14 Utah 245 | Utah | 1896
This suit is for a settlement of partnership accounts. In 1883, the plaintiff, as one partner, the defendant W. L. Pickard, as another, and the defendant H. Cohn & Co., as a third partner, constituted for a year the Territorial Wool Association. There was a renewal of that partnership afterwards, until and including 1887. The concern was so organized and continued for the business of buying wool in Utah, and selling it in Boston. Each year it
Discussing the first, we a.re met at the outset with the proposition from the respondents that, in excluding the evidence proffered of the witness Raybould, the referee simply followed the decision of the supreme court of the territory of Utah on a former appeal of this case (37 Pac. 86); that the question of its admissibility was then presented, and decided adversely to the view taken by the appellants. But it is contended on behalf of the latter that the territorial supreme court was not a court of last resort in this case, as, the amount involved being over f5,000, either party might have appealed to the supreme court of the United States, and therefore the decision of the territorial supreme court is not the law of the case;
The rule invoked upon behalf of the respondents is stated by Mr. Justice Field, now of the supreme court of the United States, speaking then for the supreme court of California, in the case of Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 417, in the following language: “A previous ruling of the appellate court upon a point distinctly made may be only authority in other cases, to be followed and affirmed, or to be modified and overruled,, according to its intrinsic merits. But, in the ease in which it is made, it is more than authority. It is a final adjudication, from the consequences of which the court cannot depart, nor the parties relieve themselves. Such 'has been the doiotrine of this court for years, and, after repeated examinations and affirmations, it cannot be considered as open to further discussion. Dewcy v. Gray, 2 Cal. 377; Clary v. Hoaglund, 6 Cal. 687; Gunter v. Laffan, 7 Cal. 592; and Davison v. Dallas, 15 Cal. 82. Nor is the doctrine peculiar to this court. It is the established doctrine of the supreme court of the United States, and of the supreme courts of several of the states. [Citing, among other cases, Sibbald v. U. S., 12 Pet. 491; Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. 413.] And the reasoning of the doctrine is obvious. The supreme court has no appellate jurisdiction over its own judgments. It cannot review or modify them after the case has once passed, by the issuance of the remittitur, from its control.” The rule is also stated as follows: “Where a decision is given by a court of ultimate appeal in a case, the decision must be regarded as conclusive in that particular ease. * * * In the same case any ruling is final; in a different one it is only the precedent estab
This is the reasoning upon which the rule is based in courts of last resort, both in Europe and America. 3 Dow, 157; Himely v. Ross, 5 Cranch, 313; Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. 424-426; Sibbald v. U. S., 12 Pet. 488; 22 Cent. Law J. 497, note, and 25 Cent. Law J. 297, note, and many cases cited in the notes referred to<; Elliott, App. Proc. § 578. See, also, Pledge v. Carr [1895] 1 Ch.
The jurisdictions in which provision has been made for successive appeals, at each step to a higher tribunal, are not numerous. In England, before the judicature ■acts, writs of error from the superior common-law courts into the exchequer chamber, and thence into the house of lords, and appeals from the high court of chancery to the court of appeals in- chancery, and thence into' the house of lords, furnish examples of such procedure; and at the present time appeals lie from the various divisions of the high court of justice to the court of appeal, and thence to the house of lords. Since 1891 similar provisions have existed with reference to certain classes of cases in the appellate procedure in the federal courts. In New York, appeals may be taken from the special term of the supreme court to the general term, and thence to the court of appeals. In Illinois certain classes of cases may be reviewed, first, in the appellate court, and then in the supreme court. Ke'cently, other states have adopted similar systems, but, in those named, they have existed many years. A careful search among the decisions in these jurisdictions reveals no support for the position taken by the appellant; but the rule seems to be that when an appellant ceases to pursue his appeal from one appellate court to a higher, though he might do so, the decision of the court where he sees fit to rest is a final one, within the meaning of the rule invoked by the respondents. Metcalf v. Del Valle, 66 Hun 627; 20 N. Y. Supp. 984; In re Nelson, 66 Hun 632; Excelsior Brick Co. v. Village of Haverstraw, 66 Hun 631; Corn v. Rosenthal (Com. Pl.), 22 N. Y. Supp. 700; Morss v. Hawley, 69 Hun 614; Whitesides v. Cook, 43 Ill. App.
The second ground upon which appellant prays for a reversal of the decree and order is the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the fourth and sixth findings- of fact, which were to- the effect that no agreement limiting the purchase was made, and, even if it had been made, that the subsequent conduct of the- parties amounted to a waiver of the limitation. Again, we are met by a rule which bars an examination of the evidence in question. There being substantial conflict, this court cannot reverse the decree and order denying a new trial, upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the findings complained of. In cases where judgment has been rendered since January 4, 1896, the date when the state constitution went into effect, this question will have to-be considered in the light of the provisions contained in section 9 of article 8 -of the constitution, providing that “in equity cases the appeal may be taken on questions o-f both law and fact.” But the constitutional provision has no- application in this case. The controlling rule is stated by the supreme court of California: “Our system does not contemplate any distinction in this respect (between cases at law and in equity), and there is no propriety in making any under it. Under the old chancery practice, the testimony was taken by deposition, generally before a master or a commissioner, and reduced to writing. When the testimony had all been filed, the
The judgment and order of the court below denying the motion for a new trial must be affirmed.