Silva v. Spohn Health System Corp.Silva v. Spohn Health System Corp.
OPINION
Herlinda Silva appeals the trial court’s granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of appellee, the operator of Spohn Hospital in Corpus Christi, Texas, in her premises liability suit. We will reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
On July 5,1994, appellant filed her original petition against appellee, alleging premisеs liability theories based on a stabbing which occurred on September 9, 1993. The undisputed facts are as follows: appellant was employed with the evening cleaning crew at Spohn Hospital; appellee required its evening employees to exit through a single unlocked exit; when appellant exited Spohn Hospital on the evening of September 9, 1993, no security personnel were patrolling the vicinity of the exit; appellant was stabbed as she left Spohn Hospital and was entering the automobile in which she was to be given a ride home. In her deposition, taken March 21, 1995, appellant testified that, at the momеnt she was stabbed, she was standing on the curb which adjoined the street and appellee’s property.
On October 3, 1995, appellee filed its motion for summary judgment, alleging its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, based on appellant’s assertion that she was standing on the curb. Appellee’s motion for summary judgment foсused upon the “duty” element of the appellant’s tort cause of action, urging that it did not own, occupy, or otherwise control the property where the assault occurred. Appellee’s summary judgment proof consisted of appellant’s deposition testimony.
Appellant’s response to the mоtion for summary judgment included the following evidence:
• Affidavit of Norman Bottom 1 , an unchallenged expert in the field of premises security, who opined that (1) Spohn Hospital was located in a “high crime” area, (2) the risk of attacks on health care employees — the majority of whom are female — is foreseeable, (3) appеllee’s policy of maintaining only one nighttime exit created a predictable pattern of pedestrian traffic, (4) appellee’s security practices were substandard, and (5) ap-pellee’s security failures caused appellant’s stabbing incident;
• Excerpts from the deposition testimony of aрpellee’s employees charged with se-eurity oversight, basically establishing that appellee recognized the need for security measures at its complex;
• Excerpts from the deposition testimony of Ross Purdy, a sociology professor with Texas A & M University in Corpus Christi, who opined that Spohn Hospital was located in a high crime area; and
• Deposition testimony of appellant.
Summary judgment was granted on October 27, 1995. This appeal ensued. On appeal, Silva brings three points of error. The first point contends that “the trial court erred in granting summary judgment ... since genuine issues of material fact existed and appellee failed to prove as a matter of lаw that it did not owe a duty to appellant.” The second point complains that “appellee failed to prove as a matter of law that it was not negligent.” Appellant complains by her third point that “appellee faded to prove that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Standard of review
Summary judgments are reviewed in accordance with the following standards: (1) the movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether or not there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovаnt will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in his favor.
Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co.,
Controlling law
The essential elements of an action bаsed on negligence, as in the instant case,
Landowners and occupiеrs owe varying duties of care to visitors on their land, depending on the legal status of the visitor.
Motel 6 G.P., Inc. v. Lopez,
An “invitee” is defined as a person who goes on the premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant on the business of the owner or occupant or for their mutual advantage.
Texas Power & Light Co. v. Holder,
As a general rule, a defendant has no duty to prevent the criminal acts of a third party who doеs not act under the defendant’s supervision or control.
El Chico Corp.,
“Foreseeability requires only that the general danger, not the exact sequence of events that produced the harm, be foreseeable.
Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 777
S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex.1989);
Nixon,
duty to protect invitees on the premises from criminal acts of third parties if the landowner knows or has reason to know of an unreasonable risk of harm to the invitee. [Nixon,690 S.W.2d at 550 .] This duty developed out of the premise that the party with the ‘power of control or expulsion’ is in the best position to protect against the harm, and when that party ‘by reason of location, mode of doing business, or observation or past experiеnce, should reasonably anticipate criminal conduct on the part of third persons, ... (that party) has a duty to take precautions against it.’ Morris v. Barnette,553 S.W.2d 648 , 649-50 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell,
Thus, if criminal acts of third parties are reasonably foreseeable, the owner or occupier is
required
to undertake definite precautions on behalf of its invitees.
See, e.g., Kendrick v. Allright Parking,
Although the issue of foreseeability, as an element of duty[,] may frequently be determined as a matter of law, in some instances it involves the resolution of disputed facts or inferences which are inappropriate for legal resolution. Mitchell v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 786 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex.[1990]), cert. denied,498 U.S. 896 ,111 S.Ct. 247 ,112 L.Ed.2d 205 (1990). In such cases, it is properly submitted to the trier of fact. Id.; Bennett v. Span Industries, Inc.,628 S.W.2d 470 , 474 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch,818 S.W.2d 392 , 395 (Tex.1991).
Kendrick,
Because appellee contends that the sidewalk upon which appellant was stabbed is, actually, part of the city street (which appel-lee contends must absolve it of any potential liability), we note that
[n]umerоus cases in Texas have held that the owner or occupant of premises abutting a highway must exercise reasonable care not to jeopardize or endanger the safety of persons using the highway as a means of passage or travel and that the owner or occupant is liable for any injury that proximately results from any breach of this duty. See, e.g., Atchison v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.,143 Tex. 466 ,186 S.W.2d 228 (1945). In Atchison, the owner of a private premises abutting on or near a highway was held liable for injury or damage resulting from an automobile collision on the highway. The collision occurred because the driver’s vision was allegedly obscured by smoke which was negligently allowed to emanate from such premises. In Skelly Oil Co. v. Johnston,151 S.W.2d 863 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1941, writ ref'd), a motorist’s automobile skidded on a wet spot caused by water negligently blown onto the highway from the cooling towers of the company’s gasoline manufacturing plant located on land adjacent to highway. [In that case, t]he company was held hable.
Golden Villa,
We also note that occupiers of premises adjacent to public walkways have a duty of care to passing pedestrians.
See, e.g., Northwest Mall, Inc. v. Lubri-Lon Intern., Inc.,
Discussion
Appellee bases its argument regarding control of the curb on the following syllogism: The legislature has delegated to home rule cities exclusive dominion, control, and jurisdiction in, over and under the public
streets,
avenues, alleys, highways and boulevards within those cities,
2
Dallas/Fort Worth Intern. Airport Bd. v. City of Irving, 854
S.W.2d 161, 173 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1993),
vacated,
The duty argument urged by appellee disregards the cases cited above which recognize the proposition that a landowner may not negligently injure parties lawfully using the street or sidewalk аdjacent to their prop
Appellee analogizes the instant lawsuit to twо cases which affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants,
Barefield v. City of Houston,
The very proximity of the curb upon which appellant was stabbed to appellee’s property raises a factual issue as to appellee’s power to control and expel third-party wrongdoers. Certainly, appellee was in a better positiоn than appellant to thwart appellant’s attacker, as it maintained a roving security patrol, and must have been aware of the environment around Spohn Hospital, which appellant’s experts characterized as dangerous. In any event, we are, axiomatically, obligated to accеpt appellant’s evidence in this regard as true.
Importantly, appellee does not dispute that the stabbing occurred, or that it occurred as appellant was leaving her place of employment, Spohn Hospital. It seems beyond question that appellant was an invitee vis-a-vis appellee; accordingly, appellee was required to protect appellant from reasonably foreseeable criminal acts. Appellee hopes to avoid this issue by arguing that, because appellant had stepped across the imaginary line separating Spohn Hospital and the curb, she also withdrew — as a matter of law — from the ambit of appellee’s duty. We cannot support this proposition.
All points of error are sustained. The judgment of the trial court is REVERSED, and this cause is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. The supreme court has characterized Dr. Bottom as a "security expert.”
See Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc.,
. Corpus Christi is a home rule city.
.
Barefield
was a suit against the City of Houston (owner of the Sam Houston Coliseum), a concert promoter, and the security company hired by the promoter; the plaintiffs had attended a concert, and exited the premises; plaintiffs were confronted by a group of hoodlums across the street from the concert hall; an altercation ensued in which one plaintiff was stabbed; while returning back across the street to the concert hall, the other plaintiff was hit by a motorist; the confrontation which set the factual underpinning of the case occurred across the street from the concert hall.
LaFleur
was a suit against the operators of the Astrodome by a television news photographer who had been at the Astrodome to tape an interview; after the interview, the photographer left the Astrodome complex and began to drive down the street; аs she left, she noticed a crowd of people standing
across the street
from the Astro-dome; she stopped on the street, exited her vehicle, and approached the crowd; after a brief interaction with the crowd, she began to return to her vehicle; as she did so, a member of the crowd assaulted her.
. The duty of an owner or occupier
vis-a-vis
a licensee is to not injure her willfully, wantonly, or through gross negligence.
See, e.g., Mendez v. Knights of Columbus Hall,