139 Mass. 280 | Mass. | 1885
Although the statute authorizing amendments is very liberal, there is a certain limitation to the power of the
In the present case, the cause of action upon which the action was brought was Hayden’s promise to Silver and Gay, upon which it was then supposed or hoped that Jordan and Marsh could be held responsible. Hayden was the person making this promise, not the person receiving it. The promise which Hayden received from Jordan and Marsh, if he received any, was at an earlier time. Silver and Gay were the proper plaintiffs upon the cause of action for which the action was brought. The difficulty was in the proof. It was held that they received no promise from Jordan and Marsh, but only from Hayden. The action was maintainable against Hayden, unless indeed it had been extinguished by payment; and it would have been maintainable against Jordan and Marsh, if the plaintiffs had been able to prove such an express or implied contract as was alleged. Certainly, at the time the action was brought, the cause of action relied on was not a promise by Jordan and Marsh to pay Hayden anything. It is plain, therefore, that the amendment now moved for does not fall within the'statutory authority to allow amendments. On the facts stated in the report, the object- of the amendment is to =enable the action to be sustained for a different cause than that for which it was intended to be brought.
Judgment for the defendants.