32 Ga. 639 | Ga. | 1861
delivering the opinion.
Matthew Nelson, by his last will and testament, after some specific legacies in favor of his wife Charlotte, and nephew John Nelson, and directing the sale of the balance of his estate by his executors, made the following bequest:
“I also give and bequeath to my wife Charlotte, one-third part of all the rest and residue of my estate not heretofore devised away, to be paid to her within a reasonable time after the sale of my estate. My will and devise is, that one other third part of my estate not hereinbefore devised away, may be equally divided between my brother Peter, and all my nephew's and neices, and the three children of my beloved Charlotte, to be paid to them as soon as convenient after the sale of my estate. My will and desire further is, that the remaining third of my estate not hereinbefore devised away, may be disposed of as follows: that is to say, that the sum of two thousand dollars be invested in stock, by my executors hereinafter named, and the income of the same be remitted annually to the trustee of the Braithwaite school, in the parish of Ripon, and the county of York, in England, for the use of said school, and the purposes hereinafter mentioned. The trustee of said Braithwaite school to be elected triennially by the parents and guardians of the children legally entitled to the use of said school, and said trustee to have a vote in the selection of the teacher or teachers, and to have the privilege of admitting to the use of the school ten poor scholars whom he considers the most deserving.
My will also is, that the first year’s income, of said sum of money, may be applied to the repairs of said school-house and its appurtenances, and that the income of all subsequent years from said sum, two-thirds be allotted to the teacher or teachers, and the remaining third be appropriated to paying the expenses of three respectable weekly newspapers for the use of the school and the neighboring inhabitants, and the purchase of books for the school or to form a library, and for the,purchase of stationery for the use of said school.”
This will was admitted to probate in the Ordinary’s office
To this answer were attached, as exhibits, copies of the deeds from William Day and Peter Buck to John Day, of 1778, copy of proceedings, and order in Chancery, in the matter of the Braithwaite school, appointment of trustees to fill vacancy, etc., of the deeds from Coverdale to the trustees, and proceeding of the parents and guardians of children entitled to the use of the school in the election of a trustee, and his acceptance of the same. All of which on the trial were read in evidence in support of the answer, from which it appeared that William Day and Peter Buck, in 1778, conveyed to John Day, his heirs and assigns, and certain messuages and premises called Deering, situated in Dacre with Beverly, in the county of York, with nine beast or cattle gates, or depasturing for nine beasts or cattle, in and upon a certain stinted pasture, called Dacre pasture, and also the sum
1. During the progress of the trial, the complainant moved the Court to exclude from the pleadings such portions of the answers of defendants, trustees, as set up the alternative right of said trustees, and that of John Burton Birthwhistle, as trustee under the will of testator, with a paper therein referred to as an exhibit, containing the actions of the parents and guardians of children entitled to the use of the Braithwaite school, on the ground that John Burton Birthwhistle was not a party to the proceeding in that character. The • Court refused the motion, and allowed the same to be read as a part of the pleadings. Complainants excepted, and this is the first ground of error complained of.
We think there was no error in this decision. The defendant, Birthwhistle, was a party defendant, as trustee, and in his answer distinctly set up his title to the fund in controversy, as trustee under the will of testator, in right of his appointment according to the directions of the will; that he was a joint defendant with and .joined in this answer with his co-trustee, under the appointment to fill the trusts of the original charity, made no difference whatever—there was no necessity that he should formally have been made a party defendant jointly with Margaret Chamberlain, and then again formally as sole trustee under the will. He was before the Court as a trustee, and in that capacity had a right to be heard and to take all that he was entitled to, either jointly
2. Counsel for complainants requested the Court to charge the jury, “that the defendants, Birthwhistle and Chamberlain, trustees, were not entitled to recover, because, by the language of the bequest they were not parties interested.” The Court refused to give the charge, and this is alleged to be error. Whether the charge was erroneous, it is not necessary to enquire now, as no recovery was had by them, and therefore no injury resulted to the complainant so to charge.
3. Complainant’s counsel further requested the Court to charge the jury, “that if it appeared, from the evidence, that the trustees of the Braithwaite school were violating the provisions of the trust, in employing a married man as a teacher, then they had no right to recover.” This charge the Court refused to give, and we think properly, because there was no evidence to warrant the charge, and if there had been evidence of such fact, the Court ought to have refused so to charge notwithstanding, because that would have been no reason to deprive the school of the testator’s bounty. He might have known personally of such departure from the provisions of the original charity by the trustees and approved of it.
4. Counsel further requested the Court to charge, “ that to enable any trustee to take, in England, under the trust of Matthew Nelson’s will, it would be necessary that proceedings be had in the Court of Chancery, modifying the original trust, so as to incorporate the conditions of the will into the original trust, and then elect a trustee as provided by the will; but that, by the laws of this State, such proceeding is inadmissible to the injury of the rights of the heir-at-law, and that a legacy defective in language for provisions to carry into full execution, is void.”
The Court below properly refused to give this charge. The request assumes, that the directions in the testator’s will, as to the application and appropriation of his bequest in favor of the Braithwaite school, are inconsistent and in conflict with the original foundation of the school by Day and Buck, and I
The Court charged the jury, “that if they found there
5. To the charge of the Court so made complainants excepted, and having moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the law and the evidence, which was refused, they allege both the charge given and decree
This charity was to be established in England, and was to be executed by persons there. How, as there was some question upon the original foundation, we think it was proper that the Court below should decree, that when the High Court of Chancery in England had recognized John Burton Birthwhistle as testator, or appointed some person to receive and administer this fund in pursuance of the testamentary intention of the testator, the whole fund should be transferred to such person in England, and leave it to the local tribunals there to see to its due administration. There is no error in this record, and were we to do otherwise than to‘ affirm this judgment, we would defeat the plain intention and most laudable purpose of the testator.
Let the judgment be affirmed.