240 Mass. 571 | Mass. | 1922
The action is replevin to obtain possession of an Owen Magnetic automobile. The admission of evidence to which the defendant excepted having been elicited in cross-examination, was within the discretion of the court, and the only remaining question is, whether there was evidence which would warrant a finding by the jury that the defendant was estopped from maintaining its alleged title to the automobile.
It seems to have been unquestioned that on January 15, 1917, one Roberts bought the car of F. M. Chase, Inc., upon a conditional contract of sale or lease, the title to remain in the seller until full payment of the balance of the price according to the tenor of certain promissory notes given by the buyer. In the following March, Roberts returned the car. He testified "that he had paid some of the notes and then that he had paid none of them,” and that he demanded a “return of his contract and notes,” and finally was told that “they were lost.” The jury, especially in the light of the evidence of one Russell, who on or about January 26, 1917, lent money to the seller, taking an assignment of the lease and notes as collateral security, and of Roberts who said that Russell came to see him to verify his “signature on the lease or on notes,” were not bound to believe his version of what took place when he returned the car. Furthermore they could rely on Russell’s testimony, that before discounting the notes he called on Roberts “to verify his signature on the lease and notes, and told him he was going to discount them,” and could find on all the evidence, that at this time Roberts knew that his friend Edward R. Sherburne, under whom the plaintiff derived title, intended to buy the car from F. M. Chase, Inc., in whose possession as the ostensible owner it had remained. If Roberts’ first statements were true the conditional contract could be found to have been mutually abrogated. But, without making any attempt to assert his rights -on the ground that the contract had been terminated before the
“It is a familiar rule that possession of property, with the exercise of rights of ownership over it, is some evidence of title. Ordinarily it makes a prima facie case for the proof of title by the possessor. If testimony is introduced to control it, the whole evidence is considered together to determine the true title, and possession, with the exercise of the usual rights of an owner, is not disregarded.” United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Bresnahan Shoe Machinery Co. 197 Mass. 206, 215, 216. Johnson v. Neale, 6 Allen, 227. If the jury were convinced by the testimony of Sherburne more or less corroborated by Roberts’ own evidence, they were warranted in reaching the conclusion under the full and well guarded instruc
The defendant is bound by the knowledge of its president, and can have no greater rights than Roberts would have if he were the adverse party. Beacon Trust Co. v. Souther, 183 Mass. 413, 419. Ratchesky v. Piscopo, 239 Mass. 180.
Exceptions overruled.