuit court. A complaint seeking money damages from the state as well as equitable or declaratory relief against the state may only be filed in the Court of Claims, because that is the sole forum that is capable of deciding the whole case.8
As pleaded by the plaintiff, this case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.9 We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the order of the circuit court, and we remand this case to the circuit сourt for entry of an order granting the defendant‘s motion for summary disposition. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
CAVANAGH, C.J., and BRICKLEY, BOYLE, RILEY, GRIFFIN, and MALLETT, JJ., concurred.
LEVIN, J. (dissenting). I adhere to the view that
This Court has not decided a case in which the
I
The majority holds that a complaint seeking money damages from the state, as well as declaratory relief, may only be filed in the Court of Claims because that is the “sole forum that is caрable of deciding the whole case.”3 The premise of the majority is thus that the circuit court does not have power to enter a declaratory judgment that a unit of state government is indebted to a citizen, and to order ancillary relief.
The majority ignores that the 1984 legislation,4 granting concurrent jurisdiction to the Court of Claims of a demand for declaratory judgment, specifically provided that the jurisdiction then cоnferred “is not intended to be exclusive of the jurisdiction of the circuit court over demands for declaratory and equitable relief conferred by section 605” of the Revised Judicature Act.5
II
The real issue in the instant case is whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter a judgment declaring Silverman to be a resident and entitled to a refund.
The 1984 amendments6 neither added to nor detracted from the powers of the circuit court, and have nothing to do with the correct resolution of that issue.
The Court of Claims Act waives the state‘s sovereign immunity from suit, and speaks of claims ex contractu and ex delicto.
The per curiam opinion does not address Silverman‘s argument that in seeking a refund of money claimed to have been wrongfully exacted by the university, he is not seeking to maintain an action ex contractu or ex delicto, but rather is seeking a declaration of rights and the equitable remedy of restitution of money wrongfully exacted by the university as a precondition to his remaining a student at the university.
I question the accuracy of the majority‘s assumption that the circuit court did not have power, before the enactment of the Court of Claims Act, to order thе refund of money wrong-
In Kosa v State Treasurer, 408 Mich 356; 292 NW2d 452 (1980), the plaintiff was permitted to maintain an action in the Court of Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus against the State Treasurer, the Legislature, and other state officials to compel the defendants to fund the Michigan Public School Employees’ Retirement System.7 The enabling legislation, authоrizing such actions to be filed in the Court of Appeals,8 does not differ, insofar as specific reference to a power to enter a judgment directing the payment of money, from RJA § 605 or the provision of the 1984 amendments stating that the jurisdiction conferred on the Court of Claims respecting declaratory judgments is not to be exclusive of the jurisdiction of the circuit court over demаnds therefor conferred by RJA § 605.
I would grant leave to appeal and dissent from the reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
