151 Pa. 52 | Pa. | 1892
Opinion by
The claim of the plaintiff in this case is extremely stale. The title which he proposes to impeach is the title which Adam S. Haas acquired by an orphans’ court sale held the 31st day of October, 1863. The present action of ejectment was not brought until the 18th day of February, 1885. The plaintiff’s claim is founded upon an allegation that the orphans’ court sale of 1863 passed no title to Adam S. Haas. It is claimed for the plaintiff that the money which was paid for the land conveyed to Adam S. Haas under that sale, was the money of Henry Haas, his father, and as against the creditors of Henry Haas the title is to be regarded as vested in Henry Haas.
Of course the legal title was in Adam S. Haas, and Henry Haas being, according to the allegation of the plaintiff, a particeps criminis with Adam S. Haas, could not impeach the title of Adam S. Haas. But it is said that, for the creditors of Henry Haas, the transaction is to be treated as a device to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of Henry Haas, and that John Kirkpatrick, being one of those creditors, was privileged to impeach the validity of the title in Adam S. Haas, and that the plaintiff having acquired the right of Kirkpatrick has the same privilege. Kirkpatrick obtained a judgment against Henry Haas in June, 1865, and upon execution process upon that judgment the land in question was sold to Kirkpatrick in December, 1865, by the sheriff, as the land of Henry Haas, for the sum of twenty dollars. Silliman, the plaintiff, obtained a conveyance of Kirkpatrick’s title by deed dated May 31, 1884, and upon that title this action of ejectment is founded. It will be observed therefore, that the sole question in this cause is the validity of Kirkpatrick’s title to the land. A question of the application of the statute of limitations arises both under the statute of frauds, and by adverse possession for twenty-one years. Another question of controlling importance arises as to the sufficiency of the evidence to impeach the title which Adam S. Haas acquired in 1863 by the orphans’ court sale above mentioned.
As the plaintiff’s case is founded upon the testimony of the two witnesses, Joseph Faust and Henry R. Mauger, it is necessary to examine and consider their testimony with some care. Had the present action been brought against Adam S. Haas, or some other alienee of his title than Henry Haas, it is clear under the authorities that the declarations of Henry Haas testified to by these two witnesses, could not have been given in evidence. There was no independent proof of any complicity of Adam S. Haas in the alleged fraud to cheat the creditors of Henry Haas, and therefore the declarations not having been made in the presence of Adam S. Haas could not have the
Recurring now to the particular testimony of the witnesses we quote all the essential parts of it. Joseph Faust was one of the sons of William Faust, the decedent, as whose property the land in controversy was sold, and had bought the land at the orphans’ court sale but was unable to pay for it and, after some negotiation with Henry Haas, it was agreed that the property should be put up again and knocked off to the purchaser for the same price that Joseph Faust had agreed to pay for it. All of this was done. Henry Haas attended the sale and bid the price agreed upon and he signed the conditions with the name of his son Adam S. Haas. The sale was returned to the orphans’ court as having been made to Adam S. Haas, and as such was confirmed by the court, and deed made accordingly.
Of course some explanation had to be made and was made of the reason for introducing the name of Adam S. Haas into the transaction. Joseph Faust gives this account of that subject : He was asked: “ Did he (Henry Haas) say anything to you about how he wanted the deed made and why he wanted it made in any way ? A. He did tell me. Q. What did he say? A. The last time he was up to the place? Q. Was that before the sale? A. Yes, sir. He said he wanted the deed made in his son Adam’s name, because he had went bail for parties and had to pay it and it broke him up, and he would not dare buy it in his own name, or else those fellows would.
The foregoing is the substance of all the testimony of Joseph Faust, upon examination in chief for the plaintiff and on cross-examination, on this subject. In no part of it does it appear that Henry Haas said that it was his own money that was to be paid for the land. He said he had plenty of money to buy this farm and another one like it, but he did not say that the money that was to be, or that was, paid for the land, was his own money. All the rest of the testimony was a mere explanation of why it was necessary to make the deed to his son, to wit, that he, Henry, had gone bail for parties who let him stick and he could not hold property in his own name because his creditors might take it from him. Of course this would be
The testimony of Mauger is substantially of the same character as that of Joseph Faust, to wit, that Henry Haas told him he had failed where he had lived before, that he had to put the deed in Adam’s name and that he had things so shaped that he had money enough to buy the place, but the witness did not testify that Henry Haas told him at any time that the money which was actually paid for the land was his money. The testimony of this witness also could be strictly true and yet the testimony that Adam really furnished the money that paid for the land could be strictly true also.
The writer has been thus particular in stating the character and substance of the plaintiff’s testimony because of the ultimate question which arises upon its effect. That question is whether the testimony is sufficient to defeat a title to land acquired at a judicial sale and acquiesced in, or not questioned, for a period of nearly twenty-two years, there being no disability to disbar the plaintiff or his grantor from attacking the title at any time during that period. We will consider that question presently.
In the meantime it is necessary to consider the other testimony in the cause, affecting this subject.
Henry Haas, the defendant, testified that he had failed in Northumberland county for four or five thousand dollars, that he was sold out by the sheriff, that all his property was sold and that when he went to Girard ville he had nothing but his clothes. This was in 1863 and he stayed there until April, 1864. That Adam wanted to buy a farm and had been looking at another farm with a view of buying it, and when he, Henry, heard of the Faust farm he told Adam about it and they both went to see
Adam S. Haas was examined and testified that when he came out of the army he wanted to buy a farm, and when he heard of the Faust farm being for sale, he went to see it, and decided to buy it and directed his father to act for him in the matter; that he was living and working, at the time, with another man at some distance from the farm; that in order to pay for the farm he borrowed thirteen hundred dollars from his uncle Nathan Haas and two hundred and sixty-five dollars from two of his brothers and the remainder of the purchase money he had earned while in the army, and by work done after he had left the army; that his father in making the purchase acted as his agent exclusively, and had no interest in it himself and put no money in it; that he gave the money to pay for the farm to his brother Edwin to take to his father and deliver it to him for the purpose of making the payment; that he moved on the farm in April, 1864, and was the owner and manager of it, and remained there until 1873 when he left and went west; that he repaid his uncle the money he had borrowed from him while he lived on the farm out of money which he had earned on the farm.
The testimony of Nathan Haas was also taken. He was the brother of Henry Haas and uncle of Adam S. Haas, and said he lent thirteen hundred dollars to Adam to buj? a farm with, and took Adam’s note for it which Adam afterwards paid. He said also he let Adam have the money that the boys sent him from the army. He also said that he never lent any money to Henry Haas to buy the farm.
Upon the question of the validity of Adam’s title, therefore, under his orphans’ court deed, we find the deed itself duly made to him after a confirmation by the court, and the positive testimony of three witnesses, Henry, Adam S., and Nathan Haas, to the effect that the money which actually paid for the land was Adam’s money, the most of it loaned to him by his uncle Nathan, and that Henry had furnished no part of the money and had no interest in the purchase. We find no proof that Henry ever furnished a dollar of the money that actually paid for the land. We find also an actual continuous possession of the land in strict accordance with the paper title from early in the year 1864 to the time this action was brought, in February, 1885, such possession being first in Adam from 1864 until 1870, and after that in Henry Haas, under conveyance by Adam of his title thereto.
Against this title we have only the testimony of two witnesses who state certain declarations made by Henry in the absence of Adam. Those declarations we have heretofore discussed and shown that they do not necessarily import that the money of Henry actually paid for the land, and that they are not inconsistent with the fact that Adam’s money was the real purchase money of the property.
The question that arises is whether in such a condition of the testimony there is enough evidence to justify a chancellor in setting aside Adam’s deed on the ground of fraud, after a delay of nearly twenty-two years on the part of a creditor and his alienee neither of whom was subject to any disability to impeach the title at any time. We are clearly of opinion that upon the whole case the evidence was entirely insufficient to justify such a decree, and that being so we consider that it was error to submit the case to the jury, and to refuse to affirm the defendant’s seventh point.
It must be constantly borne in mind that this is not the case of a conveyance of the land in dispute, by the former owner,
But in this case Henry Haas had no title to the land when Kirkpatrick recovered his judgment. The legal title had never been vested in him at any time and it was then really vested in Adam S. Haas. Even if Henry’s money had really paid for the land he could never have had the help of the law to acquire the title, because he was particeps criminis, and could not have asserted his own fraud as the basis of a decree. If there were no fraud in the case, and he had furnished the money, he could have established his title by way of a resulting trust only. Now his creditors, while they are at liberty to assert the title in him for their benefit, must do it in the method that he would be obliged to pursue, to wit, by the application of the doctrine of resulting trust, because if Henry really did not furnish the purchase money, his creditors could not assert any title in him on the ground that he had furnished it. Consequently when the creditors assert that kind of a title, they are subject to the same rules that govern the establishment of such a title in any one.
Now nothing is more clear under all the authorities than that where a title by way of resulting trust is set up against an absolute deed to the person holding the legal title, the evidence to support it must be clear, explicit and unequivocal.
In Kistler’s Appeal, 78 Pa. 393, it was said in the opinion, by Agnew, J.: “ The evidence to establish a resulting trust, especially one arising ex maleficio, which is an imputation of fraud, should be clear, explicit and unequivocal: McGinity v. McGinity, 13 P. F. S. 38; Nixon’s Appeal, lb. 279; Lingenfelter v. Richey, 12 lb. 123.” We affirmed and applied this ruling in Kimmel v. Smith, 117 Pa. 183.
In the former of these eases, McGinity v. McGinity, 63 Pa. 38, Sharswood, J., said, speaking of a resulting trust or that a deed was a mortgage : “ Both of these things may, no doubt,
In that case as in the present the most important testimony consisted of proof of conversations and declarations of the parties interested both before and after the deed was executed, quite consistent with the alleged trust, but we did not consider them sufficient to defeat the absolute deed or turn it into a trust. There was proof of the declarations of the party claiming the trust that he had the money and it was in a certain bank, just as here the only evidence in the case that Henry Haas had any money at all is the testimony of Joe Faust and Mauger that he said so. In the McGinity case we held this insufficient.
The doctrine was repeated in Nixon’s Appeal, supra, in which we said, “ the evidence must be clear and unequivocal in showing that the money was paid at the time,” and, quoting from a decision of Chancellor Kent, “ the whole foundation of the trust is the payment of the money, and that must be clearly proved.”
The law upon this subject is so perfectly familiar that it is unnecessary to multiply the citations of authority. The case is not only entirely destitute of the kind of testimony which
In Mead v. Leffingwell, 83 Pa. 187, we held that title by adverse possession under a deed claimed to be made in fraud of creditors commenced from the time of entry by the grantees, and continued to run from that time even against purchasers at a sheriff’s sale under a judgment recovered against the grantor ■by one who claimed to be a defrauded creditor. It was contended there as here that the statute could not begin to run except from the time of the title under the sheriff’s deed, but we held otherwise and ruled that the statute became a bar at the end of twenty-one years from the entry of the alleged fraudulent grantee. This case is still the law of this commonwealth and has never been questioned, and it, apparently, is applicable to the facts of the present case.
■ In Kribbs v. Downing, 25 Pa. 399, we said, Black, J.: “ When a person against whom a fraud has been perpetrated, lies by for twenty-one years without causing it to be investigated, he will not then be permitted to show it. From so long an acquiesence the presumption of law is conclusive that all was done rightly.”
But we do not decide this case either upon the statute of frauds or of limitations. We decide it upon the broad ground that the evidence is entirely insufficient to defeat the title of Adam S. Haas under the orphans’ court sale and deed of the administrators of William Faust. We have shown that the declarations of Henry Haas given in evidence, did not necessarily, or by any strong implication, import that the money which paid for the land was his and not Adam’s, that his explanation of his inability to take title in his own name on .account of his debts was entirely natural, and consistent with honesty in the transaction, and that Henry Haas denied that , he had ever said to the witnesses that he had plenty of monej'to buy the farm. It was also proved that he was sold out by the sheriff shortly before and had no money, and no proof was made that he actually had any money at the time of the transaction. Ample proof was made that Adam S. Haas did have
Judgment reversed.