53 Iowa 436 | Iowa | 1880
- 1. That On the 22d day of April, 1879, Isaac Kuhn executed the coveyance referred to in the petition, purporting to be a chattel mortgage.
2. That by virtue of said instrument, and- on behalf of said mortgagees, defendant B. O. Hanger took possession of the stock of merchandise therein described, and was selling therefrom for the purposes set forth in said mortgage.
3. That the indebtedness secured by said mortgage doe's not, in any event, exceed the sum of $18,001.78.'
4. That the property conveyed by said mortgage was of the value of $21,700.
5. That being so in possession, the defendant B: O. Hanger was garnished upon a writ of attachment, sued out by the plaintiff against the property of said Isaac Kuhn.
The record does not sustain the existence of any other facts. Do these facts warrant the appointment of á receiver of the mortgaged property? Appellees insist that they are entitled to the appointment of a receiver under section 2903 of the Code. If the applicability of this section to the matter in controversy should be conceded, what must appear in order to justify the appointment of a receiver? It must be shown that the “ property, or its rents or profits, are in danger of being lost,- or materially injured or impaired.” Appellees’ counsel concede the correctness of this position, for they say in their argument: “To entitle the plaintiffs to a receiver under section 2903, above quoted, it must appear * * *
III. Appellees further claim that they are entitled to a receiver under section 3317 of the Code. This section authorizes an injunction, but has no reference to the appointment of a receiver. We think that a receiver should not have been appointed under the facts disclosed in this case.
Bevebsed.